// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h" #include #include "base/basictypes.h" #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" #include "base/sha1.h" #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" #include "base/time/time.h" #include "build/build_config.h" #include "net/base/net_errors.h" #include "net/base/net_util.h" #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h" #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h" #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_whitelist.h" #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h" #include "net/cert/crl_set.h" #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" #include "url/url_canon.h" #if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS) #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h" #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID) #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_openssl.h" #elif defined(OS_ANDROID) #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h" #elif defined(OS_MACOSX) #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_mac.h" #elif defined(OS_WIN) #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h" #else #error Implement certificate verification. #endif namespace net { namespace { // Constants used to build histogram names const char kLeafCert[] = "Leaf"; const char kIntermediateCert[] = "Intermediate"; const char kRootCert[] = "Root"; // Matches the order of X509Certificate::PublicKeyType const char* const kCertTypeStrings[] = { "Unknown", "RSA", "DSA", "ECDSA", "DH", "ECDH" }; // Histogram buckets for RSA/DSA/DH key sizes. const int kRsaDsaKeySizes[] = {512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192, 16384}; // Histogram buckets for ECDSA/ECDH key sizes. The list is based upon the FIPS // 186-4 approved curves. const int kEccKeySizes[] = {163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 384, 409, 521, 571}; const char* CertTypeToString(int cert_type) { if (cert_type < 0 || static_cast(cert_type) >= arraysize(kCertTypeStrings)) { return "Unsupported"; } return kCertTypeStrings[cert_type]; } void RecordPublicKeyHistogram(const char* chain_position, bool baseline_keysize_applies, size_t size_bits, X509Certificate::PublicKeyType cert_type) { std::string histogram_name = base::StringPrintf("CertificateType2.%s.%s.%s", baseline_keysize_applies ? "BR" : "NonBR", chain_position, CertTypeToString(cert_type)); // Do not use UMA_HISTOGRAM_... macros here, as it caches the Histogram // instance and thus only works if |histogram_name| is constant. base::HistogramBase* counter = NULL; // Histogram buckets are contingent upon the underlying algorithm being used. if (cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDH || cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDSA) { // Typical key sizes match SECP/FIPS 186-3 recommendations for prime and // binary curves - which range from 163 bits to 571 bits. counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet( histogram_name, base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kEccKeySizes, arraysize(kEccKeySizes)), base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag); } else { // Key sizes < 1024 bits should cause errors, while key sizes > 16K are not // uniformly supported by the underlying cryptographic libraries. counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet( histogram_name, base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kRsaDsaKeySizes, arraysize(kRsaDsaKeySizes)), base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag); } counter->Add(size_bits); } // Returns true if |type| is |kPublicKeyTypeRSA| or |kPublicKeyTypeDSA|, and // if |size_bits| is < 1024. Note that this means there may be false // negatives: keys for other algorithms and which are weak will pass this // test. bool IsWeakKey(X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type, size_t size_bits) { switch (type) { case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeRSA: case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeDSA: return size_bits < 1024; default: return false; } } // Returns true if |cert| contains a known-weak key. Additionally, histograms // the observed keys for future tightening of the definition of what // constitutes a weak key. bool ExaminePublicKeys(const scoped_refptr& cert, bool should_histogram) { // The effective date of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements - // 2012-07-01 00:00:00 UTC. const base::Time kBaselineEffectiveDate = base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(12985574400000000)); // The effective date of the key size requirements from Appendix A, v1.1.5 // 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC. const base::Time kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate = base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(13033008000000000)); size_t size_bits = 0; X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type = X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeUnknown; bool weak_key = false; bool baseline_keysize_applies = cert->valid_start() >= kBaselineEffectiveDate && cert->valid_expiry() >= kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate; X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(cert->os_cert_handle(), &size_bits, &type); if (should_histogram) { RecordPublicKeyHistogram(kLeafCert, baseline_keysize_applies, size_bits, type); } if (IsWeakKey(type, size_bits)) weak_key = true; const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates = cert->GetIntermediateCertificates(); for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediates.size(); ++i) { X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(intermediates[i], &size_bits, &type); if (should_histogram) { RecordPublicKeyHistogram( (i < intermediates.size() - 1) ? kIntermediateCert : kRootCert, baseline_keysize_applies, size_bits, type); } if (!weak_key && IsWeakKey(type, size_bits)) weak_key = true; } return weak_key; } } // namespace // static CertVerifyProc* CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault() { #if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS) return new CertVerifyProcNSS(); #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID) return new CertVerifyProcOpenSSL(); #elif defined(OS_ANDROID) return new CertVerifyProcAndroid(); #elif defined(OS_MACOSX) return new CertVerifyProcMac(); #elif defined(OS_WIN) return new CertVerifyProcWin(); #else return NULL; #endif } CertVerifyProc::CertVerifyProc() {} CertVerifyProc::~CertVerifyProc() {} int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert, const std::string& hostname, const std::string& ocsp_response, int flags, CRLSet* crl_set, const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors, CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { verify_result->Reset(); verify_result->verified_cert = cert; if (IsBlacklisted(cert)) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; } // We do online revocation checking for EV certificates that aren't covered // by a fresh CRLSet. // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/142974 - Allow preferences to fully // disable revocation checking. if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) flags |= CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY; int rv = VerifyInternal(cert, hostname, ocsp_response, flags, crl_set, additional_trust_anchors, verify_result); UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallback", verify_result->common_name_fallback_used); if (!verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallbackPrivateCA", verify_result->common_name_fallback_used); } // This check is done after VerifyInternal so that VerifyInternal can fill // in the list of public key hashes. if (IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(verify_result->public_key_hashes)) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } std::vector dns_names, ip_addrs; cert->GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs); if (HasNameConstraintsViolation(verify_result->public_key_hashes, cert->subject().common_name, dns_names, ip_addrs)) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } if (IsNonWhitelistedCertificate(*verify_result->verified_cert, verify_result->public_key_hashes)) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID; rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } // Check for weak keys in the entire verified chain. bool weak_key = ExaminePublicKeys(verify_result->verified_cert, verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root); if (weak_key) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY; // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure, // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate // error. if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv)) rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } // Treat certificates signed using broken signature algorithms as invalid. if (verify_result->has_md2 || verify_result->has_md4) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } // Flag certificates using weak signature algorithms. if (verify_result->has_md5) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure, // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate // error. if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv)) rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } if (verify_result->has_sha1) verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT; // Flag certificates from publicly-trusted CAs that are issued to intranet // hosts. While the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (v1.1) permit // these to be issued until 1 November 2015, they represent a real risk for // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out ahead of the hard // deadline. if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && IsHostnameNonUnique(hostname)) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME; // CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME will eventually become a hard error. For // now treat it as a warning and do not map it to an error return value. } // Flag certificates using too long validity periods. if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && HasTooLongValidity(*cert)) { verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG; if (rv == OK) rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); } return rv; } // static bool CertVerifyProc::IsBlacklisted(X509Certificate* cert) { static const unsigned kComodoSerialBytes = 16; static const uint8 kComodoSerials[][kComodoSerialBytes] = { // Not a real certificate. For testing only. {0x07,0x7a,0x59,0xbc,0xd5,0x34,0x59,0x60,0x1c,0xa6,0x90,0x72,0x67,0xa6,0xdd,0x1c}, // The next nine certificates all expire on Fri Mar 14 23:59:59 2014. // Some serial numbers actually have a leading 0x00 byte required to // encode a positive integer in DER if the most significant bit is 0. // We omit the leading 0x00 bytes to make all serial numbers 16 bytes. // Subject: CN=mail.google.com // subjectAltName dNSName: mail.google.com, www.mail.google.com {0x04,0x7e,0xcb,0xe9,0xfc,0xa5,0x5f,0x7b,0xd0,0x9e,0xae,0x36,0xe1,0x0c,0xae,0x1e}, // Subject: CN=global trustee // subjectAltName dNSName: global trustee // Note: not a CA certificate. {0xd8,0xf3,0x5f,0x4e,0xb7,0x87,0x2b,0x2d,0xab,0x06,0x92,0xe3,0x15,0x38,0x2f,0xb0}, // Subject: CN=login.live.