1 files changed, 186 insertions, 242 deletions

diff --git a/src/ssl/t1_enc.c b/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 6bd80c3..0f1d683 100644
--- a/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -133,6 +133,8 @@
  * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
  * OTHERWISE. */
 
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -149,7 +151,7 @@
 
 
 /* tls1_P_hash computes the TLS P_<hash> function as described in RFC 5246,
- * section 5. It writes |out_len| bytes to |out|, using |md| as the hash and
+ * section 5. It XORs |out_len| bytes to |out|, using |md| as the hash and
  * |secret| as the secret. |seed1| through |seed3| are concatenated to form the
  * seed parameter. It returns one on success and zero on failure. */
 static int tls1_P_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *md,
@@ -157,57 +159,59 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *md,
                        const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
                        const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
                        const uint8_t *seed3, size_t seed3_len) {
-  size_t chunk;
   HMAC_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
   uint8_t A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   unsigned A1_len;
   int ret = 0;
 
-  chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
+  size_t chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
 
   HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
   HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
   HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
   if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_init, secret, secret_len, md, NULL) ||
       !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
-      (seed1_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) ||
-      (seed2_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) ||
-      (seed3_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len) ||
       !HMAC_Final(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) {
     goto err;
   }
 
   for (;;) {
-    /* Reinit mac contexts. */
+    unsigned len;
+    uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
         !HMAC_Update(&ctx, A1, A1_len) ||
+        /* Save a copy of |ctx| to compute the next A1 value below. */
         (out_len > chunk && !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx)) ||
-        (seed1_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) ||
-        (seed2_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) ||
-        (seed3_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))) {
+        !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Final(&ctx, hmac, &len)) {
       goto err;
     }
+    assert(len == chunk);
 
-    if (out_len > chunk) {
-      unsigned len;
-      if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, out, &len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      assert(len == chunk);
-      out += len;
-      out_len -= len;
-      /* Calculate the next A1 value. */
-      if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else {
-      /* Last chunk. */
-      if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      memcpy(out, A1, out_len);
+    /* XOR the result into |out|. */
+    if (len > out_len) {
+      len = out_len;
+    }
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+      out[i] ^= hmac[i];
+    }
+    out += len;
+    out_len -= len;
+
+    if (out_len == 0) {
       break;
     }
+
+    /* Calculate the next A1 value. */
+    if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
   }
 
   ret = 1;
@@ -220,79 +224,51 @@ err:
   return ret;
 }
 
-int tls1_prf(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
+int tls1_prf(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
              size_t secret_len, const char *label, size_t label_len,
              const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
              const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len) {
-  size_t idx, len, count, i;
-  const uint8_t *S1;
-  uint32_t m;
-  const EVP_MD *md;
-  int ret = 0;
-  uint8_t *tmp;
 
   if (out_len == 0) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  /* Allocate a temporary buffer. */
-  tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len);
-  if (tmp == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_prf, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return 0;
-  }
+  memset(out, 0, out_len);
 
-  /* Count number of digests and partition |secret| evenly. */
-  count = 0;
-  for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(&m, &md, idx); idx++) {
-    if (m & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
-      count++;
+  uint32_t algorithm_prf = ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl);
+  if (algorithm_prf == SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
+    /* If using the MD5/SHA1 PRF, |secret| is partitioned between SHA-1 and
+     * MD5, MD5 first. */
+    size_t secret_half = secret_len - (secret_len / 2);
+    if (!tls1_P_hash(out, out_len, EVP_md5(), secret, secret_half,
+                     (const uint8_t *)label, label_len, seed1, seed1_len, seed2,
+                     seed2_len)) {
+      return 0;
     }
+
+    /* Note that, if |secret_len| is odd, the two halves share a byte. */
+    secret = secret + (secret_len - secret_half);
+    secret_len = secret_half;
   }
-  /* TODO(davidben): The only case where count isn't 1 is the old MD5/SHA-1
-   * combination. The logic around multiple handshake digests can probably be
-   * simplified. */
-  assert(count == 1 || count == 2);
-  len = secret_len / count;
-  if (count == 1) {
-    secret_len = 0;
-  }
-  S1 = secret;
-  memset(out, 0, out_len);
-  for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(&m, &md, idx); idx++) {
-    if (m & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
-      /* If |count| is 2 and |secret_len| is odd, |secret| is partitioned into
-       * two halves with an overlapping byte. */
-      if (!tls1_P_hash(tmp, out_len, md, S1, len + (secret_len & 1),
-                       (const uint8_t *)label, label_len, seed1, seed1_len,
-                       seed2, seed2_len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      S1 += len;
-      for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
-        out[i] ^= tmp[i];
-      }
-    }
+
+  if (!tls1_P_hash(out, out_len, ssl_get_handshake_digest(algorithm_prf),
+                   secret, secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label, label_len,
+                   seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len)) {
+    return 0;
   }
-  ret = 1;
 
