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* Merge remote-tracking branch 'korg/linux-3.0.y' into cm-13.0rogersb112015-11-107-42/+72
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: crypto/algapi.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_debugfs.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c drivers/video/fbmem.c include/linux/nls.h kernel/cgroup.c kernel/signal.c kernel/timeconst.pl net/ipv4/ping.c Change-Id: I1f532925d1743df74d66bcdd6fc92f05c72ee0dd
| * random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcallsTheodore Ts'o2013-10-221-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 47d06e532e95b71c0db3839ebdef3fe8812fca2c upstream. The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as late_initcalls for some unknown reason. So make sure random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are run. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * virtio: console: return -ENODEV on all read operations after unplugAmit Shah2013-08-141-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 96f97a83910cdb9d89d127c5ee523f8fc040a804 upstream. If a port gets unplugged while a user is blocked on read(), -ENODEV is returned. However, subsequent read()s returned 0, indicating there's no host-side connection (but not indicating the device went away). This also happened when a port was unplugged and the user didn't have any blocking operation pending. If the user didn't monitor the SIGIO signal, they won't have a chance to find out if the port went away. Fix by returning -ENODEV on all read()s after the port gets unplugged. write() already behaves this way. Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * virtio: console: fix raising SIGIO after port unplugAmit Shah2013-08-141-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 92d3453815fbe74d539c86b60dab39ecdf01bb99 upstream. SIGIO should be sent when a port gets unplugged. It should only be sent to prcesses that have the port opened, and have asked for SIGIO to be delivered. We were clearing out guest_connected before calling send_sigio_to_port(), resulting in a sigio not getting sent to processes. Fix by setting guest_connected to false after invoking the sigio function. Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * virtio: console: clean up port data immediately at time of unplugAmit Shah2013-08-141-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ea3768b4386a8d1790f4cc9a35de4f55b92d6442 upstream. We used to keep the port's char device structs and the /sys entries around till the last reference to the port was dropped. This is actually unnecessary, and resulted in buggy behaviour: 1. Open port in guest 2. Hot-unplug port 3. Hot-plug a port with the same 'name' property as the unplugged one This resulted in hot-plug being unsuccessful, as a port with the same name already exists (even though it was unplugged). This behaviour resulted in a warning message like this one: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted) Hardware name: KVM sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/virtio0/virtio-ports/vport0p1' Call Trace: [<ffffffff8106b607>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0 [<ffffffff8106b6f6>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 [<ffffffff811f2319>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130 [<ffffffff811f23e8>] ? create_dir+0x68/0xb0 [<ffffffff811f2469>] ? sysfs_create_dir+0x39/0x50 [<ffffffff81273129>] ? kobject_add_internal+0xb9/0x260 [<ffffffff812733d8>] ? kobject_add_varg+0x38/0x60 [<ffffffff812734b4>] ? kobject_add+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81349de4>] ? get_device_parent+0xf4/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8134b389>] ? device_add+0xc9/0x650 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- Instead of relying on guest applications to release all references to the ports, we should go ahead and unregister the port from all the core layers. Any open/read calls on the port will then just return errors, and an unplug/plug operation on the host will succeed as expected. This also caused buggy behaviour in case of the device removal (not just a port): when the device was removed (which means all ports on that device are removed automatically as well), the ports with active users would clean up only when the last references were dropped -- and it would be too late then to be referencing char device pointers, resulting in oopses: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- PID: 6162 TASK: ffff8801147ad500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cat" #0 [ffff88011b9d5a90] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103232b #1 [ffff88011b9d5af0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b9322 #2 [ffff88011b9d5bc0] oops_end at ffffffff814f4a50 #3 [ffff88011b9d5bf0] die at ffffffff8100f26b #4 [ffff88011b9d5c20] do_general_protection at ffffffff814f45e2 #5 [ffff88011b9d5c50] general_protection at ffffffff814f3db5 [exception RIP: strlen+2] RIP: ffffffff81272ae2 RSP: ffff88011b9d5d00 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880118901c18 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88011799982c RSI: 00000000000000d0 RDI: 3a303030302f3030 RBP: ffff88011b9d5d38 R8: 0000000000000006 R9: ffffffffa0134500 R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff880117a1cc10 R13: 00000000000000d0 R14: 0000000000000017 R15: ffffffff81aff700 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #6 [ffff88011b9d5d00] kobject_get_path at ffffffff8126dc5d #7 [ffff88011b9d5d40] kobject_uevent_env at ffffffff8126e551 #8 [ffff88011b9d5dd0] kobject_uevent at ffffffff8126e9eb #9 [ffff88011b9d5de0] device_del at ffffffff813440c7 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- So clean up when we have all the context, and all that's left to do when the references to the port have dropped is to free up the port struct itself. Reported-by: chayang <chayang@redhat.com> Reported-by: YOGANANTH SUBRAMANIAN <anantyog@in.ibm.com> Reported-by: FuXiangChun <xfu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Qunfang Zhang <qzhang@redhat.com> Reported-by: Sibiao Luo <sluo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * virtio: console: fix race in port_fops_open() and port unplugAmit Shah2013-08-141-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 671bdea2b9f210566610603ecbb6584c8a201c8c upstream. Between open() being called and processed, the port can be unplugged. Check if this happened, and bail out. A simple test script to reproduce this is: while true; do for i in $(seq 1 100); do echo $i > /dev/vport0p3; done; done; This opens and closes the port a lot of times; unplugging the port while this is happening triggers the bug. Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * virtio: console: fix race with port unplug and open/closeAmit Shah2013-08-141-7/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 057b82be3ca3d066478e43b162fc082930a746c9 upstream. There's a window between find_port_by_devt() returning a port and us taking a kref on the port, where the port could get unplugged. Fix it by taking the reference in find_port_by_devt() itself. Problem reported and analyzed by Mateusz Guzik. Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * ipmi: ipmi_devintf: compat_ioctl method fails to take ipmi_mutexBenjamin LaHaise2013-05-191-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6368087e851e697679af059b4247aca33a69cef3 upstream. When a 32 bit version of ipmitool is used on a 64 bit kernel, the ipmi_devintf code fails to correctly acquire ipmi_mutex. This results in incomplete data being retrieved in some cases, or other possible failures. Add a wrapper around compat_ipmi_ioctl() to take ipmi_mutex to fix this. Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * drivers/char/ipmi: memcpy, need additional 2 bytes to avoid memory overflowChen Gang2013-05-191-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a5f2b3d6a738e7d4180012fe7b541172f8c8dcea upstream. When calling memcpy, read_data and write_data need additional 2 bytes. write_data: for checking: "if (size > IPMI_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)" for operating: "memcpy(bt->write_data + 3, data + 1, size - 1)" read_data: for checking: "if (msg_len < 3 || msg_len > IPMI_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)" for operating: "memcpy(data + 2, bt->read_data + 4, msg_len - 2)" Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * vm: convert HPET mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helperLinus Torvalds2013-04-251-13/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2323036dfec8ce3ce6e1c86a49a31b039f3300d1 upstream. This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The HPET case is simple, widely available, and easy to test (Clemens Ladisch sent a trivial test-program for it). Test-program-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * virtio: rng: disallow multiple device registrations, fixes crashesAmit Shah2013-03-201-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e84e7a56a3aa2963db506299e29a5f3f09377f9b upstream. The code currently only supports one virtio-rng device at a time. Invoking guests with multiple devices causes the guest to blow up. Check if we've already registered and initialised the driver. Also cleanup in case of registration errors or hot-unplug so that a new device can be used. Reported-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> Reported-by: <yunzheng@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * hw_random: make buffer usable in scatterlist.Rusty Russell2013-03-141-3/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f7f154f1246ccc5a0a7e9ce50932627d60a0c878 upstream. virtio_rng feeds the randomness buffer handed by the core directly into the scatterlist, since commit bb347d98079a547e80bd4722dee1de61e4dca0e8. However, if CONFIG_HW_RANDOM=m, the static buffer isn't a linear address (at least on most archs). We could fix this in virtio_rng, but it's actually far easier to just do it in the core as virtio_rng would have to allocate a buffer every time (it doesn't know how much the core will want to read). Reported-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net> Tested-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | smdk4412: update mdm from KK sourcesbrissen2015-03-272-0/+11
