aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/fs/cifs
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* cifs: use server timestamp for ntlmv2 authenticationPeter Seiderer2015-10-131-1/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 98ce94c8df762d413b3ecb849e2b966b21606d04 upstream. Linux cifs mount with ntlmssp against an Mac OS X (Yosemite 10.10.5) share fails in case the clocks differ more than +/-2h: digest-service: digest-request: od failed with 2 proto=ntlmv2 digest-service: digest-request: kdc failed with -1561745592 proto=ntlmv2 Fix this by (re-)using the given server timestamp for the ntlmv2 authentication (as Windows 7 does). A related problem was also reported earlier by Namjae Jaen (see below): Windows machine has extended security feature which refuse to allow authentication when there is time difference between server time and client time when ntlmv2 negotiation is used. This problem is prevalent in embedded enviornment where system time is set to default 1970. Modern servers send the server timestamp in the TargetInfo Av_Pair structure in the challenge message [see MS-NLMP 2.2.2.1] In [MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.2] it is explicitly mentioned that the client must use the server provided timestamp if present OR current time if it is not Reported-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* fs: create and use seq_show_option for escapingKees Cook2015-10-131-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a068acf2ee77693e0bf39d6e07139ba704f461c3 upstream. Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or in other situations with delegated mount privileges. Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use of "sudo" is something more sneaky: $ BASE="ovl" $ MNT="$BASE/mnt" $ LOW="$BASE/lower" $ UP="$BASE/upper" $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000" $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK" $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt $ cat /proc/mounts none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0 $ fusermount -u /proc $ cat /proc/mounts cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees] [keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Drop changes to overlayfs, reiserfs - Drop vers option from cifs - ceph changes are all in one file - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: fix use-after-free bug in find_writable_fileDavid Disseldorp2015-05-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e1e9bda22d7ddf88515e8fe401887e313922823e upstream. Under intermittent network outages, find_writable_file() is susceptible to the following race condition, which results in a user-after-free in the cifs_writepages code-path: Thread 1 Thread 2 ======== ======== inv_file = NULL refind = 0 spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock) // invalidHandle found on openFileList inv_file = open_file // inv_file->count currently 1 cifsFileInfo_get(inv_file) // inv_file->count = 2 spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock); cifs_reopen_file() cifs_close() // fails (rc != 0) ->cifsFileInfo_put() spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock) // inv_file->count = 1 spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock) spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock); list_move_tail(&inv_file->flist, &cifs_inode->openFileList); spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock); cifsFileInfo_put(inv_file); ->spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock) // inv_file->count = 0 list_del(&cifs_file->flist); // cleanup!! kfree(cifs_file); spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock); spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock); ++refind; // refind = 1 goto refind_writable; At this point we loop back through with an invalid inv_file pointer and a refind value of 1. On second pass, inv_file is not overwritten on openFileList traversal, and is subsequently dereferenced. Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* move d_rcu from overlapping d_child to overlapping d_aliasAl Viro2015-01-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | commit 946e51f2bf37f1656916eb75bd0742ba33983c28 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Apply name changes in all the different places we use d_alias and d_child - Move the WARN_ON() in __d_free() to d_free() as we don't have dentry_free()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* CIFS: Fix wrong directory attributes after renamePavel Shilovsky2014-09-131-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b46799a8f28c43c5264ac8d8ffa28b311b557e03 upstream. When we requests rename we also need to update attributes of both source and target parent directories. Not doing it causes generic/309 xfstest to fail on SMB2 mounts. Fix this by marking these directories for force revalidating. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctlyJeff Layton2014-04-091-3/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5d81de8e8667da7135d3a32a964087c0faf5483f upstream. It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069 cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and cause an oops at the very least. Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid. [Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix] Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust context - s/nr_pages/npages/ - s/wdata->pages/pages/ - In case of an error with no data copied, we must kunmap() page 0, but in neither case should we free anything else] Thanks to Raphael Geissert for an independent backport that showed some bugs in my first version.] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: set MAY_SIGN when sec=krb5Martijn de Gouw2014-04-021-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0b7bc84000d71f3647ca33ab1bf5bd928535c846 upstream. Setting this secFlg allows usage of dfs where some servers require signing and others don't. Signed-off-by: Martijn de Gouw <martijn.de.gouw@prodrive.nl> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> [Joseph Salisbury: This backport was done so including mainline commit 8830d7e07a5e38bc47650a7554b7c1cfd49902bf is not needed.] BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1285723 Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* setfacl removes part of ACL when setting POSIX ACLs to SambaSteve French2014-01-031-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b1d93356427be6f050dc55c86eb019d173700af6 upstream. setfacl over cifs mounts can remove the default ACL when setting the (non-default part of) the ACL and vice versa (we were leaving at 0 rather than setting to -1 the count field for the unaffected half of the ACL. For example notice the setfacl removed the default ACL in this sequence: steven@steven-GA-970A-DS3:~/cifs-2.6$ getfacl /mnt/test-dir ; setfacl -m default:user:test:rwx,user:test:rwx /mnt/test-dir getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:test:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-x steven@steven-GA-970A-DS3:~/cifs-2.6$ getfacl /mnt/test-dir getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names user::rwx user:test:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: don't instantiate new dentries in readdir for inodes that need to be ↵Jeff Layton2013-09-101-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | revalidated immediately commit 757c4f6260febff982276818bb946df89c1105aa upstream. David reported that commit c2b93e06 (cifs: only set ops for inodes in I_NEW state) caused a regression with mfsymlinks. Prior to that patch, if a mfsymlink dentry was instantiated at readdir time, the inode would get a new set of ops when it was revalidated. After that patch, this did not occur. This patch addresses this by simply skipping instantiating dentries in the readdir codepath when we know that they will need to be immediately revalidated. The next attempt to use that dentry will cause a new lookup to occur (which is basically what we want to happen anyway). Cc: "Stefan (metze) Metzmacher" <metze@samba.org> Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: David McBride <dwm37@cam.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: need to return NULL] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: extend the buffer length enought for sprintf() usingChen Gang2013-09-103-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 057d6332b24a4497c55a761c83c823eed9e3f23b upstream. For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName' length may be "255 + '\0'". The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related buffer enough to hold all things. It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than 256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'. Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust context in sess.c - Drop inapplicable changes to connect.c] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* Handle big endianness in NTLM (ntlmv2) authenticationSteve French2013-07-272-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit fdf96a907c1fbb93c633e2b7ede3b8df26d6a4c0 upstream. This is RH bug 970891 Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars. Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage. [To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated by sparse -- steve f.] Reported-by: steve <sanpatr1@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: fix potential buffer overrun when composing a new options stringJeff Layton2013-06-191-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 166faf21bd14bc5c5295a44874bf7f3930c30b20 upstream. Consider the case where we have a very short ip= string in the original mount options, and when we chase a referral we end up with a very long IPv6 address. Be sure to allow for that possibility when estimating the size of the string to allocate. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: only set ops for inodes in I_NEW stateJeff Layton2013-05-301-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c2b93e0699723700f886ce17bb65ffd771195a6d upstream. It's generally not safe to reset the inode ops once they've been set. In the case where the inode was originally thought to be a directory and then later found to be a DFS referral, this can lead to an oops when we try to trigger an inode op on it after changing the ops to the blank referral operations. Reported-and-Tested-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: ignore everything in SPNEGO blob after mechTypesJeff Layton2013-03-271-48/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f853c616883a8de966873a1dab283f1369e275a1 upstream. We've had several reports of people attempting to mount Windows 8 shares and getting failures with a return code of -EINVAL. The default sec= mode changed recently to sec=ntlmssp. With that, we expect and parse a SPNEGO blob from the server in the NEGOTIATE reply. The current decode_negTokenInit function first parses all of the mechTypes and then tries to parse the rest of the negTokenInit reply. The parser however currently expects a mechListMIC or nothing to follow the mechTypes, but Windows 8 puts a mechToken field there instead to carry some info for the new NegoEx stuff. In practice, we don't do anything with the fields after the mechTypes anyway so I don't see any real benefit in continuing to parse them. This patch just has the kernel ignore the fields after the mechTypes. We'll probably need to reinstate some of this if we ever want to support NegoEx. Reported-by: Jason Burgess <jason@jacknife2.dns2go.com> Reported-by: Yan Li <elliot.li.tech@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: delay super block destruction until all cifsFileInfo objects are goneMateusz Guzik2013-03-273-1/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 24261fc23db950951760d00c188ba63cc756b932 upstream. cifsFileInfo objects hold references to dentries and it is possible that these will still be around in workqueues when VFS decides to kill super block during unmount. This results in panics like this one: BUG: Dentry ffff88001f5e76c0{i=66b4a,n=1M-2} still in use (1) [unmount of cifs cifs] ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/dcache.c:943! [..] Process umount (pid: 1781, threadinfo ffff88003d6e8000, task ffff880035eeaec0) [..] Call Trace: [<ffffffff811b44f3>] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x33/0x60 [<ffffffff8119f7fc>] generic_shutdown_super+0x2c/0xe0 [<ffffffff8119f946>] kill_anon_super+0x16/0x30 [<ffffffffa036623a>] cifs_kill_sb+0x1a/0x30 [cifs] [<ffffffff8119fcc7>] deactivate_locked_super+0x57/0x80 [<ffffffff811a085e>] deactivate_super+0x4e/0x70 [<ffffffff811bb417>] mntput_no_expire+0xd7/0x130 [<ffffffff811bc30c>] sys_umount+0x9c/0x3c0 [<ffffffff81657c19>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Fix this by making each cifsFileInfo object hold a reference to cifs super block, which implicitly keeps VFS super block around as well. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: ensure that cifs_get_root() only traverses directoriesJeff Layton2013-03-201-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ce2ac52105aa663056dfc17966ebed1bf93e6e64 upstream. Kjell Braden reported this oops: [ 833.211970] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 833.212816] IP: [< (null)>] (null) [ 833.213280] PGD 1b9b2067 PUD e9f7067 PMD 0 [ 833.213874] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP [ 833.214344] CPU 0 [ 833.214458] Modules linked in: des_generic md4 nls_utf8 cifs vboxvideo drm snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_rawmidi snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq bnep rfcomm snd_timer bluetooth snd_seq_device ppdev snd vboxguest parport_pc joydev mac_hid soundcore snd_page_alloc psmouse i2c_piix4 serio_raw lp parport usbhid hid e1000 [ 833.215629] [ 833.215629] Pid: 1752, comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.0.0-rc7-bisectcifs-fec11dd9a0+ #18 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox [ 833.215629] RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>] [< (null)>] (null) [ 833.215629] RSP: 0018:ffff8800119c9c50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 833.215629] RAX: ffffffffa02186c0 RBX: ffff88000c427780 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 833.215629] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88000c427780 RDI: ffff88000c4362e8 [ 833.215629] RBP: ffff8800119c9c88 R08: ffff88001fc15e30 R09: 00000000d69515c7 [ 833.215629] R10: ffffffffa0201972 R11: ffff88000e8f6a28 R12: ffff88000c4362e8 [ 833.215629] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88001181aaa6 [ 833.215629] FS: 00007f2986171700(0000) GS:ffff88001fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 833.215629] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 833.215629] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000001b982000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 833.215629] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 833.215629] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 833.215629] Process mount.cifs (pid: 1752, threadinfo ffff8800119c8000, task ffff88001c1c16f0) [ 833.215629] Stack: [ 833.215629] ffffffff8116a9b5 ffff8800119c9c88 ffffffff81178075 0000000000000286 [ 833.215629] 0000000000000000 ffff88000c4276c0 ffff8800119c9ce8 ffff8800119c9cc8 [ 833.215629] ffffffff8116b06e ffff88001bc6fc00 ffff88000c4276c0 ffff88000c4276c0 [ 833.215629] Call Trace: [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff8116a9b5>] ? d_alloc_and_lookup+0x45/0x90 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff81178075>] ? d_lookup+0x35/0x60 