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authoragl@chromium.org <agl@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2011-06-02 16:58:54 +0000
committeragl@chromium.org <agl@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2011-06-02 16:58:54 +0000
commit8c57720482c0d5909e82b090e1d839fce2d70a82 (patch)
tree1e56e384086ff2f078cd39f1cfeafa90bb1e73f4
parent4c14ce487f93032da0ccc0d93ef42dd31303e0e6 (diff)
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net: Add code to extract CRL URLs from X.509 certificates.
This is part of the CRL filter work. BUG=none TEST=none http://codereview.chromium.org/7096014/ git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87619 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
-rw-r--r--net/base/asn1_util.cc169
-rw-r--r--net/base/asn1_util.h20
-rw-r--r--net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc19
3 files changed, 194 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/net/base/asn1_util.cc b/net/base/asn1_util.cc
index 701f53f..ee25d41 100644
--- a/net/base/asn1_util.cc
+++ b/net/base/asn1_util.cc
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ bool ParseElement(base::StringPiece* in,
if (in->size() < 2)
return false;
- if (static_cast<unsigned char>(data[0]) != tag_value)
+ if (tag_value != kAny && static_cast<unsigned char>(data[0]) != tag_value)
return false;
size_t len = 0;
@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ bool GetElement(base::StringPiece* in,
return true;
}
-bool ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(base::StringPiece cert,
- base::StringPiece* spki_out) {
+// SeekToSPKI changes |cert| so that it points to a suffix of the original
+// value where the suffix begins at the start of the ASN.1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+// value.
+static bool SeekToSPKI(base::StringPiece* cert) {
// From RFC 5280, section 4.1
// Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
// tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
@@ -89,36 +91,175 @@ bool ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(base::StringPiece cert,
// subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
base::StringPiece certificate;
- if (!asn1::GetElement(&cert, asn1::kSEQUENCE, &certificate))
+ if (!GetElement(cert, kSEQUENCE, &certificate))
return false;
base::StringPiece tbs_certificate;
- if (!asn1::GetElement(&certificate, asn1::kSEQUENCE, &tbs_certificate))
+ if (!GetElement(&certificate, kSEQUENCE, &tbs_certificate))
return false;
// The version is optional, so a failure to parse it is fine.
- asn1::GetElement(&tbs_certificate,
- asn1::kCompound | asn1::kContextSpecific | 0,
- NULL);
+ GetElement(&tbs_certificate,
+ kCompound | kContextSpecific | 0,
+ NULL);
// serialNumber
- if (!asn1::GetElement(&tbs_certificate, asn1::kINTEGER, NULL))
+ if (!GetElement(&tbs_certificate, kINTEGER, NULL))
return false;
// signature
- if (!asn1::GetElement(&tbs_certificate, asn1::kSEQUENCE, NULL))
+ if (!GetElement(&tbs_certificate, kSEQUENCE, NULL))
return false;
// issuer
- if (!asn1::GetElement(&tbs_certificate, asn1::kSEQUENCE, NULL))
+ if (!GetElement(&tbs_certificate, kSEQUENCE, NULL))
return false;
// validity
- if (!asn1::GetElement(&tbs_certificate, asn1::kSEQUENCE, NULL))
+ if (!GetElement(&tbs_certificate, kSEQUENCE, NULL))
return false;
// subject
- if (!asn1::GetElement(&tbs_certificate, asn1::kSEQUENCE, NULL))
+ if (!GetElement(&tbs_certificate, kSEQUENCE, NULL))
+ return false;
+ *cert = tbs_certificate;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(base::StringPiece cert,
+ base::StringPiece* spki_out) {
+ if (!SeekToSPKI(&cert))
+ return false;
+ if (!ParseElement(&cert, kSEQUENCE, spki_out, NULL))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ExtractCRLURLsFromDERCert(base::StringPiece cert,
+ std::vector<base::StringPiece>* urls_out) {
+ urls_out->clear();
+
+ if (!SeekToSPKI(&cert))
return false;
+
+ // From RFC 5280, section 4.1
+ // TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+ // ...
+ // subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+ // issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ // subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ // extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
+
// subjectPublicKeyInfo
- if (!asn1::ParseElement(&tbs_certificate, asn1::kSEQUENCE, spki_out, NULL))
+ if (!GetElement(&cert, kSEQUENCE, NULL))
return false;
+ // issuerUniqueID
+ GetElement(&cert, kCompound | kContextSpecific | 1, NULL);
+ // subjectUniqueID
+ GetElement(&cert, kCompound | kContextSpecific | 2, NULL);
+
+ base::StringPiece extensions_seq;
+ if (!GetElement(&cert, kCompound | kContextSpecific | 3,
+ &extensions_seq)) {
+ // If there are no extensions, then there are no CRL URLs.
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ // Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
+ // Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
+ // extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ // critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
+ // extnValue OCTET STRING
+
+ // |extensions_seq| was EXPLICITly tagged, so we still need to remove the
+ // ASN.1 SEQUENCE header.
+ base::StringPiece extensions;
+ if (!GetElement(&extensions_seq, kSEQUENCE, &extensions))
+ return false;
+
+ while (extensions.size() > 0) {
+ base::StringPiece extension;
+ if (!GetElement(&extensions, kSEQUENCE, &extension))
+ return false;
+
+ base::StringPiece oid;
+ if (!GetElement(&extension, kOID, &oid))
+ return false;
+
+ // kCRLDistributionPointsOID is the DER encoding of the OID for the X.509
+ // CRL Distribution Points extension.