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.live.com, www.login.live.com {0xb0,0xb7,0x13,0x3e,0xd0,0x96,0xf9,0xb5,0x6f,0xae,0x91,0xc8,0x74,0xbd,0x3a,0xc0}, // Subject: CN=addons.mozilla.org // subjectAltName dNSName: addons.mozilla.org, www.addons.mozilla.org {0x92,0x39,0xd5,0x34,0x8f,0x40,0xd1,0x69,0x5a,0x74,0x54,0x70,0xe1,0xf2,0x3f,0x43}, // Subject: CN=login.skype.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.skype.com, www.login.skype.com {0xe9,0x02,0x8b,0x95,0x78,0xe4,0x15,0xdc,0x1a,0x71,0x0a,0x2b,0x88,0x15,0x44,0x47}, // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com, www.login.yahoo.com {0xd7,0x55,0x8f,0xda,0xf5,0xf1,0x10,0x5b,0xb2,0x13,0x28,0x2b,0x70,0x77,0x29,0xa3}, // Subject: CN=www.google.com // subjectAltName dNSName: www.google.com, google.com {0xf5,0xc8,0x6a,0xf3,0x61,0x62,0xf1,0x3a,0x64,0xf5,0x4f,0x6d,0xc9,0x58,0x7c,0x06}, // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com {0x39,0x2a,0x43,0x4f,0x0e,0x07,0xdf,0x1f,0x8a,0xa3,0x05,0xde,0x34,0xe0,0xc2,0x29}, // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com {0x3e,0x75,0xce,0xd4,0x6b,0x69,0x30,0x21,0x21,0x88,0x30,0xae,0x86,0xa8,0x2a,0x71}, }; const std::string& serial_number = cert->serial_number(); if (!serial_number.empty() && (serial_number[0] & 0x80) != 0) { // This is a negative serial number, which isn't technically allowed but // which probably happens. In order to avoid confusing a negative serial // number with a positive one once the leading zeros have been removed, we // disregard it. return false; } base::StringPiece serial(serial_number); // Remove leading zeros. while (serial.size() > 1 && serial[0] == 0) serial.remove_prefix(1); if (serial.size() == kComodoSerialBytes) { for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kComodoSerials); i++) { if (memcmp(kComodoSerials[i], serial.data(), kComodoSerialBytes) == 0) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.SSLCertBlacklisted", i, arraysize(kComodoSerials) + 1); return true; } } } // CloudFlare revoked all certificates issued prior to April 2nd, 2014. Thus // all certificates where the CN ends with ".cloudflare.com" with a prior // issuance date are rejected. // // The old certs had a lifetime of five years, so this can be removed April // 2nd, 2019. const std::string& cn = cert->subject().common_name; static const char kCloudFlareCNSuffix[] = ".cloudflare.com"; // kCloudFlareEpoch is the base::Time internal value for midnight at the // beginning of April 2nd, 2014, UTC. static const int64 kCloudFlareEpoch = INT64_C(13040870400000000); if (cn.size() > arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1 && cn.compare(cn.size() - (arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1), arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1, kCloudFlareCNSuffix) == 0 && cert->valid_start() < base::Time::FromInternalValue(kCloudFlareEpoch)) { return true; } return false; } // static // NOTE: This implementation assumes and enforces that the hashes are SHA1. bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted( const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes) { static const unsigned kNumHashes = 17; static const uint8 kHashes[kNumHashes][base::kSHA1Length] = { // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Root CA // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net x2 and self-signed {0x41, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x36, 0x32, 0x58, 0xf3, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x7d, 0x12, 0xce, 0x48, 0x63, 0xe4, 0x33, 0x43, 0x78, 0x06, 0xa8}, // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Cyber CA // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root {0xc4, 0xf9, 0x66, 0x37, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x5e, 0x71, 0xd6, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xce, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x95, 0xb4, 0x35, 0xd1}, // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Services 1024 CA // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net {0xe2, 0x3b, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x5f, 0x87, 0x71, 0x0a, 0x68, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x80, 0x50, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xc6, 0x27, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0xa6}, // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2 // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Organisatie CA - G2 {0x7b, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x39, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x6e, 0x9f, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x45, 0xdb}, // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Overheid en Bedrijven // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Overheid CA {0xe8, 0xf9, 0x12, 0x00, 