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* Merge remote-tracking branch 'korg/linux-3.0.y' into cm-13.0rogersb112015-11-1037-325/+232
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: crypto/algapi.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_debugfs.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c drivers/video/fbmem.c include/linux/nls.h kernel/cgroup.c kernel/signal.c kernel/timeconst.pl net/ipv4/ping.c Change-Id: I1f532925d1743df74d66bcdd6fc92f05c72ee0dd
| * x86, efi: Don't map Boot Services on i386Josh Boyer2013-10-051-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 700870119f49084da004ab588ea2b799689efaf7 upstream. Add patch to fix 32bit EFI service mapping (rhbz 726701) Multiple people are reporting hitting the following WARNING on i386, WARNING: at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:102 __ioremap_caller+0x3d3/0x440() Modules linked in: Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.9.0-rc7+ #95 Call Trace: [<c102b6af>] warn_slowpath_common+0x5f/0x80 [<c1023fb3>] ? __ioremap_caller+0x3d3/0x440 [<c1023fb3>] ? __ioremap_caller+0x3d3/0x440 [<c102b6ed>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20 [<c1023fb3>] __ioremap_caller+0x3d3/0x440 [<c106007b>] ? get_usage_chars+0xfb/0x110 [<c102d937>] ? vprintk_emit+0x147/0x480 [<c1418593>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1e4/0x3de [<c102406a>] ioremap_cache+0x1a/0x20 [<c1418593>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1e4/0x3de [<c1418593>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1e4/0x3de [<c1407984>] start_kernel+0x286/0x2f4 [<c1407535>] ? repair_env_string+0x51/0x51 [<c1407362>] i386_start_kernel+0x12c/0x12f Due to the workaround described in commit 916f676f8 ("x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode") EFI Boot Service regions are mapped for a period during boot. Unfortunately, with the limited size of the i386 direct kernel map it's possible that some of the Boot Service regions will not be directly accessible, which causes them to be ioremap()'d, triggering the above warning as the regions are marked as E820_RAM in the e820 memmap. There are currently only two situations where we need to map EFI Boot Service regions, 1. To workaround the firmware bug described in 916f676f8 2. To access the ACPI BGRT image but since we haven't seen an i386 implementation that requires either, this simple fix should suffice for now. [ Added to changelog - Matt ] Reported-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue.lkml@nexus-software.ie> Acked-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@intel.com> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86/reboot: Add quirk to make Dell C6100 use reboot=pci automaticallyMasoud Sharbiani2013-10-051-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4f0acd31c31f03ba42494c8baf6c0465150e2621 upstream. Dell PowerEdge C6100 machines fail to completely reboot about 20% of the time. Signed-off-by: Masoud Sharbiani <msharbiani@twitter.com> Signed-off-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@twitter.com> Cc: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1379717947-18042-1-git-send-email-vlee@freedesktop.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86, fpu: correct the asm constraints for fxsave, unbreak mxcsr.dazH.J. Lu2013-08-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit eaa5a990191d204ba0f9d35dbe5505ec2cdd1460 upstream. GCC will optimize mxcsr_feature_mask_init in arch/x86/kernel/i387.c: memset(&fx_scratch, 0, sizeof(struct i387_fxsave_struct)); asm volatile("fxsave %0" : : "m" (fx_scratch)); mask = fx_scratch.mxcsr_mask; if (mask == 0) mask = 0x0000ffbf; to memset(&fx_scratch, 0, sizeof(struct i387_fxsave_struct)); asm volatile("fxsave %0" : : "m" (fx_scratch)); mask = 0x0000ffbf; since asm statement doesn’t say it will update fx_scratch. As the result, the DAZ bit will be cleared. This patch fixes it. This bug dates back to at least kernel 2.6.12. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * xen/time: remove blocked time accounting from xen "clockchip"Laszlo Ersek2013-07-211-15/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0b0c002c340e78173789f8afaa508070d838cf3d upstream. ... because the "clock_event_device framework" already accounts for idle time through the "event_handler" function pointer in xen_timer_interrupt(). The patch is intended as the completion of [1]. It should fix the double idle times seen in PV guests' /proc/stat [2]. It should be orthogonal to stolen time accounting (the removed code seems to be isolated). The approach may be completely misguided. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/10/6/10 [2] http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-devel/2010-08/msg01068.html John took the time to retest this patch on top of v3.10 and reported: "idle time is correctly incremented for pv and hvm for the normal case, nohz=off and nohz=idle." so lets put this patch in. Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: x86: remove vcpu's CPL check in host-invoked XCR setZhanghaoyu (A)2013-06-271-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 764bcbc5a6d7a2f3e75c9f0e4caa984e2926e346 upstream. __kvm_set_xcr function does the CPL check when set xcr. __kvm_set_xcr is called in two flows, one is invoked by guest, call stack shown as below, handle_xsetbv(or xsetbv_interception) kvm_set_xcr __kvm_set_xcr the other one is invoked by host, for example during system reset: kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs __kvm_set_xcr The former does need the CPL check, but the latter does not. Signed-off-by: Zhang Haoyu <haoyu.zhang@huawei.com> [Tweaks to commit message. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86: Fix typo in kexec register clearingKees Cook2013-06-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c8a22d19dd238ede87aa0ac4f7dbea8da039b9c1 upstream. Fixes a typo in register clearing code. Thanks to PaX Team for fixing this originally, and James Troup for pointing it out. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130605184718.GA8396@www.outflux.net Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * xen/vcpu/pvhvm: Fix vcpu hotplugging hanging.Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk2013-05-191-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7f1fc268c47491fd5e63548f6415fc8604e13003 upstream. If a user did: echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online we would (this a build with DEBUG enabled) get to: smpboot: ++++++++++++++++++++=_---CPU UP 1 .. snip.. smpboot: Stack at about ffff880074c0ff44 smpboot: CPU1: has booted. and hang. The RCU mechanism would kick in an try to IPI the CPU1 but the IPIs (and all other interrupts) would never arrive at the CPU1. At first glance at least. A bit digging in the hypervisor trace shows that (using xenanalyze): [vla] d4v1 vec 243 injecting 0.043163027 --|x d4v1 intr_window vec 243 src 5(vector) intr f3 ] 0.043163639 --|x d4v1 vmentry cycles 1468 ] 0.043164913 --|x d4v1 vmexit exit_reason PENDING_INTERRUPT eip ffffffff81673254 0.043164913 --|x d4v1 inj_virq vec 243 real [vla] d4v1 vec 243 injecting 0.043164913 --|x d4v1 intr_window vec 243 src 5(vector) intr f3 ] 0.043165526 --|x d4v1 vmentry cycles 1472 ] 0.043166800 --|x d4v1 vmexit exit_reason PENDING_INTERRUPT eip ffffffff81673254 0.043166800 --|x d4v1 inj_virq vec 243 real [vla] d4v1 vec 243 injecting there is a pending event (subsequent debugging shows it is the IPI from the VCPU0 when smpboot.c on VCPU1 has done "set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), true)") and the guest VCPU1 is interrupted with the callback IPI (0xf3 aka 243) which ends up calling __xen_evtchn_do_upcall. The __xen_evtchn_do_upcall seems to do *something* but not acknowledge the pending events. And the moment the guest does a 'cli' (that is the ffffffff81673254 in the log above) the hypervisor is invoked again to inject the IPI (0xf3) to tell the guest it has pending interrupts. This repeats itself forever. The culprit was the per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) pointer. At the bootup we set each per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) to point to the shared_info->vcpu_info[vcpu] but later on use the VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info to register per-CPU structures (xen_vcpu_setup). This is used to allow events for more than 32 VCPUs and for performance optimizations reasons. When the user performs the VCPU hotplug we end up calling the the xen_vcpu_setup once more. We make the hypercall which returns -EINVAL as it does not allow multiple registration calls (and already has re-assigned where the events are being set). We pick the fallback case and set per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) to point to the shared_info->vcpu_info[vcpu] (which is a good fallback during bootup). However the hypervisor is still setting events in the register per-cpu structure (per_cpu(xen_vcpu_info, cpu)). As such when the events are set by the hypervisor (such as timer one), and when we iterate in __xen_evtchn_do_upcall we end up reading stale events from the shared_info->vcpu_info[vcpu] instead of the per_cpu(xen_vcpu_info, cpu) structures. Hence we never acknowledge the events that the hypervisor has set and the hypervisor keeps on reminding us to ack the events which we never do. The fix is simple. Don't on the second time when xen_vcpu_setup is called over-write the per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) if it points to per_cpu(xen_vcpu_info). Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: VMX: fix halt emulation while emulating invalid guest sateGleb Natapov2013-05-191-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8d76c49e9ffeee839bc0b7a3278a23f99101263e upstream. The invalid guest state emulation loop does not check halt_request which causes 100% cpu loop while guest is in halt and in invalid state, but more serious issue is that this leaves halt_request set, so random instruction emulated by vm86 #GP exit can be interpreted as halt which causes guest hang. Fix both problems by handling halt_request in emulation loop. Reported-by: Tomas Papan <tomas.papan@gmail.com> Tested-by: Tomas Papan <tomas.papan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * Revert "x86, amd: Disable way access filter on Piledriver CPUs" it is duplicatedAndre Przywara2013-05-111-14/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Revert 5e3fe67e02c53e5a5fcf0e2b0d91dd93f757d50b which is commit 2bbf0a1427c377350f001fbc6260995334739ad7 upstream. Willy pointed out that I messed up and applied this one twice to the 3.0-stable tree, so revert the second instance of it. Reported by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Andre Przywara <osp@andrep.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> reverted:
| * x86/mm: account for PGDIR_SIZE alignmentJerry Hoemann2013-05-111-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Patch for -stable. Function find_early_table_space removed upstream. Fixes panic in alloc_low_page due to pgt_buf overflow during init_memory_mapping. find_early_table_space sizes pgt_buf based upon the size of the memory being mapped, but it does not take into account the alignment of the memory. When the region being mapped spans a 512GB (PGDIR_SIZE) alignment, a panic from alloc_low_pages occurs. kernel_physical_mapping_init takes into account PGDIR_SIZE alignment. This causes an extra call to alloc_low_page to be made. This extra call isn't accounted for by find_early_table_space and causes a kernel panic. Change is to take into account PGDIR_SIZE alignment in find_early_table_space. Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86: Eliminate irq_mis_count counted in arch_irq_statLi Fei2013-05-071-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f7b0e1055574ce06ab53391263b4e205bf38daf3 upstream. With the current implementation, kstat_cpu(cpu).irqs_sum is also increased in case of irq_mis_count increment. So there is no need to count irq_mis_count in arch_irq_stat, otherwise irq_mis_count will be counted twice in the sum of /proc/stat. Reported-by: Liu Chuansheng <chuansheng.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Li Fei <fei.li@intel.com> Acked-by: Liu Chuansheng <chuansheng.liu@intel.com> Cc: tomoki.sekiyama.qu@hitachi.com Cc: joe@perches.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1366980611.32469.7.camel@fli24-HP-Compaq-8100-Elite-CMT-PC Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * xen/time: Fix kasprintf splat when allocating timer%d IRQ line.Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk2013-05-072-2/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7918c92ae9638eb8a6ec18e2b4a0de84557cccc8 upstream. When we online the CPU, we get this splat: smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x2 installing Xen timer for CPU 1 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /home/konrad/ssd/konrad/linux/mm/slab.c:3179 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.9.0-rc6upstream-00001-g3884fad #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810c1fea>] __might_sleep+0xda/0x100 [<ffffffff81194617>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x1e7/0x2c0 [<ffffffff81303758>] ? kasprintf+0x38/0x40 [<ffffffff813036eb>] kvasprintf+0x5b/0x90 [<ffffffff81303758>] kasprintf+0x38/0x40 [<ffffffff81044510>] xen_setup_timer+0x30/0xb0 [<ffffffff810445af>] xen_hvm_setup_cpu_clockevents+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff81666d0a>] start_secondary+0x19c/0x1a8 The solution to that is use kasprintf in the CPU hotplug path that 'online's the CPU. That is, do it in in xen_hvm_cpu_notify, and remove the call to in xen_hvm_setup_cpu_clockevents. Unfortunatly the later is not a good idea as the bootup path does not use xen_hvm_cpu_notify so we would end up never allocating timer%d interrupt lines when booting. As such add the check for atomic() to continue. