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<html>
<head>
<title>Trevor Perrin</title>
</head>
<body>
<H1>Trevor Perrin</H1>
<b>Email:</b> trevp at trevp.net<br>
<b>PGP Key:</b> <a href="pgp/key.asc">8035 47B9 D1F9 C148 619A 7948 D8C0 0F11 2F2F F9E3</a>
<p>I'm a programmer, here are some projects I'm involved in.
<p>My current interest is cryptographic key management and alternatives to PKI.
<p>
<a name="cryptoID">
<H2><a href="cryptoID/">CryptoIDs</a></H2>
<b>Paper 1:</b> Public Key Distribution through "cryptoIDs" (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.html">.html</a>) <i>(presented at <a href="http://www.nspw.org/2003/">NSPW 2003</a>)</i><br>
<b>Paper 2:</b> The CryptoID Key Management Protocols (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID2.pdf">.pdf</a>) <i>(the best introduction)</i><br>
<b>Schema:</b> XML Schema for <certChain> (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Code:</b> CryptoIDlib Python and Java library and command-line tool v0.1.8 (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoIDlib-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptoID/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>PKI isn't working for person-to-person communications. Few people use
secure email, voice, instant-messaging, or anything else.
<p>CryptoIDs are an alternative. The idea is for people to exchange small,
user-friendly fingerprints (aka "cryptoIDs") like 'cyhf4.9ajd8.kbdx4.rk98c'.
These could be passed around and stored in address books as if they were phone
numbers or postal addresses.
<p>The cryptoID for each user would correspond to that user's <i>root key</i>.
The user would keep his root key in a safe place - his employer or
some commercial service might hold it for him. The rootholder would operate
an online service which would issue short-lived <i>subkey certificates</i> or <i>validation signatures</i> to the user.
<p>CryptoIDs, then, are about combining <i>fingerprint-based public-key distribution</i> with
<i>certificate-based private-key management</i>. The first paper above presents the
cryptoID fingerprint and certificate formats, which are designed specifically for
this. CryptoIDlib lets you test-drive these formats.
<p>The second paper presents private-key management protocols for use with online servers.
Support for these is being added to cryptoIDlib.
<a name="tls_lite">
<H2><a href="tls_lite/">TLS Lite</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> tls_lite python library v0.1.8 (<a href="tls_lite/tls_lite-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="tls_lite/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)<br>
<p>
TLS Lite is a free python library that implements SSL 3.0 and <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt">TLS 1.0</a>.
TLS Lite supports non-traditional authentication methods such as <a href="http://trevp.net/tls_srp/index.html">SRP</a>,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.txt">shared keys</a>,
and <a href="http://trevp.net/cryptoID/index.html">cryptoIDs</a>, in addition to X.509 certificates. TLS Lite is pure
<a href="http://www.python.org">Python</a>, however it can access <a href="http://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL</a> or
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a> for faster crypto operations.
<a name="tlssrp">
<H2><a href="tls_srp/">TLS/SRP</a></H2>
<b>Internet-Draft:</b> Using SRP for TLS Authentication (<a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.html">.html</a>)
<p><a href="http://srp.stanford.edu">SRP</a> is the best way to do password authentication
across a network. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html">TLS</a> (aka SSL v3.1)
is the best way to do channel security. What could go better together?
<p>This draft modifies the TLS handshake to use SRP. This combination of
password-based mutual authentication and the TLS record layer is
ideal for protecting protocols like POP3 and HTTP.
<a name="dss">
<H2>DSS</H2>
<b>Requirements:</b> DSS Use Case Requirements Analysis (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Specification Working Draft:</b> Digital Signature Service Core Protocol and Elements (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Schema Working Draft:</b> oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10 (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Somewhat Related Paper:</b> Delegated Cryptography, Online Trusted Third Parties, and PKI
(<a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.html">.html</a>)<br>
<i>(presented at the <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/">1st Annual PKI Research Workshop</a>)</i>
<p>The <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/">OASIS</a> <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/dss/">Digital Signature Service Technical Committee</a>
is designing protocols for signing, verifying, and
time-stamping of XML documents and other data. The idea is to perform these
operations on servers, thus freeing clients from having to manage private
keys, calculate certificate paths, and so on.
<p>Also listed is a paper arguing for the server-based approach vs. client-side PKI.
<a name="cryptoURL">
<H2>CryptoURLs</H2>
<b>Draft of potential Internet-Draft:</b> The "crypto" URL scheme (<a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.html">.html</a>)<br>
<p>
CryptoURLs add "crypto metadata" like content hashes and key fingerprints to normal URLs.
The resulting URLs are <a href="http://zooko.com/distnames.html">self-authenticating</a>,
like <a href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/mazieres99separating.html">SFS file names</a> or
<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/users/tuomaura/CGA/">Cryptographically Generated Addresses</a>.