0xc6, 0x5c, 0xee, 0x16, 0xe0, 0x39, 0xb9, 0xf8, 0x83, 0x84, 0x16, 0x61, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x81, 0xc5}, // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd. // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root // Expires: Jul 17 15:16:54 2012 GMT {0x01, 0x29, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x96, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0xe1, 0x97, 0x23, 0x91, 0x90, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x52}, // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd. // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) // Expires: Jul 16 17:53:37 2015 GMT {0xd3, 0x3c, 0x5b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xb3, 0xbe, 0x9a, 0xd6, 0x95, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x25, 0x28, 0x03, 0x29, 0x81}, // Issuer: CN=Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2 // Covers two certificates, the latter of which expires Apr 15 21:09:30 // 2021 GMT. {0xe1, 0x2d, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x22, 0x76, 0xf8, 0x30, 0xe6, 0xce, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x41, 0xa9, 0x32}, // Cyberoam CA certificate. Private key leaked, but this certificate would // only have been installed by Cyberoam customers. The certificate expires // in 2036, but we can probably remove in a couple of years (2014). {0xd9, 0xf5, 0xc6, 0xce, 0x57, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xcc, 0x7e, 0xd1, 0x72, 0xbd, 0x53, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0x07, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xd1}, // Win32/Sirefef.gen!C generates fake certificates with this public key. {0xa4, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x9e, 0x1d, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0xc3, 0x31, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xfc, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xa4}, // Three retired intermediate certificates from Symantec. No compromise; // just for robustness. All expire May 17 23:59:59 2018. // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=966060 {0x68, 0x5e, 0xec, 0x0a, 0x39, 0xf6, 0x68, 0xae, 0x8f, 0xd8, 0x96, 0x4f, 0x98, 0x74, 0x76, 0xb4, 0x50, 0x4f, 0xd2, 0xbe}, {0x0e, 0x50, 0x2d, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x60, 0x36, 0x8a, 0x31, 0xf0, 0x6a, 0x81, 0x04, 0x31, 0xba, 0x6f, 0x72, 0xc0, 0x41}, {0x93, 0xd1, 0x53, 0x22, 0x29, 0xcc, 0x2a, 0xbd, 0x21, 0xdf, 0xf5, 0x97, 0xee, 0x32, 0x0f, 0xe4, 0x24, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x0c}, // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, OU=NICCA, CN=NIC Certifying // Authority. Issued by C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2007. // Expires July 4th, 2015. {0xf5, 0x71, 0x79, 0xfa, 0xea, 0x10, 0xc5, 0x43, 0x8c, 0xb0, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x7b, 0x6e, 0x0d, 0xb2, 0xff, 0x54}, // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, CN=NIC CA 2011. Issued by // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2011. // Expires March 11th 2016. {0x07, 0x7a, 0xc7, 0xde, 0x8d, 0xa5, 0x58, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x06, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x9e, 0x55, 0x4f, 0xae, 0xb3, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0x66}, // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, CN=NIC CA 2014. Issued by // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2014. // Expires: March 5th, 2024. {0xe5, 0x8e, 0x31, 0x5b, 0xaa, 0xee, 0xaa, 0xc6, 0xe7, 0x2e, 0xc9, 0x57, 0x36, 0x70, 0xca, 0x2f, 0x25, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x47}, // C=DE, O=Fraunhofer, OU=Fraunhofer Corporate PKI, // CN=Fraunhofer Service CA 2007. // Expires: Jun 30 2019. // No compromise, just for robustness. See // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1076940 {0x38, 0x4d, 0x0c, 0x1d, 0xc4, 0x77, 0xa7, 0xb3, 0xf8, 0x67, 0x86, 0xd0, 0x18, 0x51, 0x9f, 0x58, 0x9f, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0x25}, }; for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumHashes; i++) { for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin(); j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) { if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 && memcmp(j->data(), kHashes[i], base::kSHA1Length) == 0) { return true; } } } return false; } static const size_t kMaxDomainLength = 18; // CheckNameConstraints verifies that every name in |dns_names| is in one of // the domains specified by |domains|. The |domains| array is terminated by an // empty string. static bool CheckNameConstraints(const std::vector& dns_names, const char domains[][kMaxDomainLength]) { for (std::vector::const_iterator i = dns_names.begin(); i != dns_names.end(); ++i) { bool ok = false; url::CanonHostInfo host_info; const std::string dns_name = CanonicalizeHost(*i, &host_info); if (host_info.IsIPAddress()) continue; const size_t registry_len = registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength( dns_name, registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES, registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); // If the name is not in a known TLD, ignore it. This permits internal // names. if (registry_len == 0) continue; for (size_t j = 0; domains[j][0]; ++j) { const size_t domain_length = strlen(domains[j]); // The DNS name must have "." + domains[j] as