| | | | | | | | Change-Id: If01d4a165b4b6bdc26a20fb449104e7bcb0c9403
* | Merge remote-tracking branch 'kernelorg/linux-3.0.y' into 3_0_64Andrew Dodd2013-02-277-128/+276
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/arm/Kconfig arch/arm/include/asm/hwcap.h arch/arm/kernel/smp.c arch/arm/plat-samsung/adc.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_drv.h drivers/mmc/core/sd.c drivers/net/tun.c drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c drivers/regulator/max8997.c drivers/usb/core/hub.c drivers/usb/host/xhci.h drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c fs/jbd2/transaction.c include/linux/migrate.h kernel/sys.c kernel/time/timekeeping.c lib/genalloc.c mm/memory-failure.c mm/memory_hotplug.c mm/mempolicy.c mm/page_alloc.c mm/vmalloc.c mm/vmscan.c mm/vmstat.c scripts/Kbuild.include Change-Id: I91e2d85c07320c7ccfc04cf98a448e89bed6ade6
| * virtio_console: Don't access uninitialized data.Sjur Brændeland2013-02-141-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit aded024a12b32fc1ed9a80639681daae2d07ec25 upstream. Don't access uninitialized work-queue when removing device. The work queue is initialized only if the device multi-queue. So don't call cancel_work unless this is a multi-queue device. This fixes the following panic: Kernel panic - not syncing: BUG! Call Trace: 62031b28: [<6026085d>] panic+0x16b/0x2d3 62031b30: [<6004ef5e>] flush_work+0x0/0x1d7 62031b60: [<602606f2>] panic+0x0/0x2d3 62031b68: [<600333b0>] memcpy+0x0/0x140 62031b80: [<6002d58a>] unblock_signals+0x0/0x84 62031ba0: [<602609c5>] printk+0x0/0xa0 62031bd8: [<60264e51>] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x13d/0x148 62031c10: [<6004ef5e>] flush_work+0x0/0x1d7 62031c18: [<60050234>] try_to_grab_pending+0x0/0x17e 62031c38: [<6004e984>] get_work_gcwq+0x71/0x8f 62031c48: [<60050539>] __cancel_work_timer+0x5b/0x115 62031c78: [<628acc85>] unplug_port+0x0/0x191 [virtio_console] 62031c98: [<6005061c>] cancel_work_sync+0x12/0x14 62031ca8: [<628ace96>] virtcons_remove+0x80/0x15c [virtio_console] 62031ce8: [<628191de>] virtio_dev_remove+0x1e/0x7e [virtio] 62031d08: [<601cf242>] __device_release_driver+0x75/0xe4 62031d28: [<601cf2dd>] device_release_driver+0x2c/0x40 62031d48: [<601ce0dd>] driver_unbind+0x7d/0xc6 62031d88: [<601cd5d9>] drv_attr_store+0x27/0x29 62031d98: [<60115f61>] sysfs_write_file+0x100/0x14d 62031df8: [<600b737d>] vfs_write+0xcb/0x184 62031e08: [<600b58b8>] filp_close+0x88/0x94 62031e38: [<600b7686>] sys_write+0x59/0x88 62031e88: [<6001ced1>] handle_syscall+0x5d/0x80 62031ea8: [<60030a74>] userspace+0x405/0x531 62031f08: [<600d32cc>] sys_dup+0x0/0x5e 62031f28: [<601b11d6>] strcpy+0x0/0x18 62031f38: [<600be46c>] do_execve+0x10/0x12 62031f48: [<600184c7>] run_init_process+0x43/0x45 62031fd8: [<60019a91>] new_thread_handler+0xba/0xbc Signed-off-by: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * tpm: Propagate error from tpm_transmit to fix a timeout hangPeter Huewe2012-10-211-7/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit abce9ac292e13da367bbd22c1f7669f988d931ac upstream. tpm_write calls tpm_transmit without checking the return value and assigns the return value unconditionally to chip->pending_data, even if it's an error value. This causes three bugs. So if we write to /dev/tpm0 with a tpm_param_size bigger than TPM_BUFSIZE=0x1000 (e.g. 0x100a) and a bufsize also bigger than TPM_BUFSIZE (e.g. 0x100a) tpm_transmit returns -E2BIG which is assigned to chip->pending_data as -7, but tpm_write returns that TPM_BUFSIZE bytes have been successfully been written to the TPM, altough this is not true (bug #1). As we did write more than than TPM_BUFSIZE bytes but tpm_write reports that only TPM_BUFSIZE bytes have been written the vfs tries to write the remaining bytes (in this case 10 bytes) to the tpm device driver via tpm_write which then blocks at /* cannot perform a write until the read has cleared either via tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout */ while (atomic_read(&chip->data_pending) != 0) msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT); for 60 seconds, since data_pending is -7 and nobody is able to read it (since tpm_read luckily checks if data_pending is greater than 0) (#bug 2). After that the remaining bytes are written to the TPM which are interpreted by the tpm as a normal command. (bug #3) So if the last bytes of the command stream happen to be a e.g. tpm_force_clear this gets accidentally sent to the TPM. This patch fixes all three bugs, by propagating the error code of tpm_write and returning -E2BIG if the input buffer is too big, since the response from the tpm for a truncated value is bogus anyway. Moreover it returns -EBUSY to userspace if there is a response ready to be read. Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peter.huewe@infineon.com> Signed-off-by: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * TTY: ttyprintk, don't touch behind tty->write_bufJiri Slaby2012-10-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ee8b593affdf893012e57f4c54a21984d1b0d92e upstream. If a user provides a buffer larger than a tty->write_buf chunk and passes '\r' at the end of the buffer, we touch an out-of-bound memory. Add a check there to prevent this. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Samo Pogacnik <samo_pogacnik@t-2.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: mix in architectural randomness in extract_buf()H. Peter Anvin2012-08-151-24/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d2e7c96af1e54b507ae2a6a7dd2baf588417a7e5 upstream. Mix in any architectural randomness in extract_buf() instead of xfer_secondary_buf(). This allows us to mix in more architectural randomness, and it also makes xfer_secondary_buf() faster, moving a tiny bit of additional CPU overhead to process which is extracting the randomness. [ Commit description modified by tytso to remove an extended advertisement for the RDRAND instruction. ] Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: DJ Johnston <dj.johnston@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: Add comment to random_initialize()Tony Luck2012-08-151-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cbc96b7594b5691d61eba2db8b2ea723645be9ca upstream. Many platforms have per-machine instance data (serial numbers, asset tags, etc.) squirreled away in areas that are accessed during early system bringup. Mixing this data into the random pools has a very high value in providing better random data, so we should allow (and even encourage) architecture code to call add_device_randomness() from the setup_arch() paths. However, this limits our options for internal structure of the random driver since random_initialize() is not called until long after setup_arch(). Add a big fat comment to rand_initialize() spelling out this requirement. Suggested-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: remove rand_initialize_irq()Theodore Ts'o2012-08-151-55/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c5857ccf293968348e5eb4ebedc68074de3dcda6 upstream. With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop initializing it now. [ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to rand_initialize_irq() ] Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: add tracepoints for easier debugging and verificationTheodore Ts'o2012-08-151-4/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 00ce1db1a634746040ace24c09a4e3a7949a3145 upstream. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() functionTheodore Ts'o2012-08-151-4/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c2557a303ab6712bb6e09447df828c557c710ac9 upstream. Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is present. Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it is avaiable. The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware manufacturer to have not put in a back door. (For example, an increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.) It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise --- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a whitener. Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented to the specifications claimed by Intel. Short of using a tunnelling electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us to tell for sure. Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed. So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into /dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy pool. This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any potential liabilities. The only benefits we forgo is the speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG anyway. For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG, if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch(). Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: use the arch-specific rng in xfer_secondary_poolTheodore Ts'o2012-08-151-9/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e6d4947b12e8ad947add1032dd754803c6004824 upstream. If the CPU supports a hardware random number generator, use it in xfer_secondary_pool(), where it will significantly improve things and where we can afford it. Also, remove the use of the arch-specific rng in add_timer_randomness(), since the call is significantly slower than get_cycles(), and we're much better off using it in xfer_secondary_pool() anyway. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: create add_device_randomness() interfaceLinus Torvalds2012-08-151-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 upstream. Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). [ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware in question. ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt pathTheodore Ts'o2012-08-151-39/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 902c098a3663de3fa18639efbb71b6080f0bcd3c upstream. The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine. This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the random driver, which is the interrupt collection path. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something saneTheodore Ts'o2012-08-151-17/+86
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream. We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy from a somewhat externally controllable source. This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first. During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu pool. Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool. This assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as possible. (Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by tytso.) Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu> Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu> Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu> Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu> Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * drivers/char/random.c: fix boot id uniqueness raceMathieu Desnoyers2012-08-151-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 44e4360fa3384850d65dd36fb4e6e5f2f112709b upstream. /proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently by userspace processes. If two (or more) user-space processes concurrently read boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race can occur making boot_id differ between the reads. Because the whole point of the boot id is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this by protecting this operation with a spinlock. Given that this operation is not frequently used, hitting the spinlock on each call should not be an issue. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: Adjust the number of loops when initializingH. Peter Anvin2012-08-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2dac8e54f988ab58525505d7ef982493374433c3 upstream. When we are initializing using arch_get_random_long() we only need to loop enough times to touch all the bytes in the buffer; using poolwords for that does twice the number of operations necessary on a 64-bit machine, since in the random number generator code "word" means 32 bits. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy storeTheodore Ts'o2012-08-151-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream. If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's entropy stores. Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help against any other adversaries. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: Use arch_get_random_int instead of cycle counter if availLinus Torvalds2012-08-151-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cf833d0b9937874b50ef2867c4e8badfd64948ce upstream. We still don't use rdrand in /dev/random, which just seems stupid. We accept the *cycle*counter* as a random input, but we don't accept rdrand? That's just broken. Sure, people can do things in user space (write to /dev/random, use rdrand in addition to /dev/random themselves etc etc), but that *still* seems to be a particularly stupid reason for saying "we shouldn't bother to try to do better in /dev/random". And even if somebody really doesn't trust rdrand as a source of random bytes, it seems singularly stupid to trust the cycle counter *more*. So I'd suggest the attached patch. I'm not going to even bother arguing that we should add more bits to the entropy estimate, because that's not the point - I don't care if /dev/random fills up slowly or not, I think it's just stupid to not use the bits we can get from rdrand and mix them into the strong randomness pool. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFwn59N1=m651QAyTy-1gO1noGbK18zwKDwvwqnravA84A@mail.gmail.com Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * fix typo/thinko in get_random_bytes()Luck, Tony2012-08-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bd29e568a4cb6465f6e5ec7c1c1f3ae7d99cbec1 upstream. If there is an architecture-specific random number generator we use it to acquire randomness one "long" at a time. We should put these random words into consecutive words in the result buffer - not just overwrite the first word again and again. