Remove --find-inode-switch hack from chrome-sandbox

Chrome was modified back in May 2014 to use SCM_CREDENTIALS instead of
--find-inode-switch and we haven't any heard any negative feedback, so
it's time to remove --find-inode-switch entirely.

BUG=357670

Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/569533002

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#294649}

4 files changed, 3 insertions, 190 deletions

diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h b/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h
index 9345287..99eb7b5 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ namespace sandbox {
 
 // These are command line switches that may be used by other programs
 // (e.g. Chrome) to construct a command line for the sandbox.
+static const char kSuidSandboxGetApiSwitch[] = "--get-api";
 static const char kAdjustOOMScoreSwitch[] = "--adjust-oom-score";
 
 static const char kSandboxDescriptorEnvironmentVarName[] = "SBX_D";
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.c b/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 9febe6d9..0000000
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2009 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// The following is duplicated from base/linux_utils.cc.
-// We shouldn't link against C++ code in a setuid binary.
-
-// Needed for O_DIRECTORY, must be defined before fcntl.h is included
-// (and it can be included earlier than the explicit #include below
-// in some versions of glibc).
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
-
-#include "sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.h"
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-// expected prefix of the target of the /proc/self/fd/%d link for a socket
-static const char kSocketLinkPrefix[] = "socket:[";
-
-// Parse a symlink in /proc/pid/fd/$x and return the inode number of the
-// socket.
-//   inode_out: (output) set to the inode number on success
-//   path: e.g. /proc/1234/fd/5 (must be a UNIX domain socket descriptor)
-static bool ProcPathGetInodeAt(ino_t* inode_out,
-                               int base_dir_fd,
-                               const char* path) {
-  // We also check that the path is relative.
-  if (!inode_out || !path || *path == '/')
-    return false;
-  char buf[256];
-  const ssize_t n = readlinkat(base_dir_fd, path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
-  if (n < 0)
-    return false;
-  buf[n] = 0;
-
-  if (memcmp(kSocketLinkPrefix, buf, sizeof(kSocketLinkPrefix) - 1))
-    return false;
-
-  char* endptr = NULL;
-  errno = 0;
-  const unsigned long long int inode_ull =
-      strtoull(buf + sizeof(kSocketLinkPrefix) - 1, &endptr, 10);
-  if (inode_ull == ULLONG_MAX || !endptr || *endptr != ']' || errno != 0)
-    return false;
-
-  *inode_out = inode_ull;
-  return true;
-}
-
-static DIR* opendirat(int base_dir_fd, const char* name) {
-  // Also check that |name| is relative.
-  if (base_dir_fd < 0 || !name || *name == '/')
-    return NULL;
-  int new_dir_fd = openat(base_dir_fd, name, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
-  if (new_dir_fd < 0)
-    return NULL;
-
-  return fdopendir(new_dir_fd);
-}
-
-bool FindProcessHoldingSocket(pid_t* pid_out, ino_t socket_inode) {
-  bool already_found = false;
-
-  DIR* proc = opendir("/proc");
-  if (!proc)
-    return false;
-
-  const uid_t uid = getuid();
-  struct dirent* dent;
-  while ((dent = readdir(proc))) {
-    char* endptr = NULL;
-    errno = 0;
-    const unsigned long int pid_ul = strtoul(dent->d_name, &endptr, 10);
-    if (pid_ul == ULONG_MAX || !endptr || *endptr || errno != 0)
-      continue;
-
-    // We have this setuid code here because the zygote and its children have
-    // /proc/$pid/fd owned by root. While scanning through /proc, we add this
-    // extra check so users cannot accidentally gain information about other
-    // users' processes. To determine process ownership, we use the property
-    // that if user foo owns process N, then /proc/N is owned by foo.
-    int proc_pid_fd = -1;
-    {
-      char buf[256];
-      struct stat statbuf;
-      snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%lu", pid_ul);
-      proc_pid_fd = open(buf, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
-      if (proc_pid_fd < 0)
-        continue;
-      if (fstat(proc_pid_fd, &statbuf) < 0 || uid != statbuf.st_uid) {
-        close(proc_pid_fd);
-        continue;
-      }
-    }
-
-    DIR* fd = opendirat(proc_pid_fd, "fd");
-    if (!fd) {
-      close(proc_pid_fd);
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    while ((dent = readdir(fd))) {
-      char buf[256];
-      int printed = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "fd/%s", dent->d_name);
-      if (printed < 0 || printed >= (int)(sizeof(buf) - 1)) {
-        continue;
-      }
-
-      ino_t fd_inode;
-      if (ProcPathGetInodeAt(&fd_inode, proc_pid_fd, buf)) {
-        if (fd_inode == socket_inode) {
-          if (already_found) {
-            closedir(fd);
-            close(proc_pid_fd);
-            closedir(proc);
-            return false;
-          }
-
-          already_found = true;
-          *pid_out = pid_ul;
-          break;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    closedir(fd);
-    close(proc_pid_fd);
-  }
-  closedir(proc);
-
-  return already_found;
-}
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.h b/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.h
deleted file mode 100644
index d064252..0000000
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// The following is duplicated from base/linux_utils.h.
-// We shouldn't link against C++ code in a setuid binary.
-
-#ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SUID_LINUX_UTIL_H_
-#define SANDBOX_LINUX_SUID_LINUX_UTIL_H_
-
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-static const char kFindInodeSwitch[] = "--find-inode";
-static const char kSuidSandboxGetApiSwitch[] = "--get-api";
-
-// Find the process which holds the given socket, named by inode number. If
-// multiple processes hold the socket, this function returns false.
-bool FindProcessHoldingSocket(pid_t* pid_out, ino_t socket_inode);
-
-#endif  // SANDBOX_LINUX_SUID_LINUX_UTIL_H_
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c b/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c
index 7410b71..3049ae5 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "sandbox/linux/suid/common/suid_unsafe_environment_variables.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/suid/process_util.h"
 