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: Allow cross page reads and writes from cached translations.Andrew Honig2013-04-251-6/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8f964525a121f2ff2df948dac908dcc65be21b5b upstream. This patch adds support for kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init functions for reads and writes that will cross a page. If the range falls within the same memslot, then this will be a fast operation. If the range is split between two memslots, then the slower kvm_read_guest and kvm_write_guest are used. Tested: Test against kvm_clock unit tests. Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions ↵Andy Honig2013-04-252-27/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2013-1797) commit 0b79459b482e85cb7426aa7da683a9f2c97aeae1 upstream. There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then the guest will be able to corrupt that memory. Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: x86: fix for buffer overflow in handling of MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME ↵Andy Honig2013-04-251-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2013-1796) commit c300aa64ddf57d9c5d9c898a64b36877345dd4a9 upstream. If the guest sets the GPA of the time_page so that the request to update the time straddles a page then KVM will write onto an incorrect page. The write is done byusing kmap atomic to get a pointer to the page for the time structure and then performing a memcpy to that page starting at an offset that the guest controls. Well behaved guests always provide a 32-byte aligned address, however a malicious guest could use this to corrupt host kernel memory. Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test. Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86, mm: Patch out arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode() when running on bare metalBoris Ostrovsky2013-04-165-13/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 511ba86e1d386f671084b5d0e6f110bb30b8eeb2 upstream. Invoking arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode() results in calls to preempt_enable()/disable() which may have performance impact. Since lazy MMU is not used on bare metal we can patch away arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode() so that it is never called in such environment. [ hpa: the previous patch "Fix vmalloc_fault oops during lazy MMU updates" may cause a minor performance regression on bare metal. This patch resolves that performance regression. It is somewhat unclear to me if this is a good -stable candidate. ] Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1364045796-10720-2-git-send-email-konrad.wilk@oracle.com Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86, mm, paravirt: Fix vmalloc_fault oops during lazy MMU updatesSamu Kallio2013-04-161-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1160c2779b826c6f5c08e5cc542de58fd1f667d5 upstream. In paravirtualized x86_64 kernels, vmalloc_fault may cause an oops when lazy MMU updates are enabled, because set_pgd effects are being deferred. One instance of this problem is during process mm cleanup with memory cgroups enabled. The chain of events is as follows: - zap_pte_range enables lazy MMU updates - zap_pte_range eventually calls mem_cgroup_charge_statistics, which accesses the vmalloc'd mem_cgroup per-cpu stat area - vmalloc_fault is triggered which tries to sync the corresponding PGD entry with set_pgd, but the update is deferred - vmalloc_fault oopses due to a mismatch in the PUD entries The OOPs usually looks as so: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:396! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP .. snip .. CPU 1 Pid: 10866, comm: httpd Not tainted 3.6.10-4.fc18.x86_64 #1 RIP: e030:[<ffffffff816271bf>] [<ffffffff816271bf>] vmalloc_fault+0x11f/0x208 .. snip .. Call Trace: [<ffffffff81627759>] do_page_fault+0x399/0x4b0 [<ffffffff81004f4c>] ? xen_mc_extend_args+0xec/0x110 [<ffffffff81624065>] page_fault+0x25/0x30 [<ffffffff81184d03>] ? mem_cgroup_charge_statistics.isra.13+0x13/0x50 [<ffffffff81186f78>] __mem_cgroup_uncharge_common+0xd8/0x350 [<ffffffff8118aac7>] mem_cgroup_uncharge_page+0x57/0x60 [<ffffffff8115fbc0>] page_remove_rmap+0xe0/0x150 [<ffffffff8115311a>] ? vm_normal_page+0x1a/0x80 [<ffffffff81153e61>] unmap_single_vma+0x531/0x870 [<ffffffff81154962>] unmap_vmas+0x52/0xa0 [<ffffffff81007442>] ? pte_mfn_to_pfn+0x72/0x100 [<ffffffff8115c8f8>] exit_mmap+0x98/0x170 [<ffffffff810050d9>] ? __raw_callee_save_xen_pmd_val+0x11/0x1e [<ffffffff81059ce3>] mmput+0x83/0xf0 [<ffffffff810624c4>] exit_mm+0x104/0x130 [<ffffffff8106264a>] do_exit+0x15a/0x8c0 [<ffffffff810630ff>] do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0 [<ffffffff81063177>] sys_exit_group+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff8162bae9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Calling arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode immediately after set_pgd makes the changes visible to the consistency checks. RedHat-Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=914737 Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: Krishna Raman <kraman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Samu Kallio <samu.kallio@aberdeencloud.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1364045796-10720-1-git-send-email-konrad.wilk@oracle.com Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86-32, mm: Rip out x86_32 NUMA remapping codeDave Hansen2013-04-161-161/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f03574f2d5b2d6229dcdf2d322848065f72953c7 upstream. [was already included in 3.0, but I missed the patch hunk for arch/x86/mm/numa_32.c - gregkh] This code was an optimization for 32-bit NUMA systems. It has probably been the cause of a number of subtle bugs over the years, although the conditions to excite them would have been hard to trigger. Essentially, we remap part of the kernel linear mapping area, and then sometimes part of that area gets freed back in to the bootmem allocator. If those pages get used by kernel data structures (say mem_map[] or a dentry), there's no big deal. But, if anyone ever tried to use the linear mapping for these pages _and_ cared about their physical address, bad things happen. For instance, say you passed __GFP_ZERO to the page allocator and then happened to get handed one of these pages, it zero the remapped page, but it would make a pte to the _old_ page. There are probably a hundred other ways that it could screw with things. We don't need to hang on to performance optimizations for these old boxes any more. All my 32-bit NUMA systems are long dead and buried, and I probably had access to more than most people. This code is causing real things to break today: https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/1/9/376 I looked in to actually fixing this, but it requires surgery to way too much brittle code, as well as stuff like per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(). [ hpa: Cc: this for -stable, since it is a memory corruption issue. However, an alternative is to simply mark NUMA as depends BROKEN rather than EXPERIMENTAL in the X86_32 subclause... ] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130131005616.1C79F411@kernel.stglabs.ibm.