These could be useful in:
<dir>
<LI>web pages:
<dir>
<LI>a page could link to software binaries and include their hash
<LI>a portal could provide secure introductions to a community of sites
</dir>
<LI>XML documents (e.g. extending an <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/">XML-DSIG</a> over external references)
<LI>protocols (e.g. HTTP Redirects or LDAP Referrals)
<LI>software configuration (you could configure a client with the address and fingerprint of a server in one step)
</dir>
<a href="http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/">YURLs</a> are another approach to self-authenticating URLs.
<a name="cryptlibConverter">
<H2><a href="cryptlibConverter/">CryptlibConverter</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> Version 5 for cryptlib 3.1 (<a href="cryptlibConverter/cryptlibConverter5_cl31.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptlibConverter/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>This is a python script that generates java, python, and C# wrappers for
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a>. A set of wrappers for
cryptlib 3.1 is included in the .zip file. The python and C# wrappers are also included in the latest cryptlib distribution.
<br>
<a name="cryptoID">
<H2><a href="cryptoID/">CryptoIDs</a></H2>
<b>Paper 1:</b> Public Key Distribution through "cryptoIDs" (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.html">.html</a>) <i>(presented at <a href="http://www.nspw.org/2003/">NSPW 2003</a>)</i><br>
<b>Paper 2:</b> The CryptoID Key Management Protocols (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID2.pdf">.pdf</a>) <i>(the best introduction)</i><br>
<b>Schema:</b> XML Schema for <certChain> (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Code:</b> CryptoIDlib Python and Java library and command-line tool v0.1.8 (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoIDlib-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptoID/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>PKI isn't working for person-to-person communications. Few people use
secure email, voice, instant-messaging, or anything else.
<p>CryptoIDs are an alternative. The idea is for people to exchange small,
user-friendly fingerprints (aka "cryptoIDs") like 'cyhf4.9ajd8.kbdx4.rk98c'.
These could be passed around and stored in address books as if they were phone
numbers or postal addresses.
<p>The cryptoID for each user would correspond to that user's <i>root key</i>.
The user would keep his root key in a safe place - his employer or
some commercial service might hold it for him. The rootholder would operate
an online service which would issue short-lived <i>subkey certificates</i> or <i>validation signatures</i> to the user.
<p>CryptoIDs, then, are about combining <i>fingerprint-based public-key distribution</i> with
<i>certificate-based private-key management</i>. The first paper above presents the
cryptoID fingerprint and certificate formats, which are designed specifically for
this. CryptoIDlib lets you test-drive these formats.
<p>The second paper presents private-key management protocols for use with online servers.
Support for these is being added to cryptoIDlib.
<a name="tls_lite">
<H2><a href="tls_lite/">TLS Lite</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> tls_lite python library v0.1.8 (<a href="tls_lite/tls_lite-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="tls_lite/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)<br>
<p>
TLS Lite is a free python library that implements SSL 3.0 and <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt">TLS 1.0</a>.
TLS Lite supports non-traditional authentication methods such as <a href="http://trevp.net/tls_srp/index.html">SRP</a>,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.txt">shared keys</a>,
and <a href="http://trevp.net/cryptoID/index.html">cryptoIDs</a>, in addition to X.509 certificates. TLS Lite is pure
<a href="http://www.python.org">Python</a>, however it can access <a href="http://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL</a> or
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a> for faster crypto operations.
<a name="tlssrp">
<H2><a href="tls_srp/">TLS/SRP</a></H2>
<b>Internet-Draft:</b> Using SRP for TLS Authentication (<a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.html">.html</a>)
<p><a href="http://srp.stanford.edu">SRP</a> is the best way to do password authentication
across a network. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html">TLS</a> (aka SSL v3.1)
is the best way to do channel security. What could go better together?
<p>This draft modifies the TLS handshake to use SRP. This combination of
password-based mutual authentication and the TLS record layer is
ideal for protecting protocols like POP3 and HTTP.
<a name="dss">
<H2>DSS</H2>
<b>Requirements:</b> DSS Use Case Requirements Analysis (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Specification Working Draft:</b> Digital Signature Service Core Protocol and Elements (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Schema Working Draft:</b> oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10 (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Somewhat Related Paper:</b> Delegated Cryptography, Online Trusted Third Parties, and PKI
(<a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.html">.html</a>)<br>
<i>(presented at the <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/">1st Annual PKI Research Workshop</a>)</i>
<p>The <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/">OASIS</a> <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/dss/">Digital Signature Service Technical Committee</a>
is designing protocols for signing, verifying, and
time-stamping of XML documents and other data. The idea is to perform these
operations on servers, thus freeing clients from having to manage private
keys, calculate certificate paths, and so on.
<p>Also listed is a paper arguing for the server-based approach vs. client-side PKI.
<a name="cryptoURL">
<H2>CryptoURLs</H2>
<b>Draft of potential Internet-Draft:</b> The "crypto" URL scheme (<a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.html">.html</a>)<br>
<p>
CryptoURLs add "crypto metadata" like content hashes and key fingerprints to normal URLs.
