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* IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matchingVenkat Yekkirala2006-10-111-15/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled" IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable xfrm(s) applied. The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of "deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by default" in the above case. This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context). Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied, such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). This patch: Fix the selinux side of things. This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated with the IPSec policy rule. Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case is now handled properly. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [PATCH] fs.h: ifdef security fieldsAlexey Dobriyan2006-09-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [assuming BSD security levels are deleted] The only user of i_security, f_security, s_security fields is SELinux, however, quite a few security modules are trying to get into kernel. So, wrap them under CONFIG_SECURITY. Adding config option for each security field is likely an overkill. Following Stephen Smalley's suggestion, i_security initialization is moved to security_inode_alloc() to not clutter core code with ifdefs and make alloc_inode() codepath tiny little bit smaller and faster. The user of (highly greppable) struct fown_struct::security field is still to be found. I've checked every "fown_struct" and every "f_owner" occurence. Additionally it's removal doesn't break i386 allmodconfig build. struct inode, struct file, struct super_block, struct fown_struct become smaller. P.S. Combined with two reiserfs inode shrinking patches sent to linux-fsdevel, I can finally suck 12 reiserfs inodes into one page. /proc/slabinfo -ext2_inode_cache 388 10 +ext2_inode_cache 384 10 -inode_cache 280 14 +inode_cache 276 14 -proc_inode_cache 296 13 +proc_inode_cache 292 13 -reiser_inode_cache 336 11 +reiser_inode_cache 332 12 <= -shmem_inode_cache 372 10 +shmem_inode_cache 368 10 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [NetLabel]: SELinux supportVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-12/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into the following SELinux LSM hooks: * selinux_file_permission() * selinux_socket_sendmsg() * selinux_socket_post_create() * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram() * selinux_sock_graft() * selinux_inet_conn_request() The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are "NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security attributes are checked via the additional hook in selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks. In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security (mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out of NetLabel. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child socketsVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-0/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets as well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will result in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security Associations. This also uses the sock's sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux enforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Default labeling of socket specific IPSec policiesVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-3/+16
| | | | | | | | This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the same as the socket they are set on. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Add flow labelingVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-13/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can be used. The following protos are currently not handled, but they should continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently do. ipmr ip_gre ipip igmp sit sctp ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device) decnet Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and stateVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-16/+90
| | | | | | | | | This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary SELinux enforcement pieces. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Add security sid to sockVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP LAST_ACK state). This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [SECURITY]: Fix build with CONFIG_SECURITY disabled.David S. Miller2006-08-021-1/+0
| | | | | | | include/linux/security.h: In function ‘security_release_secctx’: include/linux/security.h:2757: warning: ‘return’ with a value, in function returning void Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patchCatherine Zhang2006-08-021-6/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] SELinux: Add security hook definition for getioprio and insert hooksDavid Quigley2006-06-301-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new security hook definition for the sys_ioprio_get operation. At present, the SELinux hook function implementation for this hook is identical to the getscheduler implementation but a separate hook is introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary. This patch also creates a helper function get_task_ioprio which handles the access check in addition to retrieving the ioprio value for the task. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: extend task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completionDavid Quigley2006-06-301-4/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch extends the security_task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completion. In this case, the secid of the task responsible for the signal needs to be obtained and saved earlier, so a security_task_getsecid() hook is added, and then this saved value is passed subsequently to the extended task_kill hook for use in checking. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.Darrel Goeddel2006-06-291-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside of the lsm modules to use the interface. It also updates the SELinux implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct. This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks. Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] keys: sort out key quota systemDavid Howells2006-06-261-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a process that didn't previously have one. This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: add task_movememory hookDavid Quigley2006-06-231-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds new security hook, task_movememory, to be called when memory owened by a task is to be moved (e.g. when migrating pages to a this hook is identical to the setscheduler implementation, but a separate hook introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary. Since the last posting, the hook has been renamed following feedback from Christoph Lameter. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] lsm: add task_setioprio hookJames Morris2006-06-231-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement an LSM hook for setting a task's IO priority, similar to the hook for setting a tasks's nice value. A previous version of this LSM hook was included in an older version of multiadm by Jan Engelhardt, although I don't recall it being submitted upstream. Also included is the corresponding SELinux hook, which re-uses the setsched permission in the proccess class. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@linux01.gwdg.de> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to perform statfs with a known root dentryDavid Howells2006-06-231-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Give the statfs superblock operation a dentry pointer rather than a superblock pointer. This complements the get_sb() patch. That reduced the significance of sb->s_root, allowing NFS to place a fake root there. However, NFS does require a dentry to use as a target for the statfs operation. This permits the root in the vfsmount to be used instead. linux/mount.h has been added where necessary to make allyesconfig build successfully. Interest has also been expressed for use with the FUSE and XFS filesystems. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystemMichael LeMay2006-06-221-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings within the SELinux initialization routine. Has passed David's testsuite. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [NET]: Fix warnings after LSM-IPSEC changes.David S. Miller2006-06-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Assignment used as truth value in xfrm_del_sa() and xfrm_get_policy(). Wrong argument type declared for security_xfrm_state_delete() when SELINUX is disabled. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [LSM-IPsec]: SELinux AuthorizeCatherine Zhang2006-06-171-6/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] change lspp ipc auditingSteve Grubb2006-05-011-16/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Hi, The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the inode audit change patch already being applied. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'audit.b3' of ↵Linus Torvalds2006-03-251-3/+30
