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* Be more restrictive when finding file names for libraries that need patching.markus@chromium.org2010-02-241-2/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This avoids false positives if the directory name matches one of the well-known library names (e.g. ld). False positives not only result in a performance hit at startup, because we are now trying to instrument libraries that don't actually contain any system calls; but even worse than this, we could try to instrument system calls in the sandboxing code itself. And those system calls are deliberately coded so that they will not get rewritten. Fortunately, none of this is a security problem. If we accidentally rewrite system calls that weren't supposed to be rewritten, we will just crash on startup. TEST=the sandbox now works on the buildbots BUG=36133 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/652188 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@39839 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Explicitly ask for unsigned values when comparing addresses. Not only is thismarkus@chromium.org2010-02-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | code hard to understand (and possibly broken) otherwise, some versions of GCC complain about the comparison without the cast. TEST=none BUG=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/657034 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@39838 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Treat calls to lstat() and lstat64() the same as calls to stat(). In practise,markus@chromium.org2010-02-243-17/+72
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | this means the calls will still be denied. But we now return a correct return code. But more importantly, this change brings the source code in line with the code of the stand-alone opensource sandbox. Wherever possible, we try to keep both code bases identical. TEST=none BUG=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/657040 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@39837 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* If /tmp is not a POSIX file system, try to use /dev/shm for creating ourmarkus@chromium.org2010-02-231-3/+58
| | | | | | | | | | | temporary directory. BUG=30926 TEST=tested with tmpfs, ext3 and NFS Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/650177 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@39679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Pulled out Callback code into base/callback.h. This is the first step ↵akalin@chromium.org2010-02-193-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | towards redoing the Callback interfaces. Added and removed includes as needed. BUG=35223 TEST=trybots Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/646061 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@39419 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* linux: change a type in the sandbox to fix a warningevan@chromium.org2010-02-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | int and long are the same size on the platforms we care about, but gcc doesn't like comparing int against LONG_MAX. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/604056 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@39071 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Sandbox: Some cleanup after the previous changes.rvargas@google.com2010-02-119-555/+465
| | | | | | | | | | | No real code change. BUG=27218 TEST=current tests. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/597050 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@38837 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Sandbox: Add support for EAT interceptions in 64 bit.rvargas@google.com2010-02-107-20/+128
| | | | | | | | | | BUG=27218 TEST=manual integration tests. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/600035 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@38681 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Sandbox: Finish the interception manager support for x64.rvargas@google.com2010-02-0422-152/+343
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unit tests and integration tests run (as long as they don't depend on IPCs), both regular and under SANDBOX_EXPORTS. The interception agent is there, but no EAT interceptions yet. BUG=27218 TEST=unit tests/ integration tests. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/565026 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@38143 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* seccomp: allow dup/dup2evan@chromium.org2010-02-031-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | This is needed for opening the renderer<->plugin channel. TEST=flash works in seccomp mode Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/563024 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@38037 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Sandbox: Add the 64-bit service resolver and a fewrvargas@google.com2010-02-017-157/+324
| | | | | | | | | | | extra bits of infrastructure. BUG=27218 TEST=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/558032 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37764 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Add a DCHECK to make sure that SpawnTarget is not callednsylvain@chromium.org2010-02-011-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | from multiple threads. In chrome all child processes are started from the PROCESS_LAUNCHER thread. BUG=28798 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/548192 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37712 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Sandbox: Add the base code for the 46-bit service resolver.rvargas@google.com2010-01-292-1/+304
| | | | | | | | | BUG=27218 TEST=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/552223 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37468 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Improve handling and testing of reparse points.rvargas@google.com2010-01-2710-101/+295
| | | | | | | | | BUG=28804 TEST=unit tests. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/553080 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37286 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Fix integer overflow in sboxcpu@chromium.org2010-01-223-29/+67
| | | | | | | | | BUG=32915 TEST= unit test included Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/553061 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@36923 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Make sure we can't create reg links from the sandbox.nsylvain@chromium.org2010-01-224-6/+68
