Allow SSL_SecurityStatus, SSL_GetChannelInfo, and

SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension to be called as soon as a false
start handshake is done.

R=agl
BUG=53366
TEST=Visit any HTTPS sites, especially sites with certificate
errors.  The SSL InfoBubble should not say "your connection to
www.example.com is not encrypted."
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3233001

git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@57691 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98

5 files changed, 178 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/README.chromium b/net/third_party/nss/README.chromium
index 4c4fb36..ce137bd 100644
--- a/net/third_party/nss/README.chromium
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/README.chromium
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ Patches:
 
   * False start support
     patches/falsestart.patch
+    patches/falsestart2.patch
+    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=525092
 
   * Commenting out a couple of functions because they need NSS symbols
     which may not exist in the system NSS library.
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/patches/falsestart2.patch b/net/third_party/nss/patches/falsestart2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0449b68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/patches/falsestart2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+Index: mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvsroot/mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.16
+diff -p -u -8 -r1.16 sslauth.c
+--- mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c	20 Apr 2006 00:20:45 -0000	1.16
++++ mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c	27 Aug 2010 02:01:44 -0000
+@@ -87,16 +87,17 @@ SSL_LocalCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd)
+ /* NEED LOCKS IN HERE.  */
+ SECStatus
+ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
+ 		   char **ip, char **sp)
+ {
+     sslSocket *ss;
+     const char *cipherName;
+     PRBool isDes = PR_FALSE;
++    PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
+ 
+     ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+     if (!ss) {
+ 	SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SecurityStatus",
+ 		 SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+ 	return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -104,18 +105,24 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *
+     if (kp0) *kp0 = 0;
+     if (kp1) *kp1 = 0;
+     if (ip) *ip = 0;
+     if (sp) *sp = 0;
+     if (op) {
+ 	*op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->firstHsDone) {
++    if (ss->firstHsDone) {
++	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++    } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
++	       ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
++	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++    }
+ 
++    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
+ 	if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ 	    cipherName = ssl_cipherName[ss->sec.cipherType];
+ 	} else {
+ 	    cipherName = ssl3_cipherName[ss->sec.cipherType];
+ 	}
+ 	PORT_Assert(cipherName);
+ 	if (cipherName) {
+             if (PORT_Strstr(cipherName, "DES")) isDes = PR_TRUE;
+Index: mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvsroot/mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.23
+diff -p -u -8 -r1.23 sslinfo.c
+--- mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c	15 Jan 2010 01:49:33 -0000	1.23
++++ mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c	27 Aug 2010 02:01:44 -0000
+@@ -55,33 +55,41 @@ ssl_GetCompressionMethodName(SSLCompress
+ }
+ 
+ SECStatus 
+ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
+ {
+     sslSocket *      ss;
+     SSLChannelInfo   inf;
+     sslSessionID *   sid;
++    PRBool           enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
+ 
+     if (!info || len < sizeof inf.length) { 
+ 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ 	return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+     ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+     if (!ss) {
+ 	SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_GetChannelInfo",
+ 		 SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+ 	return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+     memset(&inf, 0, sizeof inf);
+     inf.length = PR_MIN(sizeof inf, len);
+ 
+-    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->firstHsDone) {
++    if (ss->firstHsDone) {
++	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++    } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
++	       ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
++	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++    }
++
++    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
+         sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ 	inf.protocolVersion  = ss->version;
+ 	inf.authKeyBits      = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ 	inf.keaKeyBits       = ss->sec.keaKeyBits;
+ 	if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* SSL2 */
+ 	    inf.cipherSuite           = ss->sec.cipherType | 0xff00;
+ 	    inf.compressionMethod     = ssl_compression_null;
+ 	    inf.compressionMethodName = "N/A";
+Index: mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvsroot/mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.7
+diff -p -u -8 -r1.7 sslreveal.c
+--- mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c	4 Feb 2010 03:21:11 -0000	1.7
++++ mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c	27 Aug 2010 02:01:44 -0000
+@@ -106,24 +106,36 @@ SSL_RevealURL(PRFileDesc * fd)
+ SECStatus
+ SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket, 
+                                  SSLExtensionType extId,
+                                  PRBool *pYes)
+ {
+   /* some decisions derived from SSL_GetChannelInfo */
+   sslSocket * sslsocket = NULL;
+   SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
++  PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
+ 
+   if (!pYes)
+     return rv;
+ 
+   sslsocket = ssl_FindSocket(socket);
++  if (!sslsocket) {
++    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in HandshakeNegotiatedExtension",
++             SSL_GETPID(), socket));
++    return rv;
++  }
++
++  if (sslsocket->firstHsDone) {
++    enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++  } else if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized && ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslsocket)) {
++    enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++  }
+ 
+   /* according to public API SSL_GetChannelInfo, this doesn't need a lock */
+-  if (sslsocket && sslsocket->opt.useSecurity && sslsocket->firstHsDone) {
++  if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
+     if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized) { /* SSL3 and TLS */
+       /* now we know this socket went through ssl3_InitState() and
+        * ss->xtnData got initialized, which is the only member accessed by
+        * ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated();
+        * Member xtnData appears to get accessed in functions that handle
+        * the handshake (hello messages and extension sending),
+        * therefore the handshake lock should be sufficient.
+        */
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslauth.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslauth.c
index 742765c..39c630d 100644
--- a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslauth.c
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslauth.c
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
     sslSocket *ss;
     const char *cipherName;
     PRBool isDes = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
 
     ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss) {
@@ -109,8 +110,14 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
 	*op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF;
     }
 
-    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->firstHsDone) {
+    if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+    } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
+	       ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
+	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+    }
 
+    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
 	if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
 	    cipherName = ssl_cipherName[ss->sec.cipherType];
 	} else {
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslinfo.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslinfo.c
index e4ee35f..c1c3fd7 100644
--- a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslinfo.c
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslinfo.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
     sslSocket *      ss;
     SSLChannelInfo   inf;
     sslSessionID *   sid;
+    PRBool           enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
 
     if (!info || len < sizeof inf.length) { 
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
@@ -76,7 +77,14 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
     memset(&inf, 0, sizeof inf);
     inf.length = PR_MIN(sizeof inf, len);
 
-    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->firstHsDone) {
+    if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+    } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
+	       ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
+	enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
         sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
 	inf.protocolVersion  = ss->version;
 	inf.authKeyBits      = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslreveal.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslreveal.c
index 74f8814..8941ff2 100644
--- a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslreveal.c
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslreveal.c
@@ -111,14 +111,26 @@ SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket,
   /* some decisions derived from SSL_GetChannelInfo */
   sslSocket * sslsocket = NULL;
   SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+  PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
 
   if (!pYes)
     return rv;
 
   sslsocket = ssl_FindSocket(socket);
+  if (!sslsocket) {
+    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in HandshakeNegotiatedExtension",
+             SSL_GETPID(), socket));
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (sslsocket->firstHsDone) {
+    enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+  } else if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized && ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslsocket)) {
+    enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+  }
 
   /* according to public API SSL_GetChannelInfo, this doesn't need a lock */
-  if (sslsocket && sslsocket->opt.useSecurity && sslsocket->firstHsDone) {
+  if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
     if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized) { /* SSL3 and TLS */
       /* now we know this socket went through ssl3_InitState() and
        * ss->xtnData got initialized, which is the only member accessed by