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * random: Add support for architectural random hooksH. Peter Anvin2012-08-151-2/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 63d77173266c1791f1553e9e8ccea65dc87c4485 upstream. Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the architecture random number generator interfaces for the userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool pointer. Changes in version 3: - Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes(). - Changes the hooks to inlines. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * Redefine ATOMIC_INIT and ATOMIC64_INIT to drop the castsTony Luck2012-08-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a119365586b0130dfea06457f584953e0ff6481d upstream. The following build error occured during a ia64 build with swap-over-NFS patches applied. net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: initializer element is not constant net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: (near initialization for 'memalloc_socks') net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: initializer element is not constant This is identical to a parisc build error. Fengguang Wu, Mel Gorman and James Bottomley did all the legwork to track the root cause of the problem. This fix and entire commit log is shamelessly copied from them with one extra detail to change a dubious runtime use of ATOMIC_INIT() to atomic_set() in drivers/char/mspec.c Dave Anglin says: > Here is the line in sock.i: > > struct static_key memalloc_socks = ((struct static_key) { .enabled = > ((atomic_t) { (0) }) }); The above line contains two compound literals. It also uses a designated initializer to initialize the field enabled. A compound literal is not a constant expression. The location of the above statement isn't fully clear, but if a compound literal occurs outside the body of a function, the initializer list must consist of constant expressions. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * char/agp: add another Ironlake host bridgeEugeni Dodonov2012-06-172-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 67384fe3fd450536342330f684ea1f7dcaef8130 upstream. This seems to come on Gigabyte H55M-S2V and was discovered through the https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50381 debugging. Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50381 Signed-off-by: Eugeni Dodonov <eugeni.dodonov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | Update to the exynos-mem security issue from Samsung I9300 Update7Espen Fjellvær Olsen2013-01-093-4/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | p2: includes the secmem changes as well as Andreis MFC addition as well Change-Id: I144c2b42586f07b737fba09742315683cbab36ef
* | Revert "exynos-mem: Fix major security hole"Espen Fjellvær Olsen2013-01-091-77/+0
| | | | | | | | This reverts commit 9c1d0f487d28417858778d094f2eb98eb47ea2f7.
* | Revert "exynos-mem: Add fimc1 to mmap whitelist check"Espen Fjellvær Olsen2013-01-091-3/+8
| | | | | | | | This reverts commit eaa468eae8c9d87e4c83b30d977e744b3e373613.
* | Add ION to exynos-mem whitelist, needed for n80xx cameraEspen Fjellvær Olsen2013-01-081-0/+5
| | | | | | | | Change-Id: Ib2fc55ef60e655ffc5da947c114e90ddddf666c4
* | exynos-mem: Add fimc1 to mmap whitelist checkAndrei F2012-12-201-8/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The assumption that only devices which use CONFIG_CMA_DMA use exynos-mem is wrong. Remove that check. Newer camera libraries as on Note 2 4.1.2 variants also map fimc directly, but they are not reserved through kernel CMA allocation in the device file but through Samsung's S5P framework. There, the block is called "fimc1", so add that to the whitelist check. Change-Id: Ib35e9d1c29e977774265f1e123a7ef13353485ad Conflicts: drivers/char/exynos_mem.c
* | exynos-mem: Fix major security holeAndrei F2012-12-201-0/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes the exynos-mem device security hole. The driver allowed any user to access all of the device's lowmem through the provided mmap functionality. We create a small little framework collecting the actual CMA memory blocks that exist on the device; they are the root cause of the existence of this device driver. We white-list only the CMA memory spaces as parameters to the mmap function and deny access to any other memory space requests. We furthermore just allow access to the "s3c-fimc" memory block as this is seemingly the only space which upon access denial actually breaks functionality. Change-Id: I286be4a2546621c66d214c79f480822ecd8138db
* | mem: fix permissions on exynos-memcodeworkx2012-12-161-2/+1
| | | | | | | | Change-Id: Ibf2312ce36952c28baa5476a5a856edde8d84de5
* | merge opensource jb u5codeworkx2012-09-2221-319/+5685
| | | | | | | | Change-Id: I1aaec157aa196f3448eff8636134fce89a814cf2
* | samsung update 1codeworkx2012-06-027-1/+1696
