diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c | 483 |
1 files changed, 483 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23f52a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c @@ -0,0 +1,483 @@ +/* + * Gather (Read) entire SSL2 records from socket into buffer. + * + * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK ***** + * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1 + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version + * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ + * + * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, + * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License + * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the + * License. + * + * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries. + * + * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is + * Netscape Communications Corporation. + * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000 + * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Contributor(s): + * + * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of + * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or + * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"), + * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead + * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only + * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to + * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your + * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice + * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete + * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under + * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL. + * + * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */ +/* $Id: sslgathr.c,v 1.10 2009/10/16 17:45:35 wtc%google.com Exp $ */ +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" + +/* Forward static declarations */ +static SECStatus ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss); + +/* +** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code +** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of +** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data +** for the record into gs->buf. This code handles non-blocking I/O +** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0. +** This function decrypts the gathered record in place, in gs_buf. + * + * Caller must hold RecvBufLock. + * + * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record. + * Returns 0 if it hits EOF. + * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error + * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) when it gathers an SSL v3 client hello header. +** +** The SSL2 Gather State machine has 4 states: +** GS_INIT - Done reading in previous record. Haven't begun to read in +** next record. When ssl2_GatherData is called with the machine +** in this state, the machine will attempt to read the first 3 +** bytes of the SSL2 record header, and will advance the state +** to GS_HEADER. +** +** GS_HEADER - The machine is in this state while waiting for the completion +** of the first 3 bytes of the SSL2 record. When complete, the +** machine will compute the remaining unread length of this record +** and will initiate a read of that many bytes. The machine will +** advance to one of two states, depending on whether the record +** is encrypted (GS_MAC), or unencrypted (GS_DATA). +** +** GS_MAC - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder +** of the SSL2 record to be read in. When the read is completed, +** the machine checks the record for valid length, decrypts it, +** and checks and discards the MAC, then advances to GS_INIT. +** +** GS_DATA - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder +** of the unencrypted SSL2 record to be read in. Upon completion, +** the machine advances to the GS_INIT state and returns the data. +*/ +int +ssl2_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags) +{ + unsigned char * bp; + unsigned char * pBuf; + int nb, err, rv; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + + if (gs->state == GS_INIT) { + /* Initialize gathering engine */ + gs->state = GS_HEADER; + gs->remainder = 3; + gs->count = 3; + gs->offset = 0; + gs->recordLen = 0; + gs->recordPadding = 0; + gs->hdr[2] = 0; + + gs->writeOffset = 0; + gs->readOffset = 0; + } + if (gs->encrypted) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.hash != 0); + } + + pBuf = gs->buf.buf; + for (;;) { + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder)); + bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? pBuf : gs->hdr) + gs->offset; + nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags); + if (nb > 0) { + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb)); + } + if (nb == 0) { + /* EOF */ + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rv = 0; + break; + } + if (nb < 0) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + PR_GetError())); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + gs->offset += nb; + gs->remainder -= nb; + + if (gs->remainder > 0) { + continue; + } + + /* Probably finished this piece */ + switch (gs->state) { + case GS_HEADER: + if ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) { + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) ); + + /* If this looks like an SSL3 handshake record, + ** and we're expecting an SSL2 Hello message from our peer, + ** handle it here. + */ + if (gs->hdr[0] == content_handshake) { + if ((ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage) || + (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage)) { + rv = ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(ss); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + /* XXX_1 The call stack to here is: + * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake -> + * ssl2_GatherRecord -> here. + * We want to return all the way out to ssl_Do1stHandshake, + * and have it call ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake again. + * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will call + * ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake when it is called again. + * + * Returning SECWouldBlock here causes + * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to return without clearing + * ss->handshake, ensuring that ssl_Do1stHandshake will + * call it again immediately. + * + * If we return 1 here, ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will + * clear ss->handshake before returning, and thus will not + * be called again by ssl_Do1stHandshake. + */ + return SECWouldBlock; + } else if (gs->hdr[0] == content_alert) { + if (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage) { + /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any failure + * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match + * XXX ciphers. + */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } /* ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) */ + + /* we've got the first 3 bytes. The header may be two or three. */ + if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) { + /* This record has a 2-byte header, and no padding */ + gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1]; + gs->recordPadding = 0; + } else { + /* This record has a 3-byte header that is all read in now. */ + gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1]; + /* is_escape = (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) != 0; */ + gs->recordPadding = gs->hdr[2]; + } + if (!gs->count) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (gs->count > gs->buf.space) { + err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, gs->count); + if (err) { + return err; + } + pBuf = gs->buf.buf; + } + + + if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) { + /* we've