The resulting URLs are <a href="http://zooko.com/distnames.html">self-authenticating</a>,
like <a href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/mazieres99separating.html">SFS file names</a> or
<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/users/tuomaura/CGA/">Cryptographically Generated Addresses</a>.
These could be useful in:
<dir>
<LI>web pages:
<dir>
<LI>a page could link to software binaries and include their hash
<LI>a portal could provide secure introductions to a community of sites
</dir>
<LI>XML documents (e.g. extending an <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/">XML-DSIG</a> over external references)
<LI>protocols (e.g. HTTP Redirects or LDAP Referrals)
<LI>software configuration (you could configure a client with the address and fingerprint of a server in one step)
</dir>
<a href="http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/">YURLs</a> are another approach to self-authenticating URLs.
<a name="cryptlibConverter">
<H2><a href="cryptlibConverter/">CryptlibConverter</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> Version 5 for cryptlib 3.1 (<a href="cryptlibConverter/cryptlibConverter5_cl31.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptlibConverter/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>This is a python script that generates java, python, and C# wrappers for
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a>. A set of wrappers for
cryptlib 3.1 is included in the .zip file. The python and C# wrappers are also included in the latest cryptlib distribution.
<br>
<a name="cryptoID">
<H2><a href="cryptoID/">CryptoIDs</a></H2>
<b>Paper 1:</b> Public Key Distribution through "cryptoIDs" (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.html">.html</a>) <i>(presented at <a href="http://www.nspw.org/2003/">NSPW 2003</a>)</i><br>
<b>Paper 2:</b> The CryptoID Key Management Protocols (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID2.pdf">.pdf</a>) <i>(the best introduction)</i><br>
<b>Schema:</b> XML Schema for <certChain> (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Code:</b> CryptoIDlib Python and Java library and command-line tool v0.1.8 (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoIDlib-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptoID/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>PKI isn't working for person-to-person communications. Few people use
secure email, voice, instant-messaging, or anything else.
<p>CryptoIDs are an alternative. The idea is for people to exchange small,
user-friendly fingerprints (aka "cryptoIDs") like 'cyhf4.9ajd8.kbdx4.rk98c'.
These could be passed around and stored in address books as if they were phone
numbers or postal addresses.
<p>The cryptoID for each user would correspond to that user's <i>root key</i>.
The user would keep his root key in a safe place - his employer or
some commercial service might hold it for him. The rootholder would operate
an online service which would issue short-lived <i>subkey certificates</i> or <i>validation signatures</i> to the user.
<p>CryptoIDs, then, are about combining <i>fingerprint-based public-key distribution</i> with
<i>certificate-based private-key management</i>. The first paper above presents the
cryptoID fingerprint and certificate formats, which are designed specifically for
this. CryptoIDlib lets you test-drive these formats.
<p>The second paper presents private-key management protocols for use with online servers.
Support for these is being added to cryptoIDlib.
<a name="tls_lite">
<H2><a href="tls_lite/">TLS Lite</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> tls_lite python library v0.1.8 (<a href="tls_lite/tls_lite-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="tls_lite/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)<br>
<p>
TLS Lite is a free python library that implements SSL 3.0 and <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt">TLS 1.0</a>.
TLS Lite supports non-traditional authentication methods such as <a href="http://trevp.net/tls_srp/index.html">SRP</a>,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.txt">shared keys</a>,
and <a href="http://trevp.net/cryptoID/index.html">cryptoIDs</a>, in addition to X.509 certificates. TLS Lite is pure
<a href="http://www.python.org">Python</a>, however it can access <a href="http://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL</a> or
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a> for faster crypto operations.
<a name="tlssrp">
<H2><a href="tls_srp/">TLS/SRP</a></H2>
<b>Internet-Draft:</b> Using SRP for TLS Authentication (<a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.html">.html</a>)
<p><a href="http://srp.stanford.edu">SRP</a> is the best way to do password authentication
across a network. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html">TLS</a> (aka SSL v3.1)
is the best way to do channel security. What could go better together?
<p>This draft modifies the TLS handshake to use SRP. This combination of
password-based mutual authentication and the TLS record layer is
ideal for protecting protocols like POP3 and HTTP.
<a name="dss">
<H2>DSS</H2>
<b>Requirements:</b> DSS Use Case Requirements Analysis (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Specification Working Draft:</b> Digital Signature Service Core Protocol and Elements (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Schema Working Draft:</b> oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10 (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Somewhat Related Paper:</b> Delegated Cryptography, Online Trusted Third Parties, and PKI
(<a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.html">.html</a>)<br>
<i>(presented at the <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/">1st Annual PKI Research Workshop</a>)</i>
<p>The <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/">OASIS</a> <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/dss/">Digital Signature Service Technical Committee</a>
is designing protocols for signing, verifying, and
time-stamping of XML documents and other data. The idea is to perform these
operations on servers, thus freeing clients from having to manage private
keys, calculate certificate paths, and so on.
<p>Also listed is a paper arguing for the server-based approach vs. client-side PKI.