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86-32, mm: Rip out x86_32 NUMA remapping codeDave Hansen2013-04-123-13/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f03574f2d5b2d6229dcdf2d322848065f72953c7 upstream. This code was an optimization for 32-bit NUMA systems. It has probably been the cause of a number of subtle bugs over the years, although the conditions to excite them would have been hard to trigger. Essentially, we remap part of the kernel linear mapping area, and then sometimes part of that area gets freed back in to the bootmem allocator. If those pages get used by kernel data structures (say mem_map[] or a dentry), there's no big deal. But, if anyone ever tried to use the linear mapping for these pages _and_ cared about their physical address, bad things happen. For instance, say you passed __GFP_ZERO to the page allocator and then happened to get handed one of these pages, it zero the remapped page, but it would make a pte to the _old_ page. There are probably a hundred other ways that it could screw with things. We don't need to hang on to performance optimizations for these old boxes any more. All my 32-bit NUMA systems are long dead and buried, and I probably had access to more than most people. This code is causing real things to break today: https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/1/9/376 I looked in to actually fixing this, but it requires surgery to way too much brittle code, as well as stuff like per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(). [ hpa: Cc: this for -stable, since it is a memory corruption issue. However, an alternative is to simply mark NUMA as depends BROKEN rather than EXPERIMENTAL in the X86_32 subclause... ] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130131005616.1C79F411@kernel.stglabs.ibm.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * iommu/amd: Make sure dma_ops are set for hotplug devicesJoerg Roedel2013-04-051-10/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c2a2876e863356b092967ea62bebdb4dd663af80 upstream. There is a bug introduced with commit 27c2127 that causes devices which are hot unplugged and then hot-replugged to not have per-device dma_ops set. This causes these devices to not function correctly. Fixed with this patch. Reported-by: Andreas Degert <andreas.degert@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461)Petr Matousek2013-04-051-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6d1068b3a98519247d8ba4ec85cd40ac136dbdf9 upstream. On hosts without the XSAVE support unprivileged local user can trigger oops similar to the one below by setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit in guest cr4 register using KVM_SET_SREGS ioctl and later issuing KVM_RUN ioctl. invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP Modules linked in: tun ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables ... Pid: 24935, comm: zoog_kvm_monito Tainted: G D 3.2.0-3-686-pae EIP: 0060:[<f8b9550c>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0 EIP is at kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] EAX: 00000001 EBX: 000f387e ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: ef5a0060 ESP: d7c63e70 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process zoog_kvm_monito (pid: 24935, ti=d7c62000 task=ed84a0c0 task.ti=d7c62000) Stack: 00000001 f70a1200 f8b940a9 ef5a0060 00000000 00200202 f8769009 00000000 ef5a0060 000f387e eda5c020 8722f9c8 00015bae 00000000 ed84a0c0 ed84a0c0 c12bf02d 0000ae80 ef7f8740 fffffffb f359b740 ef5a0060 f8b85dc1 0000ae80 Call Trace: [<f8b940a9>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x2fe/0x308 [kvm] ... [<c12bfb44>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb Code: 89 e8 e8 14 ee ff ff ba 00 00 04 00 89 e8 e8 98 48 ff ff 85 c0 74 1e 83 7d 48 00 75 18 8b 85 08 07 00 00 31 c9 8b 95 0c 07 00 00 <0f> 01 d1 c7 45 48 01 00 00 00 c7 45 1c 01 00 00 00 0f ae f0 89 EIP: [<f8b9550c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] SS:ESP 0068:d7c63e70 QEMU first retrieves the supported features via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and then sets them later. So guest's X86_FEATURE_XSAVE should be masked out on hosts without X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, making kvm_set_cr4 with X86_CR4_OSXSAVE fail. Userspaces that allow specifying guest cpuid with X86_FEATURE_XSAVE even on hosts that do not support it, might be susceptible to this attack from inside the guest as well. Allow setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit only if host has XSAVE support. Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settingsAvi Kivity2013-04-051-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e upstream. If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading to potential NULL pointer dereferences. Fix by: - ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called - ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without kvm->lock held. Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: x86: Prevent starting PIT timers in the absence of irqchip supportJan Kiszka2013-04-051-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0924ab2cfa98b1ece26c033d696651fd62896c69 upstream. User space may create the PIT and forgets about setting up the irqchips. In that case, firing PIT IRQs will crash the host: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000128 IP: [<ffffffffa10f6280>] kvm_set_irq+0x30/0x170 [kvm] ... Call Trace: [<ffffffffa11228c1>] pit_do_work+0x51/0xd0 [kvm] [<ffffffff81071431>] process_one_work+0x111/0x4d0 [<ffffffff81071bb2>] worker_thread+0x152/0x340 [<ffffffff81075c8e>] kthread+0x7e/0x90 [<ffffffff815a4474>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 Prevent this by checking the irqchip mode before starting a timer. We can't deny creating the PIT if the irqchips aren't set up yet as current user land expects this order to work. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * KVM: Clean up error handling during VCPU creationJan Kiszka2013-04-051-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d780592b99d7d8a5ff905f6bacca519d4a342c76 upstream. So far kvm_arch_vcpu_setup is responsible for freeing the vcpu struct if it fails. Move this confusing resonsibility back into the hands of kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu. Only kvm_arch_vcpu_setup of x86 is affected, all other archs cannot fail. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * signal: Define __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER so we know whether to clear sa_restorerBen Hutchings2013-04-051-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Vaguely based on upstream commit 574c4866e33d 'consolidate kernel-side struct sigaction declarations'. flush_signal_handlers() needs to know whether sigaction::sa_restorer is defined, not whether SA_RESTORER is defined. Define the __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER macro to indicate this. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86-64: Fix the failure case in copy_user_handle_tail()CQ Tang2013-03-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 66db3feb486c01349f767b98ebb10b0c3d2d021b upstream. The increment of "to" in copy_user_handle_tail() will have incremented before a failure has been noted. This causes us to skip a byte in the failure case. Only do the increment when assured there is no failure. Signed-off-by: CQ Tang <cq.tang@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130318150221.8439.993.stgit@phlsvslse11.ph.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * perf,x86: fix wrmsr_on_cpu() warning on suspend/resumeLinus Torvalds2013-03-201-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2a6e06b2aed6995af401dcd4feb5e79a0c7ea554 upstream. Commit 1d9d8639c063 ("perf,x86: fix kernel crash with PEBS/BTS after suspend/resume") fixed a crash when doing PEBS performance profiling after resuming, but in using init_debug_store_on_cpu() to restore the DS_AREA mtrr it also resulted in a new WARN_ON() triggering. init_debug_store_on_cpu() uses "wrmsr_on_cpu()", which in turn uses CPU cross-calls to do the MSR update. Which is not really valid at the early resume stage, and the warning is quite reasonable. Now, it all happens to _work_, for the simple reason that smp_call_function_single() ends up just doing the call directly on the CPU when the CPU number matches, but we really should just do the wrmsr() directly instead. This duplicates the wrmsr() logic, but hopefully we can just remove the wrmsr_on_cpu() version eventually. Reported-and-tested-by: Parag Warudkar <parag.lkml@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * perf,x86: fix kernel crash with PEBS/BTS after suspend/resumeStephane Eranian2013-03-202-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1d9d8639c063caf6efc2447f5f26aa637f844ff6 upstream. This patch fixes a kernel crash when using precise sampling (PEBS) after a suspend/resume. Turns out the CPU notifier code is not invoked on CPU0 (BP). Therefore, the DS_AREA (used by PEBS) is not restored properly by the kernel and keeps it power-on/resume value of 0 causing any PEBS measurement to crash when running on CPU0. The workaround is to add a hook in the actual resume code to restore the DS Area MSR value. It is invoked for all CPUS. So for all but CPU0, the DS_AREA will be restored twice but this is harmless. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuah.khan@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86/apic: Work around boot failure on HP ProLiant DL980 G7 Server systemsStoney Wang2013-03-041-5/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cb214ede7657db458fd0b2a25ea0b28dbf900ebc upstream. When a HP ProLiant DL980 G7 Server boots a regular kernel, there will be intermittent lost interrupts which could result in a hang or (in extreme cases) data loss. The reason is that this system only supports x2apic physical mode, while the kernel boots with a logical-cluster default setting. This bug can be worked around by specifying the "x2apic_phys" or "nox2apic" boot option, but we want to handle this system without requiring manual workarounds. The BIOS sets ACPI_FADT_APIC_PHYSICAL in FADT table. As all apicids are smaller than 255, BIOS need to pass the control to the OS with xapic mode, according to x2apic-spec, chapter 2.9. Current code handle x2apic when BIOS pass with xapic mode enabled: When user specifies x2apic_phys, or FADT indicates PHYSICAL: 1. During madt oem check, apic driver is set with xapic logical or xapic phys driver at first. 2. enable_IR_x2apic() will enable x2apic_mode. 3. if user specifies x2apic_phys on the boot line, x2apic_phys_probe() will install the correct x2apic phys driver and use x2apic phys mode. Otherwise it will skip the driver will let x2apic_cluster_probe to take over to install x2apic cluster driver (wrong one) even though FADT indicates PHYSICAL, because x2apic_phys_probe does not check FADT PHYSICAL. Add checking x2apic_fadt_phys in x2apic_phys_probe() to fix the problem. Signed-off-by: Stoney Wang <song-bo.wang@hp.com> [ updated the changelog and simplified the code ] Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Lin-Bao <Linbao.zhang@hp.com> [ make a patch specially for 3.0.66] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1360263182-16226-1-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86: Do not leak kernel page mapping locationsKees Cook2013-03-041-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e575a86fdc50d013bf3ad3aa81d9100e8e6cc60d upstream. Without this patch, it is trivial to determine kernel page mappings by examining the error code reported to dmesg[1]. Instead, declare the entire kernel memory space as a violation of a present page. Additionally, since show_unhandled_signals is enabled by default, switch branch hinting to the more realistic expectation, and unobfuscate the setting of the PF_PROT bit to improve readability. [1] http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2013/02/06/a-linux-memory-trick/ Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130207174413.GA12485@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86: Make sure we can boot in the case the BDA contains pure garbageH. Peter Anvin2013-03-041-19/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7c10093692ed2e6f318387d96b829320aa0ca64c upstream. On non-BIOS platforms it is possible that the BIOS data area contains garbage instead of being zeroed or something equivalent (firmware people: we are talking of 1.5K here, so please do the sane thing.) We need on the order of 20-30K of low memory in order to boot, which may grow up to < 64K in the future. We probably want to avoid the lowest of the low memory. At the same time, it seems extremely unlikely that a legitimate EBDA would ever reach down to the 128K (which would require it to be over half a megabyte in size.) Thus, pick 128K as the cutoff for "this is insane, ignore." We may still end up reserving a bunch of extra memory on the low megabyte, but that is not really a major issue these days. In the worst case we lose 512K of RAM. This code really should be merged with trim_bios_range() in arch/x86/kernel/setup.c, but that is a bigger patch for a later merge window. Reported-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-oebml055yyfm8yxmria09rja@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * iommu/amd: Initialize device table after dma_opsJoerg Roedel2013-03-041-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f528d980c17b8714aedc918ba86e058af914d66b upstream. When dma_ops are initialized the unity mappings are created. The init_device_table_dma() function makes sure DMA from all devices is blocked by default. This opens a short window in time where DMA to unity mapped regions is blocked by the IOMMU. Make sure this does not happen by initializing the device table after dma_ops. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuah.khan@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * xen: Send spinlock IPI to all waitersStefan Bader2013-02-281-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 76eaca031f0af2bb303e405986f637811956a422 upstream. There is a loophole between Xen's current implementation of pv-spinlocks and the scheduler. This was triggerable through a testcase until v3.6 changed the TLB flushing code. The problem potentially is still there just not observable in the same way. What could happen was (is): 1. CPU n tries to schedule task x away and goes into a slow wait for the runq lock of CPU n-# (must be one with a lower number). 2. CPU n-#, while processing softirqs, tries to balance domains and goes into a slow wait for its own runq lock (for updating some records). Since this is a spin_lock_irqsave in softirq context, interrupts will be re-enabled for the duration of the poll_irq hypercall used by Xen. 3. Before the runq lock of CPU n-# is unlocked, CPU n-1 receives an interrupt (e.g. endio) and when processing the interrupt, tries to wake up task x. But that is in schedule and still on_cpu, so try_to_wake_up goes into a tight loop. 4. The runq lock of CPU n-# gets unlocked, but the message only gets sent to the first waiter, which is CPU n-# and that is busily stuck. 5. CPU n-# never returns from the nested interruption to take and release the lock because the scheduler uses a busy wait. And CPU n never finishes the task migration because the unlock notification only went to CPU n-#. To avoid this and since the unlocking code has no real sense of which waiter is best suited to grab the lock, just send the IPI to all of them. This causes the waiters to return from the hyper- call (those not interrupted at least) and do active spinlocking. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1011792 Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86-32, mm: Remove reference to resume_map_numa_kva()H. Peter Anvin2013-02-282-8/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bb112aec5ee41427e9b9726e3d57b896709598ed upstream. Remove reference to removed function resume_map_numa_kva(). Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130131005616.1C79F411@kernel.stglabs.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86/xen: don't assume %ds is usable in xen_iret for 32-bit PVOPS.Jan Beulich2013-02-171-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 13d2b4d11d69a92574a55bfd985cfb0ca77aebdc upstream. This fixes CVE-2013-0228 / XSA-42 Drew Jones while working on CVE-2013-0190 found that that unprivileged guest user in 32bit PV guest can use to crash the > guest with the panic like this: ------------- general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/devices/vbd-51712/block/xvda/dev Modules linked in: sunrpc ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter ip_tables ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables ipv6 xen_netfront ext4 mbcache jbd2 xen_blkfront dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] Pid: 1250, comm: r Not tainted 2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1 EIP: 0061:[<c0407462>] EFLAGS: 00010086 CPU: 0 EIP is at xen_iret+0x12/0x2b EAX: eb8d0000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 08049860 EDX: 00000010 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 003d0f00 EBP: b77f8388 ESP: eb8d1fe0 DS: 0000 ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0069 Process r (pid: 1250, ti=eb8d0000 task=c2953550 task.ti=eb8d0000) Stack: 00000000 0027f416 00000073 00000206 b77f8364 0000007b 00000000 00000000 Call Trace: Code: c3 8b 44 24 18 81 4c 24 38 00 02 00 00 8d 64 24 30 e9 03 00 00 00 8d 76 00 f7 44 24 08 00 00 02 80 75 33 50 b8 00 e0 ff ff 21 e0 <8b> 40 10 8b 04 85 a0 f6 ab c0 8b 80 0c b0 b3 c0 f6 44 24 0d 02 EIP: [<c0407462>] xen_iret+0x12/0x2b SS:ESP 0069:eb8d1fe0 general protection fault: 0000 [#2] ---[ end trace ab0d29a492dcd330 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Pid: 1250, comm: r Tainted: G D --------------- 2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1 Call Trace: [<c08476df>] ? panic+0x6e/0x122 [<c084b63c>] ? oops_end+0xbc/0xd0 [<c084b260>] ? do_general_protection+0x0/0x210 [<c084a9b7>] ? error_code+0x73/ ------------- Petr says: " I've analysed the bug and I think that xen_iret() cannot cope with mangled DS, in this case zeroed out (null selector/descriptor) by either xen_failsafe_callback() or RESTORE_REGS because the corresponding LDT entry was invalidated by the reproducer. " Jan took a look at the preliminary patch and came up a fix that solves this problem: "This code gets called after all registers other than those handled by IRET got already restored, hence a null selector in %ds or a non-null one that got loaded from a code or read-only data descriptor would cause a kernel mode fault (with the potential of crashing the kernel as a whole, if panic_on_oops is set)." The way to fix this is to realize that the we can only relay on the registers that IRET restores. The two that are guaranteed are the %cs and %ss as they are always fixed GDT selectors. Also they are inaccessible from user mode - so they cannot be altered. This is the approach taken in this patch. Another alternative option suggested by Jan would be to relay on the subtle realization that using the %ebp or %esp relative references uses the %ss segment. In which case we could switch from using %eax to %ebp and would not need the %ss over-rides. That would also require one extra instruction to compensate for the one place where the register is used as scaled index. However Andrew pointed out that is too subtle and if further work was to be done in this code-path it could escape folks attention and lead to accidents. Reviewed-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86/mm: Check if PUD is large when validating a kernel addressMel Gorman2013-02-172-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0ee364eb316348ddf3e0dfcd986f5f13f528f821 upstream. A user reported the following oops when a backup process reads /proc/kcore: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffbb00ff33b000 IP: [<ffffffff8103157e>] kern_addr_valid+0xbe/0x110 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff811b8aaa>] read_kcore+0x17a/0x370 [<ffffffff811ad847>] proc_reg_read+0x77/0xc0 [<ffffffff81151687>] vfs_read+0xc7/0x130 [<ffffffff811517f3>] sys_read+0x53/0xa0 [<ffffffff81449692>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Investigation determined that the bug triggered when reading system RAM at the 4G mark. On this system, that was the first address using 1G pages for the virt->phys direct mapping so the PUD is pointing to a physical address, not a PMD page. The problem is that the page table walker in kern_addr_valid() is not checking pud_large() and treats the physical address as if it was a PMD. If it happens to look like pmd_none then it'll silently fail, probably returning zeros instead of real data. If the data happens to look like a present PMD though, it will be walked resulting in the oops above. This patch adds the necessary pud_large() check. Unfortunately the problem was not readily reproducible and now they are running the backup program without accessing /proc/kcore so the patch has not been validated but I think it makes sense. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.coM> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130211145236.GX21389@suse.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | Merge remote-tracking branch 'kernelorg/linux-3.0.y' into 3_0_64Andrew Dodd2013-02-2746-196/+733
