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* merged fsWolfgang Wiedmeyer2015-10-253-5/+4
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* Merge remote-tracking branch 'kernelorg/linux-3.0.y' into 3_0_64Andrew Dodd2013-02-274-21/+57
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/arm/Kconfig arch/arm/include/asm/hwcap.h arch/arm/kernel/smp.c arch/arm/plat-samsung/adc.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_drv.h drivers/mmc/core/sd.c drivers/net/tun.c drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c drivers/regulator/max8997.c drivers/usb/core/hub.c drivers/usb/host/xhci.h drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c fs/jbd2/transaction.c include/linux/migrate.h kernel/sys.c kernel/time/timekeeping.c lib/genalloc.c mm/memory-failure.c mm/memory_hotplug.c mm/mempolicy.c mm/page_alloc.c mm/vmalloc.c mm/vmscan.c mm/vmstat.c scripts/Kbuild.include Change-Id: I91e2d85c07320c7ccfc04cf98a448e89bed6ade6
| * eCryptfs: check for eCryptfs cipher support at mountTim Sally2012-11-261-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5f5b331d5c21228a6519dcb793fc1629646c51a6 upstream. The issue occurs when eCryptfs is mounted with a cipher supported by the crypto subsystem but not by eCryptfs. The mount succeeds and an error does not occur until a write. This change checks for eCryptfs cipher support at mount time. Resolves Launchpad issue #338914, reported by Tyler Hicks in 03/2009. https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/338914 Signed-off-by: Tim Sally <tsally@atomicpeace.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Copy up POSIX ACL and read-only flags from lower mountTyler Hicks2012-11-261-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 069ddcda37b2cf5bb4b6031a944c0e9359213262 upstream. When the eCryptfs mount options do not include '-o acl', but the lower filesystem's mount options do include 'acl', the MS_POSIXACL flag is not flipped on in the eCryptfs super block flags. This flag is what the VFS checks in do_last() when deciding if the current umask should be applied to a newly created inode's mode or not. When a default POSIX ACL mask is set on a directory, the current umask is incorrectly applied to new inodes created in the directory. This patch ignores the MS_POSIXACL flag passed into ecryptfs_mount() and sets the flag on the eCryptfs super block depending on the flag's presence on the lower super block. Additionally, it is incorrect to allow a writeable eCryptfs mount on top of a read-only lower mount. This missing check did not allow writes to the read-only lower mount because permissions checks are still performed on the lower filesystem's objects but it is best to simply not allow a rw mount on top of ro mount. However, a ro eCryptfs mount on top of a rw mount is valid and still allowed. https://launchpad.net/bugs/1009207 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Stefan Beller <stefanbeller@googlemail.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Copy up attributes of the lower target inode after renameTyler Hicks2012-10-021-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8335eafc2859e1a26282bef7c3d19f3d68868b8a upstream. After calling into the lower filesystem to do a rename, the lower target inode's attributes were not copied up to the eCryptfs target inode. This resulted in the eCryptfs target inode staying around, rather than being evicted, because i_nlink was not updated for the eCryptfs inode. This also meant that eCryptfs didn't do the final iput() on the lower target inode so it stayed around, as well. This would result in a failure to free up space occupied by the target file in the rename() operation. Both target inodes would eventually be evicted when the eCryptfs filesystem was unmounted. This patch calls fsstack_copy_attr_all() after the lower filesystem does its ->rename() so that important inode attributes, such as i_nlink, are updated at the eCryptfs layer. ecryptfs_evict_inode() is now called and eCryptfs can drop its final reference on the lower inode. http://launchpad.net/bugs/561129 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Properly check for O_RDONLY flag before doing privileged openTyler Hicks2012-07-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9fe79d7600497ed8a95c3981cbe5b73ab98222f0 upstream. If the first attempt at opening the lower file read/write fails, eCryptfs will retry using a privileged kthread. However, the privileged retry should not happen if the lower file's inode is read-only because a read/write open will still be unsuccessful. The check for determining if the open should be retried was intended to be based on the access mode of the lower file's open flags being O_RDONLY, but the check was incorrectly performed. This would cause the open to be retried by the privileged kthread, resulting in a second failed open of the lower file. This patch corrects the check to determine if the open request should be handled by the privileged kthread. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Fix lockdep warning in miscdev operationsTyler Hicks2012-07-161-12/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 60d65f1f07a7d81d3eb3b91fc13fca80f2fdbb12 upstream. Don't grab the daemon mutex while holding the message context mutex. Addresses this lockdep warning: ecryptfsd/2141 is trying to acquire lock: (&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa029c213>] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x143/0x470 [ecryptfs] but task is already holding lock: (&(*daemon)->mux){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa029c2ec>] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x21c/0x470 [ecryptfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&(*daemon)->mux){+.