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authorestade@chromium.org <estade@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2009-09-25 20:09:49 +0000
committerestade@chromium.org <estade@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2009-09-25 20:09:49 +0000
commite7eaeddeb5616207ddb404d0fe5344b1dd6f4c80 (patch)
tree7622f285449cccbd2d5a6e65ce574d4bc8d97856 /chrome/browser/external_protocol_handler.cc
parent89a8ffc551828c6cce7c5cfa1023d9aee7df8da5 (diff)
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Hook up external protocol handler to user gestures to prevent malicious sites from popping up a lot of dialogs (or in the case of whitelisted protocols, launching a lot of programs).
BUG=3628 TEST=test.html from crbug.com/21049 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/240002 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27237 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
Diffstat (limited to 'chrome/browser/external_protocol_handler.cc')
-rw-r--r--chrome/browser/external_protocol_handler.cc20
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/chrome/browser/external_protocol_handler.cc b/chrome/browser/external_protocol_handler.cc
index e4e68f5..b16c081 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/external_protocol_handler.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/external_protocol_handler.cc
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@
#include "googleurl/src/gurl.h"
#include "net/base/escape.h"
+// Whether we accept requests for launching external protocols. This is set to
+// false every time an external protocol is requested, and set back to true on
+// each user gesture. This variable should only be accessed from the UI thread.
+static bool g_accept_requests = true;
+
// static
void ExternalProtocolHandler::PrepopulateDictionary(DictionaryValue* win_pref) {
static bool is_warm = false;
@@ -73,6 +78,10 @@ void ExternalProtocolHandler::PrepopulateDictionary(DictionaryValue* win_pref) {
// static
ExternalProtocolHandler::BlockState ExternalProtocolHandler::GetBlockState(
const std::wstring& scheme) {
+ // If we are being carpet bombed, block the request.
+ if (!g_accept_requests)
+ return BLOCK;
+
if (scheme.length() == 1) {
// We have a URL that looks something like:
// C:/WINDOWS/system32/notepad.exe
@@ -104,6 +113,8 @@ ExternalProtocolHandler::BlockState ExternalProtocolHandler::GetBlockState(
void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrl(const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int tab_contents_id) {
+ DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::TYPE_UI, MessageLoop::current()->type());
+
// Escape the input scheme to be sure that the command does not
// have parameters unexpected by the external program.
std::string escaped_url_string = EscapeExternalHandlerValue(url.spec());
@@ -114,6 +125,7 @@ void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrl(const GURL& url,
if (block_state == UNKNOWN) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
+ g_accept_requests = false;
// Ask the user if they want to allow the protocol. This will call
// LaunchUrlWithoutSecurityCheck if the user decides to accept the protocol.
RunExternalProtocolDialog(escaped_url,
@@ -131,7 +143,7 @@ void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrl(const GURL& url,
// static
void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithoutSecurityCheck(const GURL& url) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
- // This must run on the main thread on OS X.
+ // This must run on the UI thread on OS X.
platform_util::OpenExternal(url);
#else
// Otherwise put this work on the file thread. On Windows ShellExecute may
@@ -150,3 +162,9 @@ void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithoutSecurityCheck(const GURL& url) {
void ExternalProtocolHandler::RegisterPrefs(PrefService* prefs) {
prefs->RegisterDictionaryPref(prefs::kExcludedSchemes);
}
+
+// static
+void ExternalProtocolHandler::OnUserGesture() {
+ DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::TYPE_UI, MessageLoop::current()->type());
+ g_accept_requests = true;
+}