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/arm/Kconfig arch/arm/include/asm/hwcap.h arch/arm/kernel/smp.c arch/arm/plat-samsung/adc.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_drv.h drivers/mmc/core/sd.c drivers/net/tun.c drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c drivers/regulator/max8997.c drivers/usb/core/hub.c drivers/usb/host/xhci.h drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c fs/jbd2/transaction.c include/linux/migrate.h kernel/sys.c kernel/time/timekeeping.c lib/genalloc.c mm/memory-failure.c mm/memory_hotplug.c mm/mempolicy.c mm/page_alloc.c mm/vmalloc.c mm/vmscan.c mm/vmstat.c scripts/Kbuild.include Change-Id: I91e2d85c07320c7ccfc04cf98a448e89bed6ade6
| * x86-64: Replace left over sti/cli in ia32 audit exit codeJan Beulich2013-02-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 40a1ef95da85843696fc3ebe5fce39b0db32669f upstream. For some reason they didn't get replaced so far by their paravirt equivalents, resulting in code to be run with interrupts disabled that doesn't expect so (causing, in the observed case, a BUG_ON() to trigger) when syscall auditing is enabled. David (Cc-ed) came up with an identical fix, so likely this can be taken to count as an ack from him. Reported-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5108E01902000078000BA9C5@nat28.tlf.novell.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Tested-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86/Sandy Bridge: Sandy Bridge workaround depends on CONFIG_PCIH. Peter Anvin2013-02-031-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e43b3cec711a61edf047adf6204d542f3a659ef8 upstream. early_pci_allowed() and read_pci_config_16() are only available if CONFIG_PCI is defined. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org> Signed-off-by: Abdallah Chatila <abdallah.chatila@ericsson.com>
| * efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelogNathan Zimmer2013-02-031-5/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b8f2c21db390273c3eaf0e5308faeaeb1e233840 upstream. Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available memory. This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping. The result is a crash that looks much like this. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020 IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU 0 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>] [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000 RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400) Stack: 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a Call Trace: [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP <ffffffff81601d28> CR2: 000000effd870020 ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]--- Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86/msr: Add capabilities checkAlan Cox2013-02-031-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00 upstream. At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space. Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already. In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of some capability and security model based systems down towards that of a generic "root owns the box" setup. Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal on most setups because they don't have heavy use of capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be tighter. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86: Use enum instead of literals for trap values [PARTIAL]Kees Cook2013-01-271-0/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [Based on commit c94082656dac74257f63e91f78d5d458ac781fa5 upstream, only taking the traps.h portion.] The traps are referred to by their numbers and it can be difficult to understand them while reading the code without context. This patch adds enumeration of the trap numbers and replaces the numbers with the correct enum for x86. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120310000710.GA32667@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * xen: Fix stack corruption in xen_failsafe_callback for 32bit PVOPS guests.Frediano Ziglio2013-01-211-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9174adbee4a9a49d0139f5d71969852b36720809 upstream. This fixes CVE-2013-0190 / XSA-40 There has been an error on the xen_failsafe_callback path for failed iret, which causes the stack pointer to be wrong when entering the iret_exc error path. This can result in the kernel crashing. In the classic kernel case, the relevant code looked a little like: popl %eax # Error code from hypervisor jz 5f addl $16,%esp jmp iret_exc # Hypervisor said iret fault 5: addl $16,%esp # Hypervisor said segment selector fault Here, there are two identical addls on either option of a branch which appears to have been optimised by hoisting it above the jz, and converting it to an lea, which leaves the flags register unaffected. In the PVOPS case, the code looks like: popl_cfi %eax # Error from the hypervisor lea 16(%esp),%esp # Add $16 before choosing fault path CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -16 jz 5f addl $16,%esp # Incorrectly adjust %esp again jmp iret_exc It is possible unprivileged userspace applications to cause this behaviour, for example by loading an LDT code selector, then changing the code selector to be not-present. At this point, there is a race condition where it is possible for the hypervisor to return back to userspace from an interrupt, fault on its own iret, and inject a failsafe_callback into the kernel. This bug has been present since the introduction of Xen PVOPS support in commit 5ead97c84 (xen: Core Xen implementation), in 2.6.23. Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86/Sandy Bridge: reserve pages when integrated graphics is presentJesse Barnes2013-01-211-0/+78