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff8116b06e>] __lookup_hash.part.14+0x9e/0xc0 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff8116b1d6>] lookup_one_len+0x146/0x1e0 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff815e4f7e>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x20 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffffa01eef0d>] cifs_do_mount+0x26d/0x500 [cifs] [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff81163bd3>] mount_fs+0x43/0x1b0 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff8117d41a>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6a/0xd0 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff8117e584>] do_kern_mount+0x54/0x110 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff8117fdc2>] do_mount+0x262/0x840 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff81108a0e>] ? __get_free_pages+0xe/0x50 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff8117f9ca>] ? copy_mount_options+0x3a/0x180 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff8118075d>] sys_mount+0x8d/0xe0 [ 833.215629] [<ffffffff815ece82>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 833.215629] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 833.215629] RIP [< (null)>] (null) [ 833.215629] RSP <ffff8800119c9c50> [ 833.215629] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 833.238525] ---[ end trace ec00758b8d44f529 ]--- When walking down the path on the server, it's possible to hit a symlink. The path walking code assumes that the caller will handle that situation properly, but cifs_get_root() isn't set up for it. This patch prevents the oops by simply returning an error. A better solution would be to try and chase the symlinks here, but that's fairly complicated to handle. Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=53221 Reported-and-tested-by: Kjell Braden <afflux@pentabarf.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c: fix potential memory leakageCong Ding2013-02-061-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 10b8c7dff5d3633b69e77f57d404dab54ead3787 upstream. When it goes to error through line 144, the memory allocated to *devname is not freed, and the caller doesn't free it either in line 250. So we free the memroy of *devname in function cifs_compose_mount_options() when it goes to error. Signed-off-by: Cong Ding <dinggnu@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: adjust sequence number downward after signing NT_CANCEL requestJeff Layton2013-01-161-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 31efee60f489c759c341454d755a9fd13de8c03d upstream. When a call goes out, the signing code adjusts the sequence number upward by two to account for the request and the response. An NT_CANCEL however doesn't get a response of its own, it just hurries the server along to get it to respond to the original request more quickly. Therefore, we must adjust the sequence number back down by one after signing a NT_CANCEL request. Reported-by: Tim Perry <tdparmor-sambabugs@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: fix potential buffer overrun in cifs.idmap handling codeJeff Layton2012-11-161-29/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 36960e440ccf94349c09fb944930d3bfe4bc473f upstream. The userspace cifs.idmap program generally works with the wbclient libs to generate binary SIDs in userspace. That program defines the struct that holds these values as having a max of 15 subauthorities. The kernel idmapping code however limits that value to 5. When the kernel copies those values around though, it doesn't sanity check the num_subauths value handed back from userspace or from the server. It's possible therefore for userspace to hand us back a bogus num_subauths value (or one that's valid, but greater than 5) that could cause the kernel to walk off the end of the cifs_sid->sub_auths array. Fix this by defining a new routine for copying sids and using that in all of the places that copy it. If we end up with a sid that's longer than expected then this approach will just lop off the "extra" subauths, but that's basically what the code does today already. Better approaches might be to fix this code to reject SIDs with >5 subauths, or fix it to handle the subauths array dynamically. At the same time, change the kernel to check the length of the data returned by userspace. If it's shorter than struct cifs_sid, reject it and return -EIO. If that happens we'll end up with fields that are basically uninitialized. Long term, it might make sense to redefine cifs_sid using a flexarray at the end, to allow for variable-length subauth lists, and teach the code to handle the case where the subauths array being passed in from userspace is shorter than 5 elements. Note too, that I don't consider this a security issue since you'd need a compromised cifs.idmap program. If you have that, you can do all sorts of nefarious stuff. Still, this is probably reasonable for stable. Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: fix return value in cifsConvertToUTF16Jeff Layton2012-10-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c73f693989d7a7d99ec66a7065295a0c93d0b127 upstream. This function returns the wrong value, which causes the callers to get the length of the resulting pathname wrong when it contains non-ASCII characters. This seems to fix https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6767 Reported-by: Baldvin Kovacs <baldvin.kovacs@gmail.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: Nicolas Lefebvre <nico.lefebvre@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* CIFS: Fix error handling in cifs_push_mandatory_locksPavel Shilovsky2012-09-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | commit e2f2886a824ff0a56da1eaa13019fde86aa89fa6 upstream. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: when CONFIG_HIGHMEM is set, serialize the read/write kmapsJeff Layton2012-08-021-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3cf003c08be785af4bee9ac05891a15bcbff856a upstream. Jian found that when he ran fsx on a 32 bit arch with a large wsize the process and one of the bdi writeback kthreads would sometimes deadlock with a stack trace like this: crash> bt PID: 2789 TASK: f02edaa0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "fsx" #0 [eed63cbc] schedule at c083c5b3 #1 [eed63d80] kmap_high at c0500ec8 #2 [eed63db0] cifs_async_writev at f7fabcd7 [cifs] #3 [eed63df0] cifs_writepages at f7fb7f5c [cifs] #4 [eed63e50] do_writepages at c04f3e32 #5 [eed63e54] __filemap_fdatawrite_range at c04e152a #6 [eed63ea4] filemap_fdatawrite at c04e1b3e #7 [eed63eb4] cifs_file_aio_write at f7fa111a [cifs] #8 [eed63ecc] do_sync_write at c052d202 #9 [eed63f74] vfs_write at c052d4ee #10 [eed63f94] sys_write at c052df4c #11 [eed63fb0] ia32_sysenter_target at c0409a98 EAX: 00000004 EBX: 00000003 ECX: abd73b73 EDX: 012a65c6 DS: 007b ESI: 012a65c6 ES: 007b EDI: 00000000 SS: 007b ESP: bf8db178 EBP: bf8db1f8 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: 40000424 ERR: 00000004 EFLAGS: 00000246 Each task would kmap part of its address array before getting stuck, but not enough to actually issue the write. This patch fixes this by serializing the marshal_iov operations for async reads and writes. The idea here is to ensure that cifs aggressively tries to populate a request before attempting to fulfill another one. As soon as all of the pages are kmapped for a request, then we can unlock and allow another one to proceed. There's no need to do this serialization on non-CONFIG_HIGHMEM arches however, so optimize all of this out when CONFIG_HIGHMEM isn't set. Reported-by: Jian Li <jiali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: always update the inode cache with the results from a FIND_*Jeff Layton2012-07-251-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cd60042cc1392e79410dc8de9e9c1abb38a29e57 upstream. When we get back a FIND_FIRST/NEXT result, we have some info about the dentry that we use to instantiate a new inode. We were ignoring and discarding that info when we had an existing dentry in the cache. Fix this by updating the inode in place when we find an existing dentry and the uniqueid is the same. Reported-and-Tested-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reported-by: Bill Robertson <bill_robertson@debortoli.com.au> Reported-by: Dion Edwards <dion_edwards@debortoli.com.au> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: on CONFIG_HIGHMEM machines, limit the rsize/wsize to the kmap spaceJeff Layton2012-07-251-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3ae629d98bd5ed77585a878566f04f310adbc591 upstream. We currently rely on being able to kmap all of the pages in an async read or write request. If you're on a machine that has CONFIG_HIGHMEM set then that kmap space is limited, sometimes to as low as 512 slots. With 512 slots, we can only support up to a 2M r/wsize, and that's assuming that we can get our greedy little hands on all of them. There are other users however, so it's possible we'll end up stuck with a size that large. Since we can't handle a rsize or wsize larger than that currently, cap those options at the number of kmap slots we have. We could consider capping it even lower, but we currently default to a max of 1M. Might as well allow those luddites on 32 bit arches enough rope to hang themselves. A more robust fix would be to teach the send and receive routines how to contend with an array of pages so we don't need to marshal up a kvec array at all. That's a fairly significant overhaul though, so we'll need this limit in place until that's ready. Reported-by: Jian Li <jiali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: when server doesn't set CAP_LARGE_READ_X, cap default rsize at ↵Jeff Layton2012-07-121-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | MaxBufferSize commit ec01d738a1691dfc85b96b9f796020267a7be577 upstream. When the server doesn't advertise CAP_LARGE_READ_X, then MS-CIFS states that you must cap the size of the read at the client's MaxBufferSize. Unfortunately, testing with many older servers shows that they often can't service a read larger than their own MaxBufferSize. Since we can't assume what the server will do in this situation, we must be conservative here for the default. When the server can't do large reads, then assume that it can't satisfy any read larger than its MaxBufferSize either. Luckily almost all modern servers can do large reads, so this won't affect them. This is really just for older win9x and OS/2 era servers. Also, note that this patch just governs the default rsize. The admin can always override this if he so chooses. Reported-by: David H. Durgee <dhdurgee@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven French <sfrench@w500smf.