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Diffstat (limited to 'net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.cc | 755 |
1 files changed, 755 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.cc b/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e48b2d --- /dev/null +++ b/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.cc @@ -0,0 +1,755 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h" + +#include <string> +#include <vector> + +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "base/sha1.h" +#include "base/string_util.h" +#include "base/utf_string_conversions.h" +#include "crypto/capi_util.h" +#include "crypto/scoped_capi_types.h" +#include "crypto/sha2.h" +#include "net/base/net_errors.h" +#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h" +#include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h" +#include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h" +#include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h" +#include "net/cert/crl_set.h" +#include "net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.h" +#include "net/cert/test_root_certs.h" +#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" +#include "net/cert/x509_certificate_known_roots_win.h" + +#pragma comment(lib, "crypt32.lib") + +#if !defined(CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE) +// This was introduced in Windows 8 / Windows Server 2012, but retroactively +// ported as far back as Windows XP via system update. +#define CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE 0x00100000 +#endif + +namespace net { + +namespace { + +struct FreeChainEngineFunctor { + void operator()(HCERTCHAINENGINE engine) const { + if (engine) + CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine); + } +}; + +struct FreeCertChainContextFunctor { + void operator()(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) const { + if (chain_context) + CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); + } +}; + +struct FreeCertContextFunctor { + void operator()(PCCERT_CONTEXT context) const { + if (context) + CertFreeCertificateContext(context); + } +}; + +typedef crypto::ScopedCAPIHandle<HCERTCHAINENGINE, FreeChainEngineFunctor> + ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE; + +typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT, + FreeCertChainContextFunctor> + ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT; + +typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<const CERT_CONTEXT, + FreeCertContextFunctor> ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT; + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +int MapSecurityError(SECURITY_STATUS err) { + // There are numerous security error codes, but these are the ones we thus + // far find interesting. + switch (err) { + case SEC_E_WRONG_PRINCIPAL: // Schannel + case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: // CryptoAPI + return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; + case SEC_E_UNTRUSTED_ROOT: // Schannel + case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: // CryptoAPI + return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID; + case SEC_E_CERT_EXPIRED: // Schannel + case CERT_E_EXPIRED: // CryptoAPI + return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID; + case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK: + return ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; + case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE: + return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; + case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: // Schannel and CryptoAPI + return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; + case SEC_E_CERT_UNKNOWN: + case CERT_E_ROLE: + return ERR_CERT_INVALID; + case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE: + // TODO(wtc): Should we add ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE? + return ERR_CERT_INVALID; + // We received an unexpected_message or illegal_parameter alert message + // from the server. + case SEC_E_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE: + return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + case SEC_E_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH: + return ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH; + case SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE: + return ERR_UNEXPECTED; + case SEC_E_OK: + return OK; + default: + LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED"; + return ERR_FAILED; + } +} + +// Map the errors in the chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus returned by +// CertGetCertificateChain to our certificate status flags. +int MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus(DWORD error_status) { + CertStatus cert_status = 0; + + // We don't include CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED because it's obsolete and + // we wouldn't consider it an error anyway + const DWORD kDateInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | + CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID; + if (error_status & kDateInvalidErrors) + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; + + const DWORD kAuthorityInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT | + CERT_TRUST_IS_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST | + CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN; + if (error_status & kAuthorityInvalidErrors) + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID; + + if ((error_status & CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN) && + !