a suffix. if (i->size() <= (1 /* period before domain */ + domain_length)) continue; const char* suffix = &dns_name[i->size() - domain_length - 1]; if (suffix[0] != '.') continue; if (memcmp(&suffix[1], domains[j], domain_length) != 0) continue; ok = true; break; } if (!ok) return false; } return true; } // PublicKeyDomainLimitation contains a SHA1, SPKI hash and a pointer to an // array of fixed-length strings that contain the domains that the SPKI is // allowed to issue for. struct PublicKeyDomainLimitation { uint8 public_key[base::kSHA1Length]; const char (*domains)[kMaxDomainLength]; }; // static bool CertVerifyProc::HasNameConstraintsViolation( const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes, const std::string& common_name, const std::vector& dns_names, const std::vector& ip_addrs) { static const char kDomainsANSSI[][kMaxDomainLength] = { "fr", // France "gp", // Guadeloupe "gf", // Guyane "mq", // Martinique "re", // Réunion "yt", // Mayotte "pm", // Saint-Pierre et Miquelon "bl", // Saint Barthélemy "mf", // Saint Martin "wf", // Wallis et Futuna "pf", // Polynésie française "nc", // Nouvelle Calédonie "tf", // Terres australes et antarctiques françaises "", }; static const char kDomainsIndiaCCA[][kMaxDomainLength] = { "gov.in", "nic.in", "ac.in", "rbi.org.in", "bankofindia.co.in", "ncode.in", "tcs.co.in", "", }; static const char kDomainsTest[][kMaxDomainLength] = { "example.com", "", }; static const PublicKeyDomainLimitation kLimits[] = { // C=FR, ST=France, L=Paris, O=PM/SGDN, OU=DCSSI, // CN=IGC/A/emailAddress=igca@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr { {0x79, 0x23, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x0f, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0xe6, 0xab, 0xad, 0xae, 0x27, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x14, 0xd1, 0xa8, 0x73}, kDomainsANSSI, }, // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2007 // Expires: July 4th 2015. { {0xfe, 0xe3, 0x95, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x5f, 0xea, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0xdc, 0xcf, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x58, 0x27, 0xd8, 0xb8, 0xe4}, kDomainsIndiaCCA, }, // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2011 // Expires: March 11 2016. { {0xf1, 0x42, 0xf6, 0xa2, 0x7d, 0x29, 0x3e, 0xa8, 0xf9, 0x64, 0x52, 0x56, 0xed, 0x07, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xf2, 0xdb, 0x1c, 0xdf}, kDomainsIndiaCCA, }, // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2014 // Expires: March 5 2024. { {0x36, 0x8c, 0x4a, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0xed, 0x5a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0xb8, 0xc5, 0xcf, 0x6d, 0xb3, 0x57, 0xe1}, kDomainsIndiaCCA, }, // Not a real certificate - just for testing. This is the SPKI hash of // the keys used in net/data/ssl/certificates/name_constraint_*.crt. { {0x61, 0xec, 0x82, 0x8b, 0xdb, 0x5c, 0x78, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xcc, 0x4f, 0x0f, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x85, 0x31, 0x93, 0x9f, 0xf7, 0x3d}, kDomainsTest, }, }; for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kLimits); ++i) { for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin(); j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) { if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 && memcmp(j->data(), kLimits[i].public_key, base::kSHA1Length) == 0) { if (dns_names.empty() && ip_addrs.empty()) { std::vector dns_names; dns_names.push_back(common_name); if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].domains)) return true; } else { if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].domains)) return true; } } } } return false; } // static bool CertVerifyProc::HasTooLongValidity(const X509Certificate& cert) { const base::Time& start = cert.valid_start(); const base::Time& expiry = cert.valid_expiry(); if (start.is_max() || start.is_null() || expiry.is_max() || expiry.is_null() || start > expiry) { return true; } base::Time::Exploded exploded_start; base::Time::Exploded exploded_expiry; cert.valid_start().UTCExplode(&exploded_start); cert.valid_expiry().UTCExplode(&exploded_expiry); if (exploded_expiry.year - exploded_start.year > 10) return true; int month_diff = (exploded_expiry.year - exploded_start.year) * 12 + (exploded_expiry.month - exploded_start.month); // Add any remainder as a full month. if (exploded_expiry.day_of_month > exploded_start.day_of_month) ++month_diff; static const base::Time time_2012_07_01 = base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2012, 7, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}); static const base::Time time_2015_04_01 = base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 4, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}); static const base::Time time_2019_07_01 = base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2019, 7, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}); // For certificates issued before the BRs took effect. if (start < time_2012_07_01 && (month_diff > 120 || expiry > time_2019_07_01)) return true; // For certificates issued after 1 July 2012: 60 months. if (start >= time_2012_07_01 && month_diff > 60) return true; // For certificates issued after 1 April 2015: 39 months. if (start >= time_2015_04_01 && month_diff > 39) return true; return false; } } // namespace net