// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "net/base/x509_certificate.h" // Work around https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=455424 // until NSS 3.12.2 comes out and we update to it. #define Lock FOO_NSS_Lock #include #include #include #include #include #include #undef Lock #include "base/logging.h" #include "base/pickle.h" #include "base/time.h" #include "base/nss_init.h" #include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h" #include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h" #include "net/base/net_errors.h" namespace net { namespace { class ScopedCERTCertificate { public: explicit ScopedCERTCertificate(CERTCertificate* cert) : cert_(cert) {} ~ScopedCERTCertificate() { if (cert_) CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_); } private: CERTCertificate* cert_; DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedCERTCertificate); }; class ScopedCERTCertList { public: explicit ScopedCERTCertList(CERTCertList* cert_list) : cert_list_(cert_list) {} ~ScopedCERTCertList() { if (cert_list_) CERT_DestroyCertList(cert_list_); } private: CERTCertList* cert_list_; DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedCERTCertList); }; // ScopedCERTValOutParam manages destruction of values in the CERTValOutParam // array that cvout points to. cvout must be initialized as passed to // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert, so that the array must be terminated with // cert_po_end type. // When it goes out of scope, it destroys values of cert_po_trustAnchor // and cert_po_certList types, but doesn't release the array itself. class ScopedCERTValOutParam { public: explicit ScopedCERTValOutParam(CERTValOutParam* cvout) : cvout_(cvout) {} ~ScopedCERTValOutParam() { if (cvout_ == NULL) return; for (CERTValOutParam *p = cvout_; p->type != cert_po_end; p++) { switch (p->type) { case cert_po_trustAnchor: if (p->value.pointer.cert) { CERT_DestroyCertificate(p->value.pointer.cert); p->value.pointer.cert = NULL; } break; case cert_po_certList: if (p->value.pointer.chain) { CERT_DestroyCertList(p->value.pointer.chain); p->value.pointer.chain = NULL; } break; default: break; } } } private: CERTValOutParam* cvout_; DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedCERTValOutParam); }; // Map PORT_GetError() return values to our network error codes. int MapSecurityError(int err) { switch (err) { case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID; case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID; case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER: case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID: // TODO(port): add an ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE error code. case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID: return ERR_CERT_INVALID; default: LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED"; return ERR_FAILED; } } // Map PORT_GetError() return values to our cert status flags. int MapCertErrorToCertStatus(int err) { switch (err) { case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: return CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: return CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID; case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: return CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER: case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID: // TODO(port): add an CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE error code. case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID: return CERT_STATUS_INVALID; default: return 0; } } // Saves some information about the certificate chain cert_list in // *verify_result. The caller MUST initialize *verify_result before calling // this function. // Note that cert_list[0] is the end entity certificate and cert_list doesn't // contain the root CA certificate. void GetCertChainInfo(CERTCertList* cert_list, CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { int i = 0; for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list); !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list); node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node), i++) { SECAlgorithmID& signature = node->cert->signature; SECOidTag oid_tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&signature.algorithm); switch (oid_tag) { case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: verify_result->has_md5 = true; if (i != 0) verify_result->has_md5_ca = true; break; case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: verify_result->has_md2 = true; if (i != 0) verify_result->has_md2_ca = true; break; case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: verify_result->has_md4 = true; break; default: break; } } } // TODO(port): Implement this more simply, and put it in the right place base::Time PRTimeToBaseTime(PRTime prtime) { PRExplodedTime prxtime; PR_ExplodeTime(prtime, PR_GMTParameters, &prxtime); base::Time::Exploded exploded; exploded.year = prxtime.tm_year; exploded.month = prxtime.tm_month + 1; exploded.day_of_week = prxtime.tm_wday; exploded.day_of_month = prxtime.tm_mday; exploded.hour = prxtime.tm_hour; exploded.minute = prxtime.tm_min; exploded.second = prxtime.tm_sec; exploded.millisecond = prxtime.tm_usec / 1000; return base::Time::FromUTCExploded(exploded); } void ParsePrincipal(SECItem* der_name, X509Certificate::Principal* principal) { CERTName name; PRArenaPool* arena = NULL; arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); DCHECK(arena != NULL); if (arena == NULL) return; // TODO(dkegel): is CERT_NameTemplate