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author | Adam Langley <agl@google.com> | 2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800 |
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committer | Adam Langley <agl@google.com> | 2015-01-30 16:52:14 -0800 |
commit | d9e397b599b13d642138480a28c14db7a136bf05 (patch) | |
tree | 34bab61dc4ce323b123ad4614dbc07e86ea2f9ef /src/include/openssl/aead.h | |
download | external_boringssl-d9e397b599b13d642138480a28c14db7a136bf05.zip external_boringssl-d9e397b599b13d642138480a28c14db7a136bf05.tar.gz external_boringssl-d9e397b599b13d642138480a28c14db7a136bf05.tar.bz2 |
Initial commit of BoringSSL for Android.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/include/openssl/aead.h')
-rw-r--r-- | src/include/openssl/aead.h | 277 |
1 files changed, 277 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/include/openssl/aead.h b/src/include/openssl/aead.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fd8116 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/include/openssl/aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_AEAD_H +#define OPENSSL_HEADER_AEAD_H + +#include <openssl/base.h> + +#if defined(__cplusplus) +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/* Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data. + * + * AEAD couples confidentiality and integrity in a single primtive. AEAD + * algorithms take a key and then can seal and open individual messages. Each + * message has a unique, per-message nonce and, optionally, additional data + * which is authenticated but not included in the ciphertext. + * + * The |EVP_AEAD_CTX_init| function initialises an |EVP_AEAD_CTX| structure and + * performs any precomputation needed to use |aead| with |key|. The length of + * the key, |key_len|, is given in bytes. + * + * The |tag_len| argument contains the length of the tags, in bytes, and allows + * for the processing of truncated authenticators. A zero value indicates that + * the default tag length should be used and this is defined as + * |EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH| in order to make the code clear. Using + * truncated tags increases an attacker's chance of creating a valid forgery. + * Be aware that the attacker's chance may increase more than exponentially as + * would naively be expected. + * + * When no longer needed, the initialised |EVP_AEAD_CTX| structure must be + * passed to |EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup|, which will deallocate any memory used. + * + * With an |EVP_AEAD_CTX| in hand, one can seal and open messages. These + * operations are intended to meet the standard notions of privacy and + * authenticity for authenticated encryption. For formal definitions see + * Bellare and Namprempre, "Authenticated encryption: relations among notions + * and analysis of the generic composition paradigm," Lecture Notes in Computer + * Science B<1976> (2000), 531–545, + * http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/oem.html. + * + * When sealing messages, a nonce must be given. The length of the nonce is + * fixed by the AEAD in use and is returned by |EVP_AEAD_nonce_length|. *The + * nonce must be unique for all messages with the same key*. This is critically + * important - nonce reuse may completely undermine the security of the AEAD. + * Nonces may be predictable and public, so long as they are unique. Uniqueness + * may be achieved with a simple counter or, if large enough, may be generated + * randomly. The nonce must be passed into the "open" operation by the receiver + * so must either be implicit (e.g. a counter), or must be transmitted along + * with the sealed message. + * + * The "seal" and "open" operations are atomic - an entire message must be + * encrypted or decrypted in a single call. Large messages may have to be split + * up in order to accomodate this. When doing so, be mindful of the need not to + * repeat nonces and the possibility that an attacker could duplicate, reorder + * or drop message chunks. For example, using a single key for a given (large) + * message and sealing chunks with nonces counting from zero would be secure as + * long as the number of chunks was securely transmitted. (Otherwise an + * attacker could truncate the message by dropping chunks from the end.) + * + * The number of chunks could be transmitted by prefixing it to the plaintext, + * for example. This also assumes that no other message would ever use the same + * key otherwise the rule that nonces must be unique for a given key would be + * violated. + * + * The "seal" and "open" operations also permit additional data to be + * authenticated via the |ad| parameter. This data is not included in the + * ciphertext and must be identical for both the "seal" and "open" call. This + * permits implicit context to be authenticated but may be empty if not needed. + * + * The "seal" and "open" operations may work in-place if the |out| and |in| + * arguments are equal. They may also be used to shift the data left inside the + * same buffer if |out| is less than |in|. However, |out| may not point inside + * the input data otherwise the input may be overwritten before it has been + * read. This situation will cause an error. + * + * The "seal" and "open" operations return one on success and zero on error. */ + + +/* AEAD algorithms. */ + +/* EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm is AES-128 in Galois Counter Mode. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm(void); + +/* EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm is AES-256 in Galois Counter Mode. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm(void); + +/* EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305 is an AEAD built from ChaCha20 and Poly1305. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305(void); + +/* EVP_aead_aes_128_key_wrap is AES-128 Key Wrap mode. This should never be + * used except to interoperate with existing systems that use this mode. + * + * If the nonce is empty then the default nonce will be used, otherwise it must + * be eight bytes long. The input must be a multiple of eight bytes long. No + * additional data can be given to this mode. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_key_wrap(void); + +/* EVP_aead_aes_256_key_wrap is AES-256 in Key Wrap mode. This should never be + * used except to interoperate with existing systems that use this mode. + * + * See |EVP_aead_aes_128_key_wrap| for details. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_key_wrap(void); + +/* EVP_has_aes_hardware returns one if we enable hardware support for fast and + * constant-time AES-GCM. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_has_aes_hardware(void); + + +/* TLS specific AEAD algorithms. + * + * These AEAD primitives do not meet the definition of generic AEADs. They are + * all specific to TLS in some fashion and should not be used outside of that + * context. They require an additional data of length 11 (the standard TLS one + * with the length omitted). They are also stateful, so a given |EVP_AEAD_CTX| + * may only be used for one of seal or open, but not both. */ + +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_tls(void); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls(void); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls(void); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void); + + +/* SSLv3 specific AEAD algorithms. + * + * These AEAD primitives do not meet the definition of generic AEADs. They are + * all specific to SSLv3 in some fashion and should not be used outside of that + * context. */ + +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_md5_ssl3(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_ssl3(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3(void); + + +/* Utility functions. */ + +/* EVP_AEAD_key_length returns the length, in bytes, of the keys used by + * |aead|. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead); + +/* EVP_AEAD_nonce_length returns the length, in bytes, of the per-message nonce + * for |aead|. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead); + +/* EVP_AEAD_max_overhead returns the maximum number of additional bytes added + * by the act of sealing data with |aead|. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead); + +/* EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len returns the maximum tag length when using |aead|. This + * is the largest value that can be passed as |tag_len| to + * |EVP_AEAD_CTX_init|. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead); + + +/* AEAD operations. */ + +/* An EVP_AEAD_CTX represents an AEAD algorithm configured with a specific key + * and message-independent IV. */ +typedef struct evp_aead_ctx_st { + const EVP_AEAD *aead; + /* aead_state is an opaque pointer to whatever state the AEAD needs to + * maintain. */ + void *aead_state; +} EVP_AEAD_CTX; + +/* EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH contains the maximum key length used by + * any AEAD defined in this header. */ +#define EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 80 + +/* EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH contains the maximum nonce length used by + * any AEAD defined in this header. */ +#define EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH 16 + +/* EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD contains the maximum overhead used by any AEAD + * defined in this header. */ +#define EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD 64 + +/* EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH is a magic value that can be passed to + * EVP_AEAD_CTX_init to indicate that the default tag length for an AEAD should + * be used. */ +#define EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH 0 + +/* EVP_AEAD_init initializes |ctx| for the given AEAD algorithm from |impl|. + * The |impl| argument may be NULL to choose the default implementation. + * Authentication tags may be truncated by passing a size as |tag_len|. A + * |tag_len| of zero indicates the default tag length and this is defined as + * EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH for readability. + * Returns 1 on success. Otherwise returns 0 and pushes to the error stack. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len, ENGINE *impl); + +/* EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup frees any data allocated by |ctx|. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx); + +/* EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal encrypts and authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and + * authenticates |ad_len| bytes from |ad| and writes the result to |out|. It + * returns one on success and zero otherwise. + * + * This function may be called (with the same |EVP_AEAD_CTX|) concurrently with + * itself or |EVP_AEAD_CTX_open|. + * + * At most |max_out_len| bytes are written to |out| and, in order to ensure + * success, |max_out_len| should be |in_len| plus the result of + * |EVP_AEAD_overhead|. On successful return, |*out_len| is set to the actual + * number of bytes written. + * + * The length of |nonce|, |nonce_len|, must be equal to the result of + * |EVP_AEAD_nonce_length| for this AEAD. + * + * |EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal| never results in a partial output. If |max_out_len| is + * insufficient, zero will be returned. (In this case, |*out_len| is set to + * zero.) + * + * If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be <= |in|. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, + size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, + const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len); + +/* EVP_AEAD_CTX_open authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and |ad_len| bytes + * from |ad| and decrypts at most |in_len| bytes into |out|. It returns one on + * success and zero otherwise. + * + * This function may be called (with the same |EVP_AEAD_CTX|) concurrently with + * itself or |EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal|. + * + * At most |in_len| bytes are written to |out|. In order to ensure success, + * |max_out_len| should be at least |in_len|. On successful return, |*out_len| + * is set to the the actual number of bytes written. + * + * The length of |nonce|, |nonce_len|, must be equal to the result of + * |EVP_AEAD_nonce_length| for this AEAD. + * + * |EVP_AEAD_CTX_open| never results in a partial output. If |max_out_len| is + * insufficient, zero will be returned. (In this case, |*out_len| is set to + * zero.) + * + * If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be <= |in|. */ +OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, + size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, + const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len); + + +#if defined(__cplusplus) +} /* extern C */ +#endif + +#endif /* OPENSSL_HEADER_AEAD_H */ |