+...}: [<ffffffff810a3b8d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x220 [<ffffffff8151c6da>] __mutex_lock_common+0x5a/0x4b0 [<ffffffff8151cc64>] mutex_lock_nested+0x44/0x50 [<ffffffffa029c5d7>] ecryptfs_send_miscdev+0x97/0x120 [ecryptfs] [<ffffffffa029b744>] ecryptfs_send_message+0x134/0x1e0 [ecryptfs] [<ffffffffa029a24e>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x2fe/0xa80 [ecryptfs] [<ffffffffa02960f8>] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x108/0x250 [ecryptfs] [<ffffffffa0290f80>] ecryptfs_create+0x130/0x250 [ecryptfs] [<ffffffff811963a4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0x120 [<ffffffff81197865>] do_last+0x8c5/0xa10 [<ffffffff811998f9>] path_openat+0xd9/0x460 [<ffffffff81199da2>] do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0 [<ffffffff81187998>] do_sys_open+0xf8/0x1d0 [<ffffffff81187a91>] sys_open+0x21/0x30 [<ffffffff81527d69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff810a3418>] __lock_acquire+0x1bf8/0x1c50 [<ffffffff810a3b8d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x220 [<ffffffff8151c6da>] __mutex_lock_common+0x5a/0x4b0 [<ffffffff8151cc64>] mutex_lock_nested+0x44/0x50 [<ffffffffa029c213>] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x143/0x470 [ecryptfs] [<ffffffff811887d3>] vfs_read+0xb3/0x180 [<ffffffff811888ed>] sys_read+0x4d/0x90 [<ffffffff81527d69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Gracefully refuse miscdev file ops on inherited/passed filesTyler Hicks2012-07-161-7/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8dc6780587c99286c0d3de747a2946a76989414a upstream. File operations on /dev/ecryptfs would BUG() when the operations were performed by processes other than the process that originally opened the file. This could happen with open files inherited after fork() or file descriptors passed through IPC mechanisms. Rather than calling BUG(), an error code can be safely returned in most situations. In ecryptfs_miscdev_release(), eCryptfs still needs to handle the release even if the last file reference is being held by a process that didn't originally open the file. ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid() will not be successful, so a pointer to the daemon is stored in the file's private_data. The private_data pointer is initialized when the miscdev file is opened and only used when the file is released. https://launchpad.net/bugs/994247 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | merge opensource jb u5codeworkx2012-09-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Change-Id: I1aaec157aa196f3448eff8636134fce89a814cf2
* | Merge linux-3.0.31 from korg into jellybeancodeworkx2012-09-184-80/+98
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S drivers/base/core.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_lvds.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/evergreen.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r100.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/rs600.c drivers/usb/core/hub.c drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c drivers/usb/host/xhci.c drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c fs/proc/base.c Change-Id: Ia98b35db3f8c0bfd95817867d3acb85be8e5e772
| * eCryptfs: Copy up lower inode attrs after setting lower xattrTyler Hicks2012-02-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 545d680938be1e86a6c5250701ce9abaf360c495 upstream. After passing through a ->setxattr() call, eCryptfs needs to copy the inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode, as they may have changed in the lower filesystem's ->setxattr() path. One example is if an extended attribute containing a POSIX Access Control List is being set. The new ACL may cause the lower filesystem to modify the mode of the lower inode and the eCryptfs inode would need to be updated to reflect the new mode. https://launchpad.net/bugs/926292 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Sebastien Bacher <seb128@ubuntu.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Infinite loop due to overflow in ecryptfs_write()Li Wang2012-02-131-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 684a3ff7e69acc7c678d1a1394fe9e757993fd34 upstream. ecryptfs_write() can enter an infinite loop when truncating a file to a size larger than 4G. This only happens on architectures where size_t is represented by 32 bits. This was caused by a size_t overflow due to it incorrectly being used to store the result of a calculation which uses potentially large values of type loff_t. [tyhicks@canonical.com: rewrite subject and commit message] Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Yunchuan Wen <wenyunchuan@kylinos.