diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 84 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b7640a5..535586f 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_execve { struct audit_aux_data d; int argc; int envc; - char mem[0]; + struct mm_struct *mm; }; struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { @@ -831,6 +831,55 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, return rc; } +static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, + struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) +{ + int i; + long len, ret; + const char __user *p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; + char *buf; + + if (axi->mm != current->mm) + return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ + + for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++, p += len) { + len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE); + /* + * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings + * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar + * for strings that are too long, we should not have created + * any. + */ + if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN) { + WARN_ON(1); + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + } + + buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) { + audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); + break; + } + + ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, len); + /* + * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just + * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- + * space yet. + */ + if (!ret) { + WARN_ON(1); + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + } + + audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, buf); + audit_log_format(ab, "\n"); + + kfree(buf); + } +} + static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) { int i, call_panic = 0; @@ -971,13 +1020,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts case AUDIT_EXECVE: { struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; - int i; - const char *p; - for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) { - audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i); - p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p); - audit_log_format(ab, "\n"); - } + audit_log_execve_info(ab, axi); break; } case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { @@ -1821,32 +1864,31 @@ int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode return 0; } +int audit_argv_kb = 32; + int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - unsigned long p, next; - void *to; if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) return 0; - ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p, - GFP_KERNEL); + /* + * Even though the stack code doesn't limit the arg+env size any more, + * the audit code requires that _all_ arguments be logged in a single + * netlink skb. Hence cap it :-( + */ + if (bprm->argv_len > (audit_argv_kb << 10)) + return -E2BIG; + + ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ax) return -ENOMEM; ax->argc = bprm->argc; ax->envc = bprm->envc; - for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) { - struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE]; - void *kaddr = kmap(page); - next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1); - memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p); - to += next - p; - kunmap(page); - } - + ax->mm = bprm->mm; ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; ax->d.next = context->aux; context->aux = (void *)ax; |