1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
|
// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.h"
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/cert/ct_log_verifier.h"
#include "net/cert/ct_objects_extractor.h"
#include "net/cert/ct_serialization.h"
#include "net/cert/ct_verify_result.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
namespace net {
MultiLogCTVerifier::MultiLogCTVerifier() { }
MultiLogCTVerifier::~MultiLogCTVerifier() { }
void MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(scoped_ptr<CTLogVerifier> log_verifier) {
DCHECK(log_verifier);
if (!log_verifier)
return;
linked_ptr<CTLogVerifier> log(log_verifier.release());
logs_[log->key_id()] = log;
}
int MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(
X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& sct_list_from_ocsp,
const std::string& sct_list_from_tls_extension,
ct::CTVerifyResult* result) {
DCHECK(cert);
DCHECK(result);
result->verified_scts.clear();
result->invalid_scts.clear();
result->unknown_logs_scts.clear();
bool has_verified_scts = false;
std::string embedded_scts;
if (!cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().empty() &&
ct::ExtractEmbeddedSCTList(
cert->os_cert_handle(),
&embedded_scts)) {
ct::LogEntry precert_entry;
has_verified_scts =
ct::GetPrecertLogEntry(
cert->os_cert_handle(),
cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().front(),
&precert_entry) &&
VerifySCTs(
embedded_scts,
precert_entry,
ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED,
result);
}
ct::LogEntry x509_entry;
if (ct::GetX509LogEntry(cert->os_cert_handle(), &x509_entry)) {
has_verified_scts |= VerifySCTs(
sct_list_from_ocsp,
x509_entry,
ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_OCSP_RESPONSE,
result);
has_verified_scts |= VerifySCTs(
sct_list_from_tls_extension,
x509_entry,
ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_EXTENSION,
result);
}
if (has_verified_scts)
return OK;
return ERR_CT_NO_SCTS_VERIFIED_OK;
}
bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs(
const std::string& encoded_sct_list,
const ct::LogEntry& expected_entry,
ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin origin,
ct::CTVerifyResult* result) {
if (logs_.empty())
return false;
base::StringPiece temp(encoded_sct_list);
std::vector<base::StringPiece> sct_list;
if (!ct::DecodeSCTList(&temp, &sct_list))
return false;
bool verified = false;
for (std::vector<base::StringPiece>::const_iterator it = sct_list.begin();
it != sct_list.end(); ++it) {
base::StringPiece encoded_sct(*it);
scoped_refptr<ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp> decoded_sct;
if (!DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(&encoded_sct, &decoded_sct)) {
// XXX(rsleevi): Should we really just skip over bad SCTs?
continue;
}
decoded_sct->origin = origin;
verified |= VerifySingleSCT(decoded_sct, expected_entry, result);
}
return verified;
}
bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(
scoped_refptr<ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp> sct,
const ct::LogEntry& expected_entry,
ct::CTVerifyResult* result) {
// Assume this SCT is untrusted until proven otherwise.
IDToLogMap::iterator it = logs_.find(sct->log_id);
if (it == logs_.end()) {
DVLOG(1) << "SCT does not match any known log.";
result->unknown_logs_scts.push_back(sct);
return false;
}
if (!it->second->Verify(expected_entry, *sct)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Unable to verify SCT signature.";
result->invalid_scts.push_back(sct);
return false;
}
// SCT verified ok, just make sure the timestamp is legitimate.
if (sct->timestamp > base::Time::Now()) {
DVLOG(1) << "SCT is from the future!";
result->invalid_scts.push_back(sct);
return false;
}
result->verified_scts.push_back(sct);
return true;
}
} // namespace net
|
