diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3con.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3con.c | 9077 |
1 files changed, 9077 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3con.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3con.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff93bf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3con.c @@ -0,0 +1,9077 @@ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK ***** + * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1 + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version + * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ + * + * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, + * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License + * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the + * License. + * + * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries. + * + * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is + * Netscape Communications Corporation. + * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000 + * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Contributor(s): + * Dr Stephen Henson <stephen.henson@gemplus.com> + * Dr Vipul Gupta <vipul.gupta@sun.com> and + * Douglas Stebila <douglas@stebila.ca>, Sun Microsystems Laboratories + * + * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of + * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or + * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"), + * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead + * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only + * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to + * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your + * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice + * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete + * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under + * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL. + * + * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */ +/* $Id: ssl3con.c,v 1.121 2009/11/12 05:08:27 wtc%google.com Exp $ */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "secitem.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "prtime.h" +#include "prinrval.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "pratom.h" +#include "prthread.h" + +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secmod.h" +#include "blapi.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB +#include "zlib.h" +/* zconf.h may define compress as a macro, which interferes with our use + * of compress as a member of the ssl3CipherSpec structure. Undo that. + */ +#undef compress +#endif + +#ifndef PK11_SETATTRS +#define PK11_SETATTRS(x,id,v,l) (x)->type = (id); \ + (x)->pValue=(v); (x)->ulValueLen = (l); +#endif + +static void ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss); +static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot); +static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms); +static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_InitState( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished( sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHello( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_NewHandshakeHashes( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes( sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l); + +static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, + int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, + int inputLen); + +#define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */ +#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000 + +#define MAX_CIPHER_SUITES 20 + +/* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of + * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement. + * This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). The ordering of cipher suites + * in this table must match the ordering in SSL_ImplementedCiphers (sslenum.c) + */ +static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { + /* cipher_suite policy enabled is_present*/ +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + { SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + { SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + + + { SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + + { SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + { SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + +}; + +/* This list of SSL3 compression methods is sorted in descending order of + * precedence (desirability). It only includes compression methods we + * implement. + */ +static const /*SSLCompressionMethod*/ uint8 compressions [] = { +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB + ssl_compression_deflate, +#endif + ssl_compression_null +}; + +static const int compressionMethodsCount = + sizeof(compressions) / sizeof(compressions[0]); + +/* compressionEnabled returns true iff the compression algorithm is enabled + * for the given SSL socket. */ +static PRBool +compressionEnabled(sslSocket *ss, SSLCompressionMethod compression) +{ + switch (compression) { + case ssl_compression_null: + return PR_TRUE; /* Always enabled */ +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB + case ssl_compression_deflate: + return ss->opt.enableDeflate; +#endif + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } +} + +static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ uint8 certificate_types [] = { + ct_RSA_sign, + ct_DSS_sign, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + ct_ECDSA_sign, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ +}; + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB +/* + * The DEFLATE algorithm can result in an expansion of 0.1% + 12 bytes. For a + * maximum TLS record payload of 2**14 bytes, that's 29 bytes. + */ +#define SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION 29 +#else /* !NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */ +#define SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION 0 +#endif + +/* + * make sure there is room in the write buffer for padding and + * other compression and cryptographic expansions. + */ +#define SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE 100 + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION + +#define EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH 64 /* bytes */ + + +/* This is a hack to make sure we don't do double handshakes for US policy */ +PRBool ssl3_global_policy_some_restricted = PR_FALSE; + +/* This global item is used only in servers. It is is initialized by +** SSL_ConfigSecureServer(), and is used in ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(). +*/ +CERTDistNames *ssl3_server_ca_list = NULL; +static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats; + +/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */ +static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = { + /* cipher calg keySz secretSz type ivSz BlkSz keygen */ + {cipher_null, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_null}, + {cipher_rc4, calg_rc4, 16, 16, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_strong}, + {cipher_rc4_40, calg_rc4, 16, 5, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_export}, + {cipher_rc4_56, calg_rc4, 16, 7, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_export}, + {cipher_rc2, calg_rc2, 16, 16, type_block, 8, 8, kg_strong}, + {cipher_rc2_40, calg_rc2, 16, 5, type_block, 8, 8, kg_export}, + {cipher_des, calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, kg_strong}, + {cipher_3des, calg_3des, 24, 24, type_block, 8, 8, kg_strong}, + {cipher_des40, calg_des, 8, 5, type_block, 8, 8, kg_export}, + {cipher_idea, calg_idea, 16, 16, type_block, 8, 8, kg_strong}, + {cipher_aes_128, calg_aes, 16, 16, type_block, 16,16, kg_strong}, + {cipher_aes_256, calg_aes, 32, 32, type_block, 16,16, kg_strong}, + {cipher_camellia_128, calg_camellia,16, 16, type_block, 16,16, kg_strong}, + {cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia,32, 32, type_block, 16,16, kg_strong}, + {cipher_seed, calg_seed, 16, 16, type_block, 16,16, kg_strong}, + {cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_null}, +}; + +static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] = +{ /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */ + /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType is_limited limit tls_keygen */ + {kea_null, kt_null, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_rsa, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_rsa_export, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_rsa_export_1024,kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 1024, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_dss, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_dss_export, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_rsa, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_rsa_export, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dhe_dss, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dhe_dss_export, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dhe_rsa, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dhe_rsa_export, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_anon, kt_dh, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_anon_export, kt_dh, sign_null, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_rsa_fips, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_TRUE }, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + {kea_ecdh_ecdsa, kt_ecdh, sign_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, kt_ecdh, sign_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_ecdh_rsa, kt_ecdh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_ecdhe_rsa, kt_ecdh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_ecdh_anon, kt_ecdh, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ +}; + +/* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */ +static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = +{ +/* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg */ + + {SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, mac_null, kea_null}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, mac_md5, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5, + cipher_rc2_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export}, +#if 0 /* not implemented */ + {SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA, cipher_idea, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_rsa_export}, +#endif + {SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, +#if 0 /* not implemented */ + {SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export}, + {SSL_DH_DSS_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, + {SSL_DH_DSS_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, + {SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export}, + {SSL_DH_RSA_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, + {SSL_DH_RSA_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, + {SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export}, + {SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export}, +#endif + {SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, + {SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, +#if 0 + {SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_RC4_40_MD5, cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_dh_anon_export}, + {SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_RC4_40_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_dh_anon_export}, + {SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon_export}, + {SSL_DH_ANON_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, + {SSL_DH_ANON_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, +#endif + + +/* New TLS cipher suites */ + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, +#if 0 + {TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, + {TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, + {TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, + {TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, + {TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, + {TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, +#endif + + {TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + + {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, + + {TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024}, + {TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, + cipher_rc4_56, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024}, + + {SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips}, + {SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips}, + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, + + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, + +#if 0 + {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, + {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, + {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, + {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, + {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, +#endif +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ +}; + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = { + 0x80000000L, + CKM_RSA_PKCS, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, + CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE +}; + +typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr { + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech; +} SSLCipher2Mech; + +/* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */ +static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = { + /* calg, cmech */ + { calg_null , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L }, + { calg_rc4 , CKM_RC4 }, + { calg_rc2 , CKM_RC2_CBC }, + { calg_des , CKM_DES_CBC }, + { calg_3des , CKM_DES3_CBC }, + { calg_idea , CKM_IDEA_CBC }, + { calg_fortezza , CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, + { calg_aes , CKM_AES_CBC }, + { calg_camellia , CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC }, + { calg_seed , CKM_SEED_CBC }, +/* { calg_init , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL } */ +}; + +#define mmech_null (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L +#define mmech_md5 CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC +#define mmech_sha CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC +#define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC +#define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC + +static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */ + /* mac mmech pad_size mac_size */ + { mac_null, mmech_null, 0, 0 }, + { mac_md5, mmech_md5, 48, MD5_LENGTH }, + { mac_sha, mmech_sha, 40, SHA1_LENGTH}, + {hmac_md5, mmech_md5_hmac, 48, MD5_LENGTH }, + {hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 40, SHA1_LENGTH}, +}; + +/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */ +const char * const ssl3_cipherName[] = { + "NULL", + "RC4", + "RC4-40", + "RC4-56", + "RC2-CBC", + "RC2-CBC-40", + "DES-CBC", + "3DES-EDE-CBC", + "DES-CBC-40", + "IDEA-CBC", + "AES-128", + "AES-256", + "Camellia-128", + "Camellia-256", + "SEED-CBC", + "missing" +}; + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC +/* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of + * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey + * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is + * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field + * in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes. + * + * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits + * or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params + * will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS + * supports arbitrary curves. + */ +#define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504 + +typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr { + PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */ + PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */ + PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */ + PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */ + PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */ + /* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key */ +} ECCWrappedKeyInfo; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + +#if defined(TRACE) + +static char * +ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType) +{ + char * rv; + static char line[40]; + + switch(msgType) { + case hello_request: rv = "hello_request (0)"; break; + case client_hello: rv = "client_hello (1)"; break; + case server_hello: rv = "server_hello (2)"; break; + case certificate: rv = "certificate (11)"; break; + case server_key_exchange: rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; break; + case certificate_request: rv = "certificate_request (13)"; break; + case server_hello_done: rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; break; + case certificate_verify: rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; break; + case client_key_exchange: rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; break; + case finished: rv = "finished (20)"; break; + default: + sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; + } + return rv; +} + +static char * +ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType) +{ + char * rv; + static char line[40]; + + switch(msgType) { + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)"; break; + case content_alert: rv = "alert (21)"; break; + case content_handshake: rv = "handshake (22)"; break; + case content_application_data: + rv = "application_data (23)"; break; + default: + sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; + } + return rv; +} + +#endif + +SSL3Statistics * +SSL_GetStatistics(void) +{ + return &ssl3stats; +} + +typedef struct tooLongStr { +#if defined(IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) + PRInt32 low; + PRInt32 high; +#else + PRInt32 high; + PRInt32 low; +#endif +} tooLong; + +void SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long * x) +{ + if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) { + PR_AtomicIncrement((PRInt32 *)x); + } else { + tooLong * tl = (tooLong *)x; + if (PR_AtomicIncrement(&tl->low) == 0) + PR_AtomicIncrement(&tl->high); + } +} + +/* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */ +/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ +static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite) +{ + int cipher_suite_def_len = + sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) { + if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &cipher_suite_defs[i]; + } + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); + return NULL; +} + +/* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */ +/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ +static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &suites[i]; + } + /* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); + return NULL; +} + + +/* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match + * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens, + * regardless of policy or user preference. + * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3. + */ +int +ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * suite; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; + SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech; + SSL3KEAType exchKeyType; + int i; + int numPresent = 0; + int numEnabled = 0; + PRBool isServer; + sslServerCerts *svrAuth; + + PORT_Assert(ss); + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return 0; + } + if (!ss->opt.enableSSL3 && !ss->opt.enableTLS) { + return 0; + } + isServer = (PRBool)(ss->sec.isServer != 0); + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite->enabled) { + ++numEnabled; + /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle + * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition. + */ + cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); + if (!cipher_def) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + continue; + } + cipher_alg=bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg ].calg; + PORT_Assert( alg2Mech[cipher_alg].calg == cipher_alg); + cipher_mech = alg2Mech[cipher_alg].cmech; + exchKeyType = + kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType; +#ifndef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType; +#else + /* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for + * indexing certificates. It doesn't work for + * (EC)DHE-* ciphers. Here we use a hack to ensure + * that the server uses an RSA cert for (EC)DHE-RSA. + */ + switch (cipher_def->key_exchange_alg) { + case kea_ecdhe_rsa: +#if NSS_SERVER_DHE_IMPLEMENTED + /* XXX NSS does not yet implement the server side of _DHE_ + * cipher suites. Correcting the computation for svrAuth, + * as the case below does, causes NSS SSL servers to begin to + * negotiate cipher suites they do not implement. So, until + * server side _DHE_ is implemented, keep this disabled. + */ + case kea_dhe_rsa: +#endif + svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + kt_rsa; + break; + case kea_ecdh_ecdsa: + case kea_ecdh_rsa: + /* + * XXX We ought to have different indices for + * ECDSA- and RSA-signed EC certificates so + * we could support both key exchange mechanisms + * simultaneously. For now, both of them use + * whatever is in the certificate slot for kt_ecdh + */ + default: + svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType; + break; + } +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */ + suite->isPresent = (PRBool) + (((exchKeyType == kt_null) || + ((!isServer || (svrAuth->serverKeyPair && + svrAuth->SERVERKEY && + svrAuth->serverCertChain)) && + PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[exchKeyType]))) && + ((cipher_alg == calg_null) || PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech))); + if (suite->isPresent) + ++numPresent; + } + } + PORT_Assert(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0); + if (numPresent <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); + } + return numPresent; +} + + +/* return PR_TRUE if suite matches policy and enabled state */ +/* It would be a REALLY BAD THING (tm) if we ever permitted the use +** of a cipher that was NOT_ALLOWED. So, if this is ever called with +** policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, report no match. +*/ +/* adjust suite enabled to the availability of a token that can do the + * cipher suite. */ +static PRBool +config_match(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy, PRBool enabled) +{ + PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED && enabled != PR_FALSE); + if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED || !enabled) + return PR_FALSE; + return (PRBool)(suite->enabled && + suite->isPresent && + suite->policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED && + suite->policy <= policy); +} + +/* return number of cipher suites that match policy and enabled state */ +/* called from ssl3_SendClientHello and ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack */ +static int +count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy, PRBool enabled) +{ + int i, count = 0; + + if (!ss->opt.enableSSL3 && !ss->opt.enableTLS) { + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, enabled)) + count++; + } + if (count <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + } + return count; +} + +static PRBool +anyRestrictedEnabled(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int i; + + if (!ss->opt.enableSSL3 && !ss->opt.enableTLS) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite->policy == SSL_RESTRICTED && + suite->enabled && + suite->isPresent) + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* + * Null compression, mac and encryption functions + */ + +static SECStatus +Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen, + const unsigned char *input, int inputLen) +{ + *outputLen = inputLen; + if (input != output) + PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * SSL3 Utility functions + */ + +SECStatus +ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion) +{ + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SSL3ProtocolVersion maxVersion; + + if (ss->opt.enableTLS) { + maxVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS; + } else if (ss->opt.enableSSL3) { + maxVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + } else { + /* what are we doing here? */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->version = version = PR_MIN(maxVersion, peerVersion); + + if ((version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS && ss->opt.enableTLS) || + (version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && ss->opt.enableSSL3)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random *random) +{ + PRUint32 gmt = ssl_Time(); + SECStatus rv; + + random->rand[0] = (unsigned char)(gmt >> 24); + random->rand[1] = (unsigned char)(gmt >> 16); + random->rand[2] = (unsigned char)(gmt >> 8); + random->rand[3] = (unsigned char)(gmt); + + /* first 4 bytes are reserverd for time */ + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(&random->rand[4], SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SECItem *buf, + PRBool isTLS) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE; + int signatureLen; + SECItem hashItem; + + buf->data = NULL; + signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key); + if (signatureLen <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + + buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen; + buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen); + if (!buf->data) + goto done; /* error code was set. */ + + switch (key->keyType) { + case rsaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->md5; + hashItem.len = sizeof(SSL3Hashes); + break; + case dsaKey: + doDerEncode = isTLS; + hashItem.data = hash->sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->sha); + break; +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + case ecKey: + doDerEncode = PR_TRUE; + hashItem.data = hash->sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->sha); + break; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + rv = PK11_Sign(key, buf, &hashItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE); + } else if (doDerEncode) { + SECItem derSig = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + + /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */ + rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */ + *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */ + } else if (derSig.data) { + PORT_Free(derSig.data); + } + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char*)buf->data, buf->len)); +done: + if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); + buf->data = NULL; + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */ +SECStatus +ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, CERTCertificate *cert, + SECItem *buf, PRBool isTLS, void *pwArg) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey * key; + SECItem * signature = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem hashItem; +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + unsigned int len; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes", + buf->data, buf->len)); + + key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + if (key == NULL) { + /* CERT_ExtractPublicKey doesn't set error code */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + switch (key->keyType) { + case rsaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->md5; + hashItem.len = sizeof(SSL3Hashes); + break; + case dsaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->sha); + /* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */ + if (isTLS || buf->len != DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN) { + signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSig(buf); + if (!signature) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + buf = signature; + } + break; + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + case ecKey: + hashItem.data = hash->sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->sha); + /* + * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s + * using ASN (unlike DSA where ASN encoding is used + * with TLS but not with SSL3) + */ + len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key); + if (len == 0) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + return SECFailure; + } + signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, len); + if (!signature) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + buf = signature; + break; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + default: + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified", + hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + rv = PK11_Verify(key, buf, &hashItem, pwArg); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); + if (signature) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + } + return rv; +} + + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +/* Called from ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash + * ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash + * which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(PRUint8 * hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen, + SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (bypassPKCS11) { + MD5_HashBuf (hashes->md5, hashBuf, bufLen); + SHA1_HashBuf(hashes->sha, hashBuf, bufLen); + } else { + rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->md5, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->sha, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + } +done: + return rv; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. +** Called from ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and +** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(SECItem modulus, SECItem publicExponent, + SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand, + SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11) +{ + PRUint8 * hashBuf; + PRUint8 * pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int bufLen; + PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8]; + + bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + modulus.len + 2 + publicExponent.len; + if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { + hashBuf = buf; + } else { + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(modulus.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(modulus.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, modulus.data, modulus.len); + pBuf += modulus.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, publicExponent.data, publicExponent.len); + pBuf += publicExponent.len; + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); + + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashBuf, bufLen, hashes, bypassPKCS11); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: MD5 result", hashes->md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: SHA1 result", hashes->sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL) + PORT_Free(hashBuf); + return rv; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, + SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand, + SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11) +{ + PRUint8 * hashBuf; + PRUint8 * pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int bufLen; + PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8]; + + bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + dh_p.len + 2 + dh_g.len + 2 + dh_Ys.len; + if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { + hashBuf = buf; + } else { + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len); + pBuf += dh_p.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len); + pBuf += dh_g.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len); + pBuf += dh_Ys.len; + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); + + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashBuf, bufLen, hashes, bypassPKCS11); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", hashes->md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", hashes->sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL) + PORT_Free(hashBuf); + return rv; +} + +static void +ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(SSL3SequenceNumber *num) +{ + num->low++; + if (num->low == 0) + num->high++; +} + +/* Called twice, only from ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec (immediately below). */ +static void +ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *mat) +{ + if (mat->write_key != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key); + mat->write_key = NULL; + } + if (mat->write_mac_key != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key); + mat->write_mac_key = NULL; + } + if (mat->write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); + mat->write_mac_context = NULL; + } +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and +** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs() +** ssl3_DestroySSL3Info +** Caller must hold SpecWriteLock. +*/ +static void +ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + PRBool freeit = (PRBool)(!spec->bypassCiphers); +/* PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */ + if (spec->destroy) { + spec->destroy(spec->encodeContext, freeit); + spec->destroy(spec->decodeContext, freeit); + spec->encodeContext = NULL; /* paranoia */ + spec->decodeContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->destroyCompressContext && spec->compressContext) { + spec->destroyCompressContext(spec->compressContext, 1); + spec->compressContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->destroyDecompressContext && spec->decompressContext) { + spec->destroyDecompressContext(spec->decompressContext, 1); + spec->decompressContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->master_secret != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret); + spec->master_secret = NULL; + } + spec->msItem.data = NULL; + spec->msItem.len = 0; + ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->client); + ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->server); + spec->bypassCiphers = PR_FALSE; + spec->destroy=NULL; + spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; + spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; +} + +/* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite. +** This is as much initialization as we can do without having key material. +** Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello() +** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock. +** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; + ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + SSL3MACAlgorithm mac; + SSL3BulkCipher cipher; + SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec == ss->ssl3.prSpec); + + /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */ + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + cwSpec->version = ss->version; + } + + pwSpec->version = ss->version; + isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); + + suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); + if (suite_def == NULL) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */ + } + + + cipher = suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg; + kea = suite_def->key_exchange_alg; + mac = suite_def->mac_alg; + if (isTLS) + mac += 2; + + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suite_def; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea]; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea); + + pwSpec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher]; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher); + + pwSpec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac]; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac); + + ss->sec.keyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->key_size * BPB; + ss->sec.secretKeyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; + ss->sec.cipherType = cipher; + + pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; + + pwSpec->mac_size = pwSpec->mac_def->mac_size; + + pwSpec->compression_method = ss->ssl3.hs.compression; + pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; + + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + return SECSuccess; +} + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB +#define SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE sizeof(z_stream) + +static SECStatus +ssl3_MapZlibError(int zlib_error) +{ + switch (zlib_error) { + case Z_OK: + return SECSuccess; + default: + return SECFailure; + } +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeflateInit(void *void_context) +{ + z_stream* context = void_context; + context->zalloc = NULL; + context->zfree = NULL; + context->opaque = NULL; + + return ssl3_MapZlibError(deflateInit(context, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION)); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_InflateInit(void *void_context) +{ + z_stream* context = void_context; + context->zalloc = NULL; + context->zfree = NULL; + context->opaque = NULL; + context->next_in = NULL; + context->avail_in = 0; + + return ssl3_MapZlibError(inflateInit(context)); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeflateCompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len, + int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) +{ + z_stream* context = void_context; + context->next_in = (unsigned char*) in; + context->avail_in = inlen; + context->next_out = out; + context->avail_out = maxout; + if (deflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (context->avail_out == 0) { + /* We ran out of space! */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Ran out of buffer while compressing", + SSL_GETPID())); + return SECFailure; + } + + *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeflateDecompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len, + int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) +{ + z_stream* context = void_context; + context->next_in = (unsigned char*) in; + context->avail_in = inlen; + context->next_out = out; + context->avail_out = maxout; + if (inflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DestroyCompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused) +{ + deflateEnd(void_context); + PORT_Free(void_context); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused) +{ + inflateEnd(void_context); + PORT_Free(void_context); + return SECSuccess; +} + +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */ + +/* Initialize the compression functions and contexts for the given + * CipherSpec. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitCompressionContext(ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec) +{ + /* Setup the compression functions */ + switch (pwSpec->compression_method) { + case ssl_compression_null: + pwSpec->compress = NULL; + pwSpec->decompress = NULL; + pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; + break; +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB + case ssl_compression_deflate: + pwSpec->compress = ssl3_DeflateCompress; + pwSpec->decompress = ssl3_DeflateDecompress; + pwSpec->compressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); + pwSpec->decompressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); + pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = ssl3_DestroyCompressContext; + pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext; + ssl3_DeflateInit(pwSpec->compressContext); + ssl3_InflateInit(pwSpec->decompressContext); + break; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */ + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec. + * Master Secret already is derived in spec->msItem + * Caller holds Spec write lock. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitPendingContextsBypass(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; +const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + void * serverContext = NULL; + void * clientContext = NULL; + BLapiInitContextFunc initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)NULL; + int mode = 0; + unsigned int optArg1 = 0; + unsigned int optArg2 = 0; + PRBool server_encrypts = ss->sec.isServer; + CK_ULONG macLength; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + SSLCompressionMethod compression_method; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + macLength = pwSpec->mac_size; + + /* MAC setup is done when computing the mac, not here. + * Now setup the crypto contexts. + */ + + calg = cipher_def->calg; + compression_method = pwSpec->compression_method; + + serverContext = pwSpec->server.cipher_context; + clientContext = pwSpec->client.cipher_context; + + switch (calg) { + case ssl_calg_null: + pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher; + pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher; + pwSpec->destroy = NULL; + goto success; + + case ssl_calg_rc4: + initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)RC4_InitContext; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) RC4_Encrypt; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) RC4_Decrypt; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext; + break; + case ssl_calg_rc2: + initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)RC2_InitContext; + mode = NSS_RC2_CBC; + optArg1 = cipher_def->key_size; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) RC2_Encrypt; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) RC2_Decrypt; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext; + break; + case ssl_calg_des: + initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)DES_InitContext; + mode = NSS_DES_CBC; + optArg1 = server_encrypts; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) DES_Encrypt; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) DES_Decrypt; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) DES_DestroyContext; + break; + case ssl_calg_3des: + initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)DES_InitContext; + mode = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC; + optArg1 = server_encrypts; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) DES_Encrypt; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) DES_Decrypt; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) DES_DestroyContext; + break; + case ssl_calg_aes: + initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)AES_InitContext; + mode = NSS_AES_CBC; + optArg1 = server_encrypts; + optArg2 = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) AES_Encrypt; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) AES_Decrypt; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) AES_DestroyContext; + break; + + case ssl_calg_camellia: + initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)Camellia_InitContext; + mode = NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC; + optArg1 = server_encrypts; + optArg2 = CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) Camellia_Encrypt; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) Camellia_Decrypt; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext; + break; + + case ssl_calg_seed: + initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)SEED_InitContext; + mode = NSS_SEED_CBC; + optArg1 = server_encrypts; + optArg2 = SEED_BLOCK_SIZE; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) SEED_Encrypt; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) SEED_Decrypt; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext; + break; + + case ssl_calg_idea: + case ssl_calg_fortezza : + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto bail_out; + } + rv = (*initFn)(serverContext, + pwSpec->server.write_key_item.data, + pwSpec->server.write_key_item.len, + pwSpec->server.write_iv_item.data, + mode, optArg1, optArg2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto bail_out; + } + + switch (calg) { + case ssl_calg_des: + case ssl_calg_3des: + case ssl_calg_aes: + case ssl_calg_camellia: + case ssl_calg_seed: + /* For block ciphers, if the server is encrypting, then the client + * is decrypting, and vice versa. + */ + optArg1 = !optArg1; + } + + rv = (*initFn)(clientContext, + pwSpec->client.write_key_item.data, + pwSpec->client.write_key_item.len, + pwSpec->client.write_iv_item.data, + mode, optArg1, optArg2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto bail_out; + } + + pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext; + pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext; + + ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec); + +success: + return SECSuccess; + +bail_out: + return SECFailure; +} + +/* This function should probably be moved to pk11wrap and be named + * PK11_ParamFromIVAndEffectiveKeyBits + */ +static SECItem * +ssl3_ParamFromIV(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mtype, SECItem *iv, CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits) +{ + SECItem * param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mtype, iv); + if (param && param->data && param->len >= sizeof(CK_RC2_PARAMS)) { + switch (mtype) { + case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: + case CKM_RC2_ECB: + case CKM_RC2_CBC: + case CKM_RC2_MAC: + case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL: + case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD: + *(CK_RC2_PARAMS *)param->data = ulEffectiveBits; + default: break; + } + } + return param; +} + +/* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec. + * Master Secret already is derived. + * Caller holds Spec write lock. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; +const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + PK11Context * serverContext = NULL; + PK11Context * clientContext = NULL; + SECItem * param; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mac_mech; + CK_ULONG macLength; + CK_ULONG effKeyBits; + SECItem iv; + SECItem mac_param; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + macLength = pwSpec->mac_size; + + /* + ** Now setup the MAC contexts, + ** crypto contexts are setup below. + */ + + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + mac_mech = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech; + mac_param.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength; + mac_param.len = sizeof(macLength); + mac_param.type = 0; + + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param); + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + + /* + ** Now setup the crypto contexts. + */ + + calg = cipher_def->calg; + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + + if (calg == calg_null) { + pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher; + pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher; + pwSpec->destroy = NULL; + return SECSuccess; + } + mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; + effKeyBits = cipher_def->key_size * BPB; + + /* + * build the server context + */ + iv.data = pwSpec->server.write_iv; + iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; + param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits); + if (param == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + serverContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, + (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT), + pwSpec->server.write_key, param); + iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); + if (iv.data) + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); + SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE); + if (serverContext == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + + /* + * build the client context + */ + iv.data = pwSpec->client.write_iv; + iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; + + param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits); + if (param == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + clientContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, + (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT : CKA_ENCRYPT), + pwSpec->client.write_key, param); + iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); + if (iv.data) + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); + SECITEM_FreeItem(param,PR_TRUE); + if (clientContext == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) PK11_DestroyContext; + + pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext; + pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext; + + serverContext = NULL; + clientContext = NULL; + + ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec); + + return SECSuccess; + +fail: + if (serverContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE); + if (clientContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(clientContext, PR_TRUE); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE); + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + } + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE); + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts + * for the pending Cipher Spec. + * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate. + * NULL pms means re-use old master_secret. + * + * This code is common to the bypass and PKCS11 execution paths. + * For the bypass case, pms is NULL. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + + if (pms || (!pwSpec->msItem.len && !pwSpec->master_secret)) { + rv = ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(ss, pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code set by ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret */ + } + } + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 && pwSpec->msItem.len && pwSpec->msItem.data) { + /* Double Bypass succeeded in extracting the master_secret */ + const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen || + (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + pwSpec->bypassCiphers = PR_TRUE; + rv = ssl3_KeyAndMacDeriveBypass( pwSpec, + (const unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + (const unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + isTLS, + (PRBool)(kea_def->is_limited)); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_InitPendingContextsBypass(ss); + } + } else if (pwSpec->master_secret) { + rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(ss); + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->master_secret); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + +done: + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return rv; +} + +/* + * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported. + */ +static const unsigned char mac_pad_1 [60] = { + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 +}; +static const unsigned char mac_pad_2 [60] = { + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c +}; + +/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord() +** ssl3_HandleRecord() +** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + ssl3CipherSpec * spec, + PRBool useServerMacKey, + SSL3ContentType type, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + SSL3SequenceNumber seq_num, + const SSL3Opaque * input, + int inputLength, + unsigned char * outbuf, + unsigned int * outLength) +{ + const ssl3MACDef * mac_def; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isTLS; + unsigned int tempLen; + unsigned char temp[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + + temp[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 24); + temp[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 16); + temp[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 8); + temp[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 0); + temp[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 24); + temp[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 16); + temp[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 8); + temp[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 0); + temp[8] = type; + + /* TLS MAC includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. + ** We decide which MAC defintiion to use based on the version of + ** the protocol that was negotiated when the spec became current, + ** NOT based on the version value in the record itself. + ** But, we use the record'v version value in the computation. + */ + if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + temp[9] = MSB(inputLength); + temp[10] = LSB(inputLength); + tempLen = 11; + isTLS = PR_FALSE; + } else { + /* New TLS hash includes version. */ + temp[9] = MSB(version); + temp[10] = LSB(version); + temp[11] = MSB(inputLength); + temp[12] = LSB(inputLength); + tempLen = 13; + isTLS = PR_TRUE; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: temp", temp, tempLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLength)); + + mac_def = spec->mac_def; + if (mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + *outLength = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + if (! spec->bypassCiphers) { + PK11Context *mac_context = + (useServerMacKey ? spec->server.write_mac_context + : spec->client.write_mac_context); + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, temp, tempLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); + } else { + /* bypass version */ + const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL; + unsigned int pad_bytes = 0; + PRUint64 write_mac_context[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; + + switch (mac_def->mac) { + case ssl_mac_null: + *outLength = 0; + return SECSuccess; + case ssl_mac_md5: + pad_bytes = 48; + hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5); + break; + case ssl_mac_sha: + pad_bytes = 40; + hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1); + break; + case ssl_hmac_md5: /* used with TLS */ + hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5); + break; + case ssl_hmac_sha: /* used with TLS */ + hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1); + break; + default: + break; + } + if (!hashObj) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!isTLS) { + /* compute "inner" part of SSL3 MAC */ + hashObj->begin(write_mac_context); + if (useServerMacKey) + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, + spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data, + spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len); + else + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, + spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data, + spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len); + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, mac_pad_1, pad_bytes); + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, temp, tempLen); + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, input, inputLength); + hashObj->end(write_mac_context, temp, &tempLen, sizeof temp); + + /* compute "outer" part of SSL3 MAC */ + hashObj->begin(write_mac_context); + if (useServerMacKey) + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, + spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data, + spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len); + else + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, + spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data, + spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len); + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, mac_pad_2, pad_bytes); + hashObj->update(write_mac_context, temp, tempLen); + hashObj->end(write_mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { /* is TLS */ +#define cx ((HMACContext *)write_mac_context) + if (useServerMacKey) { + rv = HMAC_Init(cx, hashObj, + spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data, + spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len, PR_FALSE); + } else { + rv = HMAC_Init(cx, hashObj, + spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data, + spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len, PR_FALSE); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + HMAC_Begin(cx); + HMAC_Update(cx, temp, tempLen); + HMAC_Update(cx, input, inputLength); + rv = HMAC_Finish(cx, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); + HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_FALSE); + } +#undef cx + } + } + + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLength == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLength)); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + rv = SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +static PRBool +ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) { + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE; + + /* we only care if we are doing client auth */ + if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + /* get the slot */ + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID); + if (slot == NULL || + !PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) || + (PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) { + isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + if (slot) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + return isPresent; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(sslSocket * ss, + SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque * pIn, + PRUint32 contentLen) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef * cipher_def; + sslBuffer * wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 macLen = 0; + PRUint32 fragLen; + PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0; + PRInt32 cipherBytes = 0; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ + + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; + + if (cwSpec->compress) { + int outlen; + rv = cwSpec->compress( + cwSpec->compressContext, wrBuf->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, + &outlen, wrBuf->space - SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, pIn, contentLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + pIn = wrBuf->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; + contentLen = outlen; + } + + /* + * Add the MAC + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( cwSpec, (PRBool)(ss->sec.isServer), + type, cwSpec->version, cwSpec->write_seq_num, pIn, contentLen, + wrBuf->buf + contentLen + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, &macLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + goto spec_locked_loser; + } + p1Len = contentLen; + p2Len = macLen; + fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */ + PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); + + /* + * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher) + * then Encrypt it + */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + unsigned char * pBuf; + int padding_length; + int i; + + oddLen = contentLen % cipher_def->block_size; + /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */ + padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 - + ((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1)); + fragLen += padding_length + 1; + PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + + /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */ + pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[fragLen + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH - 1]; + for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) { + *pBuf-- = padding_length; + } + /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */ + p2Len = fragLen - p1Len; + } + if (p1Len < 256) { + oddLen = p1Len; + p1Len = 0; + } else { + p1Len -= oddLen; + } + if (oddLen) { + p2Len += oddLen; + PORT_Assert( (cipher_def->block_size < 2) || \ + (p2Len % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + memmove(wrBuf->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + p1Len, + pIn + p1Len, oddLen); + } + if (p1Len > 0) { + rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext, + wrBuf->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, /* output */ + &cipherBytes, /* actual outlen */ + p1Len, /* max outlen */ + pIn, p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */ + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytes == p1Len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytes != p1Len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + goto spec_locked_loser; + } + } + if (p2Len > 0) { + PRInt32 cipherBytesPart2 = -1; + rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext, + wrBuf->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + p1Len, + &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */ + p2Len, /* max outlen */ + wrBuf->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + p1Len, + p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/ + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == p2Len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != p2Len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + goto spec_locked_loser; + } + cipherBytes += cipherBytesPart2; + } + PORT_Assert(cipherBytes <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); + + ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&cwSpec->write_seq_num); + + wrBuf->len = cipherBytes + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; + wrBuf->buf[0] = type; + wrBuf->buf[1] = MSB(cwSpec->version); + wrBuf->buf[2] = LSB(cwSpec->version); + wrBuf->buf[3] = MSB(cipherBytes); + wrBuf->buf[4] = LSB(cipherBytes); + + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + + return SECSuccess; + +spec_locked_loser: + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Process the plain text before sending it. + * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent + * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the + * output (write) buffer. + * Returns SECFailure on a hard IO error, memory error, or crypto error. + * Does NOT return SECWouldBlock. + * + * Notes on the use of the private ssl flags: + * (no private SSL flags) + * Attempt to make and send SSL records for all plaintext + * If non-blocking and a send gets WOULD_BLOCK, + * or if the pending (ciphertext) buffer is not empty, + * then buffer remaining bytes of ciphertext into pending buf, + * and continue to do that for all succssive records until all + * bytes are used. + * ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER + * As above, except this suppresses all write attempts, and forces + * all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer. + * + */ +static PRInt32 +ssl3_SendRecord( sslSocket * ss, + SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque * pIn, /* input buffer */ + PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */ + PRInt32 flags) +{ + sslBuffer * wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 totalSent = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type), + nIn)); + PRINT_BUF(3, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3.initialized == PR_FALSE) { + /* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record + ** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're + ** trying to send an alert. + */ + PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert); + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + } + + /* check for Token Presence */ + if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + while (nIn > 0) { + PRUint32 contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + + if (wrBuf->space < contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE) { + PRInt32 newSpace = PR_MAX(wrBuf->space * 2, contentLen); + newSpace = PR_MIN(newSpace, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + newSpace += SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE; + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, newSpace); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, newSpace)); + return SECFailure; /* sslBuffer_Grow set a memory error code. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord( ss, type, pIn, contentLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + pIn += contentLen; + nIn -= contentLen; + PORT_Assert( nIn >= 0 ); + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); + + /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext, + * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet, + * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved. + */ + if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) || + (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + return SECFailure; + } + wrBuf->len = 0; /* All cipher text is saved away. */ + + if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + PRInt32 sent; + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + } + } else if (wrBuf->len > 0) { + PRInt32 sent; + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len, + flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK); + if (sent < 0) { + if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */ + sent = 0; + } + wrBuf->len -= sent; + if (wrBuf->len) { + /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and + * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext. + */ + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf + sent, wrBuf->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + totalSent += contentLen; + } + return totalSent; +} + +#define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024 + +/* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record. + * Returns "len" or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock, nor SECSuccess. + */ +int +ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, + PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags) +{ + PRInt32 totalSent = 0; + PRInt32 discarded = 0; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + if (len < 0 || !in) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER && + !ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) { + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) { + PORT_Assert (in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)); + if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + in++; + len--; + discarded = 1; + } + while (len > totalSent) { + PRInt32 sent, toSend; + + if (totalSent > 0) { + /* + * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a + * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in + * the middle of a large application data write. (See + * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.) + */ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + } + toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, content_application_data, + in + totalSent, toSend, flags); + if (sent < 0) { + if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); + break; + } + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + totalSent += sent; + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + /* must be a non-blocking socket */ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); + break; + } + } + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + /* Must be non-blocking. */ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + if (totalSent > 0) { + ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1]; + } + + totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1; + if (totalSent <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + totalSent = SECFailure; + } + return totalSent; + } + ss->appDataBuffered = 0; + return totalSent + discarded; +} + +/* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record. + * This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock. + * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. + * + * Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(), + * ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(), + * ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(), + * ssl3_SendFinished(), + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + PRInt32 rv = SECSuccess; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) + return rv; + + /* only this flag is allowed */ + PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)); + if ((flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER) != 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + rv = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, content_handshake, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags); + } + if (rv < 0) { + int err = PORT_GetError(); + PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + } + } else if (rv < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) { + /* short write should never happen */ + PORT_Assert(rv >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + rv = SECSuccess; + } + + /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */ + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0; + return rv; +} + +/* + * Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when + * the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request. + * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth. + * SECSuccess otherwise. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + if (ss->sec.peerKey != NULL) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; + } + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + + /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't + * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no + * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure + * an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the + * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we + * know the server is paying attention to the certificate. + */ + if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || + (!ss->firstHsDone && + (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) { + PRFileDesc * lower; + + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate); + + lower = ss->fd->lower; +#ifdef _WIN32 + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND); +#else + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH); +#endif + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************ + * Alerts + */ + +/* +** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks. +** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <- +** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <- +** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord. +** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord +** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <- +** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHello <- +** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <- +** ssl3_HandleClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <- +** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificate <- +** ssl3_HandleFinished <- +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <- +** ssl3_HandleRecord <- +** +*/ +SECStatus +SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc) +{ + uint8 bytes[2]; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + + bytes[0] = level; + bytes[1] = desc; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (level == alert_fatal) { + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + } + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRInt32 sent; + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, content_alert, bytes, 2, + desc == no_certificate + ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0); + rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent; + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */ +} + +/* + * Send illegal_parameter alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRBool isTLS; + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error + : illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SSL3AlertLevel level; + SSL3AlertDescription desc; + int error; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (buf->len != 2) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); + return SECFailure; + } + level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0]; + desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1]; + buf->len = 0; + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + + switch (desc) { + case close_notify: ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1; + error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT; break; + case unexpected_message: error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT; + break; + case bad_record_mac: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; break; + case decryption_failed: error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT; + break; + case record_overflow: error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT; break; + case decompression_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case handshake_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case no_certificate: error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE; break; + case bad_certificate: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; break; + case unsupported_certificate:error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT;break; + case certificate_revoked: error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; break; + case certificate_expired: error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; break; + case certificate_unknown: error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT; + break; + case illegal_parameter: error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT;break; + + /* All alerts below are TLS only. */ + case unknown_ca: error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT; break; + case access_denied: error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT; break; + case decode_error: error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT; break; + case decrypt_error: error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT; break; + case export_restriction: error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT; + break; + case protocol_version: error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; break; + case insufficient_security: error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT; + break; + case internal_error: error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; break; + case user_canceled: error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT; break; + case no_renegotiation: error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; break; + + /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */ + case unsupported_extension: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT; break; + case certificate_unobtainable: + error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT; break; + case unrecognized_name: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; break; + case bad_certificate_status_response: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT; break; + case bad_certificate_hash_value: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT; break; + default: error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; break; + } + if (level == alert_fatal) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) && + (desc == handshake_failure)) { + /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure + * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers. + */ + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + } + PORT_SetError(error); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) { + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + return rv; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Change Cipher Specs + * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone, + * ssl3_HandleClientHello, + * and ssl3_HandleFinished + * + * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current + * and pending write spec pointers. + */ + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) +{ + uint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice; + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 sent; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1, + ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (sent < 0) { + return (SECStatus)sent; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + + /* swap the pending and current write specs. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + pwSpec->write_seq_num.high = 0; + pwSpec->write_seq_num.low = 0; + + ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + ss->ssl3.cwSpec = pwSpec; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + + /* We need to free up the contexts, keys and certs ! */ + /* If we are really through with the old cipher spec + * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) { + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. + * + * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current + * and pending write spec pointers. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * prSpec; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; + SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (ws != wait_change_cipher) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + + if(buf->len != 1) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0]; + if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) { + /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */ + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + buf->len = 0; + + /* Swap the pending and current read specs. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + prSpec->read_seq_num.high = prSpec->read_seq_num.low = 0; + + ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + ss->ssl3.crSpec = prSpec; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + + /* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec + * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) { + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This method uses PKCS11 to derive the MS from the PMS, where PMS +** is a PKCS11 symkey. This is used in all cases except the +** "triple bypass" with RSA key exchange. +** Called from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec. prSpec is pwSpec. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def= ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen || + (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + /* + * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH + * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size + * data into a 48-byte value. + */ + PRBool isDH = (PRBool) ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_ecdh)); + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + SECItem params; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags; + CK_VERSION pms_version; + CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + if (isTLS) { + if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } else { + if (isDH) master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = 0; + } + + if (pms || !pwSpec->master_secret) { + master_params.pVersion = &pms_version; + master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + + params.data = (unsigned char *) &master_params; + params.len = sizeof master_params; + } + + if (pms != NULL) { +#if defined(TRACE) + if (ssl_trace >= 100) { + SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms); + if (extractRV == SECSuccess) { + SECItem * keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms); + if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) { + ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", + keyData->data, keyData->len); + } + } + } +#endif + pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive, + ¶ms, key_derive, CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); + if (!isDH && pwSpec->master_secret && ss->opt.detectRollBack) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version; + client_version = pms_version.major << 8 | pms_version.minor; + if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) { + /* Destroy it. Version roll-back detected. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(pwSpec->master_secret); + pwSpec->master_secret = NULL; + } + } + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + /* Generate a faux master secret in the same slot as the old one. */ + PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey((PK11SymKey *)pms); + PK11SymKey * fpms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, pwSpec, slot); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (fpms != NULL) { + pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(fpms, + master_derive, ¶ms, key_derive, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(fpms); + } + } + } + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + /* Generate a faux master secret from the internal slot. */ + PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); + PK11SymKey * fpms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, pwSpec, slot); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (fpms != NULL) { + pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(fpms, + master_derive, ¶ms, key_derive, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + pwSpec->master_secret = fpms; /* use the fpms as the master. */ + fpms = NULL; + } + } + if (fpms) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(fpms); + } + } + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + SECItem * keydata; + /* In hope of doing a "double bypass", + * need to extract the master secret's value from the key object + * and store it raw in the sslSocket struct. + */ + rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pwSpec->master_secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { +#if defined(NSS_SURVIVE_DOUBLE_BYPASS_FAILURE) + /* The double bypass failed. + * Attempt to revert to an all PKCS#11, non-bypass method. + * Do we need any unacquired locks here? + */ + ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 = 0; + rv = ssl3_NewHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len); + } +#endif + return rv; + } + /* This returns the address of the secItem inside the key struct, + * not a copy or a reference. So, there's no need to free it. + */ + keydata = PK11_GetKeyData(pwSpec->master_secret); + if (keydata && keydata->len <= sizeof pwSpec->raw_master_secret) { + memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, keydata->data, keydata->len); + pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret; + pwSpec->msItem.len = keydata->len; + } else { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + + +/* + * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret + * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure. + * + * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(), + * which in turn is called from + * sendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * sendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock. + * ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that. + * + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen || + (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + /* following variables used in PKCS11 path */ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + PK11SlotInfo * slot = NULL; + PK11SymKey * symKey = NULL; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + int keySize; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + SECItem params; + PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == calg_null); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + if (!pwSpec->master_secret) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* + * generate the key material + */ + key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size* BPB; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; + + key_material_params.bIsExport = (CK_BBOOL)(kea_def->is_limited); + /* was: (CK_BBOOL)(cipher_def->keygen_mode != kg_strong); */ + + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys; + + returnedKeys.pIVClient = pwSpec->client.write_iv; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = pwSpec->server.write_iv; + keySize = cipher_def->key_size; + + if (skipKeysAndIVs) { + keySize = 0; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL; + } + + calg = cipher_def->calg; + PORT_Assert( alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + bulk_mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; + + params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params; + params.len = sizeof(key_material_params); + + if (isTLS) { + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + } else { + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + } + + /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and + * DERIVE by DEFAULT */ + symKey = PK11_Derive(pwSpec->master_secret, key_derive, ¶ms, + bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize); + if (!symKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we + * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both + * mac's map to the same keytype. + */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */ + pwSpec->client.write_mac_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + pwSpec->server.write_mac_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + if (!skipKeysAndIVs) { + pwSpec->client.write_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + pwSpec->server.write_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + return SECSuccess; + + +loser: + if (symKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0; + MD5_Begin((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx); + SHA1_Begin((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx); + } else { + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_NewHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PK11Context *md5 = NULL; + PK11Context *sha = NULL; + + /* + * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these + * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots + * that the master secret will wind up in ... + */ + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space); + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0; + } else { + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); + if (md5 == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + if (sha == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + } + if (SECSuccess == ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + +loser: + if (md5 != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; + } + if (sha != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL; + } + return SECFailure; + +} + +/* + * Handshake messages + */ +/* Called from ssl3_AppendHandshake() +** ssl3_StartHandshakeHash() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() +** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *b, unsigned int l) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "MD5 & SHA handshake hash input:", b, l)); + + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + MD5_Update((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, b, l); + SHA1_Update((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, b, l); +#if defined(NSS_SURVIVE_DOUBLE_BYPASS_FAILURE) + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages, b, l); +#endif + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * Append Handshake functions. + * All these functions set appropriate error codes. + * Most rely on ssl3_AppendHandshake to set the error code. + **************************************************************************/ +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, PRInt32 bytes) +{ + unsigned char * src = (unsigned char *)void_src; + int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); /* protects sendBuf. */ + + if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, + PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes))); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char*)void_src, bytes)); + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */ + + while (bytes > room) { + if (room > 0) + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, + room); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room; + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + bytes -= room; + src += room; + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0); + } + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize) +{ + SECStatus rv; + uint8 b[4]; + uint8 * p = b; + + switch (lenSize) { + case 4: + *p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff; + case 3: + *p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff; + case 2: + *p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff; + case 1: + *p = num & 0xff; + } + SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID())); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &b[0], lenSize); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Opaque *src, PRInt32 bytes, PRInt32 lenSize) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert((bytes < (1<<8) && lenSize == 1) || + (bytes < (1L<<16) && lenSize == 2) || + (bytes < (1L<<24) && lenSize == 3)); + + SSL_TRC(60,("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID())); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + SSL_TRC(60, ("data:")); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType t, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t))); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "MD5 handshake hash:", + (unsigned char*)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (ss, "SHA handshake hash:", + (unsigned char*)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +/************************************************************************** + * Consume Handshake functions. + * + * All data used in these functions is protected by two locks, + * the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock + **************************************************************************/ + +/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input + * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v". + * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. + * + * If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert, + * and has set a generic error code. The caller should probably + * override the generic error code by setting another. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, + PRUint32 *length) +{ + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); + *b += bytes; + *length -= bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input + * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an + * integer in network byte order. Returns the received value. + * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. + * + * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. + * This value is indistinguishable from the equivalent received value. + * Only positive numbers are to be received this way. + * Thus, the largest value that may be sent this way is 0x7fffffff. + * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, + PRUint32 *length) +{ + uint8 *buf = *b; + int i; + PRInt32 num = 0; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( bytes <= sizeof num); + + if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); + + for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) + num = (num << 8) + buf[i]; + *b += bytes; + *length -= bytes; + return num; +} + +/* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is + * *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes" + * bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value + * of the first number received. The latter byte-string, and its length, + * is returned in the SECItem i. + * + * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. + * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. + * + * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies + * of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here + * is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to + * point to the values in the buffer **b. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRInt32 bytes, + SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRInt32 count; + + PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3); + i->len = 0; + i->data = NULL; + count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, b, length); + if (count < 0) { /* Can't test for SECSuccess here. */ + return SECFailure; + } + if (count > 0) { + if ((PRUint32)count > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + i->data = *b; + i->len = count; + *b += count; + *length -= count; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * end of Consume Handshake functions. + **************************************************************************/ + +/* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point. + * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify + * ssl3_SendFinished + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage + * + * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock. + * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock. + * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.) + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */ + SSL3Hashes * hashes, /* output goes here. */ + PRUint32 sender) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + unsigned int outLength; + SSL3Opaque md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + SSL3Opaque sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + /* compute them without PKCS11 */ + PRUint64 md5_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; + PRUint64 sha_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; + +#define md5cx ((MD5Context *)md5_cx) +#define shacx ((SHA1Context *)sha_cx) + + if (!spec->msItem.data) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + } + + MD5_Clone (md5cx, (MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx); + SHA1_Clone(shacx, (SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx); + + if (!isTLS) { + /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ + unsigned char s[4]; + + s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); + s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); + s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); + s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; + + if (sender != 0) { + MD5_Update(md5cx, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, + mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + + MD5_Update(md5cx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len); + MD5_Update(md5cx, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + MD5_End(md5cx, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); + + if (sender != 0) { + SHA1_Update(shacx, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, + mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + + SHA1_Update(shacx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len); + SHA1_Update(shacx, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + SHA1_End(shacx, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, + mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); + + MD5_Begin(md5cx); + MD5_Update(md5cx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len); + MD5_Update(md5cx, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + MD5_Update(md5cx, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); + } + MD5_End(md5cx, hashes->md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + + if (!isTLS) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, + mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + SHA1_Begin(shacx); + SHA1_Update(shacx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len); + SHA1_Update(shacx, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + SHA1_Update(shacx, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); + } + SHA1_End(shacx, hashes->sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv = SECSuccess; +#undef md5cx +#undef shacx + } else { + /* compute hases with PKCS11 */ + PK11Context * md5; + PK11Context * sha = NULL; + unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL; + unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL; + unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen; + unsigned char md5StackBuf[256]; + unsigned char shaStackBuf[512]; + + if (!spec->master_secret) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + } + + md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf, + sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen); + if (md5StateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5; + + shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf, + sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen); + if (shaStateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; + + if (!isTLS) { + /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ + unsigned char s[4]; + + s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); + s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); + s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); + s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; + + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, + mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5,spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); + + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, + mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, + mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + + if (!isTLS) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, + mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha,spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv = SECSuccess; + + loser: + if (md5StateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen) + != SECSuccess) + { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen); + } + } + if (shaStateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen) + != SECSuccess) + { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen); + } + } + } + return rv; +} + +/* + * SSL 2 based implementations pass in the initial outbound buffer + * so that the handshake hash can contain the included information. + * + * Called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake() in sslcon.c + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_StartHandshakeHash(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char * buf, int length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + + PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy( + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES], + &ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge, + SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES); + + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buf, length); + /* if it failed, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes has set the error code. */ + +done: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); /**************************************/ + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * end of Handshake Hash functions. + * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes. + **************************************************************************/ + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(), + * ssl3_HandleFinished() (for step-up) + * ssl3_RedoHandshake() + * ssl2_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session) + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID * sid; + ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + int length; + int num_suites; + int actual_count = 0; + PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0; + unsigned numCompressionMethods; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + + /* We might be starting a session renegotiation in which case we should + * clear previous state. + */ + PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData)); + + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup + * handles expired entries and other details. + * XXX If we've been called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake, then + * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful. + */ + sid = (ss->opt.noCache) ? NULL + : ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url); + + /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists, + * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ... + * If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds + * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc. + */ + if (sid) { + PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE; + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + /* Session key was wrapped, which means it was using PKCS11, */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid && !ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + } + if (slot == NULL) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } else { + PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL; + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL) ) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + if (wrapKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = NULL; + } + } + /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that + ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been + ** removed, etc. + */ + if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (!sidOK) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok ); + (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } + + if (sid) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits ); + + /* Are we attempting a stateless session resume? */ + if (sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && + sid->u.ssl3.sessionTicket.ticket.data) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_stateless_resumes ); + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, sid->version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* error code was set */ + + PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); + + ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy; + } else { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses ); + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* error code was set */ + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */ + } + } + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + cwSpec->version = ss->version; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* decrement ref count, free if zero */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + + /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS); + if (!ss->opt.enableSSL3 && !ss->opt.enableTLS) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* how many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */ + num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (!num_suites) + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */ + + if (ss->opt.enableTLS && ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; /* 2^16 - 1 */ + PRInt32 extLen; + + extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, NULL); + if (extLen < 0) { + return SECFailure; + } + maxBytes -= extLen; + total_exten_len += extLen; + + if (total_exten_len > 0) + total_exten_len += 2; + } +#if defined(NSS_ENABLE_ECC) && !defined(NSS_ECC_MORE_THAN_SUITE_B) + else { /* SSL3 only */ + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, NULL); /* disable all ECC suites */ + } +#endif + + /* how many suites are permitted by policy and user preference? */ + num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE); + if (!num_suites) + return SECFailure; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */ + + /* count compression methods */ + numCompressionMethods = 0; + for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) { + if (compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i])) + numCompressionMethods++; + } + + length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + + 1 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) + + 2 + num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + + 1 + numCompressionMethods + total_exten_len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_hello, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + ss->clientHelloVersion = ss->version; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + if (sid) + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + else + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE)) { + actual_count++; + if (actual_count > num_suites) { + /* set error card removal/insertion error */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + } + } + + /* if cards were removed or inserted between count_cipher_suites and + * generating our list, detect the error here rather than send it off to + * the server.. */ + if (actual_count != num_suites) { + /* Card removal/insertion error */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, numCompressionMethods, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) { + if (!compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i])) + continue; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, compressions[i], 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + } + + if (total_exten_len) { + PRUint32 maxBytes = total_exten_len - 2; + PRInt32 extLen; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, maxBytes, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, maxBytes, NULL); + if (extLen < 0) { + return SECFailure; + } + maxBytes -= extLen; + PORT_Assert(!maxBytes); + } + + + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello; + return rv; +} + + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Hello Request. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +#define UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM 0x7fffffff + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = { + CKM_DES3_ECB, + CKM_CAST5_ECB, + CKM_DES_ECB, + CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS, + CKM_IDEA_ECB, + CKM_CAST3_ECB, + CKM_CAST_ECB, + CKM_RC5_ECB, + CKM_RC2_ECB, + CKM_CDMF_ECB, + CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, + CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, + CKM_AES_ECB, + CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB, + CKM_SEED_ECB, + UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM +}; + +static int +ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) +{ + const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *pMech = wrapMechanismList; + + while (mech != *pMech && *pMech != UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) { + ++pMech; + } + return (*pMech == UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) ? -1 + : (pMech - wrapMechanismList); +} + +static PK11SymKey * +ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey( + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk, + SECKEYPrivateKey * svrPrivKey, + SSL3KEAType exchKeyType, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void * pwArg) +{ + PK11SymKey * unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + SECItem wrappedKey; +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + PK11SymKey * Ks; + SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey; + ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + /* found the wrapping key on disk. */ + PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech); + PORT_Assert(pWswk->exchKeyType == exchKeyType); + if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech || + pWswk->exchKeyType != exchKeyType) { + goto loser; + } + wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; + wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen; + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + + switch (exchKeyType) { + + case kt_rsa: + unwrappedWrappingKey = + PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, + masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + break; + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + case kt_ecdh: + /* + * For kt_ecdh, we first create an EC public key based on + * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next, + * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and + * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting + * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e., + * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key. + * + * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined + * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. + */ + ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *) pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + + PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <= MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + + if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen > MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var + + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; + + wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen; + wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + + /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ + Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, + NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (Ks == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL, + &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech, + CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + + break; +#endif + + default: + /* Assert? */ + SET_ERROR_CODE + goto loser; + } +loser: + return unwrappedWrappingKey; +} + +/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of + * SymKey pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap + * the master secrets. There is one key for each KEA type. These Symkeys + * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache. + */ + +typedef struct { + PK11SymKey * symWrapKey[kt_kea_size]; +} ssl3SymWrapKey; + +static PZLock * symWrapKeysLock = NULL; +static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS]; + +SECStatus ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void) +{ + if (symWrapKeysLock) { + PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock); + symWrapKeysLock = NULL; + return SECSuccess; + } + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void) +{ + int i, j; + + if (!symWrapKeysLock) + return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */ + PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); + /* get rid of all symWrapKeys */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) { + for (j = 0; j < kt_kea_size; ++j) { + PK11SymKey ** pSymWrapKey; + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j]; + if (*pSymWrapKey) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey); + *pSymWrapKey = NULL; + } + } + } + + PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); + ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void) +{ + symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther); + return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; +} + +/* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array. + * If that fails, look for one on disk. + * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk, + * Put the new key in the in-memory array. + */ +static PK11SymKey * +getWrappingKey( sslSocket * ss, + PK11SlotInfo * masterSecretSlot, + SSL3KEAType exchKeyType, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void * pwArg) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey * svrPrivKey; + SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey * unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey ** pSymWrapKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + int length; + int symWrapMechIndex; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem wrappedKey; + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk; + + svrPrivKey = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].SERVERKEY; + PORT_Assert(svrPrivKey != NULL); + if (!svrPrivKey) { + return NULL; /* why are we here?!? */ + } + + symWrapMechIndex = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech); + PORT_Assert(symWrapMechIndex >= 0); + if (symWrapMechIndex < 0) + return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */ + + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[symWrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[exchKeyType]; + + ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE); + + PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey; + if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) { + if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) { + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + goto done; + } + /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + } + + /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */ + /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */ + if (ssl_GetWrappingKey(symWrapMechIndex, exchKeyType, &wswk)) { + /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType, + masterWrapMech, pwArg); + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto install; + } + } + + if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */ + goto loser; + + length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL, + length, pwArg); + if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey, + * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key. + */ + PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */ + + if (ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKeyPair) { + svrPubKey = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKeyPair->pubKey; + } + if (svrPubKey == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; + wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey) + goto loser; + + /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */ + switch (exchKeyType) { +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + PK11SymKey * Ks = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL; + ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + case kt_rsa: + asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + break; + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + case kt_ecdh: + /* + * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH + * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and + * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting + * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks, + * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate + * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all + * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in + * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as + * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. + */ + PORT_Assert(svrPubKey->keyType == ecKey); + if (svrPubKey->keyType != ecKey) { + /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey( + &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL); + if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Set the key size in bits */ + if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) { + pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey); + } + + PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len < MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >= MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ + Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, + NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (Ks == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *) (wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size; + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; + PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; + PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); + + wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN - + (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen); + wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + + /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */ + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer + * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset + */ + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + +ec_cleanup: + if (privWrapKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey); + if (pubWrapKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey); + if (Ks) PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + break; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + default: + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM); + + wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + wswk.symWrapMechIndex = symWrapMechIndex; + wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism; + wswk.exchKeyType = exchKeyType; + wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + + /* put it on disk. */ + /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set, + * then abandon the value we just computed and + * use the one we got from the disk. + */ + if (ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk)) { + /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk + * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard + * the key we just created and unwrap this new one. + */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType, + masterWrapMech, pwArg); + } + +install: + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + } + +loser: +done: + PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); + return unwrappedWrappingKey; +} + + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +/* Presently, this always uses PKCS11. There is no bypass for this. */ +static SECStatus +sendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem enc_pms = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + +#if defined(TRACE) + if (ssl_trace >= 100) { + SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms); + if (extractRV == SECSuccess) { + SECItem * keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms); + if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) { + ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", + keyData->data, keyData->len); + } + } + } +#endif + + /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */ + enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + enc_pms.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len); + if (enc_pms.data == NULL) { + goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */ + } + + /* wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */ + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 : enc_pms.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + if (isTLS) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (enc_pms.data != NULL) { + PORT_Free(enc_pms.data); + } + if (pms != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +/* Presently, this always uses PKCS11. There is no bypass for this. */ +static SECStatus +sendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + + SECKEYDHParams dhParam; /* DH parameters */ + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* Copy DH parameters from server key */ + + if (svrPubKey->keyType != dhKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + goto loser; + } + dhParam.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data; + dhParam.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + dhParam.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data; + dhParam.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len; + + /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */ + privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL); + if (!privKey || !pubKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + + if (isTLS) target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + + /* Determine the PMS */ + + pms = PK11_PubDerive(privKey, svrPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + privKey = NULL; + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len, 2); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + pubKey = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = SECSuccess; + + +loser: + + if(pms) PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if(privKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + if(pubKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return rv; +} + + + + + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey * serverKey = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) { + serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (serverKey == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey; + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */ + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + /* enforce limits on kea key sizes. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->is_limited) { + int keyLen = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(serverKey); /* bytes */ + + if (keyLen * BPB > ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->key_size_limit) { + if (isTLS) + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, export_restriction); + else + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED); + goto loser; + } + } + + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case kt_rsa: + rv = sendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + case kt_dh: + rv = sendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + case kt_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + default: + /* got an unknown or unsupported Key Exchange Algorithm. */ + SEND_ALERT + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + break; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + +loser: + if (serverKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey); + return rv; /* err code already set. */ +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS; + SECItem buf = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey, &buf, isTLS); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PK11SlotInfo * slot; + sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. + ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. + ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. + */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + /* If we're doing RSA key exchange, we're all done with the private key + * here. Diffie-Hellman key exchanges need the client's + * private key for the key exchange. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, buf.len + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + +done: + if (buf.data) + PORT_Free(buf.data); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 ServerHello message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PRInt32 temp; /* allow for consume number failure */ + PRBool suite_found = PR_FALSE; + int i; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + PRBool sid_match; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; + + /* this is appropriate since the negotiation is complete, and we only + ** know SSL 3.x. + */ + if (MSB(version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* find selected cipher suite in our list. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if ((temp == suite->cipher_suite) && + (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE))) { + suite_found = PR_TRUE; + break; /* success */ + } + } + if (!suite_found) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp; + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef((ssl3CipherSuite)temp); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { + PORT_SetError(errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; /* we don't send alerts for our screw-ups. */ + } + + /* find selected compression method in our list. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + suite_found = PR_FALSE; + for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) { + if (temp == compressions[i] && + compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i])) { + suite_found = PR_TRUE; + break; /* success */ + } + } + if (!suite_found) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp; + + /* Note that if !isTLS && length != 0, we do NOT goto alert_loser. + * There are some old SSL 3.0 implementations that do send stuff + * after the end of the server hello, and we deliberately ignore + * such stuff in the interest of maximal interoperability (being + * "generous in what you accept"). + */ + if (isTLS && length != 0) { + SECItem extensions; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) + goto alert_loser; + rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &extensions.data, &extensions.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */ + desc = handshake_failure; + + /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the + * key exchange algorithm. */ + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + + /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or + * not and if so it may match the one we sent. + * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so... + * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error. + */ + sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes.len > 0 && + sidBytes.len == sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength && + !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len)); + + if (sid_match && + sid->version == ss->version && + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite == ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) do { + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + + SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped master secret. */ + + ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + + /* 3 cases here: + * a) key is wrapped (implies using PKCS11) + * b) key is unwrapped, but we're still using PKCS11 + * c) key is unwrapped, and we're bypassing PKCS11. + */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PK11SymKey * wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + /* we cannot restart a non-bypass session in a + ** bypass socket. + */ + break; + } + /* unwrap master secret with PKCS11 */ + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (slot == NULL) { + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (wrapKey == NULL) { + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */ + } + } else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + /* MS is not wrapped */ + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, wrappedMS.data, wrappedMS.len); + pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret; + pwSpec->msItem.len = wrappedMS.len; + } else { + /* We CAN restart a bypass session in a non-bypass socket. */ + /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, + &wrappedMS, NULL); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; + } + } + + /* Got a Match */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits ); + + /* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */ + if (sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && + sid->u.ssl3.sessionTicket.ticket.data != NULL) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes ); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, session_ticket_xtn)) + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + /* copy the peer cert from the SID */ + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + + /* NULL value for PMS signifies re-use of the old MS */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */ + } + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + + if (sid_match) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok ); + else + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses ); + + /* throw the old one away */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE; + (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + + /* get a new sid */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (sid == NULL) { + goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len); + + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_cert; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + errCode = ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRArenaPool * arena = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; + PRBool isTLS; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECItem signature = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key && + ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + + case kt_rsa: { + SECItem modulus = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem exponent = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &modulus, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &exponent, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(modulus, exponent, + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature, + isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* + * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer + * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate + * pkcs11 slots and ID's. + */ + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + goto no_memory; + } + + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + goto no_memory; + } + + peerKey->arena = arena; + peerKey->keyType = rsaKey; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.modulus, &modulus) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.publicExponent, &exponent)) + { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + goto no_memory; + } + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + return SECSuccess; + } + + case kt_dh: { + SECItem dh_p = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem dh_g = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem dh_Ys = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len)); + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature, + isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* + * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer + * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate + * pkcs11 slots and ID's. + */ + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + goto no_memory; + } + + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + goto no_memory; + } + + peerKey->arena = arena; + peerKey->keyType = dhKey; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) + { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + goto no_memory; + } + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + return SECSuccess; + } + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + case kt_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + return rv; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + default: + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; + break; /* goto alert_loser; */ + } + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError( errCode ); + return SECFailure; + +no_memory: /* no-memory error has already been set. */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + + +typedef struct dnameNode { + struct dnameNode *next; + SECItem name; +} dnameNode; + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Certificate Request message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRArenaPool * arena = NULL; + dnameNode * node; + PRInt32 remaining; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + int i; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST; + int nnames = 0; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECItem cert_types = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + CERTDistNames ca_list; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request && + ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */ + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (remaining < 0) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + if ((PRUint32)remaining > length) + goto alert_loser; + + ca_list.head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + while (remaining > 0) { + PRInt32 len; + + if (remaining < 2) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + node->name.len = len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (len <= 0) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + remaining -= 2; + if (remaining < len) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + node->name.data = b; + b += len; + length -= len; + remaining -= len; + nnames++; + if (remaining <= 0) + break; /* success */ + + node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + node = node->next; + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + + ca_list.nnames = nnames; + ca_list.names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, nnames); + if (nnames > 0 && ca_list.names == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + for(i = 0, node = (dnameNode*)ca_list.head; + i < nnames; + i++, node = node->next) { + ca_list.names[i] = node->name; + } + + if (length != 0) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + desc = no_certificate; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done; + + if (ss->getClientAuthData == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */ + } else { + /* XXX Should pass cert_types in this call!! */ + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg, + ss->fd, &ca_list, + &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + } + switch (rv) { + case SECWouldBlock: /* getClientAuthData has put up a dialog box. */ + ssl_SetAlwaysBlock(ss); + break; /* not an error */ + + case SECSuccess: + /* check what the callback function returned */ + if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) { + /* we are missing either the key or cert */ + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) { + /* got a cert, but no key - free it */ + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey) { + /* got a key, but no cert - free it */ + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + goto send_no_certificate; + } + /* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause + * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate. + */ + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert( + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE); + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) { + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + goto send_no_certificate; + } + break; /* not an error */ + + case SECFailure: + default: +send_no_certificate: + if (isTLS) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE; + } else { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); + } + rv = SECSuccess; + break; + } + goto done; + +no_mem: + rv = SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto done; + +alert_loser: + if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter) + desc = decode_error; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + rv = SECFailure; +done: + if (arena != NULL) + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + return rv; +} + +/* + * attempt to restart the handshake after asynchronously handling + * a request for the client's certificate. + * + * inputs: + * cert Client cert chosen by application. + * Note: ssl takes this reference, and does not bump the + * reference count. The caller should drop its reference + * without calling CERT_DestroyCert after calling this function. + * + * key Private key associated with cert. This function makes a + * copy of the private key, so the caller remains responsible + * for destroying its copy after this function returns. + * + * certChain DER-encoded certs, client cert and its signers. + * Note: ssl takes this reference, and does not copy the chain. + * The caller should drop its reference without destroying the + * chain. SSL will free the chain when it is done with it. + * + * Return value: XXX + * + * XXX This code only works on the initial handshake on a connection, XXX + * It does not work on a subsequent handshake (redo). + * + * Caller holds 1stHandshakeLock. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq(sslSocket * ss, + CERTCertificate * cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey * key, + CERTCertificateList *certChain) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + /* XXX This code only works on the initial handshake on a connection, + ** XXX It does not work on a subsequent handshake (redo). + */ + if (ss->handshake != 0) { + ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake; + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = cert; + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = certChain; + if (key == NULL) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } else { + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(key); + } + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msgState.buf != NULL) { + rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, NULL, &ss->gs.buf); + } + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + } + } + return rv; +} + + + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Server Hello Done message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; + PRBool send_verify = PR_FALSE; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ws != wait_hello_done && + ws != wait_server_cert && + ws != wait_server_key && + ws != wait_cert_request) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); + /* Don't send verify */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + } else + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL && + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) { + send_verify = PR_TRUE; + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ + } + + if (send_verify) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, session_ticket_xtn)) + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* + * Routines used by servers + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_request, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Sets memory error when returning NULL. + * Called from: + * ssl3_SendClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleServerHello() + * ssl3_HandleClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() + */ +sslSessionID * +ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + + sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID); + if (sid == NULL) + return sid; + + sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID); + sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url); + sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer; + sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port; + sid->references = 1; + sid->cached = never_cached; + sid->version = ss->version; + + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = NULL; + sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey = NULL; + + if (is_server) { + SECStatus rv; + int pid = SSL_GETPID(); + + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff; + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES -2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + } + return sid; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello, + * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello(). + */ + kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_FALSE; + + if (kea_def->is_limited && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa) { + /* see if we can legally use the key in the cert. */ + int keyLen; /* bytes */ + + keyLen = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen( + ss->serverCerts[kea_def->exchKeyType].SERVERKEY); + + if (keyLen > 0 && + keyLen * BPB <= kea_def->key_size_limit ) { + /* XXX AND cert is not signing only!! */ + /* just fall through and use it. */ + } else if (ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL) { + ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_TRUE; + rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code was set. */ + } + } else { +#ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED); + return rv; +#endif + } +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + } else if ((kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) || + (kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa)) { + rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code was set. */ + } +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + } + + if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert + : wait_client_key; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Client Hello message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslSessionID * sid = NULL; + PRInt32 tmp; + unsigned int i; + int j; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SECItem sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem suites = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem comps = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + PRBool haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* Get peer name of client */ + rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + + /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should + * clear previous state. + */ + PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData)); + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake && + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + desc = no_renegotiation; + level = alert_warning; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + + tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (tmp < 0) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert already sent */ + ss->clientHelloVersion = version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp; + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* grab the client random data. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* grab the client's SID, if present. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* grab the list of cipher suites. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &suites, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* grab the list of compression methods. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &comps, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + desc = handshake_failure; + + /* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if + * we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been + * parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension. + * Note: we allow extensions even when negotiating SSL3 for the sake + * of interoperability (and backwards compatibility). + */ + + if (length) { + /* Get length of hello extensions */ + PRInt32 extension_length; + extension_length = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (extension_length < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (extension_length != length) { + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* send alert */ + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + } + + /* We do stateful resumes only if either of the following + * conditions are satisfied: (1) the client does not support the + * session ticket extension, or (2) the client support the session + * ticket extension, but sent an empty ticket. + */ + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, session_ticket_xtn) || + ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket) { + if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) { + SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3])); + if (ssl_sid_lookup) { + sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sidBytes.data, + sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle); + } else { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED; + goto loser; + } + } + } else if (ss->statelessResume) { + /* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume. + * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.) + */ + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/ + + if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, + sidBytes.len); + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + } else { + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0; + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports + * the extension and we are unable to do either a stateful or + * stateless resume. + * + * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful + * resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session + * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume, + * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while + * resuming.) + */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, session_ticket_xtn) && sid == NULL) { + ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, + session_ticket_xtn, ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn); + } + + if (sid != NULL) { + /* We've found a session cache entry for this client. + * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert, + * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache, + * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo), + * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session. + */ + if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate && + ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || + (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) || + ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE) + && !ss->firstHsDone))) { + + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok ); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + /* Disable any ECC cipher suites for which we have no cert. */ + ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(ss); +#endif + +#ifdef PARANOID + /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ + j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } +#endif + + /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the + ** same cipher suite we picked before. + ** This is not a loop, despite appearances. + */ + if (sid) do { + /* First check that the compression method in the session was + ** advertised by the client. + */ + + for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) { + if (comps.data[i] == sid->u.ssl3.compression) + break; + } + + if (i == comps.len) + break; + +#ifdef PARANOID + /* Check that the compression method is still enabled. */ + if (!compressionEnabled(ss, sid->u.ssl3.compression)) + break; +#endif + + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = ss->cipherSuites; + /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */ + for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) { + if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) + break; + } + PORT_Assert(j > 0); + if (j <= 0) + break; +#ifdef PARANOID + /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled, + * implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled. + * The product policy won't change during the process lifetime. + * Implemented ("isPresent") shouldn't change for servers. + */ + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE)) + break; +#else + if (!suite->enabled) + break; +#endif + /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's list */ + for (i = 0; i < suites.len; i += 2) { + if ((suites.data[i] == MSB(suite->cipher_suite)) && + (suites.data[i + 1] == LSB(suite->cipher_suite))) { + + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); + goto suite_found; + } + } + } while (0); + + /* START A NEW SESSION */ + +#ifndef PARANOID + /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ + j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } +#endif + + /* Select a cipher suite. + ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in + ** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(). + */ + for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE)) + continue; + for (i = 0; i < suites.len; i += 2) { + if ((suites.data[i] == MSB(suite->cipher_suite)) && + (suites.data[i + 1] == LSB(suite->cipher_suite))) { + + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); + goto suite_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + +suite_found: + /* If we are resuming, we use the previous compression algorithm */ + if (sid) { + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = sid->u.ssl3.compression; + goto compression_found; + } + + /* Look for a matching compression algorithm. */ + for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < compressionMethodsCount; j++) { + if (comps.data[i] == compressions[j] && + compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[j])) { + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = + (SSLCompressionMethod)compressions[j]; + goto compression_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; + /* null compression must be supported */ + goto alert_loser; + +compression_found: + suites.data = NULL; + comps.data = NULL; + + ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + + /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid, + * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave + * as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one. + */ + if (sid != NULL) do { + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped key */ + + if (sid->version != ss->version || + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE; + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PK11SymKey * wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + /* we cannot restart a non-bypass session in a + ** bypass socket. + */ + break; + } + + wrapKey = getWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!wrapKey) { + /* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */ + break; + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + + /* unwrap the master secret. */ + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + } else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, wrappedMS.data, wrappedMS.len); + pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret; + pwSpec->msItem.len = wrappedMS.len; + } else { + /* We CAN restart a bypass session in a non-bypass socket. */ + /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ + PK11SlotInfo * slot; + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &wrappedMS, + NULL); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* + * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session. + * + * XXX make sure compression still matches + */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits ); + if (ss->statelessResume) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes ); + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + + /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, + ** but they do remember the kea type we originally used, so we + ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket + ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one. + */ + ss->sec.localCert = + CERT_DupCertificate(ss->serverCerts[sid->keaType].serverCert); + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE; + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* NULL value for PMS signifies re-use of the old MS */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok ); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses ); + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc); + /* FALLTHRU */ +loser: + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes + * in asking to use the V3 handshake. + * Called from ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage() in sslcon.c + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length) +{ + sslSessionID * sid = NULL; + unsigned char * suites; + unsigned char * random; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + int j; + int sid_length; + int suite_length; + int rand_length; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData)); + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto loser; /* alert_loser */ + } + + version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; + suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4]; + sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6]; + rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; + ss->clientHelloVersion = version; + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */ + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */ + if (length != + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + rand_length) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + + rand_length)); + goto loser; /* malformed */ /* alert_loser */ + } + + suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; + random = suites + suite_length + sid_length; + + if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES || + rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ /* alert_loser */ + } + + PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy( + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], + random, rand_length); + + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[0], + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + /* Disable any ECC cipher suites for which we have no cert. */ + ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(ss); +#endif + i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (i <= 0) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Select a cipher suite. + ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in + ** ssl3_HandleClientHello(). + */ + for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE)) + continue; + for (i = 0; i < suite_length; i += 3) { + if ((suites[i] == 0) && + (suites[i+1] == MSB(suite->cipher_suite)) && + (suites[i+2] == LSB(suite->cipher_suite))) { + + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); + goto suite_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + +suite_found: + + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null; + ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + + /* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses ); + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */ + + /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + /* XXX_1 The call stack to here is: + * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage -> here. + * ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage returns whatever we return here. + * ssl_Do1stHandshake will continue looping if it gets back either + * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. + * SECSuccess is preferable here. See XXX_1 in sslgathr.c. + */ + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version. +** +** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session) +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; + PRUint32 length; + PRInt32 extensions_len = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + + if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, + &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]); + if (extensions_len > 0) + extensions_len += 2; /* Add sizeof total extension length */ + + length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 1 + + ((sid == NULL) ? 0: sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) + + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + 1 + extensions_len; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake( + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (sid) + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + else + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (extensions_len) { + PRInt32 sent_len; + + extensions_len -= 2; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */ + sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len, + &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]); + PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len); + if (sent_len != extensions_len) { + if (sent_len >= 0) + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */ + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ +const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + int length; + PRBool isTLS; + SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECKEYPublicKey * sdPub; /* public key for step-down */ + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case kt_rsa: + /* Perform SSL Step-Down here. */ + sdPub = ss->stepDownKeyPair->pubKey; + PORT_Assert(sdPub != NULL); + if (!sdPub) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(sdPub->u.rsa.modulus, + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent, + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY, + &signed_hash, isTLS); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ + } + if (signed_hash.data == NULL) { + /* how can this happen and rv == SECSuccess ?? */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + length = 2 + sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len + + 2 + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len + + 2 + signed_hash.len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.data, + sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.data, + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, + signed_hash.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECSuccess; + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + case kt_ecdh: { + rv = ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss); + return rv; + } +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + case kt_dh: + case kt_null: + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + break; + } +loser: + if (signed_hash.data != NULL) + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECFailure; +} + + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECItem * name; + CERTDistNames *ca_list; +const uint8 * certTypes; + SECItem * names = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + int length; + int i; + int calen = 0; + int nnames = 0; + int certTypesLength; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* ssl3.ca_list is initialized to NULL, and never changed. */ + ca_list = ss->ssl3.ca_list; + if (!ca_list) { + ca_list = ssl3_server_ca_list; + } + + if (ca_list != NULL) { + names = ca_list->names; + nnames = ca_list->nnames; + } + + if (!nnames) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_SSL_CLIENT_CA); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { + calen += 2 + name->len; + } + + certTypes = certificate_types; + certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types; + + length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello_done, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Certificate Verify message + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + PRBool isTLS; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify || ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */ + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signed_hash, + isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + signed_hash.data = NULL; + + if (length != 0) { + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + + +/* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA. + * Then generate and return the PMS. + * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use + * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot. + * + * Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11() (above) + * sendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below) + * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock + */ +static PK11SymKey * +ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo * slot = serverKeySlot; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECItem param; + CK_VERSION version; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3]; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (slot == NULL) { + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on + ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null + ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock. + */ + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + calg = spec->cipher_def->calg; + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + + /* First get an appropriate slot. */ + mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN; + mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + mechanism_array[2] = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; + + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND); + return pms; /* which is NULL */ + } + } + } + + /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ + version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + + param.data = (unsigned char *)&version; + param.len = sizeof version; + + pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, ¶m, 0, pwArg); + if (!serverKeySlot) + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + } + return pms; +} + +/* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER + * return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message, + * where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message. + * This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly + * or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS. + * We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection. + * Instead, we generate a random PMS. This will cause a failure + * in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where + * the failure must occur. + * + * Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms; + unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + unsigned int outLen = 0; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem enc_pms; + unsigned char rsaPmsBuf[SSL3_RSA_PMS_LENGTH]; + SECItem pmsItem = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + enc_pms.data = b; + enc_pms.len = length; + pmsItem.data = rsaPmsBuf; + pmsItem.len = sizeof rsaPmsBuf; + + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + PRInt32 kLen; + kLen = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len); + if (kLen < 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) { + enc_pms.len = kLen; + } + isTLS = PR_TRUE; + } else { + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->tls_keygen != 0); + } + + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + /* TRIPLE BYPASS, get PMS directly from RSA decryption. + * Use PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1 to decrypt the PMS to a buffer, + * then, check for version rollback attack, then + * do the equivalent of ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret, placing the MS in + * pwSpec->msItem. Finally call ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec with + * ss and NULL, so that it will use the MS we've already derived here. + */ + + rv = PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1(serverKey, rsaPmsBuf, &outLen, + sizeof rsaPmsBuf, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* triple bypass failed. Let's try for a double bypass. */ + goto double_bypass; + } else if (ss->opt.detectRollBack) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version = + (rsaPmsBuf[0] << 8) | rsaPmsBuf[1]; + if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) { + /* Version roll-back detected. ensure failure. */ + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(rsaPmsBuf, sizeof rsaPmsBuf); + } + } + /* have PMS, build MS without PKCS11 */ + rv = ssl3_MasterKeyDeriveBypass(pwSpec, cr, sr, &pmsItem, isTLS, + PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret; + pwSpec->msItem.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH; + PK11_GenerateRandom(pwSpec->msItem.data, pwSpec->msItem.len); + } + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + } else { +double_bypass: + /* + * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer + * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do + * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the + * unwrapped pms will be used. + */ + pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKey, &enc_pms, + CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0); + if (pms != NULL) { + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "decrypted premaster secret:", + PK11_GetKeyData(pms)->data, + PK11_GetKeyData(pms)->len)); + } else { + /* unwrap failed. Generate a bogus PMS and carry on. */ + PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKey); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + + if (pms == NULL) { + /* last gasp. */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SEND_ALERT + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey = NULL; + SECStatus rv; +const ssl3KEADef * kea_def; + ssl3KeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL; +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + SECKEYPublicKey *serverPubKey = NULL; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + + kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey) { + PORT_Assert(kea_def->is_limited /* XXX OR cert is signing only */ + && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa + && ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL); + if (!kea_def->is_limited || + kea_def->exchKeyType != kt_rsa || + ss->stepDownKeyPair == NULL) { + /* shouldn't happen, don't use step down if it does */ + goto skip; + } + serverKeyPair = ss->stepDownKeyPair; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB; + } else +skip: +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + /* XXX Using SSLKEAType to index server certifiates + * does not work for (EC)DHE ciphers. Until we have + * an indexing mechanism general enough for all key + * exchange algorithms, we'll need to deal with each + * one seprately. + */ + if ((kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) || + (kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa)) { + if (ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair != NULL) { + serverKeyPair = ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair; + if (serverKeyPair->pubKey) { + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey); + } + } + } else +#endif + { + sslServerCerts * sc = ss->serverCerts + kea_def->exchKeyType; + serverKeyPair = sc->serverKeyPair; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits; + } + + if (serverKeyPair) { + serverKey = serverKeyPair->privKey; + } + + if (serverKey == NULL) { + SEND_ALERT + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType; + + switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case kt_rsa: + rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SEND_ALERT + return SECFailure; /* error code set */ + } + break; + + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + case kt_ecdh: + /* XXX We really ought to be able to store multiple + * EC certs (a requirement if we wish to support both + * ECDH-RSA and ECDH-ECDSA key exchanges concurrently). + * When we make that change, we'll need an index other + * than kt_ecdh to pick the right EC certificate. + */ + if (serverKeyPair) { + serverPubKey = serverKeyPair->pubKey; + } + if (serverPubKey == NULL) { + /* XXX Is this the right error code? */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, + serverPubKey, serverKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set */ + } + break; +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + + default: + (void) ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; + +} + +/* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, 3); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); + } + return rv; /* error, if any, set by functions called above. */ +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + NewSessionTicket session_ticket; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + + session_ticket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(); + if (length < 4) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + session_ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = + (PRUint32)ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &b, &length); + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &session_ticket.ticket, 2, + &b, &length); + if (length != 0 || rv != SECSuccess) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + } + + rv = ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &session_ticket); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; +} + +#ifdef NISCC_TEST +static PRInt32 connNum = 0; + +static SECStatus +get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex) +{ + PRFileDesc *cf; + char * testdir; + char * startat; + char * stopat; + const char *extension; + int fileNum; + PRInt32 numBytes = 0; + PRStatus prStatus; + PRFileInfo info; + char cfn[100]; + + pCertItem->data = 0; + if ((testdir = PR_GetEnv("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) { + return SECSuccess; + } + *pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root")); + extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der"); + fileNum = PR_AtomicIncrement(&connNum) - 1; + if ((startat = PR_GetEnv("START_AT")) != NULL) { + fileNum += atoi(startat); + } + if ((stopat = PR_GetEnv("STOP_AT")) != NULL && + fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) { + *pIndex = -1; + return SECSuccess; + } + sprintf(cfn, "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension); + cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0); + if (!cf) { + goto loser; + } + prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info); + if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) { + PR_Close(cf); + goto loser; + } + pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size); + if (pCertItem) { + numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size); + } + PR_Close(cf); + if (numBytes != info.size) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO); + goto loser; + } + fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + fprintf(stderr, "failed to use %s\n", cfn); + *pIndex = -1; + return SECFailure; +} +#endif + +/* + * Used by both client and server. + * Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertificateList *certChain; + int len = 0; + int i; + SSL3KEAType certIndex; +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + SECItem fakeCert; + int ndex = -1; +#endif + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.localCert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + sslServerCerts * sc = NULL; + + /* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for + * indexing certificates (it breaks when we deal + * with (EC)DHE-* cipher suites. This hack ensures + * the RSA cert is picked for (EC)DHE-RSA. + * Revisit this when we add server side support + * for ECDHE-ECDSA or client-side authentication + * using EC certificates. + */ + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa)) { + certIndex = kt_rsa; + } else { + certIndex = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + } + sc = ss->serverCerts + certIndex; + certChain = sc->serverCertChain; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits; + ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sc->serverCert); + } else { + certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + } + +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex); +#endif + + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { + len += fakeCert.len + 3; + } else { + len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; + } +#else + len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; +#endif + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, fakeCert.data, + fakeCert.len, 3); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&fakeCert, PR_FALSE); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); + } +#else + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); +#endif + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain + * from the cert database after they've been validated. + */ +static void +ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRArenaPool * arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena; + ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain; + + for (; certs; certs = certs->next) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert); + } + if (arena) PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL; + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Certificate message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + ssl3CertNode * c; + ssl3CertNode * certs = NULL; + PRArenaPool * arena = NULL; + CERTCertificate *cert; + PRInt32 remaining = 0; + PRInt32 size; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = (PRBool)(!!ss->sec.isServer); + PRBool trusted = PR_FALSE; + PRBool isTLS; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE; + SECItem certItem; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert)) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + if (ss->sec.peerKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; + } + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } + + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message + ** with a zero-length message body. We'll treat that case like a + ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability. + */ + if (length) { + remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (remaining < 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + if ((PRUint32)remaining > length) + goto decode_loser; + } + + if (!remaining) { + if (!(isTLS && isServer)) + goto alert_loser; + /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + goto cert_block; + } + + ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if ( arena == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + /* First get the peer cert. */ + remaining -= 3; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (size <= 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + if (remaining < size) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = b; + certItem.len = size; + b += size; + length -= size; + remaining -= size; + + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { + /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the + * problem was just some local problem, like memory error. + */ + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + /* Now get all of the CA certs. */ + while (remaining > 0) { + remaining -= 3; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (size <= 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + if (remaining < size) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = b; + certItem.len = size; + b += size; + length -= size; + remaining -= size; + + c = PORT_ArenaNew(arena, ssl3CertNode); + if (c == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (c->cert == NULL) { + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + if (c->cert->trust) + trusted = PR_TRUE; + + c->next = certs; + certs = c; + } + + if (remaining != 0) + goto decode_loser; + + SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); + + /* + * Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain. + */ + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd, + PR_TRUE, isServer); + if (rv) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + if (!ss->handleBadCert) { + goto bad_cert; + } + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd); + if ( rv ) { + if ( rv == SECWouldBlock ) { + /* someone will handle this connection asynchronously*/ + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: go to async cert handler", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = certs; + certs = NULL; + ssl_SetAlwaysBlock(ss); + goto cert_block; + } + /* cert is bad */ + goto bad_cert; + } + /* cert is good */ + } + + /* start SSL Step Up, if appropriate */ + cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + if (!isServer && + ssl3_global_policy_some_restricted && + ss->ssl3.policy == SSL_ALLOWED && + anyRestrictedEnabled(ss) && + SECSuccess == CERT_VerifyCertNow(cert->dbhandle, cert, + PR_FALSE, /* checkSig */ + certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp, +/*XXX*/ ss->authCertificateArg) ) { + ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_RESTRICTED; + ss->ssl3.hs.rehandshake = PR_TRUE; + } + + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* set the server authentication and key exchange types and sizes + ** from the value in the cert. If the key exchange key is different, + ** it will get fixed when we handle the server key exchange message. + */ + SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType; + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + if (pubKey) { + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits = + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey); +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + if (ss->sec.keaType == kt_ecdh) { + /* Get authKeyBits from signing key. + * XXX The code below uses a quick approximation of + * key size based on cert->signatureWrap.signature.data + * (which contains the DER encoded signature). The field + * cert->signatureWrap.signature.len contains the + * length of the encoded signature in bits. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdh_ecdsa) { + ss->sec.authKeyBits = + cert->signatureWrap.signature.data[3]*8; + if (cert->signatureWrap.signature.data[4] == 0x00) + ss->sec.authKeyBits -= 8; + /* + * XXX: if cert is not signed by ecdsa we should + * destroy pubKey and goto bad_cert + */ + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdh_rsa) { + ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->signatureWrap.signature.len; + /* + * XXX: if cert is not signed by rsa we should + * destroy pubKey and goto bad_cert + */ + } + } +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + pubKey = NULL; + } + } + + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = certs; certs = NULL; arena = NULL; + +cert_block: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + } else { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; /* disallow server_key_exchange */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->is_limited || + /* XXX OR server cert is signing only. */ +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa || + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa || +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; /* allow server_key_exchange */ + } + } + + /* rv must normally be equal to SECSuccess here. If we called + * handleBadCert, it can also be SECWouldBlock. + */ + return rv; + +ambiguous_err: + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + switch (errCode) { + case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: + case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: + if (isTLS) { + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + goto loser; + } + /* fall through to bad_cert. */ + +bad_cert: /* caller has set errCode. */ + switch (errCode) { + case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: desc = unsupported_certificate; break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_expired; break; + case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_revoked; break; + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: + desc = certificate_unknown; break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: + desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; break; + + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: + case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: + default: desc = bad_certificate; break; + } + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode)); + + goto alert_loser; + +decode_loser: + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = certs; certs = NULL; arena = NULL; + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } + (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + + +/* restart an SSL connection that we stopped to run certificate dialogs +** XXX Need to document here how an application marks a cert to show that +** the application has accepted it (overridden CERT_VerifyCert). + * + * XXX This code only works on the initial handshake on a connection, XXX + * It does not work on a subsequent handshake (redo). + * + * Return value: XXX + * + * Caller holds 1stHandshakeLock. +*/ +int +ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert(sslSocket *ss) +{ + CERTCertificate * cert; + int rv = SECSuccess; + + if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + SET_ERROR_CODE + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) { + SET_ERROR_CODE + return SECFailure; + } + + cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + + /* Permit step up if user decided to accept the cert */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer && + ssl3_global_policy_some_restricted && + ss->ssl3.policy == SSL_ALLOWED && + anyRestrictedEnabled(ss) && + (SECSuccess == CERT_VerifyCertNow(cert->dbhandle, cert, + PR_FALSE, /* checksig */ + certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp, +/*XXX*/ ss->authCertificateArg) )) { + ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_RESTRICTED; + ss->ssl3.hs.rehandshake = PR_TRUE; + } + + if (ss->handshake != NULL) { + ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake; + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msgState.buf != NULL) { + rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, NULL, &ss->gs.buf); + } + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + } + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool isServer, + const SSL3Finished * hashes, + TLSFinished * tlsFinished) +{ + const char * label; + unsigned int len; + SECStatus rv; + + label = isServer ? "server finished" : "client finished"; + len = 15; + + if (spec->master_secret && !spec->bypassCiphers) { + SECItem param = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + PK11Context *prf_context = + PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, CKA_SIGN, + spec->master_secret, ¶m); + if (!prf_context) + return SECFailure; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (const unsigned char *) label, len); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, hashes->md5, sizeof *hashes); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, tlsFinished->verify_data, + &len, sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || len == sizeof *tlsFinished); + + PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); + } else { + /* bypass PKCS11 */ + SECItem inData = { siBuffer, }; + SECItem outData = { siBuffer, }; + PRBool isFIPS = PR_FALSE; + + inData.data = (unsigned char *)hashes->md5; + inData.len = sizeof hashes[0]; + outData.data = tlsFinished->verify_data; + outData.len = sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data; + rv = TLS_PRF(&spec->msItem, label, &inData, &outData, isFIPS); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || \ + outData.len == sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); + } + return rv; +} + +/* called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone + * ssl3_HandleClientHello + * ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + PRBool isTLS; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client; + SSL3Finished hashes; + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender); + if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ + } + + if (isTLS) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes, sizeof hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + return SECSuccess; + +fail: + return rv; +} + +/* wrap the master secret, and put it into the SID. + * Caller holds the Spec read lock. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType) +{ + PK11SymKey * wrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo * symKeySlot; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(spec->master_secret); + if (!isServer) { + int wrapKeyIndex; + int incarnation; + + /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */ + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex = + PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot); + PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */ + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation = + PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before + * placing it in the SID cache entry. */ + wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, + pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } else { + int keyLength; + /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it. + * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot + * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection, + * but we will not be able to restart this session. + */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL, + keyLength, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey); + } + } + } else { + /* server socket using session cache. */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) { + wrappingKey = + getWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, effectiveExchKeyType, + mechanism, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } + } + } + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism; + PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot); + + if (wrappingKey) { + SECItem wmsItem; + + wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey, + spec->master_secret, &wmsItem); + /* rv is examined below. */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len; + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Finished message from the peer. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + PRBool isTLS; + PRBool doStepUp; + SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + if (isTLS) { + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + if (length != sizeof tlsFinished) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer, + hashes, &tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess || + 0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b, length)) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + if (length != sizeof(SSL3Hashes)) { + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(hashes, b, length)) { + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + doStepUp = (PRBool)(!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.rehandshake); + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) || + (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) { + PRInt32 flags = 0; + + /* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us + * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify. + * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the + * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the + * ServerHello message.) + */ + if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, session_ticket_xtn)) { + rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data) + ** or if it is going to step up, + ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the + ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished) + ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data. + */ + if (doStepUp || ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) { + flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + + /* Optimization: don't cache this connection if we're going to step up. */ + if (doStepUp) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.rehandshake = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss); +xmit_loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return rv; /* err code is set if appropriate. */ + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + /* The first handshake is now completed. */ + ss->handshake = NULL; + ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE; + ss->gs.writeOffset = 0; + ss->gs.readOffset = 0; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) { + effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa; + } else { + effectiveExchKeyType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + } + + if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.cache) { + /* fill in the sid */ + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + sid->u.ssl3.compression = ss->ssl3.hs.compression; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy; +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + sid->u.ssl3.negotiatedECCurves = ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves; +#endif + sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = effectiveExchKeyType; + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->authAlgorithm = ss->sec.authAlgorithm; + sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType; + sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(); + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout; + sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */ + if (ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data) { + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = + ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len; + memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data, ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len); + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_FALSE; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, + ss->ssl3.crSpec, + effectiveExchKeyType); + sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_TRUE; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + /* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid. + * The connection continues normally however. + */ + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + (*ss->sec.cache)(sid); + } + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake; + + /* Do the handshake callback for sslv3 here. */ + if (ss->handshakeCallback != NULL) { + (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3 + * hanshake message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SSL3HandshakeType type = ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; + SSL3Hashes hashes; /* computed hashes are put here. */ + PRUint8 hdr[4]; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + /* + * We have to compute the hashes before we update them with the + * current message. + */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if((type == finished) || (type == certificate_verify)) { + SSL3Sender sender = (SSL3Sender)0; + ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + + if (type == finished) { + sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server; + rSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/ + } + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type))); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "MD5 handshake hash:", + (unsigned char*)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (ss, "SHA handshake hash:", + (unsigned char*)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; + hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length ); + + /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == client_hello) { + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + /* We should not include hello_request messages in the handshake hashes */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_request) { + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char*) hdr, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */ + } + + PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */ + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case hello_request: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss); + break; + case client_hello: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_hello: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate: + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_key_exchange: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate_request: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_hello_done: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss); + break; + case certificate_verify: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, &hashes); + break; + case client_key_exchange: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case new_session_ticket: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); + break; + case finished: + rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, &hashes); + break; + default: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record. + * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content. + * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) +{ + /* + * There may be a partial handshake message already in the handshake + * state. The incoming buffer may contain another portion, or a + * complete message or several messages followed by another portion. + * + * Each message is made contiguous before being passed to the actual + * message parser. + */ + sslBuffer *buf = &ss->ssl3.hs.msgState; /* do not lose the original buffer pointer */ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (buf->buf == NULL) { + *buf = *origBuf; + } + while (buf->len > 0) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) { + uint8 t; + t = *(buf->buf++); + buf->len--; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0) + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) + continue; + +#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } +#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN + + /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through, + ** even if buf->len is zero. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0) + continue; + } + + /* + * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new + * data available for this message. If it can be done right out + * of the original buffer, then use it from there. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf->len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + /* handle it from input buffer */ + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf->buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + /* This test wants to fall through on either + * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set the error code. + */ + return rv; + } + buf->buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; + buf->len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */ + return rv; + } + } else { + /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */ + unsigned int bytes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + bytes = PR_MIN(buf->len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len); + + /* Grow the buffer if needed */ + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len, + buf->buf, bytes); + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes; + buf->buf += bytes; + buf->len -= bytes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + + /* if we have a whole message, do it */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + /* + * XXX This appears to be wrong. This error handling + * should clean up after a SECWouldBlock return, like the + * error handling used 40 lines before/above this one, + */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set error code. */ + return rv; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; + } else { + PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0); + break; + } + } + } /* end loop */ + + origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ + buf->buf = NULL; /* not a leak. */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the + * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf) + * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf + * is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type, + * unless it's an application record. + * + * If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and + * checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL + * Handshake message. + * + * DOES NOT process the decrypted/decompressed application data. + * On return, databuf contains the decrypted/decompressed record. + * + * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake + * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq + * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert + * + * Caller must hold the RecvBufLock. + * + * This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the + * lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than + * Application Data records. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) +{ +const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + ssl3CipherSpec * crSpec; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1; + unsigned int padding_length; + PRBool isTLS; + PRBool padIsBad = PR_FALSE; + SSL3ContentType rType; + SSL3Opaque hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + sslBuffer *plaintext; + sslBuffer temp_buf; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + + if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) { + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + } + + /* check for Token Presence */ + if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* cText is NULL when we're called from ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterXXX(). + * This implies that databuf holds a previously deciphered SSL Handshake + * message. + */ + if (cText == NULL) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rType = content_handshake; + goto process_it; + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/ + + crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + + /* If we will be decompressing the buffer we need to decrypt somewhere + * other than into databuf */ + if (crSpec->decompress) { + temp_buf.buf = NULL; + temp_buf.space = 0; + plaintext = &temp_buf; + } else { + plaintext = databuf; + } + + plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by decode call below. */ + if (plaintext->space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)); + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len)); + + cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def; + isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + if (isTLS && cText->buf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */ + rv = crSpec->decode( + crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len, + plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len); + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILURE); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + isTLS ? decryption_failed : bad_record_mac); + PORT_SetError(err); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + padding_length = *(plaintext->buf + plaintext->len - 1); + /* TLS permits padding to exceed the block size, up to 255 bytes. */ + if (padding_length + 1 + crSpec->mac_size > plaintext->len) + padIsBad = PR_TRUE; + /* if TLS, check value of first padding byte. */ + else if (padding_length && isTLS && + padding_length != *(plaintext->buf + + plaintext->len - (padding_length + 1))) + padIsBad = PR_TRUE; + else + plaintext->len -= padding_length + 1; + } + + /* Remove the MAC. */ + if (plaintext->len >= crSpec->mac_size) + plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; + else + padIsBad = PR_TRUE; /* really macIsBad */ + + /* compute the MAC */ + rType = cText->type; + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), + rType, cText->version, crSpec->read_seq_num, + plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac); + PORT_SetError(err); + return rv; + } + + /* Check the MAC */ + if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size || padIsBad || + NSS_SecureMemcmp(plaintext->buf + plaintext->len, hash, + crSpec->mac_size) != 0) { + /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */ + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac); + /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: mac check failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + return SECFailure; + } + + + + ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&crSpec->read_seq_num); + + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/ + + /* + * The decrypted data is now in plaintext. + */ + + /* possibly decompress the record. If we aren't using compression then + * plaintext == databuf and so the uncompressed data is already in + * databuf. */ + if (crSpec->decompress) { + if (databuf->space < plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow( + databuf, plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION)); + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = crSpec->decompress(crSpec->decompressContext, + databuf->buf, + (int*) &databuf->len, + databuf->space, + plaintext->buf, + plaintext->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + isTLS ? decompression_failure : bad_record_mac); + PORT_SetError(err); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + } + + /* + ** Having completed the decompression, check the length again. + */ + if (isTLS && databuf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024)) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this + ** function, not by this function. + */ + if (rType == content_application_data) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application. + */ +process_it: + /* XXX Get the xmit lock here. Odds are very high that we'll be xmiting + * data ang getting the xmit lock here prevents deadlocks. + */ + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if + ** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock. + */ + switch (rType) { + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_alert: + rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_handshake: + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); + break; + /* + case content_application_data is handled before this switch + */ + default: + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type)); + /* XXX Send an alert ??? */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; + +} + +/* + * Initialization functions + */ + +/* Called from ssl3_InitState, immediately below. */ +/* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */ +static void +ssl3_InitCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + spec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null]; + PORT_Assert(spec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null); + spec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac_null]; + PORT_Assert(spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null); + spec->encode = Null_Cipher; + spec->decode = Null_Cipher; + spec->destroy = NULL; + spec->compress = NULL; + spec->decompress = NULL; + spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; + spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; + spec->mac_size = 0; + spec->master_secret = NULL; + spec->bypassCiphers = PR_FALSE; + + spec->msItem.data = NULL; + spec->msItem.len = 0; + + spec->client.write_key = NULL; + spec->client.write_mac_key = NULL; + spec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + + spec->server.write_key = NULL; + spec->server.write_mac_key = NULL; + spec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + + spec->write_seq_num.high = 0; + spec->write_seq_num.low = 0; + + spec->read_seq_num.high = 0; + spec->read_seq_num.low = 0; + + spec->version = ss->opt.enableTLS + ? SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS + : SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord +** ssl3_StartHandshakeHash() <- ssl2_BeginClientHandshake() +** ssl3_SendClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleServerHello() +** ssl3_HandleClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleRecord() +** +** This function should perhaps acquire and release the SpecWriteLock. +** +** +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.initialized) + return SECSuccess; /* Function should be idempotent */ + + ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[0]; + ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[1]; + ss->ssl3.hs.rehandshake = PR_FALSE; + ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec); + ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec); + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : wait_server_hello; +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves = SSL3_SUPPORTED_CURVES_MASK; +#endif + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData)); + + rv = ssl3_NewHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_TRUE; + } + + return rv; +} + +/* Returns a reference counted object that contains a key pair. + * Or NULL on failure. Initial ref count is 1. + * Uses the keys in the pair as input. + */ +ssl3KeyPair * +ssl3_NewKeyPair( SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey, SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey) +{ + ssl3KeyPair * pair; + + if (!privKey || !pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + pair = PORT_ZNew(ssl3KeyPair); + if (!pair) + return NULL; /* error code is set. */ + pair->refCount = 1; + pair->privKey = privKey; + pair->pubKey = pubKey; + return pair; /* success */ +} + +ssl3KeyPair * +ssl3_GetKeyPairRef(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair) +{ + PR_AtomicIncrement(&keyPair->refCount); + return keyPair; +} + +void +ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair) +{ + PRInt32 newCount = PR_AtomicDecrement(&keyPair->refCount); + if (!newCount) { + if (keyPair->privKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keyPair->privKey); + if (keyPair->pubKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey( keyPair->pubKey); + PORT_Free(keyPair); + } +} + + + +/* + * Creates the public and private RSA keys for SSL Step down. + * Called from SSL_ConfigSecureServer in sslsecur.c + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CreateRSAStepDownKeys(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey; /* RSA step down key */ + SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey; /* RSA step down key */ + + if (ss->stepDownKeyPair) + ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ss->stepDownKeyPair); + ss->stepDownKeyPair = NULL; +#ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER + /* Sigh, should have a get key strength call for private keys */ + if (PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY) > + EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH) { + /* need to ask for the key size in bits */ + privKey = SECKEY_CreateRSAPrivateKey(EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB, + &pubKey, NULL); + if (!privKey || !pubKey || + !(ss->stepDownKeyPair = ssl3_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey))) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + rv = SECFailure; + } + } +#endif + return rv; +} + + +/* record the export policy for this cipher suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->policy = policy; + + if (policy == SSL_RESTRICTED) { + ssl3_global_policy_some_restricted = PR_TRUE; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRInt32 policy; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + policy = suite->policy; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *oPolicy = policy; + return rv; +} + +/* record the user preference for this suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->enabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* return the user preference for this suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *enabled = pref; + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->enabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefGet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *enabled = pref; + return rv; +} + +/* copy global default policy into socket. */ +void +ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof cipherSuites); +} + +/* ssl3_config_match_init must have already been called by + * the caller of this function. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *cs, int *size) +{ + int i, count = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss != 0); + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss->opt.enableSSL3 && !ss->opt.enableTLS) { + *size = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + if (cs == NULL) { + *size = count_cipher_suites(ss, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE); + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* ssl3_config_match_init was called by the caller of this function. */ + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (config_match(suite, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE)) { + if (cs != NULL) { + *cs++ = 0x00; + *cs++ = (suite->cipher_suite >> 8) & 0xFF; + *cs++ = suite->cipher_suite & 0xFF; + } + count++; + } + } + *size = count; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* +** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state, +** then start a new handshake. +** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a +** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done. +** +** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache) +{ + sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (!ss->firstHsDone || + ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) && + ss->ssl3.initialized && + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake))) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; + } + if (sid && flushCache) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */ + ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + /* start off a new handshake. */ + rv = (ss->sec.isServer) ? ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss) + : ssl3_SendClientHello(ss); + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl_DestroySocketContents() in sslsock.c */ +void +ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss) +{ + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + + if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL) + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + + /* clean up handshake */ + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + SHA1_DestroyContext((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, PR_FALSE); + MD5_DestroyContext((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, PR_FALSE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5,PR_TRUE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha,PR_TRUE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) { + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf); + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0; + } + + /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */ + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf); + + /* free up the CipherSpecs */ + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[0]); + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[1]); + + ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_FALSE; +} + +/* End of ssl3con.c */ |