-err:
-  OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, out_len);
-  OPENSSL_free(tmp);
-  return ret;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
-  return s->enc_method->prf(s, out, out_len, s->session->master_key,
-                            s->session->master_key_length,
-                            TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-                            TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
-                            s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                            s->s3->client_random,
-                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+  return ssl->enc_method->prf(
+      ssl, out, out_len, ssl->session->master_key,
+      ssl->session->master_key_length, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+      TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+      ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 }
 
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) {
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *ssl, int which) {
   /* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message - i.e. we
    * need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just written one. */
   const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
@@ -304,20 +280,31 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) {
   const uint8_t *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret, *mac_secret;
   const uint8_t *client_write_key, *server_write_key, *key;
   const uint8_t *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv, *iv;
-  const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead = ssl->s3->tmp.new_aead;
   size_t key_len, iv_len, mac_secret_len;
   const uint8_t *key_data;
 
   /* Reset sequence number to zero. */
-  if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-    memset(is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence, 0, 8);
+  if (is_read) {
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+      ssl->d1->r_epoch++;
+      memset(&ssl->d1->bitmap, 0, sizeof(ssl->d1->bitmap));
+    }
+    memset(ssl->s3->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->read_sequence));
+  } else {
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+      ssl->d1->w_epoch++;
+      memcpy(ssl->d1->last_write_sequence, ssl->s3->write_sequence,
+             sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
+    }
+    memset(ssl->s3->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
   }
 
-  mac_secret_len = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len;
-  iv_len = s->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len;
+  mac_secret_len = ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len;
+  iv_len = ssl->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len;
 
   if (aead == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -327,13 +314,13 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) {
      * suites) the key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will
      * include the MAC and IV key bytes. */
     if (key_len < mac_secret_len + iv_len) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       return 0;
     }
     key_len -= mac_secret_len + iv_len;
   }
 
-  key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+  key_data = ssl->s3->tmp.key_block;
   client_write_mac_secret = key_data;
   key_data += mac_secret_len;
   server_write_mac_secret = key_data;
@@ -357,46 +344,46 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) {
     iv = server_write_iv;
   }
 
-  if (key_data - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+  if (key_data - ssl->s3->tmp.key_block != ssl->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
   }
 
   if (is_read) {
-    SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(s->aead_read_ctx);
-    s->aead_read_ctx = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
-        evp_aead_open, ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->version),
-        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, key, key_len, mac_secret, mac_secret_len, iv,
-        iv_len);
-    return s->aead_read_ctx != NULL;
-  } else {
-    SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(s->aead_write_ctx);
-    s->aead_write_ctx = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
-        evp_aead_seal, ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->version),
-        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, key, key_len, mac_secret, mac_secret_len, iv,
+    SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(ssl->aead_read_ctx);
+    ssl->aead_read_ctx = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
+        evp_aead_open, ssl3_version_from_wire(ssl, ssl->version),
+        ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher, key, key_len, mac_secret, mac_secret_len, iv,
         iv_len);
-    return s->aead_write_ctx != NULL;
+    return ssl->aead_read_ctx != NULL;
   }
+
+  SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(ssl->aead_write_ctx);
+  ssl->aead_write_ctx = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
+      evp_aead_seal, ssl3_version_from_wire(ssl, ssl->version),
+      ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher, key, key_len, mac_secret, mac_secret_len, iv,
+      iv_len);
+  return ssl->aead_write_ctx != NULL;
 }
 
