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-rw-r--r--sandbox/linux/seccomp/access.cc97
1 files changed, 97 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp/access.cc b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/access.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbe7e53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp/access.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "debug.h"
+#include "sandbox_impl.h"
+
+namespace playground {
+
+long Sandbox::sandbox_access(const char *pathname, int mode) {
+ long long tm;
+ Debug::syscall(&tm, __NR_access, "Executing handler");
+ size_t len = strlen(pathname);
+ struct Request {
+ int sysnum;
+ long long cookie;
+ Access access_req;
+ char pathname[0];
+ } __attribute__((packed)) *request;
+ char data[sizeof(struct Request) + len];
+ request = reinterpret_cast<struct Request*>(data);
+ request->sysnum = __NR_access;
+ request->cookie = cookie();
+ request->access_req.path_length = len;
+ request->access_req.mode = mode;
+ memcpy(request->pathname, pathname, len);
+
+ long rc;
+ SysCalls sys;
+ if (write(sys, processFdPub(), request, sizeof(data)) != (int)sizeof(data) ||
+ read(sys, threadFdPub(), &rc, sizeof(rc)) != sizeof(rc)) {
+ die("Failed to forward access() request [sandbox]");
+ }
+ Debug::elapsed(tm, __NR_access);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+bool Sandbox::process_access(int parentMapsFd, int sandboxFd, int threadFdPub,
+ int threadFd, SecureMem::Args* mem) {
+ // Read request
+ SysCalls sys;
+ Access access_req;
+ if (read(sys, sandboxFd, &access_req, sizeof(access_req)) !=
+ sizeof(access_req)) {
+ read_parm_failed:
+ die("Failed to read parameters for access() [process]");
+ }
+ int rc = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (access_req.path_length >= sizeof(mem->pathname)) {
+ char buf[32];
+ while (access_req.path_length > 0) {
+ size_t len = access_req.path_length > sizeof(buf) ?
+ sizeof(buf) : access_req.path_length;
+ ssize_t i = read(sys, sandboxFd, buf, len);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ goto read_parm_failed;
+ }
+ access_req.path_length -= i;
+ }
+ if (write(sys, threadFd, &rc, sizeof(rc)) != sizeof(rc)) {
+ die("Failed to return data from access() [process]");
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!g_policy.allow_file_namespace) {
+ // After locking the mutex, we can no longer abandon the system call. So,
+ // perform checks before clobbering the securely shared memory.
+ char tmp[access_req.path_length];
+ if (read(sys, sandboxFd, tmp, access_req.path_length) !=
+ (ssize_t)access_req.path_length) {
+ goto read_parm_failed;
+ }
+ Debug::message(("Denying access to \"" + std::string(tmp) + "\"").c_str());
+ SecureMem::abandonSystemCall(threadFd, -EACCES);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SecureMem::lockSystemCall(parentMapsFd, mem);
+ if (read(sys, sandboxFd, mem->pathname, access_req.path_length) !=
+ (ssize_t)access_req.path_length) {
+ goto read_parm_failed;
+ }
+ mem->pathname[access_req.path_length] = '\000';
+
+ // TODO(markus): Implement sandboxing policy
+ Debug::message(("Allowing access to \"" + std::string(mem->pathname) +
+ "\"").c_str());
+
+ // Tell trusted thread to access the file.
+ SecureMem::sendSystemCall(threadFdPub, true, parentMapsFd, mem, __NR_access,
+ mem->pathname - (char*)mem + (char*)mem->self,
+ access_req.mode);
+ return true;
+}
+
+} // namespace