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Fix oops when printing debug info in extent crypto functionsTyler Hicks2012-02-031-40/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 58ded24f0fcb85bddb665baba75892f6ad0f4b8a upstream. If pages passed to the eCryptfs extent-based crypto functions are not mapped and the module parameter ecryptfs_verbosity=1 was specified at loading time, a NULL pointer dereference will occur. Note that this wouldn't happen on a production system, as you wouldn't pass ecryptfs_verbosity=1 on a production system. It leaks private information to the system logs and is for debugging only. The debugging info printed in these messages is no longer very useful and rather than doing a kmap() in these debugging paths, it will be better to simply remove the debugging paths completely. https://launchpad.net/bugs/913651 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Check inode changes in setattrTyler Hicks2012-02-031-12/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a261a03904849c3df50bd0300efb7fb3f865137d upstream. Most filesystems call inode_change_ok() very early in ->setattr(), but eCryptfs didn't call it at all. It allowed the lower filesystem to make the call in its ->setattr() function. Then, eCryptfs would copy the appropriate inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode. This patch changes that and actually calls inode_change_ok() on the eCryptfs inode, fairly early in ecryptfs_setattr(). Ideally, the call would happen earlier in ecryptfs_setattr(), but there are some possible inode initialization steps that must happen first. Since the call was already being made on the lower inode, the change in functionality should be minimal, except for the case of a file extending truncate call. In that case, inode_newsize_ok() was never being called on the eCryptfs inode. Rather than inode_newsize_ok() catching maximum file size errors early on, eCryptfs would encrypt zeroed pages and write them to the lower filesystem until the lower filesystem's write path caught the error in generic_write_checks(). This patch introduces a new function, called ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(), which checks if the new lower file size is within the appropriate limits when the truncate operation will be growing the lower file. In summary this change prevents eCryptfs truncate operations (and the resulting page encryptions), which would exceed the lower filesystem limits or FSIZE rlimits, from ever starting. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Make truncate path killableTyler Hicks2012-02-031-5/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5e6f0d769017cc49207ef56996e42363ec26c1f0 upstream. ecryptfs_write() handles the truncation of eCryptfs inodes. It grabs a page, zeroes out the appropriate portions, and then encrypts the page before writing it to the lower filesystem. It was unkillable and due to the lack of sparse file support could result in tying up a large portion of system resources, while encrypting pages of zeros, with no way for the truncate operation to be stopped from userspace. This patch adds the ability for ecryptfs_write() to detect a pending fatal signal and return as gracefully as possible. The intent is to leave the lower file in a useable state, while still allowing a user to break out of the encryption loop. If a pending fatal signal is detected, the eCryptfs inode size is updated to reflect the modified inode size and then -EINTR is returned. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * ecryptfs: Improve metadata read failure loggingTim Gardner2012-02-031-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 30373dc0c87ffef68d5628e77d56ffb1fa22e1ee upstream. Print inode on metadata read failure. The only real way of dealing with metadata read failures is to delete the underlying file system file. Having the inode allows one to 'find . -inum INODE`. [tyhicks@canonical.com: Removed some minor not-for-stable parts] Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: Sanitize write counts of /dev/ecryptfsTyler Hicks2012-02-031-18/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit db10e556518eb9d21ee92ff944530d84349684f4 upstream. A malicious count value specified when writing to /dev/ecryptfs may result in a a very large kernel memory allocation. This patch peeks at the specified packet payload size, adds that to the size of the packet headers and compares the result with the write count value. The resulting maximum memory allocation size is approximately 532 bytes. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | samsung update 1codeworkx2012-06-027-3/+298
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* eCryptfs: Extend array bounds for all filename charsTyler Hicks2011-12-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0f751e641a71157aa584c2a2e22fda52b52b8a56 upstream. From mhalcrow's original commit message: Characters with ASCII values greater than the size of filename_rev_map[] are valid filename characters. ecryptfs_decode_from_filename() will access kernel memory beyond that array, and ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() will then decrypt those characters. The attacker, using the FNEK of the crafted file, can then re-encrypt the characters to reveal the kernel memory past the end of the filename_rev_map[] array. I expect low security impact since this array is statically allocated in the text area, and the amount of memory past the array that is accessible is limited by the largest possible ASCII filename character. This patch solves the issue reported by mhalcrow but with an implementation suggested by Linus to simply extend the length of filename_rev_map[] to 256. Characters greater than 0x7A are mapped to 0x00, which is how invalid characters less than 0x7A were previously being handled. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* eCryptfs: Flush file in vma closeTyler Hicks2011-12-091-1/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 32001d6fe9ac6b0423e674a3093aa56740849f3b upstream. Dirty pages weren't being written back when an mmap'ed eCryptfs file was closed before the mapping was unmapped. Since f_ops->flush() is not called by the munmap() path, the lower file was simply being released. This patch flushes the eCryptfs file in the vm_ops->close() path. https://launchpad.net/bugs/870326 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* eCryptfs: Return error when lower file pointer is NULLTyler Hicks2011-08-151-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f61500e000eedc0c7a0201200a7f00ba5529c002 upstream. When an eCryptfs inode's lower file has been closed, and the pointer has been set to NULL, return an error when trying to do a lower read or write rather than calling BUG(). https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=37292 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uidJohn Johansen2011-08-151-2/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97 upstream. Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace. Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* eCryptfs: Unlock keys needed by ecryptfsdTyler Hicks2011-08-041-22/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b2987a5e05ec7a1af7ca42e5d5349d7a22753031 upstream. Fixes a regression caused by b5695d04634fa4ccca7dcbc05bb4a66522f02e0b Kernel keyring keys containing eCryptfs authentication tokens should not be write locked when calling out to ecryptfsd to wrap and unwrap file encryption keys. The eCryptfs kernel code can not hold the key's write lock because ecryptfsd needs to request the key after receiving such a request from the kernel. Without this fix, all file opens and creates will timeout and fail when using the eCryptfs PKI infrastructure. This is not an issue when using passphrase-based mount keys, which is the most widely deployed eCryptfs configuration. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Tested-by: Alexis Hafner1 <haf@zurich.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* ecryptfs: Make inode bdi consistent with superblock bdiThieu Le2011-08-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit 985ca0e626e195ea08a1a82b8dbeb6719747429a upstream. Make the inode mapping bdi consistent with the superblock bdi so that dirty pages are flushed properly. Signed-off-by: Thieu Le <thieule@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* eCryptfs: Remove ecryptfs_header_cache_2Tyler Hicks2011-05-293-13/+6
| | | | | | | | | Now that ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() is no longer using ecryptfs_header_cache_2 to read in metadata, the kmem_cache can be removed and the ecryptfs_header_cache_1 kmem_cache can be renamed to ecryptfs_header_cache. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Cleanup and optimize ecryptfs_lookup_interpose()Tyler Hicks2011-05-293-105/+88
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() has turned into spaghetti code over the years. This is an effort to clean it up. - Shorten overly descriptive variable names such as ecryptfs_dentry - Simplify gotos and error paths - Create helper function for reading plaintext i_size from metadata It also includes an optimization when reading i_size from the metadata. A complete page-sized kmem_cache_alloc() was being done to read in 16 bytes of metadata. The buffer for that is now statically declared. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Return useful code from contains_ecryptfs_markerTyler Hicks2011-05-291-16/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | Instead of having the calling functions translate the true/false return code to either 0 or -EINVAL, have contains_ecryptfs_marker() return 0 or -EINVAL so that the calling functions can just reuse the return code. Also, rename the function to ecryptfs_validate_marker() to avoid callers mistakenly thinking that it returns true/false codes. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Fix new inode race conditionTyler Hicks2011-05-295-28/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | Only unlock and d_add() new inodes after the plaintext inode size has been read from the lower filesystem. This fixes a race condition that was sometimes seen during a multi-job kernel build in an eCryptfs mount. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36002 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: David <david@unsolicited.net> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
* eCryptfs: Cleanup inode initialization codeTyler Hicks2011-05-292-68/+69
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The eCryptfs inode get, initialization, and dentry interposition code has two separate paths. One is for when dentry interposition is needed after doing things like a mkdir in the lower filesystem and the other is needed after a lookup. Unlocking new inodes and doing a d_add() needs to happen at different times, depending on which type of dentry interposing is being done. This patch cleans up the inode get and initialization code paths and splits them up so that the locking and d_add() differences mentioned above can be handled appropriately in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
* eCryptfs: Consolidate inode functions into inode.cTyler Hicks2011-05-294-107/+91