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a9acc5365dbda29f7be2884efb63771dc24bd815 upstream. SNB graphics devices have a bug that prevent them from accessing certain memory ranges, namely anything below 1M and in the pages listed in the table. So reserve those at boot if set detect a SNB gfx device on the CPU to avoid GPU hangs. Stephane Marchesin had a similar patch to the page allocator awhile back, but rather than reserving pages up front, it leaked them at allocation time. [ hpa: made a number of stylistic changes, marked arrays as static const, and made less verbose; use "memblock=debug" for full verbosity. ] Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86, amd: Disable way access filter on Piledriver CPUsAndre Przywara2013-01-171-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2bbf0a1427c377350f001fbc6260995334739ad7 upstream. The Way Access Filter in recent AMD CPUs may hurt the performance of some workloads, caused by aliasing issues in the L1 cache. This patch disables it on the affected CPUs. The issue is similar to that one of last year: http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1107.3/00041.html This new patch does not replace the old one, we just need another quirk for newer CPUs. The performance penalty without the patch depends on the circumstances, but is a bit less than the last year's 3%. The workloads affected would be those that access code from the same physical page under different virtual addresses, so different processes using the same libraries with ASLR or multiple instances of PIE-binaries. The code needs to be accessed simultaneously from both cores of the same compute unit. More details can be found here: http://developer.amd.com/Assets/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf CPUs affected are anything with the core known as Piledriver. That includes the new parts of the AMD A-Series (aka Trinity) and the just released new CPUs of the FX-Series (aka Vishera). The model numbering is a bit odd here: FX CPUs have model 2, A-Series has model 10h, with possible extensions to 1Fh. Hence the range of model ids. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <osp@andrep.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1351700450-9277-1-git-send-email-osp@andrep.de Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86, amd: Disable way access filter on Piledriver CPUsAndre Przywara2013-01-111-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2bbf0a1427c377350f001fbc6260995334739ad7 upstream. The Way Access Filter in recent AMD CPUs may hurt the performance of some workloads, caused by aliasing issues in the L1 cache. This patch disables it on the affected CPUs. The issue is similar to that one of last year: http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1107.3/00041.html This new patch does not replace the old one, we just need another quirk for newer CPUs. The performance penalty without the patch depends on the circumstances, but is a bit less than the last year's 3%. The workloads affected would be those that access code from the same physical page under different virtual addresses, so different processes using the same libraries with ASLR or multiple instances of PIE-binaries. The code needs to be accessed simultaneously from both cores of the same compute unit. More details can be found here: http://developer.amd.com/Assets/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf CPUs affected are anything with the core known as Piledriver. That includes the new parts of the AMD A-Series (aka Trinity) and the just released new CPUs of the FX-Series (aka Vishera). The model numbering is a bit odd here: FX CPUs have model 2, A-Series has model 10h, with possible extensions to 1Fh. Hence the range of model ids. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <osp@andrep.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1351700450-9277-1-git-send-email-osp@andrep.de Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86: hpet: Fix masking of MSI interruptsJan Beulich2012-12-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6acf5a8c931da9d26c8dd77d784daaf07fa2bff0 upstream. HPET_TN_FSB is not a proper mask bit; it merely toggles between MSI and legacy interrupt delivery. The proper mask bit is HPET_TN_ENABLE, so use both bits when (un)masking the interrupt. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5093E09002000078000A60E6@nat28.tlf.novell.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86-32: Export kernel_stack_pointer() for modulesH. Peter Anvin2012-12-051-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cb57a2b4cff7edf2a4e32c0163200e9434807e0a upstream. Modules, in particular oprofile (and possibly other similar tools) need kernel_stack_pointer(), so export it using EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(). Cc: Yang Wei <wei.yang@windriver.com> Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com> Cc: Jun Zhang <jun.zhang@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120912135059.GZ8285@erda.amd.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org> Cc: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com> Cc: Philip Müller <philm@manjaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * x86, mce, therm_throt: Don't report power limit and package level thermal ↵Fenghua Yu2012-12-031-22/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | throttle events in mcelog commit 29e9bf1841e4f9df13b4992a716fece7087dd237 upstream. Thermal throttle and power limit events are not defined as MCE errors in x86 architecture and should not generate MCE errors in mcelog. Current kernel generates fake software defined MCE errors for these events. This may confuse users because they may think the machine has real MCE errors while actually only thermal throttle or power limit events happen. To make it worse, buggy firmware on some platforms may falsely generate the events. Therefore, kernel reports MCE errors which users think as real hardware errors. Although the firmware bugs should be fixed, on the other hand, kernel should not report MCE errors either. So mcelog is not a good mechanism to report these events. To report the events, we count them in respective counters (core_power_limit_count, package_power_limit_count, core_throttle_count, and package_throttle_count) in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu#/thermal_throttle/. Users can check the counters for each event on each CPU. Please note that all CPU's on one package report duplicate counters. It's user application's responsibity to retrieve a package level counter for one package. This patch doesn't report package level power limit, core level power limit, and package level thermal throttle events in mcelog. When the events happen, only report them in respective counters in sysfs. Since core level thermal throttle has been legacy code in kernel for a while and users accepted it as MCE error in mcelog, core level thermal throttle is still reported in mcelog. In the mean time, the event is counted in a counter in sysfs as well. Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@amd64.org> Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20111215001945.GA21009@linux-os.sc.intel.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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