// Copyright (c) 2009 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "chrome/browser/renderer_host/render_crash_handler_host_linux.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "base/eintr_wrapper.h" #include "base/file_path.h" #include "base/format_macros.h" #include "base/logging.h" #include "base/message_loop.h" #include "base/path_service.h" #include "base/rand_util.h" #include "base/string_util.h" #include "breakpad/linux/exception_handler.h" #include "breakpad/linux/linux_dumper.h" #include "breakpad/linux/minidump_writer.h" #include "chrome/app/breakpad_linux.h" #include "chrome/browser/chrome_thread.h" #include "chrome/common/chrome_paths.h" // expected prefix of the target of the /proc/self/fd/%d link for a socket static const char kSocketLinkPrefix[] = "socket:["; // Parse a symlink in /proc/pid/fd/$x and return the inode number of the // socket. // inode_out: (output) set to the inode number on success // path: e.g. /proc/1234/fd/5 (must be a UNIX domain socket descriptor) // log: if true, log messages about failure details static bool ProcPathGetInode(uint64_t* inode_out, const char* path, bool log = false) { char buf[256]; const ssize_t n = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); if (n == -1) { if (log) { LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to read the inode number for a socket from /proc" "(" << errno << ")"; } return false; } buf[n] = 0; if (memcmp(kSocketLinkPrefix, buf, sizeof(kSocketLinkPrefix) - 1)) { if (log) { LOG(WARNING) << "The descriptor passed from the crashing process wasn't a" " UNIX domain socket."; } return false; } char *endptr; const unsigned long long int inode_ul = strtoull(buf + sizeof(kSocketLinkPrefix) - 1, &endptr, 10); if (*endptr != ']') return false; if (inode_ul == ULLONG_MAX) { if (log) { LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to parse a socket's inode number: the number was " "too large. Please report this bug: " << buf; } return false; } *inode_out = inode_ul; return true; } // Return the inode number for the UNIX domain socket |fd|. static bool FileDescriptorGetInode(uint64_t* inode_out, int fd) { char path[256]; if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd) < 0) return false; return ProcPathGetInode(inode_out, path, true); } // Find the process which holds the given socket, named by inode number. If // multiple processes hold the socket, this function returns false. static bool FindProcessHoldingSocket(pid_t* pid_out, uint64_t socket_inode) { bool already_found = false; DIR* proc = opendir("/proc"); if (!proc) { LOG(WARNING) << "Cannot open /proc"; return false; } std::vector pids; struct dirent* dent; while ((dent = readdir(proc))) { char *endptr; const unsigned long int pid_ul = strtoul(dent->d_name, &endptr, 10); if (pid_ul == ULONG_MAX || *endptr) continue; pids.push_back(pid_ul); } closedir(proc); for (std::vector::const_iterator i = pids.begin(); i != pids.end(); ++i) { const pid_t current_pid = *i; char buf[256]; if (snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%d/fd", current_pid) < 0) continue; DIR* fd = opendir(buf); if (!fd) continue; while ((dent = readdir(fd))) { if (snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%d/fd/%s", current_pid, dent->d_name) < 0) { continue; } uint64_t fd_inode; if (ProcPathGetInode(&fd_inode, buf)) { if (fd_inode == socket_inode) { if (already_found) { closedir(fd); return false; } already_found = true; *pid_out = current_pid; break; } } } closedir(fd); } return already_found; } // Since RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux is a singleton, it's only destroyed at the // end of the processes lifetime, which is greater in span then the lifetime of // the IO message loop. template<> struct RunnableMethodTraits { void RetainCallee(RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux*) { } void ReleaseCallee(RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux*) { } }; RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux::RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux() : renderer_socket_(-1), browser_socket_(-1) { int fds[2]; CHECK(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fds) == 0); static const int on = 1; // Enable passcred on the server end of the socket CHECK(setsockopt(fds[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof(on)) == 0); renderer_socket_ = fds[0]; browser_socket_ = fds[1]; MessageLoop* ml = ChromeThread::GetMessageLoop(ChromeThread::IO); ml->PostTask(FROM_HERE, NewRunnableMethod( this, &RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux::Init)); } RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux::~RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux() { HANDLE_EINTR(close(renderer_socket_)); HANDLE_EINTR(close(browser_socket_)); } void RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux::Init() { MessageLoopForIO* ml = MessageLoopForIO::current(); CHECK(ml->WatchFileDescriptor( browser_socket_, true /* persistent */, MessageLoopForIO::WATCH_READ, &file_descriptor_watcher_, this)); ml->AddDestructionObserver(this); } void RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux::OnFileCanWriteWithoutBlocking(int fd) { DCHECK(false); } void RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux::OnFileCanReadWithoutBlocking(int fd) { DCHECK_EQ(fd, browser_socket_); // A renderer process has crashed and has signaled us by writing a datagram // to the death signal socket. The datagram contains the crash context needed // for writing the minidump as well as a file descriptor