// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "net/base/cert_verify_proc.h" #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" #include "base/sha1.h" #include "build/build_config.h" #include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h" #include "net/base/cert_verifier.h" #include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h" #include "net/base/crl_set.h" #include "net/base/net_errors.h" #include "net/base/x509_certificate.h" #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS) #include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_nss.h" #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL) #include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_openssl.h" #elif defined(OS_MACOSX) #include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_mac.h" #elif defined(OS_WIN) #include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_win.h" #else #error Implement certificate verification. #endif namespace net { namespace { // Returns true if |type| is |kPublicKeyTypeRSA| or |kPublicKeyTypeDSA|, and // if |size_bits| is < 1024. Note that this means there may be false // negatives: keys for other algorithms and which are weak will pass this // test. bool IsWeakKey(X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type, size_t size_bits) { switch (type) { case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeRSA: case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeDSA: return size_bits < 1024; default: return false; } } } // namespace // static CertVerifyProc* CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault() { #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS) return new CertVerifyProcNSS(); #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL) return new CertVerifyProcOpenSSL(); #elif defined(OS_MACOSX) return new CertVerifyProcMac(); #elif defined(OS_WIN) return new CertVerifyProcWin(); #else return NULL; #endif } CertVerifyProc::CertVerifyProc() {} CertVerifyProc::~CertVerifyProc() {} int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert, const std::string& hostname, int flags, CRLSet* crl_set, CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { verify_result->Reset(); verify_result->verified_cert = cert; if (IsBlacklisted(cert)) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; } // If EV verification was requested and no CRLSet is present, or if the // CRLSet has expired, then enable online revocation checks. If the online // check fails, EV status won't be shown. // // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/142974 - Allow preferences to fully // disable revocation checking. if ((flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) && (!crl_set || crl_set->IsExpired())) { flags |= CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY; } int rv = VerifyInternal(cert, hostname, flags, crl_set, verify_result); // This check is done after VerifyInternal so that VerifyInternal can fill // in the list of public key hashes. if (IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(verify_result->public_key_hashes)) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } // Check for weak keys in the entire verified chain. size_t size_bits = 0; X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type = X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeUnknown; bool weak_key = false; X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo( verify_result->verified_cert->os_cert_handle(), &size_bits, &type); if (IsWeakKey(type, size_bits)) { weak_key = true; } else { const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates = verify_result->verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates(); for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediates.size(); ++i) { X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(intermediates[i], &size_bits, &type); if (IsWeakKey(type, size_bits)) weak_key = true; } } if (weak_key) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY; // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure, // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate // error. if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv)) rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } // Treat certificates signed using broken signature algorithms as invalid. if (verify_result->has_md2 || verify_result->has_md4) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } // Flag certificates using weak signature algorithms. if (verify_result->has_md5) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure, // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate // error. if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv)) rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } return rv; } // static bool CertVerifyProc::IsBlacklisted(X509Certificate* cert) { static const unsigned kComodoSerialBytes = 16; static const uint8 kComodoSerials[][kComodoSerialBytes] = { // Not a real certificate. For testing only. {0x07,0x7a,0x59,0xbc,0xd5,0x34,0x59,0x60,0x1c,0xa6,0x90,0x72,0x67,0xa6,0xdd,0x1c}, // The next nine certificates all expire on Fri Mar 14 23:59:59 2014. // Some serial numbers actually have a leading 0x00 byte required to // encode a positive integer in DER if the most significant bit is 0. // We omit the leading 0x00 bytes to make all serial numbers 16 bytes. // Subject: CN=mail.google.com // subjectAltName dNSName: mail.google.com, www.mail.google.com {0x04,0x7e,0xcb,0xe9,0xfc,0xa5,0x5f,0x7b,0xd0,0x9e,0xae,0x36,0xe1,0x0c,0xae,0x1e}, // Subject: CN=global trustee // subjectAltName dNSName: global trustee // Note: not a CA certificate. {0xd8,0xf3,0x5f,0x4e,0xb7,0x87,0x2b,0x2d,0xab,0x06,0x92,0xe3,0x15,0x38,0x2f,0xb0}, // Subject: CN=login.live.