| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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The samsung_extdisp driver for GT-I9500 was affected by CVE-2015-1800 and
CVE-2015-1801. The Galaxy S3 uses an older version of this driver and is at
least affected by CVE-2015-1801. Newer kernel versions for the GT-I9500
had the driver completely removed. I also found no indication that the
driver is actually needed for the S3, so let's disable it.
vulnerability disclosure and further information:
http://blog.quarkslab.com/kernel-vulnerabilities-in-the-samsung-s4.html
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
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Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
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mac80211 needs this function.
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
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Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
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net/wireless and mac80211 are already backported from a 3.4 kernel, so
it makes sense to also get ath from 3.4 (3.4.113).
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
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The ath9k_htc driver depends on mac80211, but mac80211 can't be
build. The reason is that net/wireless is almost completely backported
from a 3.4 kernel. To follow suit, mac80211 is also backported from
3.4, more precisely from 3.4.113. This makes mac80211 build.
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
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Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Change-Id: I5dbc5260abe527261b4b8c4699400b317af8451e
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Change-Id: I7b3a4b234eee4e3b2b2766f4d61a44d92e76095d
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use min_t()/max_t() macros, reformat two comments, use !!test_bit() to
match !!sock_flag()
Change-Id: Ie9ef0586af81908916e7df27ea3c4508982dc42c
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Change-Id: I0d2f3b1ed4e763c559ecec98af32767360985e91
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_kernel_samsung_smdk4412 into replicant-6.0
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Change-Id: I09f0b17d6f77ebb7e8982e9a1c0357ca4e2eae7a
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Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
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Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>
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Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>
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Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>
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https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_kernel_samsung_smdk4412 into replicant-6.0
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The format specifier %p can leak kernel addresses
while not valuing the kptr_restrict system settings.
Use %pK instead of %p, which also evaluates whether
kptr_restrict is set.
Bug: 31796940
Change-Id: Ia2946d6b493126d68281f97778faf578247f088e
Signed-off-by: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
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Verify that unsigned int value will not become negative before cast to
signed int.
Bug: 31651010
Change-Id: I548a200f678762042617f11100b6966a405a3920
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In fb_set_user_cmap function, cmap->start variable is an unsigned
integer, it doesn't need a condition check with the sign.
Change-Id: I355ddb7edcc085ee52e4054833b687640376eee3
Signed-off-by: Ping Li <pingli@codeaurora.org>
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On FBIOPUTCMAP ioctl failure deallocate
fb cmap. Put null check for cmap red, green,
blue component.
Change-Id: I10468ee30d0e76c256cf3d7a6ffe14db7fd4511b
Signed-off-by: Pawan Kumar <pavaku@codeaurora.org>
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In ping_common_sendmsg(), when len < icmph_len, memcpy_fromiovec()
will access invalid memory because msg->msg_iov only has 1 element
and memcpy_fromiovec() attempts to increment it. KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623
page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G BU 3.18.0-dirty #15
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90
[<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147
[< inline >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236
[<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259
[< inline >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264
[<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507
[<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15
[< inline >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667
[<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674
[<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714
[<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632
[<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643
[< inline >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797
[<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffc071077c80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1
ffffffc071077d00: f1 f1 04 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2 f2 04 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2
>ffffffc071077d80: f2 f2 00 00 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00
^
ffffffc071077e00: 00 f4 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffffffc071077e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00
RM-290
Bug: 31349935
Change-Id: Ib7385fc26dfe7e07e9bab42a10ff65a37cbaab54
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>
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When moving a group_leader perf event from a software-context
to a hardware-context, there's a race in checking and
updating that context. The existing locking solution
doesn't work; note that it tries to grab a lock inside
the group_leader's context object, which you can only
get at by going through a pointer that should be protected
from these races. To avoid that problem, and to produce
a simple solution, we can just use a lock per group_leader
to protect all checks on the group_leader's context.
The new lock is grabbed and released when no context locks
are held.
RM-290
Bug: 30955111
Bug: 31095224
Change-Id: If37124c100ca6f4aa962559fba3bd5dbbec8e052
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There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b)
Bug: 30955111
Bug: 31095224
Change-Id: I5bab713034e960fad467637e98e914440de5666d
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Since commit c9a4962881929df7f1ef6e63e1b9da304faca4dd ("nfsd:
make client_lock per net") compiling nfs4state.o without
CONFIG_LOCKDEP set, triggers this GCC warning:
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c: In function ‘free_client’:
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c:1051:19: warning: unused variable ‘nn’ [-Wunused-variable]
The cause of that warning is that lockdep_assert_held() compiles
away if CONFIG_LOCKDEP is not set. Silence this warning by using
the argument to lockdep_assert_held() as a nop if CONFIG_LOCKDEP
is not set.
Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359060797.1325.33.camel@x61.thuisdomein
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
--
include/linux/lockdep.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Change-Id: I4a4e78fd92dccffe5fc7c3a2617ef7d4cf59f738
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Originally from Peter Zijlstra. The helper migrates perf events
from one cpu to another cpu.
Conflicts (perf: Fix race in removing an event):
kernel/events/core.c
Change-Id: I7885fe36c9e2803b10477d556163197085be3d19
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yan <zheng.z.yan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1339741902-8449-5-git-send-email-zheng.z.yan@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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events
Allow the pmu->event_init callback to change event->cpu, so the PMU driver
can choose the CPU on which to install events.
Change-Id: I0f8b4310d306f4c87bc961f0359c2bdf65c129b6
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yan <zheng.z.yan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1339741902-8449-4-git-send-email-zheng.z.yan@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Change-Id: Ic3edddb6d0909df89a0d9551394891fa1fac707a
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Change-Id: I803de2a929dbb9fe470414ea55f2401da5637791
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Change-Id: I1d67d7e79502eec9dca036b4ea7c4f8a41d1c128
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Change-Id: I28764a4d6752ccb1501b6af24c7efa443b037dac
Signed-off-by: Jeonghun Yang <didwjdgns820@gmail.com>
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Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Change-Id: I11d44957b450a3eda258c05f9e833c71a079e83c
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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(cherry picked from commit dd42bf1197144ede075a9d4793123f7689e164bc)
Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].
Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.
[1]
commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200
isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
[ 634.336761] ==================================================================
[ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
[ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
[ 634.340359] =============================================================================
[ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
...
[ 634.405018] Call Trace:
[ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
[ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
[ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
[ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
[ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
[ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
[ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
[ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
[ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
[ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
[ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: Ibed6feadfb9706d478f93feec3b240aecfc64af3
Bug: 30951112
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There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Change-Id: I751faf3215bbdaa6b6358f3a752bdd24126cfa0b
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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snd_usb_add_audio_stream() call
commit 836b34a935abc91e13e63053d0a83b24dfb5ea78 upstream.
create_fixed_stream_quirk(), snd_usb_parse_audio_interface() and
create_uaxx_quirk() functions allocate the audioformat object by themselves
and free it upon error before returning. However, once the object is linked
to a stream, it's freed again in snd_usb_audio_pcm_free(), thus it'll be
double-freed, eventually resulting in a memory corruption.
This patch fixes these failures in the error paths by unlinking the audioformat
object before freeing it.
Based on a patch by Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[Note for stable backports:
this patch requires the commit 902eb7fd1e4a ('ALSA: usb-audio: Minor
code cleanup in create_fixed_stream_quirk()')]
Change-Id: Ia332409f06bbd20c0abf9cf915f4a041200e4736
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283358
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 902eb7fd1e4af3ac69b9b30f8373f118c92b9729 upstream.
Just a minor code cleanup: unify the error paths.
Change-Id: Idbac50c4d1602ea3b075c747a716cc6eab905b52
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 0f886ca12765d20124bd06291c82951fd49a33be upstream.
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Change-Id: I94025f3eec256347b50805b388940774e559dae2
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- There's no altsd variable
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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In sg_common_write(), we free the block request and return -ENODEV if
the device is detached in the middle of the SG_IO ioctl().
Unfortunately, sg_finish_rem_req() also tries to free srp->rq, so we
end up freeing rq->cmd in the already free rq object, and then free
the object itself out from under the current user.
This ends up corrupting random memory via the list_head on the rq
object. The most common crash trace I saw is this:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at block/blk-core.c:1420!
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81281eab>] blk_put_request+0x5b/0x80
[<ffffffffa0069e5b>] sg_finish_rem_req+0x6b/0x120 [sg]
[<ffffffffa006bcb9>] sg_common_write.isra.14+0x459/0x5a0 [sg]
[<ffffffff8125b328>] ? selinux_file_alloc_security+0x48/0x70
[<ffffffffa006bf95>] sg_new_write.isra.17+0x195/0x2d0 [sg]
[<ffffffffa006cef4>] sg_ioctl+0x644/0xdb0 [sg]
[<ffffffff81170f80>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x520
[<ffffffff81258967>] ? file_has_perm+0x97/0xb0
[<ffffffff811714a1>] SyS_ioctl+0x91/0xb0
[<ffffffff81602afb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
RIP [<ffffffff81281e04>] __blk_put_request+0x154/0x1a0
The solution is straightforward: just set srp->rq to NULL in the
failure branch so that sg_finish_rem_req() doesn't attempt to re-free
it.