| | | | | | | | | | | These functions should live in inode.c since their focus is on inodes and they're primarily used by functions in inode.c. Also does a simple cleanup of ecryptfs_inode_test() and rolls ecryptfs_init_inode() into ecryptfs_inode_set(). Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-05-281-5/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (36 commits) Cache xattr security drop check for write v2 fs: block_page_mkwrite should wait for writeback to finish mm: Wait for writeback when grabbing pages to begin a write configfs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename fat: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename hpfs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename minix: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename fuse: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename coda: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename afs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename affs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename 9p: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename ncpfs: fix rename over directory with dangling references ncpfs: document dentry_unhash usage ecryptfs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename hostfs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename hfsplus: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename hfs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rename omfs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir rneame udf: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash from rmdir, dir rename ...
| * ecryptfs: remove unnecessary dentry_unhash on rmdir, dir renameSage Weil2011-05-281-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ecryptfs does not have problems with references to unlinked directories. CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> CC: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> CC: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-05-272-25/+23
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6: MAINTAINERS: Update eCryptfs mailing list eCryptfs: Allow 2 scatterlist entries for encrypted filenames eCryptfs: Clear i_nlink in rmdir
| * eCryptfs: Allow 2 scatterlist entries for encrypted filenamesTyler Hicks2011-05-271-25/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The buffers allocated while encrypting and decrypting long filenames can sometimes straddle two pages. In this situation, virt_to_scatterlist() will return -ENOMEM, causing the operation to fail and the user will get scary error messages in their logs: kernel: ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet: Internal error whilst attempting to convert filename memory to scatterlist; expected rc = 1; got rc = [-12]. block_aligned_filename_size = [272] kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_filename: Error attempting to generate tag 70 packet; rc = [-12] kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename: Error attempting to encrypt filename; rc = [-12] kernel: ecryptfs_lookup: Error attempting to encrypt and encode filename; rc = [-12] The solution is to allow up to 2 scatterlist entries to be used. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
| * eCryptfs: Clear i_nlink in rmdirTyler Hicks2011-05-271-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | eCryptfs wasn't clearing the eCryptfs inode's i_nlink after a successful vfs_rmdir() on the lower directory. This resulted in the inode evict and destroy paths to be missed. https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/723518 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
* | vfs: push dentry_unhash on rename_dir into file systemsSage Weil2011-05-261-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Only a few file systems need this. Start by pushing it down into each rename method (except gfs2 and xfs) so that it can be dealt with on a per-fs basis. Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | vfs: push dentry_unhash on rmdir into file systemsSage Weil2011-05-261-0/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | Only a few file systems need this. Start by pushing it down into each fs rmdir method (except gfs2 and xfs) so it can be dealt with on a per-fs basis. This does not change behavior for any in-tree file systems. Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* eCryptfs: Flush dirty pages in setattrTyler Hicks2011-04-251-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After 57db4e8d73ef2b5e94a3f412108dff2576670a8a changed eCryptfs to write-back caching, eCryptfs page writeback updates the lower inode times due to the use of vfs_write() on the lower file. To preserve inode metadata changes, such as 'cp -p' does with utimensat(), we need to flush all dirty pages early in ecryptfs_setattr() so that the user-updated lower inode metadata isn't clobbered later in writeback. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33372 Reported-by: Rocko <rockorequin@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Handle failed metadata read in lookupTyler Hicks2011-04-254-16/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When failing to read the lower file's crypto metadata during a lookup, eCryptfs must continue on without throwing an error. For example, there may be a plaintext file in the lower mount point that the user wants to delete through the eCryptfs mount. If an error is encountered while reading the metadata in lookup(), the eCryptfs inode's size could be incorrect. We must be sure to reread the plaintext inode size from the metadata when performing an open() or setattr(). The metadata is already being read in those paths, so this adds minimal performance overhead. This patch introduces a flag which will track whether or not the plaintext inode size has been read so that an incorrect i_size can be fixed in the open() or setattr() paths. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/509180 Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Add reference counting to lower filesTyler Hicks2011-04-256-59/+92