<a name="cryptoURL">
<H2>CryptoURLs</H2>
<b>Draft of potential Internet-Draft:</b> The "crypto" URL scheme (<a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.html">.html</a>)<br>
<p>
CryptoURLs add "crypto metadata" like content hashes and key fingerprints to normal URLs.
The resulting URLs are <a href="http://zooko.com/distnames.html">self-authenticating</a>,
like <a href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/mazieres99separating.html">SFS file names</a> or
<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/users/tuomaura/CGA/">Cryptographically Generated Addresses</a>.
These could be useful in:
<dir>
<LI>web pages:
<dir>
<LI>a page could link to software binaries and include their hash
<LI>a portal could provide secure introductions to a community of sites
</dir>
<LI>XML documents (e.g. extending an <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/">XML-DSIG</a> over external references)
<LI>protocols (e.g. HTTP Redirects or LDAP Referrals)
<LI>software configuration (you could configure a client with the address and fingerprint of a server in one step)
</dir>
<a href="http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/">YURLs</a> are another approach to self-authenticating URLs.
<a name="cryptlibConverter">
<H2><a href="cryptlibConverter/">CryptlibConverter</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> Version 5 for cryptlib 3.1 (<a href="cryptlibConverter/cryptlibConverter5_cl31.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptlibConverter/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>This is a python script that generates java, python, and C# wrappers for
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a>. A set of wrappers for
cryptlib 3.1 is included in the .zip file. The python and C# wrappers are also included in the latest cryptlib distribution.
<br>
<a name="cryptoID">
<H2><a href="cryptoID/">CryptoIDs</a></H2>
<b>Paper 1:</b> Public Key Distribution through "cryptoIDs" (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.html">.html</a>) <i>(presented at <a href="http://www.nspw.org/2003/">NSPW 2003</a>)</i><br>
<b>Paper 2:</b> The CryptoID Key Management Protocols (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID2.pdf">.pdf</a>) <i>(the best introduction)</i><br>
<b>Schema:</b> XML Schema for <certChain> (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Code:</b> CryptoIDlib Python and Java library and command-line tool v0.1.8 (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoIDlib-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptoID/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>PKI isn't working for person-to-person communications. Few people use
secure email, voice, instant-messaging, or anything else.
<p>CryptoIDs are an alternative. The idea is for people to exchange small,
user-friendly fingerprints (aka "cryptoIDs") like 'cyhf4.9ajd8.kbdx4.rk98c'.
These could be passed around and stored in address books as if they were phone
numbers or postal addresses.
<p>The cryptoID for each user would correspond to that user's <i>root key</i>.
The user would keep his root key in a safe place - his employer or
some commercial service might hold it for him. The rootholder would operate
an online service which would issue short-lived <i>subkey certificates</i> or <i>validation signatures</i> to the user.
<p>CryptoIDs, then, are about combining <i>fingerprint-based public-key distribution</i> with
<i>certificate-based private-key management</i>. The first paper above presents the
cryptoID fingerprint and certificate formats, which are designed specifically for
this. CryptoIDlib lets you test-drive these formats.
<p>The second paper presents private-key management protocols for use with online servers.
Support for these is being added to cryptoIDlib.
<a name="tls_lite">
<H2><a href="tls_lite/">TLS Lite</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> tls_lite python library v0.1.8 (<a href="tls_lite/tls_lite-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="tls_lite/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)<br>
<p>
TLS Lite is a free python library that implements SSL 3.0 and <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt">TLS 1.0</a>.
TLS Lite supports non-traditional authentication methods such as <a href="http://trevp.net/tls_srp/index.html">SRP</a>,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.txt">shared keys</a>,
and <a href="http://trevp.net/cryptoID/index.html">cryptoIDs</a>, in addition to X.509 certificates. TLS Lite is pure
<a href="http://www.python.org">Python</a>, however it can access <a href="http://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL</a> or
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a> for faster crypto operations.
<a name="tlssrp">
<H2><a href="tls_srp/">TLS/SRP</a></H2>
<b>Internet-Draft:</b> Using SRP for TLS Authentication (<a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.html">.html</a>)
<p><a href="http://srp.stanford.edu">SRP</a> is the best way to do password authentication
across a network. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html">TLS</a> (aka SSL v3.1)
is the best way to do channel security. What could go better together?
<p>This draft modifies the TLS handshake to use SRP. This combination of
password-based mutual authentication and the TLS record layer is
ideal for protecting protocols like POP3 and HTTP.
<a name="dss">
<H2>DSS</H2>
<b>Requirements:</b> DSS Use Case Requirements Analysis (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Specification Working Draft:</b> Digital Signature Service Core Protocol and Elements (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Schema Working Draft:</b> oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10 (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Somewhat Related Paper:</b> Delegated Cryptography, Online Trusted Third Parties, and PKI
(<a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.html">.html</a>)<br>
<i>(presented at the <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/">1st Annual PKI Research Workshop</a>)</i>
<p>The <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/">OASIS</a> <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/dss/">Digital Signature Service Technical Committee</a>
is designing protocols for signing, verifying, and
time-stamping of XML documents and other data. The idea is to perform these
operations on servers, thus freeing clients from having to manage private
keys, calculate certificate paths, and so on.