(none)> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: fix oops while traversing open file list (try #4)Shirish Pargaonkar2012-06-102-24/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2c0c2a08bed7a3b791f88d09d16ace56acb3dd98 upstream. While traversing the linked list of open file handles, if the identfied file handle is invalid, a reopen is attempted and if it fails, we resume traversing where we stopped and cifs can oops while accessing invalid next element, for list might have changed. So mark the invalid file handle and attempt reopen if no valid file handle is found in rest of the list. If reopen fails, move the invalid file handle to the end of the list and start traversing the list again from the begining. Repeat this four times before giving up and returning an error if file reopen keeps failing. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: Include backup intent search flags during searches {try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar2012-06-103-11/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2608bee744a92d60d15ff4e6e0b913d8b406aedd upstream. As observed and suggested by Tushar Gosavi... --------- readdir calls these function to send TRANS2_FIND_FIRST and TRANS2_FIND_NEXT command to the server. The current cifs module is not specifying CIFS_SEARCH_BACKUP_SEARCH flag while sending these command when backupuid/backupgid is specified. This can be resolved by specifying CIFS_SEARCH_BACKUP_SEARCH flag. --------- Reported-and-Tested-by: Tushar Gosavi <tugosavi@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* cifs: fix revalidation test in cifs_llseek()Dan Carpenter2012-05-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 48a5730e5b71201e226ff06e245bf308feba5f10 upstream. This test is always true so it means we revalidate the length every time, which generates more network traffic. When it is SEEK_SET or SEEK_CUR, then we don't need to revalidate. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* fs/cifs: fix parsing of dfs referralsStefan Metzmacher2012-05-111-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d8f2799b105a24bb0bbd3380a0d56e6348484058 upstream. The problem was that the first referral was parsed more than once and so the caller tried the same referrals multiple times. The problem was introduced partly by commit 066ce6899484d9026acd6ba3a8dbbedb33d7ae1b, where 'ref += le16_to_cpu(ref->Size);' got lost, but that was also wrong... Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Tested-by: Björn Jacke <bj@sernet.de> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> [bwh: Backport to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* CIFS: Fix VFS lock usage for oplocked filesPavel Shilovsky2012-04-131-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 66189be74ff5f9f3fd6444315b85be210d07cef2 upstream. We can deadlock if we have a write oplock and two processes use the same file handle. In this case the first process can't unlock its lock if the second process blocked on the lock in the same time. Fix it by using posix_lock_file rather than posix_lock_file_wait under cinode->lock_mutex. If we request a blocking lock and posix_lock_file indicates that there is another lock that prevents us, wait untill that lock is released and restart our call. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* CIFS: Fix a spurious error in cifs_push_posix_locksPavel Shilovsky2012-04-021-9/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | commit ce85852b90a214cf577fc1b4f49d99fd7e98784a upstream. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* cifs: fix issue mounting of DFS ROOT when redirecting from one domain ↵Jeff Layton2012-04-021-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | controller to the next commit 1daaae8fa4afe3df78ca34e724ed7e8187e4eb32 upstream. This patch fixes an issue when cifs_mount receives a STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME error during cifs_get_tcon but is able to continue after an DFS ROOT referral. In this case, the return code variable is not reset prior to trying to mount from the system referred to. Thus, is_path_accessible is not executed and the final DFS referral is not performed causing a mount error. Use case: In DNS, example.com resolves to the secondary AD server ad2.example.com Our primary domain controller is ad1.example.com and has a DFS redirection set up from \\ad1\share\Users to \\files\share\Users. Mounting \\example.com\share\Users fails. Regression introduced by commit 724d9f1. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru Signed-off-by: Thomas Hadig <thomas@intapp.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* CIFS: Respect negotiated MaxMpxCountPavel Shilovsky2012-04-027-26/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 10b9b98e41ba248a899f6175ce96ee91431b6194 upstream. Some servers sets this value less than 50 that was hardcoded and we lost the connection if when we exceed this limit. Fix this by respecting this value - not sending more than the server allows. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* CIFS: Do not kmalloc under the flocks spinlockPavel Shilovsky2012-03-191-13/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d5751469f210d2149cc2159ffff66cbeef6da3f2 upstream. Reorganize the code to make the memory already allocated before spinlock'ed loop. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* cifs: fix dentry refcount leak when opening a FIFO on lookupJeff Layton2012-03-121-2/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5bccda0ebc7c0331b81ac47d39e4b920b198b2cd upstream. The cifs code will attempt to open files on lookup under certain circumstances. What happens though if we find that the file we opened was actually a FIFO or other special file? Currently, the open filehandle just ends up being leaked leading to a dentry refcount mismatch and oops on umount. Fix this by having the code close the filehandle on the server if it turns out not to be a regular file. While we're at it, change this spaghetti if statement into a switch too. Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* cifs: don't return error from standard_receive3 after marking response malformedJeff Layton2012-02-201-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ff4fa4a25a33f92b5653bb43add0c63bea98d464 upstream. standard_receive3 will check the validity of the response from the server (via checkSMB). It'll pass the result of that check to handle_mid which will dequeue it and mark it with a status of MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED if checkSMB returned an error. At that point, standard_receive3 will also return an error, which will make the demultiplex thread skip doing the callback for the mid. This is wrong -- if we were able to identify the request and the response is marked malformed, then we want the demultiplex thread to do the callback. Fix this by making standard_receive3 return 0 in this situation. Reported-and-Tested-by: Mark Moseley <moseleymark@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* cifs: request oplock when doing open on lookupJeff Layton2012-02-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | commit 8b0192a5f478da1c1ae906bf3ffff53f26204f56 upstream. Currently, it's always set to 0 (no oplock requested). Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* cifs: Fix oops in session setup code for null user mountsShirish Pargaonkar2012-02-131-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit de47a4176c532ef5961b8a46a2d541a3517412d3 upstream. For null user mounts, do not invoke string length function during session setup. Reported-and-Tested-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* cifs: lower default wsize when unix extensions are not usedJeff Layton2012-01-251-4/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ce91acb3acae26f4163c5a6f1f695d1a1e8d9009 upstream. We've had some reports of servers (namely, the Solaris in-kernel CIFS server) that don't deal properly with writes that are "too large" even though they set CAP_LARGE_WRITE_ANDX. Change the default to better mirror what windows clients do. Cc: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reported-by: Nick Davis <phireph0x@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* [CIFS] default ntlmv2 for cifs mount delayed to 3.3Steve French2012-01-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Turned out the ntlmv2 (default security authentication) upgrade was harder to test than expected, and we ran out of time to test against Apple and a few other servers that we wanted to. Delay upgrade of default security from ntlm to ntlmv2 (on mount) to 3.3. Still works fine to specify it explicitly via "sec=ntlmv2" so this should be fine. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: fix bad buffer length check in coalesce_t2Jeff Layton2012-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current check looks to see if the RFC1002 length is larger than CIFSMaxBufSize, and fails if it is. The buffer is actually larger than that by MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE. This bug has been around for a long time, but the fact that we used to cap the clients MaxBufferSize at the same level as the server tended to paper over it. Commit c974befa changed that however and caused this bug to bite in more cases. Reported-and-Tested-by: Konstantinos Skarlatos <k.skarlatos@gmail.com> Tested-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: check for NULL last_entry before calling cifs_save_resume_keyJeff Layton2011-12-081-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Prior to commit eaf35b1, cifs_save_resume_key had some NULL pointer checks at the top. It turns out that at least one of those NULL pointer checks is needed after all. When the LastNameOffset in a FIND reply appears to be beyond the end of the buffer, CIFSFindFirst and CIFSFindNext will set srch_inf.last_entry to NULL. Since eaf35b1, the code will now oops in this situation. Fix this by having the callers check for a NULL last entry pointer before calling cifs_save_resume_key. No change is needed for the call site in cifs_readdir as it's not reachable with a NULL current_entry pointer. This should fix: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=750247 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Reported-by: Adam G. Metzler <adamgmetzler@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: attempt to freeze while looping on a receive attemptJeff Layton2011-12-081-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | In the recent overhaul of the demultiplex thread receive path, I neglected to ensure that we attempt to freeze on each pass through the receive loop. Reported-and-Tested-by: Woody Suwalski <terraluna977@gmail.