// Copyright (c) 2006-2009 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "chrome/browser/sandbox_policy.h" #include "app/win_util.h" #include "base/command_line.h" #include "base/debug_util.h" #include "base/file_util.h" #include "base/logging.h" #include "base/path_service.h" #include "base/process_util.h" #include "base/registry.h" #include "base/string_util.h" #include "base/win_util.h" #include "chrome/browser/browser_process.h" #include "chrome/common/child_process_info.h" #include "chrome/common/chrome_constants.h" #include "chrome/common/chrome_paths.h" #include "chrome/common/chrome_switches.h" #include "chrome/common/debug_flags.h" #include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" #include "webkit/glue/plugins/plugin_list.h" namespace { // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes // when they are loaded in the renderer. const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = { L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown. L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8. L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth. L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security. L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock. L"GoogleDesktopNetwork3.DLL", // Google Desktop Search v5. L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus. L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector. L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter. L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter. L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus. L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic). L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro). L"libdivx.dll", // DivX. L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam. L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library). L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour. L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus. L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX. L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008. L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older). L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor. L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security. L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus. L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor. L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems. L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone. L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor. L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown. L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2. L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard). L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6. L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5. L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX. L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface. L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus. L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools). L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006. }; enum PluginPolicyCategory { PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED, PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED, }; // Returns the policy category for the plugin dll. PluginPolicyCategory GetPolicyCategoryForPlugin( const std::wstring& dll, const std::wstring& list) { std::wstring filename = FilePath(dll).BaseName().value(); std::wstring plugin_dll = StringToLowerASCII(filename); std::wstring trusted_plugins = StringToLowerASCII(list); size_t pos = 0; size_t end_item = 0; while (end_item != std::wstring::npos) { end_item = list.find(L",", pos); size_t size_item = (end_item == std::wstring::npos) ? end_item : end_item - pos; std::wstring item = list.substr(pos, size_item); if (!item.empty() && item == plugin_dll) return PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED; pos = end_item + 1; } return PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED; } // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|. // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subfiles // and subfolders. bool AddDirectoryAndChildren(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { std::wstring directory; if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory)) return false; if (sub_dir) file_util::AppendToPath(&directory, sub_dir); sandbox::ResultCode result; result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, directory.c_str()); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) return false; file_util::AppendToPath(&directory, L"*"); result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, directory.c_str()); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) return false; return true; } // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|. // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys. bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key, sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { sandbox::ResultCode result; result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, key.c_str()); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) return false; key += L"\\*"; result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, key.c_str()); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) return false; return true; } // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash. // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module // does not get a chance to execute any code. void AddDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix) { // To minimize the list we only add an unload policy if the dll is also // loaded in this process. All the injected dlls of interest do this. if (::GetModuleHandleW(kTroublesomeDlls[ix])) { LOG(INFO) << "dll to unload found: " << kTroublesomeDlls[ix]; policy->AddDllToUnload(kTroublesomeDlls[ix]); } } } // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy. bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { sandbox::ResultCode result; // Add the policy for the pipes result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*"); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) return false; // Add the policy for debug message only in debug #ifndef NDEBUG std::wstring debug_message; if (!PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_APP, &debug_message)) return false; if (!win_util::ConvertToLongPath(debug_message, &debug_message)) return false; file_util::AppendToPath(&debug_message, L"debug_message.exe"); result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, debug_message.c_str()); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) return false; #endif // NDEBUG return true; } // Creates a sandbox without any restriction. bool ApplyPolicyForTrustedPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED); return true; } // Creates a sandbox with the plugin running in a restricted environment. // Only the "Users" and "Everyone" groups are enabled in the token. The User SID // is disabled. bool ApplyPolicyForUntrustedPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED; if (win_util::GetWinVersion() > win_util::WINVERSION_XP) { // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main token // is restricted. initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS; } policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LIMITED); policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); if (!AddDirectoryAndChildren(base::DIR_TEMP, NULL, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, policy)) return false; if (!AddDirectoryAndChildren(base::DIR_IE_INTERNET_CACHE, NULL, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, policy)) return false; if (!AddDirectoryAndChildren(base::DIR_APP_DATA, NULL, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, policy)) return false; if (!AddDirectoryAndChildren(base::DIR_APP_DATA, L"Macromedia", sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, policy)) return false; if (!AddDirectoryAndChildren(base::DIR_LOCAL_APP_DATA, NULL, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, policy)) return false; if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\MACROMEDIA", sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, policy)) return false; if (win_util::GetWinVersion() >= win_util::WINVERSION_VISTA) { if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\AppDataLow", sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, policy)) return false; if (!AddDirectoryAndChildren(base::DIR_LOCAL_APP_DATA_LOW, NULL, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, policy)) return false; } return true; } // Adds the custom policy rules for a given plugin. |trusted_plugins| contains // the comma separate list of plugin dll names that should not be sandboxed. bool AddPolicyForPlugin(const CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { std::wstring plugin_dll = cmd_line-> GetSwitchValue(switches::kPluginPath); std::wstring trusted_plugins = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()-> GetSwitchValue(switches::kTrustedPlugins); // Add the policy for the pipes. sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*"); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) { NOTREACHED(); return false; } PluginPolicyCategory policy_category = GetPolicyCategoryForPlugin(plugin_dll, trusted_plugins); switch (policy_category) { case PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED: return ApplyPolicyForTrustedPlugin(policy); case PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED: return ApplyPolicyForUntrustedPlugin(policy); default: NOTREACHED(); break; } return false; } void AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy, bool* on_sandbox_desktop) { policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0); sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED; if (win_util::GetWinVersion() > win_util::WINVERSION_XP) { // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main // token is restricted. initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS; } policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN); policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch( switches::kDisableAltWinstation); if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) { *on_sandbox_desktop = true; } else { *on_sandbox_desktop = false; DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer"; } AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy); } } // namespace namespace sandbox { base::ProcessHandle StartProcess(CommandLine* cmd_line) { return StartProcessWithAccess(cmd_line, FilePath()); } base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess(CommandLine* cmd_line, const FilePath& exposed_dir) { base::ProcessHandle process = 0; const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); ChildProcessInfo::ProcessType type; std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType); if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) { type = ChildProcessInfo::RENDER_PROCESS; } else if (type_str == switches::kExtensionProcess) { // Extensions are just renderers with another name. type = ChildProcessInfo::RENDER_PROCESS; } else if (type_str == switches::kPluginProcess) { type = ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS; } else if (type_str == switches::kWorkerProcess) { type = ChildProcessInfo::WORKER_PROCESS; } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClProcess) { type = ChildProcessInfo::NACL_PROCESS; } else if (type_str == switches::kUtilityProcess) { type = ChildProcessInfo::UTILITY_PROCESS; } else { NOTREACHED(); return 0; } bool in_sandbox = !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) && (type != ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS || browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSafePlugins)); #if !defined (GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD) if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins)) { // In process plugins won't work if the sandbox is enabled. in_sandbox = false; } #endif // Propagate the Chrome Frame flag to sandboxed processes if present. if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) { if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) { cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame); } } bool child_needs_help = DebugFlags::ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, type, in_sandbox); if (!in_sandbox) { base::LaunchApp(*cmd_line, false, false, &process); return process; } // spawn the child process in the sandbox sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_service = g_browser_process->broker_services(); sandbox::ResultCode result; PROCESS_INFORMATION target = {0}; sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = broker_service->CreatePolicy(); bool on_sandbox_desktop = false; // TODO(gregoryd): try locked-down policy for sel_ldr after we fix IMC. // TODO(gregoryd): do we need a new desktop for sel_ldr? if (type == ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS) { if (!AddPolicyForPlugin(cmd_line, policy)) return 0; } else { AddPolicyForRenderer(policy, &on_sandbox_desktop); if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) { // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into // this subprocess. See // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580 cmd_line->AppendSwitchWithValue("ignored", " --type=renderer "); } } if (!exposed_dir.empty()) { result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, exposed_dir.ToWStringHack().c_str()); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) return 0; FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*"); result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, exposed_files.ToWStringHack().c_str()); if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) return 0; } if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) { NOTREACHED(); return 0; } result = broker_service->SpawnTarget( cmd_line->program().c_str(), cmd_line->command_line_string().c_str(), policy, &target); policy->Release(); if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) return 0; ResumeThread(target.hThread); CloseHandle(target.hThread); process = target.hProcess; // Help the process a little. It can't start the debugger by itself if // the process is in a sandbox. if (child_needs_help) DebugUtil::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.dwProcessId); return process; } } // namespace sandbox