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authorrsleevi@chromium.org <rsleevi@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2011-11-02 00:58:13 +0000
committerrsleevi@chromium.org <rsleevi@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2011-11-02 00:58:13 +0000
commit261c0ae28dd6682b39005171689311cb26276703 (patch)
tree3fed9fe76c8378e8fe2fc46dc1e618065038fffb /net/base/x509_certificate.cc
parent13a8aa1a2529d531305885cca052b818841693d1 (diff)
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Revert 107679 - Broke https for appspot.com - http://crbug.com/102507
Disallow wildcards from matching top-level registry controlled domains during cert validation. BUG=100442 TEST=net_unittests:X509CertificateNameVerifyTest.* Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=107075 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8362023 TBR=rsleevi@chromium.org Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8438024 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@108216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
Diffstat (limited to 'net/base/x509_certificate.cc')
-rw-r--r--net/base/x509_certificate.cc32
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate.cc
index 9db4ff0..6624493 100644
--- a/net/base/x509_certificate.cc
+++ b/net/base/x509_certificate.cc
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/base/net_util.h"
#include "net/base/pem_tokenizer.h"
-#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domain.h"
namespace net {
@@ -509,36 +508,17 @@ bool X509Certificate::VerifyHostname(
// |reference_domain| is the remainder of |host| after the leading host
// component is stripped off, but includes the leading dot e.g.
// "www.f.com" -> ".f.com".
- // If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no
- // dots) then |reference_domain| will be empty.
+ // If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no dots)
+ // then |reference_domain| will be empty.
base::StringPiece reference_host, reference_domain;
SplitOnChar(reference_name, '.', &reference_host, &reference_domain);
bool allow_wildcards = false;
if (!reference_domain.empty()) {
DCHECK(reference_domain.starts_with("."));
-
- // Do not allow wildcards for registry controlled domains, so as to
- // prevent accepting *.com or *.co.uk as valid presented names. Passing
- // true for |allow_unknown_registries| so that top-level domains which are
- // unknown (intranet domains, new TLDs/gTLDs not yet recognized) are
- // treated as registry-controlled domains. Because the |reference_domain|
- // must contain at least one name component that is not registry
- // controlled, this ensures that all reference names have at least three
- // domain components in order to permit wildcards.
- size_t registry_length =
- RegistryControlledDomainService::GetRegistryLength(reference_name,
- true);
- // As the |reference_name| was already canonicalized, this should never
- // happen.
- CHECK_NE(registry_length, std::string::npos);
-
- // Subtracting 1 to account for the leading dot in |reference_domain|.
- bool is_registry_controlled = registry_length != 0 &&
- registry_length == (reference_domain.size() - 1);
-
- // Additionally, do not attempt wildcard matching for purely numeric
- // hostnames.
- allow_wildcards = !is_registry_controlled &&
+ // We required at least 3 components (i.e. 2 dots) as a basic protection
+ // against too-broad wild-carding.
+ // Also we don't attempt wildcard matching on a purely numerical hostname.
+ allow_wildcards = reference_domain.rfind('.') != 0 &&
reference_name.find_first_not_of("0123456789.") != std::string::npos;
}