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.live.com, www.login.live.com {0xb0,0xb7,0x13,0x3e,0xd0,0x96,0xf9,0xb5,0x6f,0xae,0x91,0xc8,0x74,0xbd,0x3a,0xc0}, // Subject: CN=addons.mozilla.org // subjectAltName dNSName: addons.mozilla.org, www.addons.mozilla.org {0x92,0x39,0xd5,0x34,0x8f,0x40,0xd1,0x69,0x5a,0x74,0x54,0x70,0xe1,0xf2,0x3f,0x43}, // Subject: CN=login.skype.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.skype.com, www.login.skype.com {0xe9,0x02,0x8b,0x95,0x78,0xe4,0x15,0xdc,0x1a,0x71,0x0a,0x2b,0x88,0x15,0x44,0x47}, // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com, www.login.yahoo.com {0xd7,0x55,0x8f,0xda,0xf5,0xf1,0x10,0x5b,0xb2,0x13,0x28,0x2b,0x70,0x77,0x29,0xa3}, // Subject: CN=www.google.com // subjectAltName dNSName: www.google.com, google.com {0xf5,0xc8,0x6a,0xf3,0x61,0x62,0xf1,0x3a,0x64,0xf5,0x4f,0x6d,0xc9,0x58,0x7c,0x06}, // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com {0x39,0x2a,0x43,0x4f,0x0e,0x07,0xdf,0x1f,0x8a,0xa3,0x05,0xde,0x34,0xe0,0xc2,0x29}, // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com {0x3e,0x75,0xce,0xd4,0x6b,0x69,0x30,0x21,0x21,0x88,0x30,0xae,0x86,0xa8,0x2a,0x71}, }; const std::string& serial_number = cert->serial_number(); if (!serial_number.empty() && (serial_number[0] & 0x80) != 0) { // This is a negative serial number, which isn't technically allowed but // which probably happens. In order to avoid confusing a negative serial // number with a positive one once the leading zeros have been removed, we // disregard it. return false; } base::StringPiece serial(serial_number); // Remove leading zeros. while (serial.size() > 1 && serial[0] == 0) serial.remove_prefix(1); if (serial.size() == kComodoSerialBytes) { for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kComodoSerials); i++) { if (memcmp(kComodoSerials[i], serial.data(), kComodoSerialBytes) == 0) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.SSLCertBlacklisted", i, arraysize(kComodoSerials) + 1); return true; } } } return false; } // static // NOTE: This implementation assumes and enforces that the hashes are SHA1. bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted( const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes) { static const unsigned kNumHashes = 9; static const uint8 kHashes[kNumHashes][base::kSHA1Length] = { // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Root CA // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net x2 and self-signed {0x41, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x36, 0x32, 0x58, 0xf3, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x7d, 0x12, 0xce, 0x48, 0x63, 0xe4, 0x33, 0x43, 0x78, 0x06, 0xa8}, // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Cyber CA // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root {0xc4, 0xf9, 0x66, 0x37, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x5e, 0x71, 0xd6, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xce, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x95, 0xb4, 0x35, 0xd1}, // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Services 1024 CA // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net {0xe2, 0x3b, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x5f, 0x87, 0x71, 0x0a, 0x68, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x80, 0x50, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xc6, 0x27, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0xa6}, // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2 // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Organisatie CA - G2 {0x7b, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x39, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x6e, 0x9f, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x45, 0xdb}, // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Overheid en Bedrijven // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Overheid CA {0xe8, 0xf9, 0x12, 0x00, 0xc6, 0x5c, 0xee, 0x16, 0xe0, 0x39, 0xb9, 0xf8, 0x83, 0x84, 0x16, 0x61, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x81, 0xc5}, // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd. // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root // Expires: Jul 17 15:16:54 2012 GMT {0x01, 0x29, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x96, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0xe1, 0x97, 0x23, 0x91, 0x90, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x52}, // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd. // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) // Expires: Jul 16 17:53:37 2015 GMT {0xd3, 0x3c, 0x5b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xb3, 0xbe, 0x9a, 0xd6, 0x95, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x25, 0x28, 0x03, 0x29, 0x81}, // Issuer: CN=Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2 // Covers two certificates, the latter of which expires Apr 15 21:09:30 // 2021 GMT. {0xe1, 0x2d, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x22, 0x76, 0xf8, 0x30, 0xe6, 0xce, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x41, 0xa9, 0x32}, // Cyberoam CA certificate. Private key leaked, but this certificate would // only have been installed by Cyberoam customers. The certificate expires // in 2036, but we can probably remove in a couple of years (2014). {0xd9, 0xf5, 0xc6, 0xce, 0x57, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xcc, 0x7e, 0xd1, 0x72, 0xbd, 0x53, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0x07, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xd1}, }; for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumHashes; i++) { for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin(); j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) { if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 && memcmp(j->data(), kHashes[i], base::kSHA1Length) == 0) { return true; } } } return false; } } // namespace net