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authorStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>2015-07-07 09:43:45 -0400
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>2015-10-13 03:46:12 +0100
commit79bff4bc9204dec190576741babecf73786f48a3 (patch)
treef0739c0925021143bbad594e696f31f362644b9b
parent2ef259c0f5b2f3ca28ccb7bf126a0a2177012f89 (diff)
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net/tipc: initialize security state for new connection socket
[ Upstream commit fdd75ea8df370f206a8163786e7470c1277a5064 ] Calling connect() with an AF_TIPC socket would trigger a series of error messages from SELinux along the lines of: SELinux: Invalid class 0 type=AVC msg=audit(1434126658.487:34500): avc: denied { <unprintable> } for pid=292 comm="kworker/u16:5" scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=<unprintable> permissive=0 This was due to a failure to initialize the security state of the new connection sock by the tipc code, leaving it with junk in the security class field and an unlabeled secid. Add a call to security_sk_clone() to inherit the security state from the parent socket. Reported-by: Tim Shearer <tim.shearer@overturenetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
-rw-r--r--net/tipc/socket.c2
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/tipc/socket.c b/net/tipc/socket.c
index 058941e..580ecf2 100644
--- a/net/tipc/socket.c
+++ b/net/tipc/socket.c
@@ -1541,6 +1541,8 @@ static int accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *new_sock, int flags)
u32 new_ref = new_tport->ref;
struct tipc_msg *msg = buf_msg(buf);
+ security_sk_clone(sock->sk, new_sock->sk);
+
lock_sock(new_sk);
/*