// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "extensions/common/csp_validator.h" #include #include #include "base/macros.h" #include "base/strings/string_split.h" #include "base/strings/string_tokenizer.h" #include "base/strings/string_util.h" #include "content/public/common/url_constants.h" #include "extensions/common/constants.h" #include "extensions/common/error_utils.h" #include "extensions/common/install_warning.h" #include "extensions/common/manifest_constants.h" #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" namespace extensions { namespace csp_validator { namespace { const char kDefaultSrc[] = "default-src"; const char kScriptSrc[] = "script-src"; const char kObjectSrc[] = "object-src"; const char kPluginTypes[] = "plugin-types"; const char kObjectSrcDefaultDirective[] = "object-src 'self';"; const char kScriptSrcDefaultDirective[] = "script-src 'self' chrome-extension-resource:;"; const char kSandboxDirectiveName[] = "sandbox"; const char kAllowSameOriginToken[] = "allow-same-origin"; const char kAllowTopNavigation[] = "allow-top-navigation"; // This is the list of plugin types which are fully sandboxed and are safe to // load up in an extension, regardless of the URL they are navigated to. const char* const kSandboxedPluginTypes[] = { "application/pdf", "application/x-google-chrome-pdf", "application/x-pnacl" }; // List of CSP hash-source prefixes that are accepted. Blink is a bit more // lenient, but we only accept standard hashes to be forward-compatible. // http://www.w3.org/TR/2015/CR-CSP2-20150721/#hash_algo const char* const kHashSourcePrefixes[] = { "'sha256-", "'sha384-", "'sha512-" }; struct DirectiveStatus { explicit DirectiveStatus(const char* name) : directive_name(name), seen_in_policy(false) {} const char* directive_name; bool seen_in_policy; }; // Returns whether |url| starts with |scheme_and_separator| and does not have a // too permissive wildcard host name. If |should_check_rcd| is true, then the // Public suffix list is used to exclude wildcard TLDs such as "https://*.org". bool isNonWildcardTLD(const std::string& url, const std::string& scheme_and_separator, bool should_check_rcd) { if (!base::StartsWith(url, scheme_and_separator, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) return false; size_t start_of_host = scheme_and_separator.length(); size_t end_of_host = url.find("/", start_of_host); if (end_of_host == std::string::npos) end_of_host = url.size(); // Note: It is sufficient to only compare the first character against '*' // because the CSP only allows wildcards at the start of a directive, see // host-source and host-part at http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#source-list-syntax bool is_wildcard_subdomain = end_of_host > start_of_host + 2 && url[start_of_host] == '*' && url[start_of_host + 1] == '.'; if (is_wildcard_subdomain) start_of_host += 2; size_t start_of_port = url.rfind(":", end_of_host); // The ":" check at the end of the following condition is used to avoid // treating the last part of an IPv6 address as a port. if (start_of_port > start_of_host && url[start_of_port - 1] != ':') { bool is_valid_port = false; // Do a quick sanity check. The following check could mistakenly flag // ":123456" or ":****" as valid, but that does not matter because the // relaxing CSP directive will just be ignored by Blink. for (size_t i = start_of_port + 1; i < end_of_host; ++i) { is_valid_port = base::IsAsciiDigit(url[i]) || url[i] == '*'; if (!is_valid_port) break; } if (is_valid_port) end_of_host = start_of_port; } std::string host(url, start_of_host, end_of_host - start_of_host); // Global wildcards are not allowed. if (host.empty() || host.find("*") != std::string::npos) return false; if (!is_wildcard_subdomain || !should_check_rcd) return true; // Allow *.googleapis.com to be whitelisted for backwards-compatibility. // (crbug.com/409952) if (host == "googleapis.com") return true; // Wildcards on subdomains of a TLD are not allowed. size_t registry_length = net::registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength( host, net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES, net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); return registry_length != 0; } // Checks whether the source is a syntactically valid hash. bool IsHashSource(const std::string& source) { size_t hash_end = source.length() - 1; if (source.empty() || source[hash_end] != '\'') { return false; } for (const char* prefix : kHashSourcePrefixes) { if (base::StartsWith(source, prefix, base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) { for (size_t i = strlen(prefix); i < hash_end; ++i) { const char c = source[i]; // The hash must be base64-encoded. Do not allow any other characters. if (!base::IsAsciiAlpha(c) && !base::IsAsciiDigit(c) && c != '+' && c != '/' && c != '=') { return false; } } return true; } } return false; } InstallWarning CSPInstallWarning(const std::string& csp_warning) { return InstallWarning(csp_warning, manifest_keys::kContentSecurityPolicy); } void GetSecureDirectiveValues(const std::string& directive_name, base::StringTokenizer* tokenizer, int options, std::vector* sane_csp_parts, std::vector* warnings) { sane_csp_parts->push_back(directive_name); while (tokenizer->GetNext()) { std::string source_literal = tokenizer->token(); std::string source_lower = base::ToLowerASCII(source_literal); bool is_secure_csp_token = false; // We might need to relax this whitelist over time. if (source_lower == "'self'" || source_lower == "'none'" || source_lower == "http://127.0.0.1" || source_lower == "blob:" || source_lower == "filesystem:" || source_lower == "http://localhost" || base::StartsWith(source_lower, "http://127.0.0.1:", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) || base::StartsWith(source_lower, "http://localhost:", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) || isNonWildcardTLD(source_lower, "https://", true) || isNonWildcardTLD(source_lower, "chrome://", false) || isNonWildcardTLD(source_lower, std::string(extensions::kExtensionScheme) + url::kStandardSchemeSeparator, false) || IsHashSource(source_literal) || base::StartsWith(source_lower, "chrome-extension-resource:", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) { is_secure_csp_token = true; } else if ((options & OPTIONS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_EVAL) && source_lower == "'unsafe-eval'") { is_secure_csp_token = true; } if (is_secure_csp_token) { sane_csp_parts->push_back(source_literal); } else if (warnings) { warnings->push_back(CSPInstallWarning(ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage( manifest_errors::kInvalidCSPInsecureValue, source_literal, directive_name))); } } // End of CSP directive that was started at the beginning of this method. If // none of the values are secure, the policy will be empty and default to // 'none', which is secure. sane_csp_parts->back().push_back(';'); } // Returns true if |directive_name| matches |status.directive_name|. bool UpdateStatus(const std::string& directive_name, base::StringTokenizer* tokenizer, DirectiveStatus* status, int options, std::vector* sane_csp_parts, std::vector* warnings) { if (directive_name != status->directive_name) return false; if (!status->seen_in_policy) { status->seen_in_policy = true; GetSecureDirectiveValues(directive_name, tokenizer, options, sane_csp_parts, warnings); } else { // Don't show any errors for duplicate CSP directives, because it will be // ignored by the CSP parser (http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#policy-parsing). GetSecureDirectiveValues(directive_name, tokenizer, options, sane_csp_parts, NULL); } return true; } // Returns true if the |plugin_type| is one of the fully sandboxed plugin types. bool PluginTypeAllowed(const std::string& plugin_type) { for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kSandboxedPluginTypes); ++i) { if (plugin_type == kSandboxedPluginTypes[i]) return true; } return false; } // Returns true if the policy is allowed to contain an insecure object-src // directive. This requires OPTIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_OBJECT_SRC to be specified // as an option and the plugin-types that can be loaded must be restricted to // the set specified in kSandboxedPluginTypes. bool AllowedToHaveInsecureObjectSrc( int options, const std::vector& directives) { if (!(options & OPTIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_OBJECT_SRC)) return false; for (size_t i = 0; i < directives.size(); ++i) { const std::string& input = directives[i]; base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n"); if (!tokenizer.GetNext()) continue; if (!base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(tokenizer.token(), kPluginTypes)) continue; while (tokenizer.GetNext()) { if (!PluginTypeAllowed(tokenizer.token())) return false; } // All listed plugin types are whitelisted. return true; } // plugin-types not specified. return false; } } // namespace bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsLegal(const std::string& policy) { // We block these characters to prevent HTTP header injection when // representing the content security policy as an HTTP header. const char kBadChars[] = {',', '\r', '\n', '\0'}; return policy.find_first_of(kBadChars, 0, arraysize(kBadChars)) == std::string::npos; } std::string SanitizeContentSecurityPolicy( const std::string& policy, int options, std::vector* warnings) { // See http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#parse-a-csp-policy for parsing algorithm. std::vector directives = base::SplitString( policy, ";", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL); DirectiveStatus default_src_status(kDefaultSrc); DirectiveStatus script_src_status(kScriptSrc); DirectiveStatus object_src_status(kObjectSrc); bool allow_insecure_object_src = AllowedToHaveInsecureObjectSrc(options, directives); std::vector sane_csp_parts; std::vector default_src_csp_warnings; for (size_t i = 0; i < directives.size(); ++i) { std::string& input = directives[i]; base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n"); if (!tokenizer.GetNext()) continue; std::string directive_name = base::ToLowerASCII(tokenizer.token_piece()); if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, &tokenizer, &default_src_status, options, &sane_csp_parts, &default_src_csp_warnings)) continue; if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, &tokenizer, &script_src_status, options, &sane_csp_parts, warnings)) continue; if (!allow_insecure_object_src && UpdateStatus(directive_name, &tokenizer, &object_src_status, options, &sane_csp_parts, warnings)) continue; // Pass the other CSP directives as-is without further validation. sane_csp_parts.push_back(input + ";"); } if (default_src_status.seen_in_policy) { if (!script_src_status.seen_in_policy || !object_src_status.seen_in_policy) { // Insecure values in default-src are only relevant if either script-src // or object-src is omitted. if (warnings) warnings->insert(warnings->end(), default_src_csp_warnings.begin(), default_src_csp_warnings.end()); } } else { if (!script_src_status.seen_in_policy) { sane_csp_parts.push_back(kScriptSrcDefaultDirective); if (warnings) warnings->push_back(CSPInstallWarning(ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage( manifest_errors::kInvalidCSPMissingSecureSrc, kScriptSrc))); } if (!object_src_status.seen_in_policy && !allow_insecure_object_src) { sane_csp_parts.push_back(kObjectSrcDefaultDirective); if (warnings) warnings->push_back(CSPInstallWarning(ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage( manifest_errors::kInvalidCSPMissingSecureSrc, kObjectSrc))); } } return base::JoinString(sane_csp_parts, " "); } bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsSandboxed( const std::string& policy, Manifest::Type type) { // See http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#parse-a-csp-policy for parsing algorithm. bool seen_sandbox = false; for (const std::string& input : base::SplitString( policy, ";", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL)) { base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n"); if (!tokenizer.GetNext()) continue; std::string directive_name = base::ToLowerASCII(tokenizer.token_piece()); if (directive_name != kSandboxDirectiveName) continue; seen_sandbox = true; while (tokenizer.GetNext()) { std::string token = base::ToLowerASCII(tokenizer.token_piece()); // The same origin token negates the sandboxing. if (token == kAllowSameOriginToken) return false; // Platform apps don't allow navigation. if (type == Manifest::TYPE_PLATFORM_APP) { if (token == kAllowTopNavigation) return false; } } } return seen_sandbox; } } // namespace csp_validator } // namespace extensions