<p>Also listed is a paper arguing for the server-based approach vs. client-side PKI.
<a name="cryptoURL">
<H2>CryptoURLs</H2>
<b>Draft of potential Internet-Draft:</b> The "crypto" URL scheme (<a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.html">.html</a>)<br>
<p>
CryptoURLs add "crypto metadata" like content hashes and key fingerprints to normal URLs.
The resulting URLs are <a href="http://zooko.com/distnames.html">self-authenticating</a>,
like <a href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/mazieres99separating.html">SFS file names</a> or
<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/users/tuomaura/CGA/">Cryptographically Generated Addresses</a>.
These could be useful in:
<dir>
<LI>web pages:
<dir>
<LI>a page could link to software binaries and include their hash
<LI>a portal could provide secure introductions to a community of sites
</dir>
<LI>XML documents (e.g. extending an <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/">XML-DSIG</a> over external references)
<LI>protocols (e.g. HTTP Redirects or LDAP Referrals)
<LI>software configuration (you could configure a client with the address and fingerprint of a server in one step)
</dir>
<a href="http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/">YURLs</a> are another approach to self-authenticating URLs.
<a name="cryptlibConverter">
<H2><a href="cryptlibConverter/">CryptlibConverter</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> Version 5 for cryptlib 3.1 (<a href="cryptlibConverter/cryptlibConverter5_cl31.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptlibConverter/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>This is a python script that generates java, python, and C# wrappers for
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a>. A set of wrappers for
cryptlib 3.1 is included in the .zip file. The python and C# wrappers are also included in the latest cryptlib distribution.
<br>
<a name="cryptoID">
<H2><a href="cryptoID/">CryptoIDs</a></H2>
<b>Paper 1:</b> Public Key Distribution through "cryptoIDs" (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.html">.html</a>) <i>(presented at <a href="http://www.nspw.org/2003/">NSPW 2003</a>)</i><br>
<b>Paper 2:</b> The CryptoID Key Management Protocols (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID2.pdf">.pdf</a>) <i>(the best introduction)</i><br>
<b>Schema:</b> XML Schema for <certChain> (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Code:</b> CryptoIDlib Python and Java library and command-line tool v0.1.8 (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoIDlib-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptoID/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>PKI isn't working for person-to-person communications. Few people use
secure email, voice, instant-messaging, or anything else.
<p>CryptoIDs are an alternative. The idea is for people to exchange small,
user-friendly fingerprints (aka "cryptoIDs") like 'cyhf4.9ajd8.kbdx4.rk98c'.
These could be passed around and stored in address books as if they were phone
numbers or postal addresses.
<p>The cryptoID for each user would correspond to that user's <i>root key</i>.
The user would keep his root key in a safe place - his employer or
some commercial service might hold it for him. The rootholder would operate
an online service which would issue short-lived <i>subkey certificates</i> or <i>validation signatures</i> to the user.
<p>CryptoIDs, then, are about combining <i>fingerprint-based public-key distribution</i> with
<i>certificate-based private-key management</i>. The first paper above presents the
cryptoID fingerprint and certificate formats, which are designed specifically for
this. CryptoIDlib lets you test-drive these formats.
<p>The second paper presents private-key management protocols for use with online servers.
Support for these is being added to cryptoIDlib.
<a name="tls_lite">
<H2><a href="tls_lite/">TLS Lite</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> tls_lite python library v0.1.8 (<a href="tls_lite/tls_lite-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="tls_lite/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)<br>
<p>
TLS Lite is a free python library that implements SSL 3.0 and <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt">TLS 1.0</a>.
TLS Lite supports non-traditional authentication methods such as <a href="http://trevp.net/tls_srp/index.html">SRP</a>,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.txt">shared keys</a>,
and <a href="http://trevp.net/cryptoID/index.html">cryptoIDs</a>, in addition to X.509 certificates. TLS Lite is pure
<a href="http://www.python.org">Python</a>, however it can access <a href="http://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL</a> or
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a> for faster crypto operations.
<a name="tlssrp">
<H2><a href="tls_srp/">TLS/SRP</a></H2>
<b>Internet-Draft:</b> Using SRP for TLS Authentication (<a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.html">.html</a>)
<p><a href="http://srp.stanford.edu">SRP</a> is the best way to do password authentication
across a network. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html">TLS</a> (aka SSL v3.1)
is the best way to do channel security. What could go better together?
<p>This draft modifies the TLS handshake to use SRP. This combination of
password-based mutual authentication and the TLS record layer is
ideal for protecting protocols like POP3 and HTTP.
