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* Backport mac80211 from 3.4 kernelWolfgang Wiedmeyer2017-01-211-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | The ath9k_htc driver depends on mac80211, but mac80211 can't be build. The reason is that net/wireless is almost completely backported from a 3.4 kernel. To follow suit, mac80211 is also backported from 3.4, more precisely from 3.4.113. This makes mac80211 build. Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
* mac80211: Remove redundant checks for NULL before calls to crypto_free_cipher()Jesper Juhl2010-11-151-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | crypto_free_cipher() is a wrapper around crypto_free_tfm() which is a wrapper around crypto_destroy_tfm() and the latter can handle being passed a NULL pointer, so checking for NULL in the ieee80211_aes_key_free()/ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free() wrappers around crypto_free_cipher() is pointless and just increase object code size needlesly and makes us execute extra test/branch instructions that we don't need. Btw; don't we have to many wrappers around wrappers ad nauseam here? Anyway, this patch removes the redundant conditionals. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
* mac80211: Don't squash error codes in key setup functionsBen Hutchings2010-08-161-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ieee80211_add_key() currently returns -ENOMEM in case of any error, including a missing crypto algorithm. Change ieee80211_key_alloc() and ieee80211_aes_{key_setup_encrypt,cmac_key_setup}() to encode errors with ERR_PTR() rather than returning NULL, and change ieee80211_add_key() accordingly. Compile-tested only. Reported-by: Marcin Owsiany <porridge@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
* mac80211: 802.11w - Add BIP (AES-128-CMAC)Jouni Malinen2009-01-291-0/+135
Implement Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol for management frame protection. This patch adds the needed definitions for the new information element (MMIE) and implementation for the new "encryption" type (though, BIP is actually not encrypting data, it provides only integrity protection). These routines will be used by a follow-on patch that enables BIP for multicast/broadcast robust management frames. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>