and a credentials // block so that they can't lie about their pid. // The length of the control message: static const unsigned kControlMsgSize = CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int)) + CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred)); // The length of the regular payload: static const unsigned kCrashContextSize = sizeof(google_breakpad::ExceptionHandler::CrashContext); struct msghdr msg = {0}; struct iovec iov[4]; char crash_context[kCrashContextSize]; char guid[kGuidSize + 1]; char crash_url[kMaxActiveURLSize + 1]; char distro[kDistroSize + 1]; char control[kControlMsgSize]; const ssize_t expected_msg_size = sizeof(crash_context) + sizeof(guid) + sizeof(crash_url) + sizeof(distro); iov[0].iov_base = crash_context; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(crash_context); iov[1].iov_base = guid; iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(guid); iov[2].iov_base = crash_url; iov[2].iov_len = sizeof(crash_url); iov[3].iov_base = distro; iov[3].iov_len = sizeof(distro); msg.msg_iov = iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 4; msg.msg_control = control; msg.msg_controllen = kControlMsgSize; const ssize_t msg_size = HANDLE_EINTR(recvmsg(browser_socket_, &msg, 0)); if (msg_size != expected_msg_size) { LOG(ERROR) << "Error reading from death signal socket. Crash dumping" << " is disabled." << " msg_size:" << msg_size << " errno:" << errno; file_descriptor_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor(); return; } if (msg.msg_controllen != kControlMsgSize || msg.msg_flags & ~MSG_TRUNC) { LOG(ERROR) << "Received death signal message with the wrong size;" << " msg.msg_controllen:" << msg.msg_controllen << " msg.msg_flags:" << msg.msg_flags << " kCrashContextSize:" << kCrashContextSize << " kControlMsgSize:" << kControlMsgSize; return; } // Walk the control payload an extract the file descriptor and validated pid. pid_t crashing_pid = -1; int signal_fd = -1; for (struct cmsghdr *hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); hdr; hdr = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, hdr)) { if (hdr->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET) continue; if (hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) { const unsigned len = hdr->cmsg_len - (((uint8_t*)CMSG_DATA(hdr)) - (uint8_t*)hdr); DCHECK_EQ(len % sizeof(int), 0u); const unsigned num_fds = len / sizeof(int); if (num_fds > 1 || num_fds == 0) { // A nasty renderer could try and send us too many descriptors and // force a leak. LOG(ERROR) << "Death signal contained too many descriptors;" << " num_fds:" << num_fds; for (unsigned i = 0; i < num_fds; ++i) HANDLE_EINTR(close(reinterpret_cast(CMSG_DATA(hdr))[i])); return; } else { signal_fd = reinterpret_cast(CMSG_DATA(hdr))[0]; } } else if (hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_CREDENTIALS) { const struct ucred *cred = reinterpret_cast(CMSG_DATA(hdr)); crashing_pid = cred->pid; } } if (crashing_pid == -1 || signal_fd == -1) { LOG(ERROR) << "Death signal message didn't contain all expected control" << " messages"; if (signal_fd) HANDLE_EINTR(close(signal_fd)); return; } // Kernel bug workaround (broken in 2.6.30 at least): // The kernel doesn't translate PIDs in SCM_CREDENTIALS across PID // namespaces. Thus |crashing_pid| might be garbage from our point of view. // In the future we can remove this workaround, but we have to wait a couple // of years to be sure that it's worked its way out into the world. uint64_t inode_number; if (!FileDescriptorGetInode(&inode_number, signal_fd)) { LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to get inode number for passed socket"; HANDLE_EINTR(close(signal_fd)); return; } if (!FindProcessHoldingSocket(&crashing_pid, inode_number - 1)) { LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to find process holding other end of crash reply " "socket"; HANDLE_EINTR(close(signal_fd)); return; } bool upload = true; FilePath dumps_path("/tmp"); if (getenv("CHROME_HEADLESS")) { upload = false; PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_CRASH_DUMPS, &dumps_path); } const uint64 rand = base::RandUint64(); const std::string minidump_filename = StringPrintf("%s/chromium-renderer-minidump-%016" PRIx64 ".dmp", dumps_path.value().c_str(), rand); if (!google_breakpad::WriteMinidump(minidump_filename.c_str(), crashing_pid, crash_context, kCrashContextSize)) { LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write crash dump for pid " << crashing_pid; HANDLE_EINTR(close(signal_fd)); } // Send the done signal to the renderer: it can exit now. memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); struct iovec done_iov; done_iov.iov_base = const_cast("\x42"); done_iov.iov_len = 1; msg.msg_iov = &done_iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; HANDLE_EINTR(sendmsg(signal_fd, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL)); HANDLE_EINTR(close(signal_fd)); // Sanitize the string data a bit more guid[kGuidSize] = crash_url[kMaxActiveURLSize] = distro[kDistroSize] = 0; BreakpadInfo info; info.filename = minidump_filename.c_str(); info.process_type = "renderer"; info.process_type_length = 8; info.crash_url = crash_url; info.crash_url_length = strlen(crash_url); info.guid = guid; info.guid_length = strlen(guid); info.distro = distro; info.distro_length = strlen(distro); info.upload = upload; HandleCrashDump(info); } void RenderCrashHandlerHostLinux::WillDestroyCurrentMessageLoop() { file_descriptor_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor(); }