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authorcodeworkx <daniel.hillenbrand@codeworkx.de>2012-06-02 13:09:29 +0200
committercodeworkx <daniel.hillenbrand@codeworkx.de>2012-06-02 13:09:29 +0200
commitc6da2cfeb05178a11c6d062a06f8078150ee492f (patch)
treef3b4021d252c52d6463a9b3c1bb7245e399b009c /fs/proc
parentc6d7c4dbff353eac7919342ae6b3299a378160a6 (diff)
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samsung update 1
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/array.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c187
2 files changed, 84 insertions, 107 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 9b45ee8..b6cf87a 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -204,7 +204,11 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
group_info = cred->group_info;
task_unlock(p);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLP
+ for (g = 0; g < group_info->ngroups; g++)
+#else
for (g = 0; g < min(group_info->ngroups, NGROUPS_SMALL); g++)
+#endif
seq_printf(m, "%d ", GROUP_AT(group_info, g));
put_cred(cred);
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index f039017..ca54a1b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ struct pid_entry {
NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \
{ .proc_show = show } )
+/* ANDROID is for special files in /proc. */
+#define ANDROID(NAME, MODE, OTYPE) \
+ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
+ &proc_##OTYPE##_inode_operations, \
+ &proc_##OTYPE##_operations, {})
+
/*
* Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
* and .. links.
@@ -194,65 +200,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
return result;
}
-static struct mm_struct *__check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
-{
- struct mm_struct *mm;
-
- mm = get_task_mm(task);
- if (!mm)
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-
- /*
- * A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
- * to use system calls instead of load instructions.
- */
- if (task == current)
- return mm;
-
- /*
- * If current is actively ptrace'ing, and would also be
- * permitted to freshly attach with ptrace now, permit it.
- */
- if (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) {
- int match;
- rcu_read_lock();
- match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
- return mm;
- }
-
- /*
- * No one else is allowed.
- */
- mmput(mm);
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-}
-
-/*
- * If current may access user memory in @task return a reference to the
- * corresponding mm, otherwise ERR_PTR.
- */
-static struct mm_struct *check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
-{
- struct mm_struct *mm;
- int err;
-
- /*
- * Avoid racing if task exec's as we might get a new mm but validate
- * against old credentials.
- */
- err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
- if (err)
- return ERR_PTR(err);
-
- mm = __check_mem_permission(task);
- mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
-
- return mm;
-}
-
-struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
+static struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
@@ -263,7 +211,8 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm && mm != current->mm &&
- !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+ !ptrace_may_access(task, mode) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
mmput(mm);
mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
@@ -272,6 +221,11 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
return mm;
}
+struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+}
+
static int proc_pid_cmdline(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
{
int res = 0;
@@ -816,38 +770,39 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_single_file_operations = {
static int mem_open(struct inode* inode, struct file* file)
{
- file->private_data = (void*)((long)current->self_exec_id);
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+
+ if (!task)
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+ mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(mm))
+ return PTR_ERR(mm);
+
/* OK to pass negative loff_t, we can catch out-of-range */
file->f_mode |= FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET;
+ file->private_data = mm;
+
return 0;
}
static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
+ int ret;
char *page;
unsigned long src = *ppos;
- int ret = -ESRCH;
- struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
- if (!task)
- goto out_no_task;
+ if (!mm)
+ return 0;
- ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
if (!page)
- goto out;
-
- mm = check_mem_permission(task);
- ret = PTR_ERR(mm);
- if (IS_ERR(mm))
- goto out_free;
-
- ret = -EIO;
-
- if (file->private_data != (void*)((long)current->self_exec_id))
- goto out_put;
+ return -ENOMEM;
ret = 0;
@@ -874,13 +829,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
}
*ppos = src;
-out_put:
- mmput(mm);
-out_free:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
-out:
- put_task_struct(task);
-out_no_task:
return ret;
}
@@ -889,27 +838,15 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf,
{
int copied;
char *page;
- struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
unsigned long dst = *ppos;
- struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
- copied = -ESRCH;
- if (!task)
- goto out_no_task;
+ if (!mm)
+ return 0;
- copied = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
if (!page)
- goto out_task;
-
- mm = check_mem_permission(task);
- copied = PTR_ERR(mm);
- if (IS_ERR(mm))
- goto out_free;
-
- copied = -EIO;
- if (file->private_data != (void *)((long)current->self_exec_id))
- goto out_mm;
+ return -ENOMEM;
copied = 0;
while (count > 0) {
@@ -933,13 +870,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf,
}
*ppos = dst;
-out_mm:
- mmput(mm);
-out_free:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
-out_task:
- put_task_struct(task);
-out_no_task:
return copied;
}
@@ -959,11 +890,20 @@ loff_t mem_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
return file->f_pos;
}
+static int mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
+
+ mmput(mm);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {
.llseek = mem_lseek,
.read = mem_read,
.write = mem_write,
.open = mem_open,
+ .release = mem_release,
};
static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
@@ -1141,6 +1081,39 @@ out:
return err < 0 ? err : count;
}
+static int oom_adjust_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ uid_t uid;
+ struct task_struct *p;
+
+ if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
+ return -ECHILD;
+
+ p = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if(p) {
+ uid = task_uid(p);
+ put_task_struct(p);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * System Server (uid == 1000) is granted access to oom_adj of all
+ * android applications (uid > 10000) as and services (uid >= 1000)
+ */
+ if (p && (current_fsuid() == 1000) && (uid >= 1000)) {
+ if (inode->i_mode >> 6 & mask) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Fall back to default. */
+ return generic_permission(inode, mask, flags, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations proc_oom_adjust_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = oom_adjust_permission,
+};
+
static const struct file_operations proc_oom_adjust_operations = {
.read = oom_adjust_read,
.write = oom_adjust_write,
@@ -2847,7 +2820,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("cgroup", S_IRUGO, proc_cgroup_operations),
#endif
INF("oom_score", S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score),
- REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adjust_operations),
+ ANDROID("oom_adj",S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, oom_adjust),
REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations),
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),