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-rw-r--r--net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc4
-rw-r--r--net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc23
2 files changed, 18 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
index 52a6980..4d8b719 100644
--- a/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
+++ b/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
@@ -1641,11 +1641,9 @@ const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIncompleteIntermediateTestData[] = {
{ NULL, "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
false, false, true, false, true },
};
-// Disabled on Windows - http://crbug.com/101123. The Windows implementation
-// does not report the status of the last intermediate for incomplete chains.
// Disabled on NSS - libpkix does not return constructed chains on error,
// preventing us from detecting/inspecting the verified chain.
-#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(USE_NSS)
+#if defined(USE_NSS)
#define MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteIntermediate \
DISABLED_VerifyIncompleteIntermediate
#else
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc
index 4f27836..4f0d40c 100644
--- a/net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc
+++ b/net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc
@@ -330,11 +330,22 @@ void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context,
PCCERT_CONTEXT verified_cert = NULL;
std::vector<PCCERT_CONTEXT> verified_chain;
+ bool has_root_ca = num_elements > 1 &&
+ !(chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
+ CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
+
// Each chain starts with the end entity certificate (i = 0) and ends with
- // the root CA certificate (i = num_elements - 1). Do not inspect the
- // signature algorithm of the root CA certificate because the signature on
- // the trust anchor is not important.
- for (int i = 0; i < num_elements - 1; ++i) {
+ // either the root CA certificate or the last available intermediate. If a
+ // root CA certificate is present, do not inspect the signature algorithm of
+ // the root CA certificate because the signature on the trust anchor is not
+ // important.
+ if (has_root_ca) {
+ // If a full chain was constructed, regardless of whether it was trusted,
+ // don't inspect the root's signature algorithm.
+ num_elements -= 1;
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < num_elements; ++i) {
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext;
if (i == 0) {
verified_cert = cert;
@@ -361,8 +372,8 @@ void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context,
if (verified_cert) {
// Add the root certificate, if present, as it was not added above.
- if (num_elements > 1)
- verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext);
+ if (has_root_ca)
+ verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements]->pCertContext);
verify_result->verified_cert =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain);
}