 #if !defined(CLONE_NEWPID)
@@ -433,34 +432,8 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // In the SUID sandbox, if we succeed in calling MoveToNewNamespaces()
-  // below, then the zygote and all the renderers are in an alternate PID
-  // namespace and do not know their real PIDs. As such, they report the wrong
-  // PIDs to the task manager.
-  //
-  // To fix this, when the zygote spawns a new renderer, it gives the renderer
-  // a dummy socket, which has a unique inode number. Then it asks the sandbox
-  // host to find the PID of the process holding that fd by searching /proc.
-  //
-  // Since the zygote and renderers are all spawned by this setuid executable,
-  // their entries in /proc are owned by root and only readable by root. In
-  // order to search /proc for the fd we want, this setuid executable has to
-  // double as a helper and perform the search. The code block below does this
-  // when you call it with --find-inode INODE_NUMBER.
-  if (argc == 3 && (0 == strcmp(argv[1], kFindInodeSwitch))) {
-    pid_t pid;
-    char* endptr = NULL;
-    errno = 0;
-    ino_t inode = strtoull(argv[2], &endptr, 10);
-    if (inode == ULLONG_MAX || !endptr || *endptr || errno != 0)
-      return 1;
-    if (!FindProcessHoldingSocket(&pid, inode))
-      return 1;
-    printf("%d\n", pid);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  // Likewise, we cannot adjust /proc/pid/oom_adj for sandboxed renderers
-  // because those files are owned by root. So we need another helper here.
+  // We cannot adjust /proc/pid/oom_adj for sandboxed renderers
+  // because those files are owned by root. So we need a helper here.
   if (argc == 4 && (0 == strcmp(argv[1], kAdjustOOMScoreSwitch))) {
     char* endptr = NULL;
     long score;