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* TPM: Zero buffer after copying to userspacePeter Huewe2011-10-031-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3321c07ae5068568cd61ac9f4ba749006a7185c9 upstream. Since the buffer might contain security related data it might be a good idea to zero the buffer after we have copied it to userspace. This got assigned CVE-2011-1162. Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* TPM: Call tpm_transmit with correct sizePeter Huewe2011-10-031-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6b07d30aca7e52f2881b8c8c20c8a2cd28e8b3d3 upstream. This patch changes the call of tpm_transmit by supplying the size of the userspace buffer instead of TPM_BUFSIZE. This got assigned CVE-2011-1161. [The first hunk didn't make sense given one could expect way less data than TPM_BUFSIZE, so added tpm_transmit boundary check over bufsiz instead The last parameter of tpm_transmit() reflects the amount of data expected from the device, and not the buffer size being supplied to it. It isn't ideal to parse it directly, so we just set it to the maximum the input buffer can handle and let the userspace API to do such job.] Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.David S. Miller2011-08-151-326/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* agp/intel: Fix typo in G4x_GMCH_SIZE_VT_2MChris Wilson2011-07-131-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | Konstantin Belousov found an error in the define of G4x_GMCH_SIZE_VT_2M relative to the GMCH specs, and confirmed that indeed one of his users with a Q45 reports 0xb not 0xc for a 2/2MiB GATT. Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Konstantin Belousov <kostikbel@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
* drivers/char/hpet.c: fix periodic-emulation for delayed interruptsNils Carlson2011-06-151-2/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When interrupts are delayed due to interrupt masking or due to other interrupts being serviced the HPET periodic-emuation would fail. This happened because given an interval t and a time for the current interrupt m we would compute the next time as t + m. This works until we are delayed for > t, in which case we would be writing a new value which is in fact in the past. This can be solved by computing the next time instead as (k * t) + m where k is large enough to be in the future. The exact computation of k is described in a comment to the code. More detail: Assuming an interval of 5 between each expected interrupt we have a normal case of t0: interrupt, read t0 from comparator, set next interrupt t0 + 5 t5: interrupt, read t5 from comparator, set next interrupt t5 + 5 t10: interrupt, read t10 from comparator, set next interrupt t10 + 5 ... So, what happens when the interrupt is serviced too late? t0: interrupt, read t0 from comparator, set next interrupt t0 + 5 t11: delayed interrupt serviced, read t5 from comparator, set next interrupt t5 + 5, which is in the past! ... counter loops ... t10: Much much later, get the next interrupt. This can happen either because we have interrupts masked for too long (some stupid driver goes on a printk rampage) or just because we are pushing the limits of the interval (too small a period), or both most probably. My solution is to read the main counter as well and set the next interrupt to occur at the right interval, for example: t0: interrupt, read t0 from comparator, set next interrupt t0 + 5 t11: delayed interrupt serviced, read t5 from comparator, set next interrupt t15 as t10 has been missed. t15: back on track. Signed-off-by: Nils Carlson <nils.carlson@ericsson.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* virtio console: don't manually set or finalize VIRTIO_CONSOLE_F_MULTIPORT.Rusty Russell2011-05-301-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | That's already been done by the virtio infrastructure before the probe function is called. Reported-by: alexey.kardashevskiy@au1.ibm.com Acked-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Tested-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* drivers/char/ppdev.c: put gotten port valueJulia Lawall2011-05-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | parport_find_number() calls parport_get_port() on its result, so there should be a corresponding call to parport_put_port() before dropping the reference. Similar code is found in the function register_device() in the same file. The semantic match that finds this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // <smpl> @exists@ local idexpression struct parport * x; expression ra,rr; statement S1,S2; @@ x = parport_find_number(...) ... when != x = rr when any when != parport_put_port(x,...) when != if (...) { ... parport_put_port(x,...) ...} ( if(<+...x...+>) S1 else S2 | if(...) { ... when != x = ra when forall when != parport_put_port(x,...) *return...; } ) // </smpl> Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2024-05-20 09:10:23 +0000