| | | | | | | | BUG=28805 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/555041 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@36895 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Prepare the sandbox for integration with NaCl broker for 64-bit Windows. The ↵gregoryd@google.com2010-01-174-84/+137
| | | | | | | | | | broker currently launches with --no-sandbox, so the 64-bit version of the sandbox library is there only to allow successful build. BUG=27218 TEST=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/543058 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@36469 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Try the SANDOX_INERT flag in CreateRestrictedTokencpu@chromium.org2010-01-121-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | - It might help with the AppLocker problem. See bug below. BUG=10576 TEST=existing tests suffice Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/541018 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35990 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* linux: make the seccomp sandbox work againevan@chromium.org2010-01-081-12/+54
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We were hitting a stack overflow on renderer startup, because of the following: When we patch out syscalls, we need a scratch space near (within a 32-bit jump) of the original code. We pick the scratch space as the end of the nearest empty region available before the code we're patching. For the vdso region, the stack lies directly before it and so the region we'd grab was directly before the stack. This meant that as soon as the stack attempted to grow it'd fail because it ran into our patch region, and we'd hit a stack overflow. The fix is to specially note when we're near the stack region, and instead put our scratch space as far away from the stack as possible. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/518071 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35759 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Linux: Adjust /proc/pid/oom_adj to sacrifice plugin and renderer processes ↵thestig@chromium.org2009-12-104-1/+83
| | | | | | | | | | to the OOM killer. BUG=29752 TEST=During out of memory conditions, Linux kernel picks a plugin/renderer over the browser process. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/467058 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@34222 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* 64-bit compatibility changes for the sandbox codegregoryd@google.com2009-11-117-12/+27
| | | | | | | | | This CL contains some basic changes that eliminate some of the warnings that appear when the sandbox code is compiled for 64-bit Windows. This is part of a larger effort to support Native Client on 64-bit Windows (that will require the sandbox to support 64-bit Windows). TEST=will be tested when the rest of the code builds for 64-bit Windows BUG=27218 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/378030 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@31625 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Sort the source files in sandbox.gypgregoryd@google.com2009-11-091-70/+70
| | | | | | Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/375018 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@31449 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Allow the seccomp sandbox to be enabled, even if the suid sandbox hasmarkus@chromium.org2009-11-0720-103/+141
| | | | | | | | | | already put a chroot() jail around it. The only tricky part is access to /proc/self/maps, but we can safely pass in an open file descriptor. BUG=26527 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/371047 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@31372 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* linux: compile fix for chrome_sandbox on 64-bit karmicevan@chromium.org2009-11-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | You need <limits.h> for ULLONG_MAX. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/355025 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30978 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Only enable the seccomp sandbox, if the machine actually has kernel support formarkus@chromium.org2009-11-043-1/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | this feature, and if no other obstacle prevents us from enabling it. Otherwise, we print a warning message and continue running without the sandbox. This is not ideal, but given the non-trivial number of users who might not have seccomp enabled by default, this seems the prudent approach. BUG=26521 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/341092 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30966 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Allow chrome_sandbox to act as a helper program and find the socket with a ↵thestig@chromium.org2009-11-044-4/+168
| | | | | | | | | | given inode number. BUG=none TEST=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/312003 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30931 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Use scoped_array (not scoped_ptr) with new[].kuchhal@chromium.org2009-10-236-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | BUG=24266 TEST=No functional change so make sure nothing changes. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/307045 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@29843 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* GCC's optimizer is getting more aggressive. It is no longer goodmarkus@chromium.org2009-10-223-7/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | enough to just pass the address of a structure as an input parameter to assembly code. The assembly code must also mark "memory" as getting clobbered, even if it only wants to read from the structure. This seems to be a result of strict aliasing and the lack of an ability for the assembly code to clearly say which pointers it dereferences. Furthermore, if the assembly code touches the stack (e.g. uses "push"), it must now mark the stack pointer as getting clobbered. Otherwise, GCC assumes that the red zone won't be clobbered, and that it is possible to use the stack pointer as an input register. BUG=none TEST=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/320008 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@29829 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* - found all symbols that we directly access from assembly and marked them as ↵markus@chromium.org2009-10-2113-486/+210