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) {
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *ssl) {
   uint8_t *p;
   const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
   int ret = 0;
   size_t mac_secret_len, fixed_iv_len, variable_iv_len, key_len;
   size_t key_block_len;
 
-  if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) {
+  if (ssl->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+  if (ssl->session->cipher == NULL) {
     goto cipher_unavailable_err;
   }
 
   if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &mac_secret_len, &fixed_iv_len,
-                               s->session->cipher,
-                               ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->version))) {
+                               ssl->session->cipher,
+                               ssl3_version_from_wire(ssl, ssl->version))) {
     goto cipher_unavailable_err;
   }
   key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
@@ -406,14 +393,14 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) {
      * key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key
      * bytes and initial implicit IV. */
     if (key_len < mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       return 0;
     }
     key_len -= mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len;
   } else {
     /* The nonce is split into a fixed portion and a variable portion. */
     if (variable_iv_len < fixed_iv_len) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       return 0;
     }
     variable_iv_len -= fixed_iv_len;
@@ -423,83 +410,84 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) {
   assert(fixed_iv_len < 256);
   assert(variable_iv_len < 256);
 
-  s->s3->tmp.new_aead = aead;
-  s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len = (uint8_t)mac_secret_len;
-  s->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len = (uint8_t)fixed_iv_len;
-  s->s3->tmp.new_variable_iv_len = (uint8_t)variable_iv_len;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.new_aead = aead;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len = (uint8_t)mac_secret_len;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len = (uint8_t)fixed_iv_len;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.new_variable_iv_len = (uint8_t)variable_iv_len;
 
   key_block_len = key_len + mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len;
   key_block_len *= 2;
 
-  ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+  ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl);
 
   p = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(key_block_len);
   if (p == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     goto err;
   }
 
-  s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len;
-  s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
 
-  if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, key_block_len)) {
+  if (!tls1_generate_key_block(ssl, p, key_block_len)) {
     goto err;
   }
 
-  if (!SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
-      (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0) {
-    /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
-     * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). */
-    s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
-
-    if (s->session->cipher != NULL &&
-        s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) {
-      s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
-    }
-  }
-
   ret = 1;
 
 err:
   return ret;
 
 cipher_unavailable_err:
-  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block,
-                    SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
   return 0;
 }
 
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, uint8_t *out) {
-  unsigned int ret;
-  EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
-  int i;
-
-  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
-      !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
-    if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] &&
-        EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
-      d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!d) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_cert_verify_mac, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *ssl, int md_nid, uint8_t *out) {
+  const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx_template;
+  if (md_nid == NID_md5) {
+    ctx_template = &ssl->s3->handshake_md5;
+  } else if (md_nid == EVP_MD_CTX_type(&ssl->s3->handshake_hash)) {
+    ctx_template = &ssl->s3->handshake_hash;
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
     return 0;
   }
 
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
   EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d)) {
+  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, ctx_template)) {
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
     return 0;
   }
+  unsigned ret;
   EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
   EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int append_digest(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                         size_t max_out) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx_copy;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_copy);
 
+  if (EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) > max_out) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  unsigned len;
+  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_copy, ctx) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx_copy, out, &len)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  assert(len == EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx));
+
+  *out_len = len;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_copy);
   return ret;
 }
 
@@ -508,71 +496,40 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, uint8_t *out) {
  * written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
  * underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
  * update etc. */
-int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
-  const EVP_MD *md;
-  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-  int err = 0, len = 0;
-  size_t i;
-  uint32_t mask;
-
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-  for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(&mask, &md, i); i++) {
-    size_t hash_size;
-    unsigned int digest_len;
-    EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-
-    if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
-    if (!hdgst ||
-        hash_size > out_len ||
-        !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
-        !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &digest_len) ||
-        digest_len != hash_size /* internal error */) {
-      err = 1;
-      break;
-    }
-
-    out += digest_len;
-    out_len -= digest_len;
-    len += digest_len;
+int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+  size_t md5_len = 0;
+  if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ssl->s3->handshake_md5) != NULL &&
+      !append_digest(&ssl->s3->handshake_md5, out, &md5_len, out_len)) {
+    return -1;
   }
 