what we always want here? SECStatus rv; rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &name, CERT_NameTemplate, der_name); DCHECK(rv == SECSuccess); if ( rv != SECSuccess ) { PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); return; } std::vector common_names, locality_names, state_names, country_names; // TODO(jcampan): add business_category and serial_number. static const SECOidTag kOIDs[] = { SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME, SEC_OID_AVA_LOCALITY, SEC_OID_AVA_STATE_OR_PROVINCE, SEC_OID_AVA_COUNTRY_NAME, SEC_OID_AVA_STREET_ADDRESS, SEC_OID_AVA_ORGANIZATION_NAME, SEC_OID_AVA_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT_NAME, SEC_OID_AVA_DC }; std::vector* values[] = { &common_names, &locality_names, &state_names, &country_names, &principal->street_addresses, &principal->organization_names, &principal->organization_unit_names, &principal->domain_components }; DCHECK(arraysize(kOIDs) == arraysize(values)); CERTRDN** rdns = name.rdns; for (size_t rdn = 0; rdns[rdn]; ++rdn) { CERTAVA** avas = rdns[rdn]->avas; for (size_t pair = 0; avas[pair] != 0; ++pair) { SECOidTag tag = CERT_GetAVATag(avas[pair]); for (size_t oid = 0; oid < arraysize(kOIDs); ++oid) { if (kOIDs[oid] == tag) { SECItem* decode_item = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&avas[pair]->value); if (!decode_item) break; std::string value(reinterpret_cast(decode_item->data), decode_item->len); values[oid]->push_back(value); SECITEM_FreeItem(decode_item, PR_TRUE); break; } } } } // We don't expect to have more than one CN, L, S, and C. std::vector* single_value_lists[4] = { &common_names, &locality_names, &state_names, &country_names }; std::string* single_values[4] = { &principal->common_name, &principal->locality_name, &principal->state_or_province_name, &principal->country_name }; for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(single_value_lists); ++i) { DCHECK(single_value_lists[i]->size() <= 1); if (single_value_lists[i]->size() > 0) *(single_values[i]) = (*(single_value_lists[i]))[0]; } PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); } void ParseDate(SECItem* der_date, base::Time* result) { PRTime prtime; SECStatus rv = DER_DecodeTimeChoice(&prtime, der_date); DCHECK(rv == SECSuccess); *result = PRTimeToBaseTime(prtime); } void GetCertSubjectAltNamesOfType(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle, CERTGeneralNameType name_type, std::vector* result) { SECItem alt_name; SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert_handle, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, &alt_name); if (rv != SECSuccess) return; PRArenaPool* arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); DCHECK(arena != NULL); CERTGeneralName* alt_name_list; alt_name_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &alt_name); CERTGeneralName* name = alt_name_list; while (name) { // For future extension: We're assuming that these values are of types // RFC822Name, DNSName or URI. See the mac code for notes. DCHECK(name->type == certRFC822Name || name->type == certDNSName || name->type == certURI); if (name->type == name_type) { unsigned char* p = name->name.other.data; int len = name->name.other.len; std::string value = std::string(reinterpret_cast(p), len); result->push_back(value); } name = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(name); if (name == alt_name_list) break; } PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); PORT_Free(alt_name.data); } } // namespace void X509Certificate::Initialize() { ParsePrincipal(&cert_handle_->derSubject, &subject_); ParsePrincipal(&cert_handle_->derIssuer, &issuer_); ParseDate(&cert_handle_->validity.notBefore, &valid_start_); ParseDate(&cert_handle_->validity.notAfter, &valid_expiry_); fingerprint_ = CalculateFingerprint(cert_handle_); // Store the certificate in the cache in case we need it later. X509Certificate::Cache::GetInstance()->Insert(this); } // static X509Certificate* X509Certificate::CreateFromPickle(const Pickle& pickle, void** pickle_iter) { const char* data; int length; if (!pickle.ReadData(pickle_iter, &data, &length)) return NULL; return CreateFromBytes(data, length); } void X509Certificate::Persist(Pickle* pickle) { pickle->WriteData(reinterpret_cast(cert_handle_->derCert.data), cert_handle_->derCert.len); } void X509Certificate::GetDNSNames(std::vector* dns_names) const { dns_names->clear(); // Compare with CERT_VerifyCertName(). GetCertSubjectAltNamesOfType(cert_handle_, certDNSName, dns_names); // TODO(port): suppress nss's support of the obsolete extension // SEC_OID_NS_CERT_EXT_SSL_SERVER_NAME // by providing our own authCertificate callback. if (dns_names->empty()) dns_names->push_back(subject_.common_name); } // TODO(ukai): fix to use this method to verify certificate on SSL channel. // Note that it's not being used yet. We need to fix SSLClientSocketNSS to // use this method to verify ssl certificate. // The problem is that we get segfault when unit tests is going to terminate // if PR_Cleanup is called in NSSInitSingleton destructor. int X509Certificate::Verify(const std::string& hostname, int flags, CertVerifyResult* verify_result) const { verify_result->Reset(); // Make sure that the hostname matches with the common name of the cert. SECStatus status = CERT_VerifyCertName(cert_handle_, hostname.c_str()); if (status != SECSuccess) verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; // Make sure that the cert is valid now. SECCertTimeValidity validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes( cert_handle_, PR_Now(), PR_TRUE); if (validity != secCertTimeValid) verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; CERTRevocationFlags revocation_flags; // TODO(ukai): Fix to use OCSP. // OCSP mode would fail with SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER. // We need to set up OCSP and install an HTTP client for NSS. bool use_ocsp = false; // EV requires revocation checking. if (!