(error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION)) + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; + + if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION) + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; + + if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED) + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; + + const DWORD kWrongUsageErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE | + CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE; + if (error_status & kWrongUsageErrors) { + // TODO(wtc): Should we add CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE? + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; + } + + if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID) { + // Check for a signature that does not meet the OS criteria for strong + // signatures. + // Note: These checks may be more restrictive than the current weak key + // criteria implemented within CertVerifier, such as excluding SHA-1 or + // excluding RSA keys < 2048 bits. However, if the user has configured + // these more stringent checks, respect that configuration and err on the + // more restrictive criteria. + if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE) { + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY; + } else { + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; + } + } + + // The rest of the errors. + const DWORD kCertInvalidErrors = + CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | + CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | + CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS | + CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | + CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS | + CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID | + CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | + CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | + CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | + CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | + CERT_TRUST_NO_ISSUANCE_CHAIN_POLICY | + CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT; + if (error_status & kCertInvalidErrors) + cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; + + return cert_status; +} + +// Returns true if any common name in the certificate's Subject field contains +// a NULL character. +bool CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { + CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; + decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); + decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc; + decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree; + CERT_NAME_INFO* name_info = NULL; + DWORD name_info_size = 0; + BOOL rv; + rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, + X509_NAME, + cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, + cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData, + CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, + &decode_para, + &name_info, + &name_info_size); + if (rv) { + scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_NAME_INFO> scoped_name_info(name_info); + + // The Subject field may have multiple common names. According to the + // "PKI Layer Cake" paper, CryptoAPI uses every common name in the + // Subject field, so we inspect every common name. + // + // From RFC 5280: + // X520CommonName ::= CHOICE { + // teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), + // printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), + // universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), + // utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), + // bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) } + // + // We also check IA5String and VisibleString. + for (DWORD i = 0; i < name_info->cRDN; ++i) { + PCERT_RDN rdn = &name_info->rgRDN[i]; + for (DWORD j = 0; j < rdn->cRDNAttr; ++j) { + PCERT_RDN_ATTR rdn_attr = &rdn->rgRDNAttr[j]; + if (strcmp(rdn_attr->pszObjId, szOID_COMMON_NAME) == 0) { + switch (rdn_attr->dwValueType) { + // After the CryptoAPI ASN.1 security vulnerabilities described in + // http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-056.mspx + // were patched, we get CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB for a common name + // that contains a NULL character. + case CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB: + break; + // Array of 8-bit characters. + case CERT_RDN_PRINTABLE_STRING: + case CERT_RDN_TELETEX_STRING: + case CERT_RDN_IA5_STRING: + case CERT_RDN_VISIBLE_STRING: + for (DWORD k = 0; k < rdn_attr->Value.cbData; ++k) { + if (rdn_attr->Value.pbData[k] == '\0') + return true; + } + break; + // Array of 16-bit characters. + case CERT_RDN_BMP_STRING: + case CERT_RDN_UTF8_STRING: { + DWORD num_wchars = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 2; + wchar_t* common_name = + reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData); + for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_wchars; ++k) { + if (common_name[k] == L'\0') + return true; + } + break; + } + // Array of ints (32-bit). + case CERT_RDN_UNIVERSAL_STRING: { + DWORD num_ints = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 4; + int* common_name = + reinterpret_cast<int*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData); + for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_ints; ++k) { + if (common_name[k] == 0) + return true; + } + break; + } + default: + NOTREACHED(); + break; + } + } + } + } + } + return false; +} + +// IsIssuedByKnownRoot returns true if the given chain is rooted at a root CA +// which we recognise as a standard root. +// static +bool IsIssuedByKnownRoot(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) { + PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0]; + int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; + if (num_elements < 1) + return false; + PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; + PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext; + + SHA1HashValue hash = X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(cert); + return IsSHA1HashInSortedArray( + hash, &kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes[0][0], sizeof(kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes)); +} + +// Saves some information about the certificate chain |chain_context| in +// |*verify_result|. The caller MUST initialize |*verify_result| before +// calling this function. +void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context, + CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { + if (chain_context->cChain == 0) + return; + + PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0]; + int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; + PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; + + PCCERT_CONTEXT verified_cert = NULL; + std::vector<PCCERT_CONTEXT> verified_chain; + + bool has_root_ca = num_elements > 1 && + !(chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & + CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN); + + // Each chain starts with the end entity certificate (i = 0) and ends with + // either the root CA certificate or the last available intermediate. If a + // root CA certificate is present, do not inspect the signature algorithm of + // the root CA certificate because the signature on the trust anchor is not + // important. + if (has_root_ca) { + // If a full chain was constructed, regardless of whether it was trusted, + // don't inspect the root's signature algorithm. + num_elements -= 1; + } + + for (int i = 0; i < num_elements; ++i) { + PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; + if (i == 0) { + verified_cert = cert; + } else { + verified_chain.push_back(cert); + } + + const char* algorithm = cert->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId; + if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD5RSA) == 0) { + // md5WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4 + verify_result->has_md5 = true; + if (i != 0) + verify_result->has_md5_ca = true; + } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD2RSA) == 0) { + // md2WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.2 + verify_result->has_md2 = true; + if (i != 0) + verify_result->has_md2_ca = true; + } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD4RSA) == 0) { + // md4WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.3 + verify_result->has_md4 = true; + } + } + + if (verified_cert) { + // Add the root certificate, if present, as it was not added above. + if (has_root_ca) + verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements]->pCertContext); + verify_result->verified_cert = + X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain); + } +} + +// Decodes the cert's certificatePolicies extension into a CERT_POLICIES_INFO +// structure and stores it in *output. +void GetCertPoliciesInfo(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, + scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_POLICIES_INFO>* output) { + PCERT_EXTENSION extension = CertFindExtension(szOID_CERT_POLICIES, + cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, + cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); + if (!extension) + return; + + CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; + decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); + decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc; + decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree; + CERT_POLICIES_INFO* policies_info = NULL; + DWORD policies_info_size = 0; + BOOL rv; + rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, + szOID_CERT_POLICIES, + extension->Value.pbData, + extension->Value.cbData, + CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, + &decode_para, + &policies_info, + &policies_info_size); + if (rv) + output->reset(policies_info); +} + +bool CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, + CRLSet* crl_set) { + if (chain->cChain == 0) + return true; + + const PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0]; + const PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; + + const int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; + if (num_elements == 0) + return true; + + // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of + // the issuer's SPKI at each step. + std::string issuer_spki_hash; + for (int i = num_elements - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; + + base::StringPiece der_bytes( + reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded), + cert->cbCertEncoded); + + base::StringPiece spki; + if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki)) { + NOTREACHED(); + continue; + } + + const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki); + + const CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB* serial_blob = &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber; + scoped_array<uint8> serial_bytes(new uint8[serial_blob->cbData]); + // The bytes of the serial number are stored little-endian. + for (unsigned j = 0; j < serial_blob->cbData; j++) + serial_bytes[j] = serial_blob->pbData[serial_blob->cbData - j - 1]; + base::StringPiece serial(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(serial_bytes.get()), + serial_blob->cbData); + + CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash); + + if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty()) + result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial, issuer_spki_hash); + + issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash; + + switch (result) { + case CRLSet::REVOKED: + return false; + case CRLSet::UNKNOWN: + case CRLSet::GOOD: + continue; + default: + NOTREACHED(); + continue; + } + } + + return true; +} + +void AppendPublicKeyHashes(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, + HashValueVector* hashes) { + if (chain->cChain == 0) + return; + + PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0]; + PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* const element = first_chain->rgpElement; + + const DWORD num_elements = first_chain->cElement; + for (DWORD i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) { + PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; + + base::StringPiece der_bytes( + reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded), + cert->cbCertEncoded); + base::StringPiece spki_bytes; + if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki_bytes)) + continue; + + HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1); + base::SHA1HashBytes(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(spki_bytes.data()), + spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data()); + hashes->push_back(sha1); + + HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256); + crypto::SHA256HashString(spki_bytes, sha1.data(), crypto::kSHA256Length); + hashes->push_back(sha256); + } +} + +// Returns true if the certificate is an extended-validation certificate. +// +// This function checks the certificatePolicies extensions of the +// certificates in the certificate chain according to Section 7 (pp. 11-12) +// of the EV Certificate Guidelines Version 1.0 at +// http://cabforum.org/EV_Certificate_Guidelines.pdf. +bool CheckEV(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context, + bool rev_checking_enabled, + const char* policy_oid) { + DCHECK_NE(static_cast<DWORD>(0), chain_context->cChain); + // If the cert doesn't match any of the policies, the + // CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE bit (0x10) in + // chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus is set. + DWORD error_status = chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus; + + if (!rev_checking_enabled) { + // If online revocation checking is disabled then we will have still + // requested that the revocation cache be checked. However, that will often + // cause the following two error bits to be set. These error bits mean that + // the local OCSP/CRL is stale or missing entries for these certificates. + // Since they are expected, we mask them away. + error_status &= ~(CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION | + CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN); + } + if (!chain_context->cChain || error_status != CERT_TRUST_NO_ERROR) + return false; + + // Check the end certificate simple chain (chain_context->rgpChain[0]). + // If the end certificate's certificatePolicies extension contains the + // EV policy OID of the root CA, return true. + PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement; + int num_elements = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->cElement; + if (num_elements < 2) + return false; + + // Look up the EV policy OID of the root CA. + PCCERT_CONTEXT root_cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext; + SHA1HashValue fingerprint = + X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_cert); + EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); + return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(fingerprint, policy_oid); +} + +} // namespace + +CertVerifyProcWin::CertVerifyProcWin() {} + +CertVerifyProcWin::~CertVerifyProcWin() {} + +bool CertVerifyProcWin::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const { + return false; +} + +int CertVerifyProcWin::VerifyInternal( + X509Certificate* cert, + const std::string& hostname, + int flags, + CRLSet* crl_set, + const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors, + CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { + PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle(); + if (!cert_handle) + return ERR_UNEXPECTED; + + // Build and validate certificate chain. + CERT_CHAIN_PARA chain_para; + memset(&chain_para, 0, sizeof(chain_para)); + chain_para.cbSize = sizeof(chain_para); + // ExtendedKeyUsage. + // We still need to request szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO and szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE + // today because some certificate chains need them. IE also requests these + // two usages. + static const LPSTR usage[] = { + szOID_PKIX_KP_SERVER_AUTH, + szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO, + szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE + }; + chain_para.RequestedUsage.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_OR; + chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = arraysize(usage); + chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = + const_cast<LPSTR*>(usage); + + // Get the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate. + scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_POLICIES_INFO> policies_info; + LPSTR ev_policy_oid = NULL; + if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) { + GetCertPoliciesInfo(cert_handle, &policies_info); + if (policies_info.get()) { + EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); + for (DWORD i = 0; i < policies_info->cPolicyInfo; ++i) { + LPSTR policy_oid = policies_info->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier; + if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_oid)) { + ev_policy_oid = policy_oid; + chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND; + chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 1; + chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = + &ev_policy_oid; + break; + } + } + } + } + + // We can set CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS to get more chains. + DWORD chain_flags = CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_END_CERT | + CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT; + const bool rev_checking_enabled = + (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) || + (ev_policy_oid != NULL && + (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY)); + + if (rev_checking_enabled) { + verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; + } else { + chain_flags |= CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY; + } + + // For non-test scenarios, use the default HCERTCHAINENGINE, NULL, which + // corresponds to HCCE_CURRENT_USER and is is initialized as needed by + // crypt32. However, when testing, it is necessary to create a new + // HCERTCHAINENGINE and use that instead. This is because each + // HCERTCHAINENGINE maintains a cache of information about certificates + // encountered, and each test run may modify the trust status of a + // certificate. + ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE chain_engine(NULL); + if (TestRootCerts::HasInstance()) + chain_engine.reset(TestRootCerts::GetInstance()->GetChainEngine()); + + ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT cert_list(cert->CreateOSCertChainForCert()); + PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context; + // IE passes a non-NULL pTime argument that specifies the current system + // time. IE passes CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT as the + // chain_flags argument. + if (!CertGetCertificateChain( + chain_engine, + cert_list.get(), + NULL, // current system time + cert_list->hCertStore, + &chain_para, + chain_flags, + NULL, // reserved + &chain_context)) { + verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; + return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); + } + + if (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & + CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE) { + ev_policy_oid = NULL; + chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 0; + chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = NULL; + CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); + if (!CertGetCertificateChain( + chain_engine, + cert_list.get(), + NULL, // current system time + cert_list->hCertStore, + &chain_para, + chain_flags, + NULL, // reserved + &chain_context)) { + verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; + return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); + } + } + + ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT scoped_chain_context(chain_context); + + GetCertChainInfo(chain_context, verify_result); + verify_result->cert_status |= MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus( + chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus); + + // Flag certificates that have a Subject common name with a NULL character. + if (CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(cert_handle)) + verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; + + if (crl_set && !CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(chain_context, crl_set)) + verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; + + std::wstring wstr_hostname = ASCIIToWide(hostname); + + SSL_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA extra_policy_para; + memset(&extra_policy_para, 0, sizeof(extra_policy_para)); + extra_policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(extra_policy_para); + extra_policy_para.dwAuthType = AUTHTYPE_SERVER; + extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = 0; + extra_policy_para.pwszServerName = + const_cast<wchar_t*>(wstr_hostname.c_str()); + + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA policy_para; + memset(&policy_para, 0, sizeof(policy_para)); + policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(policy_para); + policy_para.dwFlags = 0; + policy_para.pvExtraPolicyPara = &extra_policy_para; + + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS policy_status; + memset(&policy_status, 0, sizeof(policy_status)); + policy_status.cbSize = sizeof(policy_status); + + if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy( + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, + chain_context, + &policy_para, + &policy_status)) { + return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); + } + + if (policy_status.dwError) { + verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus( + MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError)); + + // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy reports only one error (in + // policy_status.dwError) if the certificate has multiple errors. + // CertGetCertificateChain doesn't report certificate name mismatch, so + // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy is the only function that can report + // certificate name mismatch. + // + // To prevent a potential certificate name mismatch from being hidden by + // some other certificate error, if we get any other certificate error, + // we call CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy again, ignoring all other + // certificate errors. Both extra_policy_para.fdwChecks and + // policy_para.dwFlags allow us to ignore certificate errors, so we set + // them both. + if (policy_status.dwError != CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH) { + const DWORD extra_ignore_flags = + 0x00000080 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION + 0x00000100 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA + 0x00002000 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID + 0x00000200; // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE + extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = extra_ignore_flags; + const DWORD ignore_flags = + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_NOT_TIME_VALID_FLAGS | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_FLAG | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_CA_FLAG | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE_FLAG | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_NAME_FLAG | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_POLICY_FLAG | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_REV_UNKNOWN_FLAGS | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_TESTROOT_FLAG | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_TRUST_TESTROOT_FLAG | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT_FLAG | + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_PEER_TRUST_FLAG; + policy_para.dwFlags = ignore_flags; + if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy( + CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, + chain_context, + &policy_para, + &policy_status)) { + return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); + } + if (policy_status.dwError) { + verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus( + MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError)); + } + } + } + + // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be + // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004). + verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; + + if (!rev_checking_enabled) { + // If we didn't do online revocation checking then Windows will report + // CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION unless it had cached OCSP or CRL + // information for every certificate. We only want to put up revoked + // statuses from the offline checks so we squash this error. + verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; + } + + AppendPublicKeyHashes(chain_context, &verify_result->public_key_hashes); + verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = IsIssuedByKnownRoot(chain_context); + + if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) + return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); + + if (ev_policy_oid && + CheckEV(chain_context, rev_checking_enabled, ev_policy_oid)) { + verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; + } + return OK; +} + +} // namespace net |