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| author | Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> | 2015-02-23 11:17:13 -0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> | 2015-10-13 03:46:11 +0100 |
| commit | 1c825dacb615430cb384e0e3be07700013291742 (patch) | |
| tree | 91d29a724d0722d37a7bcd4a17da5c80c3f6ca4c /drivers/net/virtio_net.c | |
| parent | 06f0f9d843af52573c7dad0d81ee9df984e0b6be (diff) | |
| download | kernel_samsung_smdk4412-1c825dacb615430cb384e0e3be07700013291742.zip kernel_samsung_smdk4412-1c825dacb615430cb384e0e3be07700013291742.tar.gz kernel_samsung_smdk4412-1c825dacb615430cb384e0e3be07700013291742.tar.bz2 | |
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
commit 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac upstream.
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/virtio_net.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions