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authordavidben <davidben@chromium.org>2015-05-12 12:56:51 -0700
committerCommit bot <commit-bot@chromium.org>2015-05-12 19:57:13 +0000
commit421116c22292293f78c6ab15c7a8d6ca2fc1b68b (patch)
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parentcfaf5dcfb0371f395a9b8cfb9c835f6690e0ecbd (diff)
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Reject renegotiations in SSLClientSocket by default.
Only HTTP/1.1 (and below) sockets may renegotiate. This fix a crash because SpdyHttpStream didn't account for this properly. (And can't as the renego + client auth hack is inherently incompatible with multiplexing.) Tested manually against hacked up Go servers: - HTTP/1.1 server which renegotiates with client auth before sending a response on a fresh socket. - Same as above but with a reused socket (the server only requests renego when fetching /auth). - HTTP/2 which incorrectly renegotiates with client auth upon requesting /auth. Verified that we get ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR and not crash. - HTTP/1.1 server which does two handshakes in a row with Finished and HelloRequest in the same record. NSS and BoringSSL differ in their behavior here, but in neither port should we miss the renego. BUG=484543,462283 Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1131763002 Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#329466}
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