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For any given lower inode, eCryptfs keeps only one lower file open and multiplexes all eCryptfs file operations through that lower file. The lower file was considered "persistent" and stayed open from the first lookup through the lifetime of the inode. This patch keeps the notion of a single, per-inode lower file, but adds reference counting around the lower file so that it is closed when not currently in use. If the reference count is at 0 when an operation (such as open, create, etc.) needs to use the lower file, a new lower file is opened. Since the file is no longer persistent, all references to the term persistent file are changed to lower file. Locking is added around the sections of code that opens the lower file and assign the pointer in the inode info, as well as the code the fputs the lower file when all eCryptfs users are done with it. This patch is needed to fix issues, when mounted on top of the NFSv3 client, where the lower file is left silly renamed until the eCryptfs inode is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: dput dentries returned from dget_parentTyler Hicks2011-04-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Call dput on the dentries previously returned by dget_parent() in ecryptfs_rename(). This is needed for supported eCryptfs mounts on top of the NFSv3 client. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Remove extra d_delete in ecryptfs_rmdirTyler Hicks2011-04-251-2/+0
| | | | | | | | vfs_rmdir() already calls d_delete() on the lower dentry. That was being duplicated in ecryptfs_rmdir() and caused a NULL pointer dereference when NFSv3 was the lower filesystem. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* Fix common misspellingsLucas De Marchi2011-03-311-2/+2
| | | | | | Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed. Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
* eCryptfs: write lock requested keysRoberto Sassu2011-03-282-7/+23
| | | | | | | | A requested key is write locked in order to prevent modifications on the authentication token while it is being used. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: move ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig() call before mutex_lockRoberto Sassu2011-03-281-19/+19
| | | | | | | | | | The ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig() call is moved before the mutex_lock(s->tfm_mutex) instruction in order to avoid possible deadlocks that may occur by holding the lock on the two semaphores 'key->sem' and 's->tfm_mutex' in reverse order. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: verify authentication tokens before their useRoberto Sassu2011-03-283-81/+135
| | | | | | | | | | | | Authentication tokens content may change if another requestor calls the update() method of the corresponding key. The new function ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key() retrieves the authentication token from the provided key and verifies if it is still valid before being used to encrypt or decrypt an eCryptfs file. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> [tyhicks: Minor formatting changes] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: modified size of keysig in the ecryptfs_key_sig structureRoberto Sassu2011-03-282-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | The size of the 'keysig' array is incremented of one byte in order to make room for the NULL character. The 'keysig' variable is used, in the function ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(), to find an authentication token with the given signature and is printed a debug message if it cannot be retrieved. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: removed num_global_auth_toks from ecryptfs_mount_crypt_statRoberto Sassu2011-03-283-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the 'num_global_auth_toks' field of the ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat structure, used to count the number of items in the 'global_auth_tok_list' list. This variable is not needed because there are no checks based upon it. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig() bug fixRoberto Sassu2011-03-281-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | The pointer '(*auth_tok_key)' is set to NULL in case request_key() fails, in order to prevent its use by functions calling ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Unlock page in write_begin error pathTyler Hicks2011-03-281-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | Unlock the page in error path of ecryptfs_write_begin(). This may happen, for example, if decryption fails while bring the page up-to-date. Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2024-05-05 22:24:55 +0000