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current * 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits) [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking [PATCH] Fix audit operators [PATCH] promiscuous mode [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records [PATCH] add/remove rule update [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer [PATCH] SE Linux audit events [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing. [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information. [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing. [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks. [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages. [PATCH] Filter rule comparators ... Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
| * [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixesDustin Kirkland2006-03-201-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently added to -mm1: * fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode * fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off due to a missing function in security/dummy.c * fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing return just before an error_path label * some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(), audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context() Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
| * [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.Dustin Kirkland2006-03-201-0/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver of an action. These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the appropriate record in the audit code. This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP). [AV: fixed kmalloc flags use] [folded leak fixes] [folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)] [folded audit_inode_context() leak fix] [folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT] Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | [PATCH] refactor capable() to one implementation, add __capable() helperChris Wright2006-03-251-6/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate implementations. Add __capable() function which can be used to check for capabiilty of any process. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersecCatherine Zhang2006-03-201-6/+19
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] SELinux: fix size-128 slab leakStephen Smalley2006-02-031-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | Remove private inode tests from security_inode_alloc and security_inode_free, as we otherwise end up leaking inode security structures for private inodes. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] tpm_bios: needs more securityfs_ functionsRandy Dunlap2006-02-011-0/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | tpm_bios.c needs securityfs_xyz() functions. Does include/linux/security.h need stubs for these, or should char/tpm/Makefile just be modified to say: ifdef CONFIG_ACPI ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm_bios.o endif endif drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:494: warning: implicit declaration of function 'securityfs_create_dir' drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:494: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:499: warning: implicit declaration of function 'securityfs_create_file' drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:501: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:508: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c:523: warning: implicit declaration of function 'securityfs_remove' *** Warning: "securityfs_create_file" [drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.ko] undefined! *** Warning: "securityfs_create_dir" [drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.ko] undefined! *** Warning: "securityfs_remove" [drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.ko] undefined! There are also some gcc and sparse warnings that could be fixed. (see http://www.xenotime.net/linux/doc/build-tpm.out) Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Kylene Jo Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.Trent Jaeger2006-01-031-0/+132
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]David Howells2005-10-301-0/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable changes are: (1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which programs may access a key. (2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key. (3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules; the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out. (4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather than a boolean value. (5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of attributes (UID, GID, permissions). Note that there isn't an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation, but rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based on the permission request bits. Key management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both CONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled. This should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected: [PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: canonicalize getxattr()James Morris2005-10-301-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows SELinux to canonicalize the value returned from getxattr() via the security_inode_getsecurity() hook, which is called after the fs level getxattr() function. The purpose of this is to allow the in-core security context for an inode to override the on-disk value. This could happen in cases such as upgrading a system to a different labeling form (e.g. standard SELinux to MLS) without needing to do a full relabel of the filesystem. In such cases, we want getxattr() to return the canonical security context that the kernel is using rather than what is stored on disk. The implementation hooks into the inode_getsecurity(), adding another parameter to indicate the result of the preceding fs-level getxattr() call, so that SELinux knows whether to compare a value obtained from disk with the kernel value. We also now allow getxattr() to work for mountpoint labeled filesystems (i.e. mount with option context=foo_t), as we are able to return the kernel value to the user. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] gfp_t: net/*Al Viro2005-10-281-1/+1
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1Al Viro2005-10-081-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | - added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t; - replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with typedef) and documents what's going on far better. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chrisw/lsm-2.6 Linus Torvalds2005-09-131-0/+5
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| * [PATCH] add securityfs for all LSMs to useGreg KH2005-07-081-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a small patch against 2.6.13-rc2 that adds securityfs, a virtual fs that all LSMs can use instead of creating their own. The fs should be mounted at /sys/kernel/security, and the fs creates that mount point. This will make the LSB people happy that we aren't creating a new /my_lsm_fs directory in the root for every different LSM. It has changed a bit since the last version, thanks to comments from Mike Waychison. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] remove the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooksStephen Smalley2005-09-091-49/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooks as they are unused (and likely useless). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] Remove security_inode_post_create/mkdir/symlink/mknod hooksStephen Smalley2005-09-091-90/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the inode_post_create/mkdir/mknod/symlink LSM hooks as they are obsoleted by the new inode_init_security hook that enables atomic inode security labeling. If anyone sees any reason to retain these hooks, please speak now. Also, is anyone using the post_rename/link hooks; if not, those could also be removed. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] security: enable atomic inode security labelingStephen Smalley2005-09-091-0/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode security state during the inode creation transaction. This parallels the existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes. Otherwise, it is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the post_create/mkdir/... LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash. SELinux presently works around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes (in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses. A simple test program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the problem. Similar such false denials have been encountered in real applications. This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation to SELinux. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [NET]: Fix sparse warningsArnaldo Carvalho de Melo2005-08-291-2/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | Of this type, mostly: CHECK net/ipv6/netfilter.c net/ipv6/netfilter.c:96:12: warning: symbol 'ipv6_netfilter_init' was not declared. Should it be static? net/ipv6/netfilter.c:101:6: warning: symbol 'ipv6_netfilter_fini' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+2858
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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