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authorTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>2011-03-28 13:03:58 +0200
committerTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>2011-03-28 13:03:58 +0200
commitcdccfc8dc0bf62a1da327324a8d639139acc9279 (patch)
treedca7934b27d510c9c006558979ebc48e07a531cf /fs/open.c
parentb21a8ee67013372f439fbd1591e91d09de49bb9c (diff)
parentc6b358748e19ce7e230b0926ac42696bc485a562 (diff)
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Merge branch 'fix/misc' into topic/misc
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/open.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/open.c150
1 files changed, 130 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 5a2c6eb..b52cf01 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -233,6 +233,14 @@ int do_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EBADF;
+
+ /* It's not possible punch hole on append only file */
+ if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE && IS_APPEND(inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/*
* Revalidate the write permissions, in case security policy has
* changed since the files were opened.
@@ -565,13 +573,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fchownat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user,
{
struct path path;
int error = -EINVAL;
- int follow;
+ int lookup_flags;
- if ((flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
+ if ((flag & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
goto out;
- follow = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
- error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, follow, &path);
+ lookup_flags = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flag & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+ error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
if (error)
goto out;
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
@@ -661,11 +671,16 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
+ static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
+
+ if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
+ f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
+
inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, mnt);
@@ -679,9 +694,15 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
f->f_path.dentry = dentry;
f->f_path.mnt = mnt;
f->f_pos = 0;
- f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
file_sb_list_add(f, inode->i_sb);
+ if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
+ f->f_op = &empty_fops;
+ return f;
+ }
+
+ f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
+
error = security_dentry_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
@@ -693,7 +714,8 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
- ima_counts_get(f);
+ if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+ i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
@@ -813,17 +835,8 @@ struct file *dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags,
validate_creds(cred);
- /*
- * We must always pass in a valid mount pointer. Historically
- * callers got away with not passing it, but we must enforce this at
- * the earliest possible point now to avoid strange problems deep in the
- * filesystem stack.
- */
- if (!mnt) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s called with NULL vfsmount\n", __func__);
- dump_stack();
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- }
+ /* We must always pass in a valid mount pointer. */
+ BUG_ON(!mnt);
error = -ENFILE;
f = get_empty_filp();
@@ -882,15 +895,110 @@ void fd_install(unsigned int fd, struct file *file)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fd_install);
+static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, int mode, struct open_flags *op)
+{
+ int lookup_flags = 0;
+ int acc_mode;
+
+ if (!(flags & O_CREAT))
+ mode = 0;
+ op->mode = mode;
+
+ /* Must never be set by userspace */
+ flags &= ~FMODE_NONOTIFY;
+
+ /*
+ * O_SYNC is implemented as __O_SYNC|O_DSYNC. As many places only
+ * check for O_DSYNC if the need any syncing at all we enforce it's
+ * always set instead of having to deal with possibly weird behaviour
+ * for malicious applications setting only __O_SYNC.
+ */
+ if (flags & __O_SYNC)
+ flags |= O_DSYNC;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have O_PATH in the open flag. Then we
+ * cannot have anything other than the below set of flags
+ */
+ if (flags & O_PATH) {
+ flags &= O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH;
+ acc_mode = 0;
+ } else {
+ acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(flags);
+ }
+
+ op->open_flag = flags;
+
+ /* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
+ if (flags & O_TRUNC)
+ acc_mode |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+ /* Allow the LSM permission hook to distinguish append
+ access from general write access. */
+ if (flags & O_APPEND)
+ acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+ op->acc_mode = acc_mode;
+
+ op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN;
+
+ if (flags & O_CREAT) {
+ op->intent |= LOOKUP_CREATE;
+ if (flags & O_EXCL)
+ op->intent |= LOOKUP_EXCL;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & O_DIRECTORY)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
+ if (!(flags & O_NOFOLLOW))
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ return lookup_flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * filp_open - open file and return file pointer
+ *
+ * @filename: path to open
+ * @flags: open flags as per the open(2) second argument
+ * @mode: mode for the new file if O_CREAT is set, else ignored
+ *
+ * This is the helper to open a file from kernelspace if you really
+ * have to. But in generally you should not do this, so please move
+ * along, nothing to see here..
+ */
+struct file *filp_open(const char *filename, int flags, int mode)
+{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
+ return do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, filename, &op, lookup);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(filp_open);
+
+struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ const char *filename, int flags)
+{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, 0, &op);
+ if (flags & O_CREAT)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ if (!filename && (flags & O_DIRECTORY))
+ if (!dentry->d_inode->i_op->lookup)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
+ return do_file_open_root(dentry, mnt, filename, &op, lookup);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_open_root);
+
long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, int mode)
{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
char *tmp = getname(filename);
int fd = PTR_ERR(tmp);
if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags);
if (fd >= 0) {
- struct file *f = do_filp_open(dfd, tmp, flags, mode, 0);
+ struct file *f = do_filp_open(dfd, tmp, &op, lookup);
if (IS_ERR(f)) {
put_unused_fd(fd);
fd = PTR_ERR(f);
@@ -960,8 +1068,10 @@ int filp_close(struct file *filp, fl_owner_t id)
if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->flush)
retval = filp->f_op->flush(filp, id);
- dnotify_flush(filp, id);
- locks_remove_posix(filp, id);
+ if (likely(!(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
+ dnotify_flush(filp, id);
+ locks_remove_posix(filp, id);
+ }
fput(filp);
return retval;
}