+ static const uint8 kCRLDistributionPointsOID[] = {0x55, 0x1d, 0x1f};
+
+ if (oid.size() != sizeof(kCRLDistributionPointsOID) ||
+ memcmp(oid.data(), kCRLDistributionPointsOID, oid.size()) != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // critical
+ GetElement(&extension, kBOOLEAN, NULL);
+
+ // extnValue
+ base::StringPiece extension_value;
+ if (!GetElement(&extension, kOCTETSTRING, &extension_value))
+ return false;
+
+ // RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.13.
+ //
+ // CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
+ //
+ // DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
+ // distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
+ // reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
+ // cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL }
+
+ base::StringPiece distribution_points;
+ if (!GetElement(&extension_value, kSEQUENCE, &distribution_points))
+ return false;
+
+ while (distribution_points.size() > 0) {
+ base::StringPiece distrib_point;
+ if (!GetElement(&distribution_points, kSEQUENCE, &distrib_point))
+ return false;
+
+ base::StringPiece name;
+ if (!GetElement(&distrib_point, kContextSpecific | kCompound | 0,
+ &name)) {
+ // If it doesn't contain a name then we skip it.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (GetElement(&distrib_point, kContextSpecific | 1, NULL)) {
+ // If it contains a subset of reasons then we skip it. We aren't
+ // interested in subsets of CRLs and the RFC states that there MUST be
+ // a CRL that covers all reasons.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (GetElement(&distrib_point, kContextSpecific | kCompound | 2, NULL)) {
+ // If it contains a alternative issuer, then we skip it.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
+ // fullName [0] GeneralNames,
+ // nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName }
+ base::StringPiece general_names;
+ if (!GetElement(&name, kContextSpecific | kCompound | 0, &general_names))
+ continue;
+
+ // GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
+ // GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
+ // ...
+ // uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
+ // ...
+ while (general_names.size() > 0) {
+ base::StringPiece url;
+ if (GetElement(&general_names, kContextSpecific | 6, &url)) {
+ urls_out->push_back(url);
+ } else {
+ if (!GetElement(&general_names, kAny, NULL))
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
return true;
}
diff --git a/net/base/asn1_util.h b/net/base/asn1_util.h
index 563f6d1..904d7a5 100644
--- a/net/base/asn1_util.h
+++ b/net/base/asn1_util.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#define NET_BASE_ASN1_UTIL_H_
#pragma once
+#include <vector>
+
#include "base/string_piece.h"
#include "net/base/net_api.h"
@@ -14,7 +16,9 @@ namespace net {
namespace asn1 {
// These are the DER encodings of the tag byte for ASN.1 objects.
+static const unsigned kBOOLEAN = 0x01;
static const unsigned kINTEGER = 0x02;
+static const unsigned kOCTETSTRING = 0x04;
static const unsigned kOID = 0x06;
static const unsigned kSEQUENCE = 0x30;
@@ -22,6 +26,9 @@ static const unsigned kSEQUENCE = 0x30;
static const unsigned kContextSpecific = 0x80;
static const unsigned kCompound = 0x20;
+// kAny matches any tag value;
+static const unsigned kAny = 0x10000;
+
// ParseElement parses a DER encoded ASN1 element from |in|, requiring that
// it have the given |tag_value|. It returns true on success. The following
// limitations are imposed:
@@ -49,6 +56,19 @@ bool GetElement(base::StringPiece* in,
NET_TEST bool ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(base::StringPiece cert,
base::StringPiece* spki_out);
+// ExtractCRLURLsFromDERCert parses the DER encoded certificate in |cert| and
+// extracts the URL of each CRL. On successful return, the elements of
+// |urls_out| point into |cert|.
+//
+// CRLs that only cover a subset of the reasons are omitted as the spec
+// requires that at least one CRL be included that covers all reasons.
+//
+// The nested set of GeneralNames is flattened into a single list because
+// having several CRLs with one location is equivalent to having one CRL with
+// several locations as far as a CRL filter is concerned.
+bool ExtractCRLURLsFromDERCert(base::StringPiece cert,
+ std::vector<base::StringPiece>* urls_out);
+
} // namespace asn1
} // namespace net
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
index d2fe3e3..cb2e9f0 100644
--- a/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
+++ b/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
@@ -576,6 +576,25 @@ TEST(X509CertificateTest, ExtractSPKIFromDERCert) {
EXPECT_TRUE(0 == memcmp(hash, nistSPKIHash, sizeof(hash)));
}
+TEST(X509CertificateTest, ExtractCRLURLsFromDERCert) {
+ FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
+ scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
+ ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "nist.der");
+ ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), cert);
+
+ std::string derBytes;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(cert->GetDEREncoded(&derBytes));
+
+ std::vector<base::StringPiece> crl_urls;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(asn1::ExtractCRLURLsFromDERCert(derBytes, &crl_urls));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(crl_urls.size(), 1u);
+ if (crl_urls.size() > 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(crl_urls[0].as_string(),
+ "http://SVRSecure-G3-crl.verisign.com/SVRSecureG3.crl");
+ }
+}
+
TEST(X509CertificateTest, PublicKeyHashes) {
FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
// This is going to blow up in Feb 2012. Sorry! Disable and file a bug