already read in the first byte of the body. + ** Put it into the buffer. + */ + pBuf[0] = gs->hdr[2]; + gs->offset = 1; + gs->remainder = gs->count - 1; + } else { + gs->offset = 0; + gs->remainder = gs->count; + } + + if (gs->encrypted) { + gs->state = GS_MAC; + gs->recordLen = gs->count - gs->recordPadding + - ss->sec.hash->length; + } else { + gs->state = GS_DATA; + gs->recordLen = gs->count; + } + + break; + + + case GS_MAC: + /* Have read in entire rest of the ciphertext. + ** Check for valid length. + ** Decrypt it. + ** Check the MAC. + */ + PORT_Assert(gs->encrypted); + + { + unsigned int macLen; + int nout; + unsigned char mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_BYTES]; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /**********************************/ + + /* If this is a stream cipher, blockSize will be 1, + * and this test will always be false. + * If this is a block cipher, this will detect records + * that are not a multiple of the blocksize in length. + */ + if (gs->count & (ss->sec.blockSize - 1)) { + /* This is an error. Sender is misbehaving */ + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: sender, count=%d blockSize=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->count, + ss->sec.blockSize)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING); + rv = SECFailure; + goto spec_locked_done; + } + PORT_Assert(gs->count == gs->offset); + + if (gs->offset == 0) { + rv = 0; /* means EOF. */ + goto spec_locked_done; + } + + /* Decrypt the portion of data that we just recieved. + ** Decrypt it in place. + */ + rv = (*ss->sec.dec)(ss->sec.readcx, pBuf, &nout, gs->offset, + pBuf, gs->offset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto spec_locked_done; + } + + + /* Have read in all the MAC portion of record + ** + ** Prepare MAC by resetting it and feeding it the shared secret + */ + macLen = ss->sec.hash->length; + if (gs->offset >= macLen) { + PRUint32 sequenceNumber = ss->sec.rcvSequence++; + unsigned char seq[4]; + + seq[0] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 24); + seq[1] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 16); + seq[2] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 8); + seq[3] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber); + + (*ss->sec.hash->begin)(ss->sec.hashcx); + (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, ss->sec.rcvSecret.data, + ss->sec.rcvSecret.len); + (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, pBuf + macLen, + gs->offset - macLen); + (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, seq, 4); + (*ss->sec.hash->end)(ss->sec.hashcx, mac, &macLen, macLen); + } + + PORT_Assert(macLen == ss->sec.hash->length); + + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************/ + + if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(mac, pBuf, macLen) != 0) { + /* MAC's didn't match... */ + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: mac check failed, seq=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.rcvSequence)); + PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "computed mac:", mac, macLen)); + PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "received mac:", pBuf, macLen)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + rv = SECFailure; + goto cleanup; + } + + + PORT_Assert(gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset); + if (gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset) { + gs->recordOffset = macLen; + gs->readOffset = macLen; + gs->writeOffset = gs->offset - gs->recordPadding; + rv = 1; + } else { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING); +cleanup: + /* nothing in the buffer any more. */ + gs->recordOffset = 0; + gs->readOffset = 0; + gs->writeOffset = 0; + rv = SECFailure; + } + + gs->recordLen = gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset; + gs->recordPadding = 0; /* forget we did any padding. */ + gs->state = GS_INIT; + + + if (rv > 0) { + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:", + pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen)); + } + return rv; + +spec_locked_done: + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + return rv; + } + + case GS_DATA: + /* Have read in all the DATA portion of record */ + + gs->recordOffset = 0; + gs->readOffset = 0; + gs->writeOffset = gs->offset; + PORT_Assert(gs->recordLen == gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset); + gs->recordLen = gs->offset; + gs->recordPadding = 0; + gs->state = GS_INIT; + + ++ss->sec.rcvSequence; + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:", + pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen)); + return 1; + + } /* end switch gs->state */ + } /* end gather loop. */ + return rv; +} + +/* +** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code +** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of +** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data +** for the record into the readBuf. This code handles non-blocking I/O +** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0. + * + * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record. + * Returns 0 if it hits EOF. + * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error + * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) + * + * Called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c, + * and by DoRecv in sslsecur.c + * Caller must hold RecvBufLock. + */ +int +ssl2_GatherRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags) +{ + return ssl2_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags); +} + +/* + * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record. + * Returns 0 if it hits EOF. + * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error + * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) + * + * Called from SocksStartGather in sslsocks.c + * Caller must hold RecvBufLock. + */ +int +ssl2_StartGatherBytes(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, unsigned int count) +{ + int rv; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + gs->state = GS_DATA; + gs->remainder = count; + gs->count = count; + gs->offset = 0; + if (count > gs->buf.space) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, count); + if (rv) { + return rv; + } + } + return ssl2_GatherData(ss, gs, 0); +} + +/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */ +SECStatus +ssl_InitGather(sslGather *gs) +{ + SECStatus status; + + gs->state = GS_INIT; + gs->writeOffset = 0; + gs->readOffset = 0; + status = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, 4096); + return status; +} + +/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */ +void +ssl_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs) +{ + if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */ + PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space); + PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf); + } +} + +/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */ +static SECStatus +ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2]; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) ); + + /* We've read in 3 bytes, there are 2 more to go in an ssl3 header. */ + ss->gs.remainder = 2; + ss->gs.count = 0; + + /* Clearing these handshake pointers ensures that + * ssl_Do1stHandshake won't call ssl2_HandleMessage when we return. + */ + ss->nextHandshake = 0; + ss->securityHandshake = 0; + + /* Setting ss->version to an SSL 3.x value will cause + ** ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to invoke ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake() + ** the next time it is called. + **/ + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + + return SECSuccess; +} |