<a name="dss">
<H2>DSS</H2>
<b>Requirements:</b> DSS Use Case Requirements Analysis (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Specification Working Draft:</b> Digital Signature Service Core Protocol and Elements (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Schema Working Draft:</b> oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10 (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Somewhat Related Paper:</b> Delegated Cryptography, Online Trusted Third Parties, and PKI
(<a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.html">.html</a>)<br>
<i>(presented at the <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/">1st Annual PKI Research Workshop</a>)</i>
<p>The <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/">OASIS</a> <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/dss/">Digital Signature Service Technical Committee</a>
is designing protocols for signing, verifying, and
time-stamping of XML documents and other data. The idea is to perform these
operations on servers, thus freeing clients from having to manage private
keys, calculate certificate paths, and so on.
<p>Also listed is a paper arguing for the server-based approach vs. client-side PKI.
<a name="cryptoURL">
<H2>CryptoURLs</H2>
<b>Draft of potential Internet-Draft:</b> The "crypto" URL scheme (<a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.html">.html</a>)<br>
<p>
CryptoURLs add "crypto metadata" like content hashes and key fingerprints to normal URLs.
The resulting URLs are <a href="http://zooko.com/distnames.html">self-authenticating</a>,
like <a href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/mazieres99separating.html">SFS file names</a> or
<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/users/tuomaura/CGA/">Cryptographically Generated Addresses</a>.
These could be useful in:
<dir>
<LI>web pages:
<dir>
<LI>a page could link to software binaries and include their hash
<LI>a portal could provide secure introductions to a community of sites
</dir>
<LI>XML documents (e.g. extending an <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/">XML-DSIG</a> over external references)
<LI>protocols (e.g. HTTP Redirects or LDAP Referrals)
<LI>software configuration (you could configure a client with the address and fingerprint of a server in one step)
</dir>
<a href="http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/">YURLs</a> are another approach to self-authenticating URLs.
<a name="cryptlibConverter">
<H2><a href="cryptlibConverter/">CryptlibConverter</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> Version 5 for cryptlib 3.1 (<a href="cryptlibConverter/cryptlibConverter5_cl31.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptlibConverter/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>This is a python script that generates java, python, and C# wrappers for
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a>. A set of wrappers for
cryptlib 3.1 is included in the .zip file. The python and C# wrappers are also included in the latest cryptlib distribution.
<br>
<a name="cryptoID">
<H2><a href="cryptoID/">CryptoIDs</a></H2>
<b>Paper 1:</b> Public Key Distribution through "cryptoIDs" (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.html">.html</a>) <i>(presented at <a href="http://www.nspw.org/2003/">NSPW 2003</a>)</i><br>
<b>Paper 2:</b> The CryptoID Key Management Protocols (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID2.pdf">.pdf</a>) <i>(the best introduction)</i><br>
<b>Schema:</b> XML Schema for <certChain> (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Code:</b> CryptoIDlib Python and Java library and command-line tool v0.1.8 (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoIDlib-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptoID/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>PKI isn't working for person-to-person communications. Few people use
secure email, voice, instant-messaging, or anything else.
<p>CryptoIDs are an alternative. The idea is for people to exchange small,
user-friendly fingerprints (aka "cryptoIDs") like 'cyhf4.9ajd8.kbdx4.rk98c'.
These could be passed around and stored in address books as if they were phone
numbers or postal addresses.
<p>The cryptoID for each user would correspond to that user's <i>root key</i>.
The user would keep his root key in a safe place - his employer or
some commercial service might hold it for him. The rootholder would operate
an online service which would issue short-lived <i>subkey certificates</i> or <i>validation signatures</i> to the user.
<p>CryptoIDs, then, are about combining <i>fingerprint-based public-key distribution</i> with
<i>certificate-based private-key management</i>. The first paper above presents the
cryptoID fingerprint and certificate formats, which are designed specifically for
this. CryptoIDlib lets you test-drive these formats.
<p>The second paper presents private-key management protocols for use with online servers.
Support for these is being added to cryptoIDlib.
<a name="tls_lite">
<H2><a href="tls_lite/">TLS Lite</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> tls_lite python library v0.1.8 (<a href="tls_lite/tls_lite-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="tls_lite/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)<br>
<p>
TLS Lite is a free python library that implements SSL 3.0 and <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt">TLS 1.0</a>.
TLS Lite supports non-traditional authentication methods such as <a href="http://trevp.net/tls_srp/index.html">SRP</a>,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.txt">shared keys</a>,
and <a href="http://trevp.net/cryptoID/index.html">cryptoIDs</a>, in addition to X.509 certificates. TLS Lite is pure
<a href="http://www.python.org">Python</a>, however it can access <a href="http://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL</a> or
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a> for faster crypto operations.
<a name="tlssrp">
<H2><a href="tls_srp/">TLS/SRP</a></H2>
<b>Internet-Draft:</b> Using SRP for TLS Authentication (<a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.html">.html</a>)
<p><a href="http://srp.stanford.edu">SRP</a> is the best way to do password authentication
across a network. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html">TLS</a> (aka SSL v3.1)
is the best way to do channel security. What could go better together?
<p>This draft modifies the TLS handshake to use SRP. This combination of
password-based mutual authentication and the TLS record layer is
ideal for protecting protocols like POP3 and HTTP.