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: Adam Williamson <awilliam@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Fix sparse warning when calling cifs_strtoUCSSteve French2011-12-081-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix sparse endian check warning while calling cifs_strtoUCS CHECK fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c:216:37: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types) fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c:216:37: expected restricted __le16 [usertype] *<noident> fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c:216:37: got unsigned short *<noident> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com
* CIFS: Add descriptions to the brlock cache functionsPavel Shilovsky2011-12-081-0/+26
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Merge git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6Linus Torvalds2011-11-071-55/+50
|\ | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: CIFS: Cleanup byte-range locking code style CIFS: Simplify setlk error handling for mandatory locking
| * CIFS: Cleanup byte-range locking code stylePavel Shilovsky2011-11-041-24/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reorder parms of cifs_lock_init, trivially simplify getlk code and remove extra {} in cifs_lock_add_if. Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
| * CIFS: Simplify setlk error handling for mandatory lockingPavel Shilovsky2011-11-041-32/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now we allocate a lock structure at first, then we request to the server and save the lock if server returned OK though void function - it prevents the situation when we locked a file on the server and then return -ENOMEM from setlk. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* | Merge branch 'modsplit-Oct31_2011' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-11-061-0/+1
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulg/linux * 'modsplit-Oct31_2011' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulg/linux: (230 commits) Revert "tracing: Include module.h in define_trace.h" irq: don't put module.h into irq.h for tracking irqgen modules. bluetooth: macroize two small inlines to avoid module.h ip_vs.h: fix implicit use of module_get/module_put from module.h nf_conntrack.h: fix up fallout from implicit moduleparam.h presence include: replace linux/module.h with "struct module" wherever possible include: convert various register fcns to macros to avoid include chaining crypto.h: remove unused crypto_tfm_alg_modname() inline uwb.h: fix implicit use of asm/page.h for PAGE_SIZE pm_runtime.h: explicitly requires notifier.h linux/dmaengine.h: fix implicit use of bitmap.h and asm/page.h miscdevice.h: fix up implicit use of lists and types stop_machine.h: fix implicit use of smp.h for smp_processor_id of: fix implicit use of errno.h in include/linux/of.h of_platform.h: delete needless include <linux/module.h> acpi: remove module.h include from platform/aclinux.h miscdevice.h: delete unnecessary inclusion of module.h device_cgroup.h: delete needless include <linux/module.h> net: sch_generic remove redundant use of <linux/module.h> net: inet_timewait_sock doesnt need <linux/module.h> ... Fix up trivial conflicts (other header files, and removal of the ab3550 mfd driver) in - drivers/media/dvb/frontends/dibx000_common.c - drivers/media/video/{mt9m111.c,ov6650.c} - drivers/mfd/ab3550-core.c - include/linux/dmaengine.h
| * fs: add module.h to files that were implicitly using itPaul Gortmaker2011-10-311-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some files were using the complete module.h infrastructure without actually including the header at all. Fix them up in advance so once the implicit presence is removed, we won't get failures like this: CC [M] fs/nfsd/nfssvc.o fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c: In function 'nfsd_create_serv': fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:335: error: 'THIS_MODULE' undeclared (first use in this function) fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:335: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:335: error: for each function it appears in.) fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c: In function 'nfsd': fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:555: error: implicit declaration of function 'module_put_and_exit' make[3]: *** [fs/nfsd/nfssvc.o] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2024-05-17 12:56:17 +0000