linux: turn on -Wextra

This is a followup to an earlier change (r38266) which did most of the
warning-related cleanup.  This one just flips the flag, and fixes some
new warnings that crept in during the window while the flag was off.

BUG=34160

Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/597023

git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@42688 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98

7 files changed, 22 insertions, 22 deletions

diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/library.cc b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/library.cc
index 1b06bc1..768b00a 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/library.cc
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/library.cc
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ const Elf_Shdr* Library::getSection(const string& section) {
   return &iter->second.second;
 }
 
-const int Library::getSectionIndex(const string& section) {
+int Library::getSectionIndex(const string& section) {
   if (!valid_) {
     return -1;
   }
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/library.h b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/library.h
index 96ec581..e27bfde 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/library.h
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/library.h
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ class Library {
   bool parseElf();
   const Elf_Ehdr* getEhdr();
   const Elf_Shdr* getSection(const string& section);
-  const int getSectionIndex(const string& section);
+  int getSectionIndex(const string& section);
   void makeWritable(bool state) const;
   void patchSystemCalls();
   bool isVDSO() const { return isVDSO_; }
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/sandbox_impl.h b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/sandbox_impl.h
index 0a98283..18a359c 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/sandbox_impl.h
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/sandbox_impl.h
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ class Sandbox {
   // Wrapper around "read()" that can deal with partial and interrupted reads
   // and that does not modify the global errno variable.
   static ssize_t read(SysCalls& sys, int fd, void* buf, size_t len) {
-    if (len < 0) {
+    if (static_cast<ssize_t>(len) < 0) {
       sys.my_errno = EINVAL;
       return -1;
     }
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/socketcall.cc b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/socketcall.cc
index 43116bb..497e5e2 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/socketcall.cc
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/socketcall.cc
@@ -288,8 +288,7 @@ bool Sandbox::process_sendmsg(int parentMapsFd, int sandboxFd, int threadFdPub,
     die("Failed to read parameters for sendmsg() [process]");
   }
 
-  if (data.msg.msg_namelen    < 0 || data.msg.msg_namelen    > 4096 ||
-      data.msg.msg_controllen < 0 || data.msg.msg_controllen > 4096) {
+  if (data.msg.msg_namelen > 4096 || data.msg.msg_controllen > 4096) {
     die("Unexpected size for socketcall() payload [process]");
   }
   char extra[data.msg.msg_namelen + data.msg.msg_controllen];
@@ -767,7 +766,7 @@ bool Sandbox::process_socketcall(int parentMapsFd, int sandboxFd,
   // Verify that the length for the payload is reasonable. We don't want to
   // blow up our stack, and excessive (or negative) buffer sizes are almost
   // certainly a bug.
-  if (numExtraData < 0 || numExtraData > 4096) {
+  if (numExtraData > 4096) {
     die("Unexpected size for socketcall() payload [process]");
   }
 
@@ -783,8 +782,7 @@ bool Sandbox::process_socketcall(int parentMapsFd, int sandboxFd,
   ssize_t numSendmsgExtra = 0;
   if (socketcall_req.call == SYS_SENDMSG) {
     struct msghdr* msg = reinterpret_cast<struct msghdr*>(extra);
-    if (msg->msg_namelen    < 0 || msg->msg_namelen    > 4096 ||
-        msg->msg_controllen < 0 || msg->msg_controllen > 4096) {
+    if (msg->msg_namelen > 4096 || msg->msg_controllen > 4096) {
       die("Unexpected size for socketcall() payload [process]");
     }
     numSendmsgExtra = msg->msg_namelen + msg->msg_controllen;
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.c b/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.c
index ded545b..c5af0d0 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.c
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/linux_util.c
@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@ bool FindProcessHoldingSocket(pid_t* pid_out, ino_t socket_inode) {
       continue;
 
     while ((dent = readdir(fd))) {
-      if (snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%lu/fd/%s", pid_ul,
-                   dent->d_name) >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+      int printed = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%lu/fd/%s", pid_ul,
+                             dent->d_name);
+      if (printed < 0 || printed >= (int)(sizeof(buf) - 1)) {
         continue;
       }
 
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/process_util_linux.c b/sandbox/linux/suid/process_util_linux.c
index 9f40f39..7b31274 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/process_util_linux.c
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/process_util_linux.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ bool AdjustOOMScore(pid_t process, int score) {
 
   char buf[3];  // 0 <= |score| <= 15;
   snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", score);
-  size_t len = strlen(buf);
+  ssize_t len = strlen(buf);
 
   ssize_t bytes_written = write(fd, buf, len);
   close(fd);
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c b/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c
index e4968c9..7389f03 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c
@@ -90,13 +90,13 @@ static int CloneChrootHelperProcess() {
   char tempDirectoryTemplate[80] = "/tmp/chrome-sandbox-chroot-XXXXXX";
   struct statfs sfs;
   if (!statfs("/tmp", &sfs) &&
-      sfs.f_type != BTRFS_SUPER_MAGIC &&
-      sfs.f_type != EXT2_SUPER_MAGIC &&
-      sfs.f_type != EXT3_SUPER_MAGIC &&
-      sfs.f_type != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC &&
-      sfs.f_type != REISERFS_SUPER_MAGIC &&
-      sfs.f_type != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
-      sfs.f_type != XFS_SUPER_MAGIC) {
+      (unsigned long)sfs.f_type != BTRFS_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+      (unsigned long)sfs.f_type != EXT2_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+      (unsigned long)sfs.f_type != EXT3_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+      (unsigned long)sfs.f_type != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+      (unsigned long)sfs.f_type != REISERFS_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+      (unsigned long)sfs.f_type != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
+      (unsigned long)sfs.f_type != XFS_SUPER_MAGIC) {
     // If /dev/shm exists, it is supposed to be a tmpfs filesystem. While we
     // are not actually using it for shared memory, moving our temp directory
     // into a known tmpfs filesystem is preferable over using a potentially
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int CloneChrootHelperProcess() {
   char proc_self_fd_str[128];
   int printed = snprintf(proc_self_fd_str, sizeof(proc_self_fd_str),
                          "/proc/self/fd/%d", chroot_dir_fd);
-  if (printed < 0 || printed >= sizeof(proc_self_fd_str)) {
+  if (printed < 0 || printed >= (int)sizeof(proc_self_fd_str)) {
     fprintf(stderr, "Error in snprintf");
     return -1;
   }
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static bool SpawnChrootHelper() {
   // number of the file descriptor.
   char desc_str[64];
   int printed = snprintf(desc_str, sizeof(desc_str), "%d", chroot_signal_fd);
-  if (printed < 0 || printed >= sizeof(desc_str)) {
+  if (printed < 0 || printed >= (int)sizeof(desc_str)) {
     fprintf(stderr, "Failed to snprintf\n");
     return false;
   }
@@ -379,9 +379,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
   if (argc == 4 && (0 == strcmp(argv[1], kAdjustOOMScoreSwitch))) {
     char* endptr;
     long score;
-    pid_t pid = strtoul(argv[2], &endptr, 10);
-    if (pid == ULONG_MAX || *endptr)
+    unsigned long pid_ul = strtoul(argv[2], &endptr, 10);
+    if (pid_ul == ULONG_MAX || *endptr)
       return 1;
+    pid_t pid = pid_ul;
     score = strtol(argv[3], &endptr, 10);
     if (score == LONG_MAX || score == LONG_MIN || *endptr)
       return 1;