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | internal. This ensures that the linker won't complain about IP relative addressing for symbols that could be overridden at run-time. - avoided using "g" register constraints, as there has been a report of some versions of GCC erroneously generating code that is no longer position independant when this constraint is used. - removed the old code that fork()'s a child to try to extend mappings of libraries at run-time. This code always was somewhat fragile and caused a measurable performance penalty when the sandbox was started. Replaced with code that remapped just the very first page. This can actually be done in a running process without disrupting the use of the libraries. - added a special case for the instrumentation code allowing it to deal with jumps between the VDSO and VSyscalls even if the instructions would normally not be eligible for interception as they are IP relative. After making this change, we can again find sufficiently large code snippets to rewrite them successfully. This is only a concern on x86_64. - fixed a bug that would erroneously look for IP relative addressing on x86_32. It doesn't exist for that architecture. TEST=none BUG=http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=18337 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/306036 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@29726 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Change yet again the way we do ResolveNTFunctionPtrcpu@chromium.org2009-10-141-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | - This version is different from last three TEST=chrome should start and you can browse BUG=11789 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/275014 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@29039 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Add comments setting emacs and vim tab width and expansion variables.sgk@google.com2009-10-061-0/+6
| | | | | | | | BUG=none TEST=successful builds Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/256059 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@28089 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Change again the way we do ResolveNTFunctionPtrcpu@chromium.org2009-09-291-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | - This version is different from last two TEST=chrome should start and you can browse BUG=11789 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/246026 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27453 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Preliminary fixes to enable link dependent objects.maruel@chromium.org2009-09-241-1/+5
| | | | | | | | BUG=22926 TEST=still builds Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/231020 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27112 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Force inclusion of build/common.gypi for all chromium gyp files.yaar@chromium.org2009-09-151-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Why: Simpler build code. If everybody includes it, it should be included automatically. Why now: The webkit chromium builds need it be specified, since can't default to build/common.gypi. What was done: 1. build/common.gypi's contents were moved to a new file build/gyp_chromium.gypi 2. tools/gyp/gyp_chromium was moved to build/gyp_chromium and made to automatically include build/gyp_chromium.gypi. 3. lots of gyp files were fixed to not refer to build/common.gypi any more. 4. o3d which also builds independently of chrome, was fixed to have a gyp_o3d that includes gyp_chromium.gypi too. 5. build/common.gypi was left empty, because there are some external projects that still refer to it. Things that are left to do after this patch is in: 1. The following external files (in other repositories) need to stop include common.gypi ./third_party/hunspell/hunspell.gyp ./third_party/icu/icu.gyp ./v8/tools/gyp/v8.gyp 2. Once nobody refers to common.gypi anymore, delete common.gypi -or- Delete gyp_chromium.gypi and move its content back to common.gypi Tested on mac, win and linux. On win, got a few unit tests errors on chrome bookmarks, which should not be related. I'm running again with clobber to verify. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/206006 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@26302 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Linux: add support for SELinux.agl@chromium.org2009-09-151-1/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds support for a selinux GYP variable which, when set to one, does the following: * Removes the seccomp sandbox from the compile * Removes support for SUID sandboxing from the zygote * Performs a dynamic transition, in the zygote, to chromium_renderer_t. This code requires that the system policy have a sensible set of access vectors for the chromium_renderer_t type. Such a policy will be found in sandbox/selinux in the future. http://codereview.chromium.org/203071 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@26257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Fix minor compilation issues that can trigger on some platforms (e.g. CentOS)markus@chromium.org2009-09-142-2/+2
| | | | | | | | TEST=none BUG=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/204012 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@26175 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Despite the futex(2) manual page telling us to include <linux/futex.h>, thismarkus@chromium.org2009-09-142-1/+59