<a name="dss">
<H2>DSS</H2>
<b>Requirements:</b> DSS Use Case Requirements Analysis (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Specification Working Draft:</b> Digital Signature Service Core Protocol and Elements (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Schema Working Draft:</b> oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10 (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Somewhat Related Paper:</b> Delegated Cryptography, Online Trusted Third Parties, and PKI
(<a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.html">.html</a>)<br>
<i>(presented at the <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/">1st Annual PKI Research Workshop</a>)</i>
<p>The <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/">OASIS</a> <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/dss/">Digital Signature Service Technical Committee</a>
is designing protocols for signing, verifying, and
time-stamping of XML documents and other data. The idea is to perform these
operations on servers, thus freeing clients from having to manage private
keys, calculate certificate paths, and so on.
<p>Also listed is a paper arguing for the server-based approach vs. client-side PKI.
<a name="cryptoURL">
<H2>CryptoURLs</H2>
<b>Draft of potential Internet-Draft:</b> The "crypto" URL scheme (<a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.html">.html</a>)<br>
<p>
CryptoURLs add "crypto metadata" like content hashes and key fingerprints to normal URLs.
The resulting URLs are <a href="http://zooko.com/distnames.html">self-authenticating</a>,
like <a href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/mazieres99separating.html">SFS file names</a> or
<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/users/tuomaura/CGA/">Cryptographically Generated Addresses</a>.
These could be useful in:
<dir>
<LI>web pages:
<dir>
<LI>a page could link to software binaries and include their hash
<LI>a portal could provide secure introductions to a community of sites
</dir>
<LI>XML documents (e.g. extending an <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/">XML-DSIG</a> over external references)
<LI>protocols (e.g. HTTP Redirects or LDAP Referrals)
<LI>software configuration (you could configure a client with the address and fingerprint of a server in one step)
</dir>
<a href="http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/">YURLs</a> are another approach to self-authenticating URLs.
<a name="cryptlibConverter">
<H2><a href="cryptlibConverter/">CryptlibConverter</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> Version 5 for cryptlib 3.1 (<a href="cryptlibConverter/cryptlibConverter5_cl31.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptlibConverter/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>This is a python script that generates java, python, and C# wrappers for
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a>. A set of wrappers for
cryptlib 3.1 is included in the .zip file. The python and C# wrappers are also included in the latest cryptlib distribution.
<br>
<a name="cryptoID">
<H2><a href="cryptoID/">CryptoIDs</a></H2>
<b>Paper 1:</b> Public Key Distribution through "cryptoIDs" (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.html">.html</a>) <i>(presented at <a href="http://www.nspw.org/2003/">NSPW 2003</a>)</i><br>
<b>Paper 2:</b> The CryptoID Key Management Protocols (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID2.pdf">.pdf</a>) <i>(the best introduction)</i><br>
<b>Schema:</b> XML Schema for <certChain> (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Code:</b> CryptoIDlib Python and Java library and command-line tool v0.1.8 (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoIDlib-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptoID/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>PKI isn't working for person-to-person communications. Few people use
secure email, voice, instant-messaging, or anything else.
<p>CryptoIDs are an alternative. The idea is for people to exchange small,
user-friendly fingerprints (aka "cryptoIDs") like 'cyhf4.9ajd8.kbdx4.rk98c'.
These could be passed around and stored in address books as if they were phone
numbers or postal addresses.
<p>The cryptoID for each user would correspond to that user's <i>root key</i>.
The user would keep his root key in a safe place - his employer or
some commercial service might hold it for him. The rootholder would operate
an online service which would issue short-lived <i>subkey certificates</i> or <i>validation signatures</i> to the user.
<p>CryptoIDs, then, are about combining <i>fingerprint-based public-key distribution</i> with
<i>certificate-based private-key management</i>. The first paper above presents the
cryptoID fingerprint and certificate formats, which are designed specifically for
this. CryptoIDlib lets you test-drive these formats.
<p>The second paper presents private-key management protocols for use with online servers.
Support for these is being added to cryptoIDlib.
<a name="tls_lite">
<H2><a href="tls_lite/">TLS Lite</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> tls_lite python library v0.1.8 (<a href="tls_lite/tls_lite-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="tls_lite/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)<br>
<p>
TLS Lite is a free python library that implements SSL 3.0 and <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt">TLS 1.0</a>.
TLS Lite supports non-traditional authentication methods such as <a href="http://trevp.net/tls_srp/index.html">SRP</a>,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.txt">shared keys</a>,
and <a href="http://trevp.net/cryptoID/index.html">cryptoIDs</a>, in addition to X.509 certificates. TLS Lite is pure
<a href="http://www.python.org">Python</a>, however it can access <a href="http://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL</a> or
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a> for faster crypto operations.
<a name="tlssrp">
<H2><a href="tls_srp/">TLS/SRP</a></H2>
<b>Internet-Draft:</b> Using SRP for TLS Authentication (<a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="tls_srp/draft-ietf-tls-srp-06.html">.html</a>)
<p><a href="http://srp.stanford.edu">SRP</a> is the best way to do password authentication
across a network. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html">TLS</a> (aka SSL v3.1)
is the best way to do channel security. What could go better together?
