net: add low-entropy, shared secret authentication protocol.

BUG=none
TEST=crypto_unittests


Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8499032

git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@111070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98

1 files changed, 139 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/p224_spake_unittest.cc b/crypto/p224_spake_unittest.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e45ec82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/p224_spake_unittest.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include <crypto/p224_spake.h>
+
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
+
+using namespace crypto;
+
+bool RunExchange(P224EncryptedKeyExchange* client,
+                 P224EncryptedKeyExchange* server) {
+
+  for (;;) {
+    std::string client_message, server_message;
+    client_message = client->GetMessage();
+    server_message = server->GetMessage();
+
+    P224EncryptedKeyExchange::Result client_result, server_result;
+    client_result = client->ProcessMessage(server_message);
+    server_result = server->ProcessMessage(client_message);
+
+    // Check that we never hit the case where only one succeeds.
+    if ((client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess) ^
+        (server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess)) {
+      CHECK(false) << "Parties differ on whether authentication was successful";
+    }
+
+    if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed ||
+        server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess &&
+        server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess) {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    CHECK_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending, client_result);
+    CHECK_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending, server_result);
+  }
+}
+
+static const char kPassword[] = "foo";
+static const char kSession[] = "bar";
+
+TEST(MutualAuth, CorrectAuth) {
+  P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
+      P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient,
+      kPassword, kSession);
+  P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
+      P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer,
+      kPassword, kSession);
+
+  EXPECT_TRUE(RunExchange(&client, &server));
+}
+
+TEST(MutualAuth, IncorrectPassword) {
+  P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
+      P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient,
+      kPassword, kSession);
+  P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
+      P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer,
+      "wrongpassword", kSession);
+
+  EXPECT_FALSE(RunExchange(&client, &server));
+}
+
+TEST(MutualAuth, IncorrectSession) {
+  P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
+      P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient,
+      kPassword, kSession);
+  P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
+      P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer,
+      kPassword, "wrongsession");
+
+  EXPECT_FALSE(RunExchange(&client, &server));
+}
+
+TEST(MutualAuth, Fuzz) {
+  static const unsigned kIterations = 40;
+
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < kIterations; i++) {
+    P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
+        P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient,
+        kPassword, kSession);
+    P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
+        P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer,
+        kPassword, kSession);
+
+    // We'll only be testing small values of i, but we don't want that to bias
+    // the test coverage. So we disperse the value of i by multiplying by the
+    // FNV, 32-bit prime, producing a poor-man's PRNG.
+    const uint32 rand = i * 16777619;
+
+    for (unsigned round = 0;; round++) {
+      std::string client_message, server_message;
+      client_message = client.GetMessage();
+      server_message = server.GetMessage();
+
+      if ((rand & 1) == round) {
+        const bool server_or_client = rand & 2;
+        std::string* m = server_or_client ? &server_message : &client_message;
+        if (rand & 4) {
+          // Truncate
+          *m = m->substr(0, (i >> 3) % m->size());
+        } else {
+          // Corrupt
+          const size_t bits = m->size() * 8;
+          const size_t bit_to_corrupt = (rand >> 3) % bits;
+          const_cast<char*>(m->data())[bit_to_corrupt / 8] ^=
+              1 << (bit_to_corrupt % 8);
+        }
+      }
+
+      P224EncryptedKeyExchange::Result client_result, server_result;
+      client_result = client.ProcessMessage(server_message);
+      server_result = server.ProcessMessage(client_message);
+
+      // If we have corrupted anything, we expect the authentication to fail,
+      // although one side can succeed if we happen to corrupt the second round
+      // message to the other.
+      ASSERT_FALSE(
+          client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess &&
+          server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess);
+
+      if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed ||
+          server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      ASSERT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending,
+                client_result);
+      ASSERT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending,
+                server_result);
+    }
+  }
+}