| | | | | | | | | | | | | is neither sufficient nor necessary. The header does not actually include a definition for futex(). And while it does include definitions for useful constants, the version of the file that is shipped by some distributions (e.g Centos) doesn't even compile as it is meant to only be used by the Linux kernel. TEST=none BUG=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/193104 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@26167 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Simplify ResolveNTFunctionPtr (temporary)cpu@chromium.org2009-09-091-33/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I want to test the theory that the issues we are observing here are actually a race condition. - The race condtion would be related with 2 operations that are not thread safe: 1- check/creation of the map 2- search/insert on the map I would like to air this CL on dev channel for a week and observe the crash rate. BUG=11789 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/199052 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@25741 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Fix issue 8348: unfork pe_image.h / pe_image.cctkent@chromium.org2009-09-0812-1017/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Moved versions of those files from sandbox/src/ to base/ (overwrite versions in base/ to avoid 64-bit warning). Removed 'sandbox' namespace, adapted other files as necessary. BUG=8348 TEST=none Original review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/179039 Patch by rsteiner git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@25611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* On Linux, move the passing of filedescriptors to a dedicated socketpair().agl@chromium.org2009-09-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (Patch by Markus) This allows the fast path to use read()/write() instead of recvmsg()/sendmsg() which is much cheaper for the Seccomp sandbox. Also, fixed minor seccomp sandbox issues discovered by this change. BUG=19120 ISSUE=164373 http://codereview.chromium.org/177049 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@25518 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Delete all precompiled support. It is causing more harm than good, ↵maruel@chromium.org2009-09-0417-227/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | especially when define changes. TEST=none BUG=20889 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/171118 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@25511 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Clean out leftover bits of the path-based Linux SUID sandbox.thestig@chromium.org2009-09-012-14/+0
| | | | | | | | TEST=none BUG=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/181030 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@25019 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Linux: updates to the SUID sandboxagl@chromium.org2009-08-282-85/+65
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (patch from Julien Tinnes) * Light changes to make it compile as C99 code instead of C++ (no variable declaration inside 'for' loops initialization) * argc = 0 would lead to memory corruption. * Now always in CHROME_DEVEL_SANDBOX mode: + In the previous mode, the trusted binary was attacker-owned anyway because of the environment variables, so I believe it was trivial to bypass the check. + Remove check for being owned by current user. * Move all the tmp dir creation stuff *before* CLONE_FS happens: avoid doing stuff in a scary environment. I closed the fd in the untrusted process. * changed if (st.st_uid || st.st_gid || st.st_mode & S_IWOTH) to if (st.st_uid || st.st_gid || st.st_mode & 0777) * Check rmdir/fchown/fchmod return values * Check snprintf return value x3 (probably useless) git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@24758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Hide seccomp sandbox from !X86deanm@chromium.org2009-08-211-37/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This CL moves the seccomp sandbox callsite behind an ifdef arch x86 and makes the gyp target conditional on !ARM. Patch by Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> BUG=19953 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/173201 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@23984 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Linux: fix seccomp sandbox for GCC 4.4agl@chromium.org2009-08-131-2/+4
| | | | | | | http://codereview.chromium.org/164484 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@23318 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Linux sandbox: fix security issue.agl@chromium.org2009-08-121-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (Reported by Julien Tinnes) Because the chroot helper process and the zygote share a FILES structure, the latter can race the former and change the value of cwd before it does chroot("."). Because of this, the zygote could chroot into a directory of its choosing. Once there, it could setup hardlinks to SUID binaries and possibly make them misbehave if they weren't sufficiently paranoid. This possibility should have been migigated by the removal of dangerous environment variables. However, we had to reinstate them in order to pass LD_LIBRARY_PATH because some setups don't have ld.so setup to use /usr/lib32 and also for ffmpeg. http://codereview.chromium.org/164427 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@23228 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Fix seccomp sandbox for gcc44markus@chromium.org2009-08-122-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Constness of return values and paramaters were causing compiler errors. BUG=19120 ISSUE=164373 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/164414 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@23202 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Initial version of the Seccomp sandbox. Imported from ↵markus@chromium.org2009-08-1137-1/+11410
| | | | | | | | | | | http://code.google.com/p/seccompsandbox/ Make the seccomp sandbox dependant on the --enable-seccomp-sandbox flag Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/165310 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@23087 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Declare exe_name and cmd_line as const pointers and usewtc@chromium.org2009-07-231-7/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | const_cast only where necessary. Fix a FORWARD_NULL defect reported by Coverity. Pass cmd_line to sandbox::WideToMultiByte only if cmd_line is not NULL. R=rvargas BUG=http://crbug.com/17101 TEST=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/155969 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@21406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
* Fix a FORWARD_NULL defect in ExtractModuleName reported by Coverity.wtc@chromium.org2009-07-232-6/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If 'sep' is still NULL after the for loop, ix must be -1, so ix == 0 cannot be true. Update the comment for ExtractModuleName in the header to match the implementation. I don't see any code that checks whether the path is a full path. R=rvargas BUG=http://crbug.com/17101 TEST=none Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/155979 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@21404 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2025-01-29 16:41:33 +0000