<p>This draft modifies the TLS handshake to use SRP. This combination of
password-based mutual authentication and the TLS record layer is
ideal for protecting protocols like POP3 and HTTP.
<a name="dss">
<H2>DSS</H2>
<b>Requirements:</b> DSS Use Case Requirements Analysis (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-requirements-wd-12.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Specification Working Draft:</b> Digital Signature Service Core Protocol and Elements (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-spec-wd-10.doc">.doc</a>)<br>
<b>Schema Working Draft:</b> oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10 (<a href="dss/oasis-dss-1.0-core-schema-wd-10.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Somewhat Related Paper:</b> Delegated Cryptography, Online Trusted Third Parties, and PKI
(<a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="delegatedCrypto/delegatedCrypto.html">.html</a>)<br>
<i>(presented at the <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/">1st Annual PKI Research Workshop</a>)</i>
<p>The <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/">OASIS</a> <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/dss/">Digital Signature Service Technical Committee</a>
is designing protocols for signing, verifying, and
time-stamping of XML documents and other data. The idea is to perform these
operations on servers, thus freeing clients from having to manage private
keys, calculate certificate paths, and so on.
<p>Also listed is a paper arguing for the server-based approach vs. client-side PKI.
<a name="cryptoURL">
<H2>CryptoURLs</H2>
<b>Draft of potential Internet-Draft:</b> The "crypto" URL scheme (<a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.txt">.txt</a>, <a href="cryptoURL/draft-ietf-cryptoURL-01.html">.html</a>)<br>
<p>
CryptoURLs add "crypto metadata" like content hashes and key fingerprints to normal URLs.
The resulting URLs are <a href="http://zooko.com/distnames.html">self-authenticating</a>,
like <a href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/mazieres99separating.html">SFS file names</a> or
<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/users/tuomaura/CGA/">Cryptographically Generated Addresses</a>.
These could be useful in:
<dir>
<LI>web pages:
<dir>
<LI>a page could link to software binaries and include their hash
<LI>a portal could provide secure introductions to a community of sites
</dir>
<LI>XML documents (e.g. extending an <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/">XML-DSIG</a> over external references)
<LI>protocols (e.g. HTTP Redirects or LDAP Referrals)
<LI>software configuration (you could configure a client with the address and fingerprint of a server in one step)
</dir>
<a href="http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/">YURLs</a> are another approach to self-authenticating URLs.
<a name="cryptlibConverter">
<H2><a href="cryptlibConverter/">CryptlibConverter</a></H2>
<b>Code:</b> Version 5 for cryptlib 3.1 (<a href="cryptlibConverter/cryptlibConverter5_cl31.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptlibConverter/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>This is a python script that generates java, python, and C# wrappers for
<a href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/">cryptlib</a>. A set of wrappers for
cryptlib 3.1 is included in the .zip file. The python and C# wrappers are also included in the latest cryptlib distribution.
<br>
<a name="cryptoID">
<H2><a href="cryptoID/">CryptoIDs</a></H2>
<b>Paper 1:</b> Public Key Distribution through "cryptoIDs" (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.pdf">.pdf</a>, <a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.html">.html</a>) <i>(presented at <a href="http://www.nspw.org/2003/">NSPW 2003</a>)</i><br>
<b>Paper 2:</b> The CryptoID Key Management Protocols (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID2.pdf">.pdf</a>) <i>(the best introduction)</i><br>
<b>Schema:</b> XML Schema for <certChain> (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoID.xsd">.xsd</a>)<br>
<b>Code:</b> CryptoIDlib Python and Java library and command-line tool v0.1.8 (<a href="cryptoID/cryptoIDlib-0.1.8.zip">.zip</a>, <a href="cryptoID/readme.txt">readme.txt</a>)
<p>PKI isn't working for person-to-person communications. Few people use
secure email, voice, instant-messaging, or anything else.
<p>CryptoIDs are an alternative. The idea is for people to exchange small,
user-friendly fingerprints (aka "cryptoIDs") like 'cyhf4.9ajd8.kbdx4.rk98c'.
These could be passed around and stored in address books as if they were phone
numbers or postal addresses.
<p>The cryptoID for each user would correspond to that user's <i>root key</i>.
The user would keep his root key in a safe place - his employer or
some commercial service might hold it for him. The rootholder would operate
an online service which would issue short-lived <i>subkey certificates</i> or <i>validation signatures</i> to the user.
<p>CryptoIDs, then, are about combining <i>fingerprint-based public-key distribution</i> with
<i>certificate-based private-key management</i>. The first paper above presents the
cryptoID fingerprint and certificate formats, which are designed specifically for
this. CryptoIDlib lets you test-drive these formats.
<p>The second paper presents private-key management protocols for use with online servers.
Support for these is being added to cryptoIDlib.
<br>
<br>
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