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-  if (err != 0) {
+  size_t len;
+  if (!append_digest(&ssl->s3->handshake_hash, out + md5_len, &len,
+                     out_len - md5_len)) {
     return -1;
   }
-  return len;
+
+  return (int)(md5_len + len);
 }
 
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, uint8_t *out) {
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *ssl, const char *str, int slen, uint8_t *out) {
   uint8_t buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   int err = 0;
   int digests_len;
 
   /* At this point, the handshake should have released the handshake buffer on
-   * its own.
-   * TODO(davidben): Apart from initialization, the handshake buffer should be
-   * orthogonal to the handshake digest. https://crbug.com/492371 */
-  assert(s->s3->handshake_buffer == NULL);
-  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
-      !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
+   * its own. */
+  assert(ssl->s3->handshake_buffer == NULL);
 
-  digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
+  digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf));
   if (digests_len < 0) {
     err = 1;
     digests_len = 0;
   }
 
-  if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, 12, s->session->master_key,
-                          s->session->master_key_length, str, slen, buf,
-                          digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
+  if (!ssl->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, 12, ssl->session->master_key,
+                            ssl->session->master_key_length, str, slen, buf,
+                            digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
     err = 1;
   }
 
@@ -583,41 +540,29 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, uint8_t *out) {
   }
 }
 
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *premaster,
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
+                                const uint8_t *premaster,
                                 size_t premaster_len) {
-  if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
+  if (ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
     uint8_t digests[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    int digests_len;
-
-    /* The master secret is based on the handshake hash just after sending the
-     * ClientKeyExchange. However, we might have a client certificate to send,
-     * in which case we might need different hashes for the verification and
-     * thus still need the handshake buffer around. Keeping both a handshake
-     * buffer *and* running hashes isn't yet supported so, when it comes to
-     * calculating the Finished hash, we'll have to hash the handshake buffer
-     * again. */
-    if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
-        !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, dont_free_handshake_buffer)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, digests, sizeof(digests));
+    int digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, digests, sizeof(digests));
     if (digests_len == -1) {
       return 0;
     }
 
-    if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
-                            premaster_len, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-                            TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, digests,
-                            digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
+    if (!ssl->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
+                              premaster_len,
+                              TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                              TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, digests,
+                              digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
       return 0;
     }
   } else {
-    if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
-                            premaster_len, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-                            TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
-                            s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                            s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+    if (!ssl->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
+                              premaster_len, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                              TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+                              ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                              ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
       return 0;
     }
   }
@@ -625,41 +570,40 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *premaster,
   return SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
 }
 
-int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
                                 const char *label, size_t label_len,
                                 const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
                                 int use_context) {
-  if (!s->s3->have_version || s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material,
-                      ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+  if (!ssl->s3->have_version || ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
     return 0;
   }
 
   size_t seed_len = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
   if (use_context) {
     if (context_len >= 1u << 16) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
       return 0;
     }
     seed_len += 2 + context_len;
   }
   uint8_t *seed = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len);
   if (seed == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  memcpy(seed, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-  memcpy(seed + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  memcpy(seed, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  memcpy(seed + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
   if (use_context) {
     seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = (uint8_t)(context_len >> 8);
     seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
     memcpy(seed + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 2, context, context_len);
   }
 
-  int ret = s->enc_method->prf(s, out, out_len, s->session->master_key,
-                               s->session->master_key_length, label, label_len,
-                               seed, seed_len, NULL, 0);
+  int ret = ssl->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, out_len, ssl->session->master_key,
+                                 ssl->session->master_key_length, label,
+                                 label_len, seed, seed_len, NULL, 0);
   OPENSSL_free(seed);
   return ret;
 }