(flags & VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED)) flags &= ~VERIFY_EV_CERT; // TODO(wtc): Use CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE and // CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE for EV certificate // verification. PRUint64 revocation_method_flags = CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD | CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING | CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE | CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE | CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO; PRUint64 revocation_method_independent_flags = CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST | CERT_REV_MI_NO_OVERALL_INFO_REQUIREMENT; PRUint64 method_flags[2]; method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] = revocation_method_flags; method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] = revocation_method_flags; int number_of_defined_methods; CERTRevocationMethodIndex preferred_revocation_methods[1]; if (use_ocsp) { number_of_defined_methods = 2; preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp; } else { number_of_defined_methods = 1; preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_crl; } revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods = number_of_defined_methods; revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags; revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods = arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods); revocation_flags.leafTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods; revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags = revocation_method_independent_flags; revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods = number_of_defined_methods; revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags; revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods = arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods); revocation_flags.chainTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods; revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags = revocation_method_independent_flags; CERTValInParam cvin[2]; int cvin_index = 0; // We can't use PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL) for cert_pi_trustAnchors. // We get SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER (-8172) for our test root CA cert with // it by NSS 3.12.0.3. // No need to set cert_pi_trustAnchors here. // TODO(ukai): use cert_pi_useAIACertFetch (new feature in NSS 3.12.1). cvin[cvin_index].type = cert_pi_revocationFlags; cvin[cvin_index].value.pointer.revocation = &revocation_flags; cvin_index++; cvin[cvin_index].type = cert_pi_end; CERTValOutParam cvout[3]; int cvout_index = 0; cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor; cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL; cvout_index++; cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList; cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL; int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index; cvout_index++; cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end; ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout); status = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle_, certificateUsageSSLServer, cvin, cvout, NULL); if (status != SECSuccess) { int err = PORT_GetError(); LOG(ERROR) << "CERT_PKIXVerifyCert failed err=" << err; // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert rerports the wrong error code for // expired certificates (NSS bug 491174) if (err == SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID && (verify_result->cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID) != 0) err = SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE; verify_result->cert_status |= MapCertErrorToCertStatus(err); return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } GetCertChainInfo(cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, verify_result); if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); if ((flags & VERIFY_EV_CERT) && VerifyEV()) verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; return OK; } // TODO(port): Implement properly on Linux. bool X509Certificate::VerifyEV() const { NOTIMPLEMENTED(); return false; } // static X509Certificate::OSCertHandle X509Certificate::CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes( const char* data, int length) { base::EnsureNSSInit(); SECItem der_cert; der_cert.data = reinterpret_cast(const_cast(data)); der_cert.len = length; return CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &der_cert, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); } // static void X509Certificate::FreeOSCertHandle(OSCertHandle cert_handle) { CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_handle); } // static X509Certificate::Fingerprint X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint( OSCertHandle cert) { Fingerprint sha1; memset(sha1.data, 0, sizeof(sha1.data)); DCHECK(NULL != cert->derCert.data); DCHECK(0 != cert->derCert.len); SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1, sha1.data, cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len); DCHECK(rv == SECSuccess); return sha1; } } // namespace net