From dd681aaa0b27d995e077f3255ee5bf7d96e7b7c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "agl@chromium.org" Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2010 20:35:18 +0000 Subject: Remove some dead SPDY code. (The string doesn't match the current NPN string for SPDY, so this wasn't triggering.) http://codereview.chromium.org/3060014/show git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@53673 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 --- net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc | 15 +-------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/socket') diff --git a/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc b/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc index 0a81a48..bbbfaab 100644 --- a/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc +++ b/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc @@ -1456,20 +1456,7 @@ int SSLClientSocketNSS::DoVerifyCert(int result) { GotoState(STATE_VERIFY_CERT_COMPLETE); int flags = 0; - /* Disable revocation checking for SPDY. This is a hack, but we ignore - * certificate errors for SPDY anyway so it's no loss in security. This lets - * us benchmark as if we had OCSP stapling. - * - * http://crbug.com/32020 - */ - unsigned char buf[255]; - int state; - unsigned int len; - SECStatus rv = SSL_GetNextProto(nss_fd_, &state, buf, &len, sizeof(buf)); - bool spdy = (rv == SECSuccess && state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED && - len == 4 && memcmp(buf, "spdy", 4) == 0); - - if (ssl_config_.rev_checking_enabled && !spdy) + if (ssl_config_.rev_checking_enabled) flags |= X509Certificate::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; if (ssl_config_.verify_ev_cert) flags |= X509Certificate::VERIFY_EV_CERT; -- cgit v1.1