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* xen: xen/page.h compile fixJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fix: linux/include/xen/page.h: In function mfn_pte: linux/include/xen/page.h:149: error: __supported_pte_mask undeclared (first use in this function) linux/include/xen/page.h:149: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once linux/include/xen/page.h:149: error: for each function it appears in.) Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* xen: Place vcpu_info structure into per-cpu memoryJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-181-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | An experimental patch for Xen allows guests to place their vcpu_info structs anywhere. We try to use this to place the vcpu_info into the PDA, which allows direct access. If this works, then switch to using direct access operations for irq_enable, disable, save_fl and restore_fl. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com>
* xen: add the Xenbus sysfs and virtual device hotplug driverJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-181-0/+234
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This communicates with the machine control software via a registry residing in a controlling virtual machine. This allows dynamic creation, destruction and modification of virtual device configurations (network devices, block devices and CPUS, to name some examples). [ Greg, would you mind giving this a review? Thanks -J ] Signed-off-by: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
* xen: Add grant table supportJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-182-10/+191
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add Xen 'grant table' driver which allows granting of access to selected local memory pages by other virtual machines and, symmetrically, the mapping of remote memory pages which other virtual machines have granted access to. This driver is a prerequisite for many of the Xen virtual device drivers, which grant the 'device driver domain' restricted and temporary access to only those memory pages that are currently involved in I/O operations. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
* xen: use the hvc console infrastructure for Xen consoleJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-182-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement a Xen back-end for hvc console. * * * Add early printk support via hvc console, enable using "earlyprintk=xen" on the kernel command line. From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
* xen: SMP guest supportJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-181-4/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a fairly straightforward Xen implementation of smp_ops. Xen has its own IPI mechanisms, and has no dependency on any APIC-based IPI. The smp_ops hooks and the flush_tlb_others pv_op allow a Xen guest to avoid all APIC code in arch/i386 (the only apic operation is a single apic_read for the apic version number). One subtle point which needs to be addressed is unpinning pagetables when another cpu may have a lazy tlb reference to the pagetable. Xen will not allow an in-use pagetable to be unpinned, so we must find any other cpus with a reference to the pagetable and get them to shoot down their references. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
* xen: event channelsJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-181-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Xen implements interrupts in terms of event channels. Each guest domain gets 1024 event channels which can be used for a variety of purposes, such as Xen timer events, inter-domain events, inter-processor events (IPI) or for real hardware IRQs. Within the kernel, we map the event channels to IRQs, and implement the whole interrupt handling using a Xen irq_chip. Rather than setting NR_IRQ to 1024 under PARAVIRT in order to accomodate Xen, we create a dynamic mapping between event channels and IRQs. Ideally, Linux will eventually move towards dynamically allocating per-irq structures, and we can use a 1:1 mapping between event channels and irqs. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* xen: Core Xen implementationJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-182-0/+202
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* xen: Add Xen interface header filesJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-1816-0/+2366
Add Xen interface header files. These are taken fairly directly from the Xen tree, but somewhat rearranged to suit the kernel's conventions. Define macros and inline functions for doing hypercalls into the hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>