diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/ssl/s3_both.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ssl/s3_both.c | 699 |
1 files changed, 699 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/ssl/s3_both.c b/src/ssl/s3_both.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a34d221 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ssl/s3_both.c @@ -0,0 +1,699 @@ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/buf.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/obj.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/sha.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> + +#include "ssl_locl.h" + + +/* ssl3_do_write sends |s->init_buf| in records of type 'type' + * (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns -1 on error, 1 + * on success or zero if the transmission is still incomplete. */ +int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { + int n; + + n = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num); + if (n < 0) { + return -1; + } + + if (n == s->init_num) { + if (s->msg_callback) { + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + } + return 1; + } + + s->init_off += n; + s->init_num -= n; + return 0; +} + +int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) { + uint8_t *p; + int n; + + if (s->state == a) { + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + + n = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); + if (n == 0) { + return 0; + } + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n; + memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n); + + /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */ + if (!ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(s->ctx, s->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Copy the finished so we can use it for + * renegotiation checks */ + if (s->server) { + assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n; + } else { + assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n; + } + + ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, n); + s->state = b; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */ + return ssl_do_write(s); +} + +/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to + * far. */ +static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { + const char *sender; + int slen; + + /* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set + * the appropriate error. */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { + sender = s->enc_method->server_finished_label; + slen = s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len; + } else { + sender = s->enc_method->client_finished_label; + slen = s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len; + } + + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac( + s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); +} + +int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) { + int al, finished_len, ok; + long message_len; + uint8_t *p; + + message_len = + s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, + SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok); + + if (!ok) { + return message_len; + } + + /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */ + ssl3_take_mac(s); + ssl3_hash_current_message(s); + + /* If this occurs, we have missed a message. + * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; + + p = s->init_msg; + finished_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + + if (finished_len != message_len) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); + goto f_err; + } + + /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (s->server) { + assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; + } else { + assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; + } + + return 1; + +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return 0; +} + +/* for these 2 messages, we need to + * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init + * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero + * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init + * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign + * ssl->session->read_compression assign + * ssl->session->read_hash assign */ +int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) { + if (s->state == a) { + *((uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data) = SSL3_MT_CCS; + s->init_num = 1; + s->init_off = 0; + + s->state = b; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ + return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); +} + +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { + uint8_t *p; + unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) { + return 0; + } + + l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + l2n3(l, p); + l += 3; + ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l); + return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); +} + +/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| == -1), + * maximum acceptable body length |max|. The first four bytes (msg_type and + * length) are read in state |header_state|, the body is read in state |body_state|. */ +long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int header_state, int body_state, int msg_type, + long max, int hash_message, int *ok) { + uint8_t *p; + unsigned long l; + long n; + int al; + + if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { + /* A SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE call cannot be combined with + * reuse_message; the SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE would have to have + * been applied to the previous call. */ + assert(hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE); + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; + if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + *ok = 1; + s->state = body_state; + s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4; + s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; + return s->init_num; + } + + p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; + + if (s->state == header_state) { + assert(s->init_num < 4); + + for (;;) { + while (s->init_num < 4) { + int bytes_read = s->method->ssl_read_bytes( + s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], 4 - s->init_num, 0); + if (bytes_read <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + *ok = 0; + return bytes_read; + } + s->init_num += bytes_read; + } + + static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0}; + if (s->server || memcmp(p, kHelloRequest, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) != 0) { + break; + } + + /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing + * a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct. + * Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */ + s->init_num = 0; + + if (s->msg_callback) { + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + } + } + + /* s->init_num == 4 */ + + if (msg_type >= 0 && *p != msg_type) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); + + n2l3(p, l); + if (l > (unsigned long)max) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, l + 4)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; + s->state = body_state; + + s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4; + s->init_num = 0; + } + + /* next state (body_state) */ + p = s->init_msg; + n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; + while (n > 0) { + int bytes_read = + s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], n, 0); + if (bytes_read <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + *ok = 0; + return bytes_read; + } + s->init_num += bytes_read; + n -= bytes_read; + } + + /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ + if (hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE) { + ssl3_hash_current_message(s); + } + if (s->msg_callback) { + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + } + *ok = 1; + return s->init_num; + +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + +err: + *ok = 0; + return -1; +} + +void ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *s) { + /* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in + * the hash. */ + size_t header_len = s->init_msg - (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; + ssl3_finish_mac(s, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + header_len); +} + +/* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that + * is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */ +OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max); + +int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, + const EVP_MD **out_md, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { + /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using + * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use + * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. */ + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + const uint8_t *hdata; + size_t hdatalen; + EVP_MD_CTX mctx; + unsigned len; + + if (!BIO_mem_contents(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) || + !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || + !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + return 0; + } + *out_len = len; + } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, out) == 0 || + s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) == + 0) { + return 0; + } + *out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + *out_md = EVP_md5_sha1(); + } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out) == 0) { + return 0; + } + *out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + *out_md = EVP_sha1(); + } else { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int ssl_cert_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { + switch (pkey->type) { + case EVP_PKEY_RSA: + return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + case EVP_PKEY_EC: + return SSL_PKEY_ECC; + default: + return -1; + } +} + +int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) { + int al; + + switch (type) { + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: + al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: + case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: + al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: + al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; + break; + + default: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; + break; + } + + return al; +} + +int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) { + uint8_t *p; + size_t len, align = 0, headerlen; + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + } else { + headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + } + +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 + align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); +#endif + + if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) { + len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + + headerlen + align; + if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) { + s->s3->init_extra = 1; + len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; + } + p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if (p == NULL) { + goto err; + } + s->s3->rbuf.buf = p; + s->s3->rbuf.len = len; + } + + s->packet = &s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]; + return 1; + +err: + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_read_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; +} + +int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s) { + uint8_t *p; + size_t len, align = 0, headerlen; + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; + } else { + headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + } + +#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 + align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); +#endif + + if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) { + len = s->max_send_fragment + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + + headerlen + align; + /* Account for 1/n-1 record splitting. */ + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) { + len += headerlen + align + 1 + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; + } + + p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if (p == NULL) { + goto err; + } + s->s3->wbuf.buf = p; + s->s3->wbuf.len = len; + } + + return 1; + +err: + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_write_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; +} + + +int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s) { + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s) || + !ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s) { + if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->wbuf.buf); + s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL; + } + return 1; +} + +int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) { + if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); + s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL; + } + return 1; +} + +/* ssl_fill_hello_random fills a client_random or server_random field of length + * |len|. Returns 0 on failure or 1 on success. */ +int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, uint8_t *result, size_t len) { + int send_time = 0; + + if (server) { + send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0; + } else { + send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0; + } + + if (send_time) { + const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL); + uint8_t *p = result; + + if (len < 4) { + return 0; + } + p[0] = current_time >> 24; + p[1] = current_time >> 16; + p[2] = current_time >> 8; + p[3] = current_time; + return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4); + } else { + return RAND_bytes(result, len); + } +} |