summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/content
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorjschuh@chromium.org <jschuh@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2011-07-20 23:03:41 +0000
committerjschuh@chromium.org <jschuh@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2011-07-20 23:03:41 +0000
commite4876b29d769e62971fc67fe0ab0efab7512e3d1 (patch)
tree786b019c83b25a1eb481d6d2f46bce0d4cb8e283 /content
parentd1f594543972abf64a46bf32c23a924301ccb11e (diff)
downloadchromium_src-e4876b29d769e62971fc67fe0ab0efab7512e3d1.zip
chromium_src-e4876b29d769e62971fc67fe0ab0efab7512e3d1.tar.gz
chromium_src-e4876b29d769e62971fc67fe0ab0efab7512e3d1.tar.bz2
Add a sandbox API to allow closing open handles at lockdown.
BUG=58069 BUG=74242 TEST=sbox_integration_tests --gtest_filter=HandleCloserTests.* Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7253054 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93274 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
Diffstat (limited to 'content')
-rw-r--r--content/common/sandbox_policy.cc38
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_policy.cc b/content/common/sandbox_policy.cc
index bfa7db1..41995f4 100644
--- a/content/common/sandbox_policy.cc
+++ b/content/common/sandbox_policy.cc
@@ -194,6 +194,41 @@ void AddDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], policy);
}
+// Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
+string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const char16* object) {
+ // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
+ static string16* session_prefix = NULL;
+ if (!session_prefix) {
+ HANDLE token;
+ DWORD session_id;
+ DWORD session_id_length;
+
+ CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
+ CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
+ sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
+ CloseHandle(token);
+
+ session_prefix = new string16(base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d",
+ session_id));
+ }
+
+ return *session_prefix + object;
+}
+
+// Closes handles that are opened at process creation and initialization.
+void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
+ // Being able to manipulate anything BaseNamedObjects is bad.
+ policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Directory", PrependWindowsSessionPath(
+ L"\\BaseNamedObjects").data());
+ policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", PrependWindowsSessionPath(
+ L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters").data());
+}
+
+void AddStrictHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
+ // This is loaded when rand_s is seeded, but not needed again.
+ policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\KsecDD");
+}
+
// Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
sandbox::ResultCode result;
@@ -279,6 +314,7 @@ void AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
}
AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
+ AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(policy);
}
// The Pepper process as locked-down as a renderer execpt that it can
@@ -414,6 +450,8 @@ base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess(CommandLine* cmd_line,
return 0;
} else {
AddPolicyForRenderer(policy);
+ if (type == ChildProcessInfo::RENDER_PROCESS)
+ AddStrictHandleClosePolicy(policy);
if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
// Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into