Additionally, since sg_rq_end_io() will never be called on the object
when this happens, we need to free memory backing ->cmd if it isn't
embedded in the object itself.
KASAN was extremely helpful in finding the root cause of this bug.
Change-Id: I8c2389a4e2e1b5f753a47f8af60502a761b891b5
Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task
lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
my 4-core QEMU VM:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t pid, child;
long nproc, i;
/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);
nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) {
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
for (;;) {
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
_exit(0);
} else {
child = wait(NULL);
assert(child == pid);
}
}
}
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
for (;;) {
/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
}
}
}
for (;;) {
/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
}
return 0;
}
This gets us KASAN dumps like this:
[ 35.526914] ==================================================================
[ 35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
[ 35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
[ 35.530009] =============================================================================
[ 35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[ 35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
[ 35.530009] ___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
[ 35.530009] __slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
[ 35.530009] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
[ 35.530009] create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
[ 35.530009] get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
[ 35.530009] copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
[ 35.530009] _do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
[ 35.530009] SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
[ 35.530009] do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
[ 35.530009] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[ 35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
[ 35.530009] __slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
[ 35.530009] kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
[ 35.530009] put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
[ 35.530009] put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
[ 35.530009] exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
[ 35.530009] do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
[ 35.530009] do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
[ 35.530009] SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
[ 35.530009] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
[ 35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
[ 35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
[ 35.530009] ==================================================================
Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.
Change-Id: I4261aaf076fab943a80a45b0a77e023aa4ecbbd8
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Change-Id: I41ee55505a213f99a92ce630885e6c31b4b60232
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector
is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption.
The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout
rendered as weeks:
(gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7)
$2 = 30500568904943
That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL.
Expand the buffer to 16 chars.
I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not
enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a
64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that
isn't checked again on the other side.
The panic incurred looks something like:
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe
CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f
ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6
ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84
[<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a
[<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0
[<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30
[<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50
[<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390
[<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150
[<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0
[<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130
[<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
[<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
Change-Id: I0787d5a38c730ecb75d3c08f28f0ab36295d59e7
Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
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This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Change-Id: Id9bec3722797dff7d0ff0d9f6097c4229e31fd62
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: s/gup.c/memory.c; s/follow_page_pte/follow_page_mask;
s/faultin_page/__get_user_page]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Change-Id: I0e5b9979850042d790cb89996163bdc69a4c7879
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When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the
tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail()
Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb.
If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb.
Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and
we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb)
Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and
access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped,
this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy,
returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug
features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel.
This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller.
Change-Id: I264f97d30d0a623011d9ee811c63fa0e0c2149a2
Fixes: 6859d49475d4 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb")
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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the stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”
Bug: 28620102
Change-Id: I13da380c6fe8abca49e3cf9f05293c02b44d2e5e
Signed-off-by: kangjie <kangjielu@gmail.com>
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BUG: 27532522
Change-Id: Ic0710a9a8cfc682acd88ecf3bbfeece2d798c4a4
Signed-off-by: Mohamad Ayyash <mkayyash@google.com>
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(cherry pick from commit 82262a46627bebb0febcc26664746c25cef08563)
There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user
controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is
actually a user control and neither does it check if the control is
owned by the process that tries to remove it. That allows userspace
applications to remove arbitrary controls, which can cause a user after
free if a for example a driver does not expect a control to be removed
from under its feed.
The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the
user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the
user_ctl_count is increased (even though the number of user controls
does not change). This allows userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit
has been reached, to repeatedly replace a control until user_ctl_count
overflows. Once that happens new controls can be added effectively
bypassing the user_ctl_count limit.
Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the
control that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This
function does proper permission checks as well as decrements
user_ctl_count after the control has been removed.
Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns
-EBUSY at beginning of the function if the control already exists is
removed. This is not a problem though since the check is quite
useless, because the lock that is protecting the control list is
released between the check and before adding the new control to the
list, which means that it is possible that a different control with
the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily there
is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(),
so we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added
twice.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Change-Id: I0b183e2d52afe8e747f59e1ecca6f6fbbac2d016
Bug: 29916012
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Bug: 28760453
Change-Id: I019c2de559db9e4b95860ab852211b456d78c4ca
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
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The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: Ie3b6ee89ad3e8cd3a0fe8f50f74aaa4834d0b4ca
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