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* SELinux: calculate and print hashtab stats with a generic functionEric Paris2011-04-281-19/+13
| | | | | | | | | We have custom debug functions like rangetr_hash_eval and symtab_hash_eval which do the same thing. Just create a generic function that takes the name of the hash table as an argument instead of having custom functions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: skip filename trans rules if ttype does not match parent dirEric Paris2011-04-283-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now we walk to filename trans rule list for every inode that is created. First passes at policy using this facility creates around 5000 filename trans rules. Running a list of 5000 entries every time is a bad idea. This patch adds a new ebitmap to policy which has a bit set for each ttype that has at least 1 filename trans rule. Thus when an inode is created we can quickly determine if any rules exist for this parent directory type and can skip the list if we know there is definitely no relevant entry. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: rename filename_compute_type argument to *type instead of *conEric Paris2011-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | filename_compute_type() takes as arguments the numeric value of the type of the subject and target. It does not take a context. Thus the names are misleading. Fix the argument names. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: fix comment to state filename_compute_type takes an objname not a qstrEric Paris2011-04-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | filename_compute_type used to take a qstr, but it now takes just a name. Fix the comments to indicate it is an objname, not a qstr. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATHEric Paris2011-04-251-13/+13
| | | | | | | | | This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODEEric Paris2011-04-252-26/+26
| | | | | | | | | | The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code complexity. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safeEric Paris2011-04-253-25/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not be RCU safe. This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue. Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen2011-04-251-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: security_read_policy should take a size_t not ssize_tEric Paris2011-04-252-2/+2
| | | | | | | | The len should be an size_t but is a ssize_t. Easy enough fix to silence build warnings. We have no need for signed-ness. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: silence build warning when !CONFIG_BUGEric Paris2011-04-252-0/+3
| | | | | | | | If one builds a kernel without CONFIG_BUG there are a number of 'may be used uninitialized' warnings. Silence these by returning after the BUG(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: delete debugging printks from filename_trans rule processingEric Paris2011-04-201-4/+0
| | | | | | | | The filename_trans rule processing has some printk(KERN_ERR ) messages which were intended as debug aids in creating the code but weren't removed before it was submitted. Remove them. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* Initialize policydb.process_class eariler.Harry Ciao2011-04-071-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | Initialize policydb.process_class once all symtabs read from policy image, so that it could be used to setup the role_trans.tclass field when a lower version policy.X is loaded. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* selinux: Fix regression for XorgStephen Smalley2011-04-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Commit 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 introduced a bug in the handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class. Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: add type_transition with name extension support for selinuxfsKohei Kaigai2011-04-013-12/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch allows /selinux/create takes optional 4th argument to support TYPE_TRANSITION with name extension for userspace object managers. If 4th argument is not supplied, it shall perform as existing kernel. In fact, the regression test of SE-PostgreSQL works well on the patched kernel. Thanks, Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@eu.nec.com> [manually verify fuzz was not an issue, and it wasn't: eparis] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: Write class field in role_trans_write.Harry Ciao2011-03-281-2/+9
| | | | | | | | | If kernel policy version is >= 26, then write the class field of the role_trans structure into the binary reprensentation. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: Compute role in newcontext for all classesHarry Ciao2011-03-281-11/+9
| | | | | | | | Apply role_transition rules for all kinds of classes. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: Add class support to the role_trans structureHarry Ciao2011-03-283-2/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If kernel policy version is >= 26, then the binary representation of the role_trans structure supports specifying the class for the current subject or the newly created object. If kernel policy version is < 26, then the class field would be default to the process class. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2011-03-0810-201/+413
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| * SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hookEric Paris2011-03-031-0/+86
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For SELinux we do not allow security information to change during a remount operation. Thus this hook simply strips the security module options from the data and verifies that those are the same options as exist on the current superblock. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socketHarry Ciao2011-03-031-6/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security context for the newly created socket shares the same user, role and MLS attribute as its creator but may have a different type, which could be specified by a type_transition rule in the relevant policy package. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> [fix call to security_transition_sid to include qstr, Eric Paris] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| * SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attributeHarry Ciao2011-03-033-7/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The socket SID would be computed on creation and no longer inherit its creator's SID by default. Socket may have a different type but needs to retain the creator's role and MLS attribute in order not to break labeled networking and network access control. The kernel value for a class would be used to determine if the class if one of socket classes. If security_compute_sid is called from userspace the policy value for a class would be mapped to the relevant kernel value first. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| * SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_classHarry Ciao2011-03-031-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket". Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| * Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"Eric Paris2011-02-251-8/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 242631c49d4cf39642741d6627750151b058233b. Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c SELinux used to recognize certain individual ioctls and check permissions based on the knowledge of the individual ioctl. In commit 242631c49d4cf396 the SELinux code stopped trying to understand individual ioctls and to instead looked at the ioctl access bits to determine in we should check read or write for that operation. This same suggestion was made to SMACK (and I believe copied into TOMOYO). But this suggestion is total rubbish. The ioctl access bits are actually the access requirements for the structure being passed into the ioctl, and are completely unrelated to the operation of the ioctl or the object the ioctl is being performed upon. Take FS_IOC_FIEMAP as an example. FS_IOC_FIEMAP is defined as: FS_IOC_FIEMAP _IOWR('f', 11, struct fiemap) So it has access bits R and W. What this really means is that the kernel is going to both read and write to the struct fiemap. It has nothing at all to do with the operations that this ioctl might perform on the file itself! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| * selinux: drop unused packet flow permissionsEric Paris2011-02-251-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These permissions are not used and can be dropped in the kernel definitions. Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| * selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postroutingSteffen Klassert2011-02-251-18/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IPSKB_FORWARDED and IP6SKB_FORWARDED flags are used only in the multicast forwarding case to indicate that a packet looped back after forward. So these flags are not a good indicator for packet forwarding. A better indicator is the incoming interface. If we have no socket context, but an incoming interface and we see the packet in the ip postroute hook, the packet is going to be forwarded. With this patch we use the incoming interface as an indicator on packet forwarding. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeerSteffen Klassert2011-02-251-18/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat and selinux_ip_postroute_compat are just called if selinux_policycap_netpeer is not set. However in these functions we check if selinux_policycap_netpeer is set. This leads to some dead code and to the fact that selinux_xfrm_postroute_last is never executed. This patch removes the dead code and the checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer in the compatibility functions. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithmSteffen Klassert2011-02-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc accidentally checks the xfrm domain of interpretation against the selinux context algorithm. This patch fixes this by checking ctx_alg against the selinux context algorithm. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labelingLucian Adrian Grijincu2011-02-011-102/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for /proc/sys returned -r--r--r-- unknown /proc/sys/fs/file-nr instead of -r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling: 1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/ commit 77b14db502cb85a031fe8fde6c85d52f3e0acb63 [PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support 2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table: commit 3fbfa98112fc3962c416452a0baf2214381030e6 [PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables 3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/ inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by selinux. commit bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962 [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes commit 86a71dbd3e81e8870d0f0e56b87875f57e58222b [PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry. We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this patch). With this patch: * we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private * we don't need the sysclt security hook * we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode. We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like '/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label). PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: Use dentry name in new object labelingEric Paris2011-02-016-37/+197
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria. The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd. There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't. This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new rules. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creationEric Paris2011-02-011-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path, just the last component of the path. This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating /etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name exists it is fine to pass NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'master'; commit 'v2.6.38-rc7' into nextJames Morris2011-03-084-5/+8
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| * CRED: Fix BUG() upon security_cred_alloc_blank() failureTetsuo Handa2011-02-071-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with new->security == NULL and new->magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank() returns an error. As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y. If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because cred->magic == 0. Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free() because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred->security == NULL. This does not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free(). Fix these bugs by (1) Set new->magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank(). (2) Handle null cred->security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * selinux: return -ENOMEM when memory allocation failsDavidlohr Bueso2011-01-242-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return -ENOMEM when memory allocation fails in cond_init_bool_indexes, correctly propagating error code to caller. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-01-1011-931/+944
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (30 commits) MAINTAINERS: Add tomoyo-dev-en ML. SELinux: define permissions for DCB netlink messages encrypted-keys: style and other cleanup encrypted-keys: verify datablob size before converting to binary trusted-keys: kzalloc and other cleanup trusted-keys: additional TSS return code and other error handling syslog: check cap_syslog when dmesg_restrict Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories selinux: cache sidtab_context_to_sid results SELinux: do not compute transition labels on mountpoint labeled filesystems This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running. SELinux: merge policydb_index_classes and policydb_index_others selinux: convert part of the sym_val_to_name array to use flex_array selinux: convert type_val_to_struct to flex_array flex_array: fix flex_array_put_ptr macro to be valid C SELinux: do not set automatic i_ino in selinuxfs selinux: rework security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c SELinux: standardize return code handling in policydb.c ...
| * | headers: path.h reduxAlexey Dobriyan2011-01-101-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove path.h from sched.h and other files. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | security:selinux: kill unused MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK and ebitmap_startbitShan Wei2011-01-242-2/+0
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | Kill unused MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK and ebitmap_startbit. Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2011-01-1010-930/+943
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| * | SELinux: define permissions for DCB netlink messagesEric Paris2010-12-161-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 2f90b865 added two new netlink message types to the netlink route socket. SELinux has hooks to define if netlink messages are allowed to be sent or received, but it did not know about these two new message types. By default we allow such actions so noone likely noticed. This patch adds the proper definitions and thus proper permissions enforcement. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | selinux: cache sidtab_context_to_sid resultsEric Paris2010-12-072-2/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sidtab_context_to_sid takes up a large share of time when creating large numbers of new inodes (~30-40% in oprofile runs). This patch implements a cache of 3 entries which is checked before we do a full context_to_sid lookup. On one system this showed over a x3 improvement in the number of inodes that could be created per second and around a 20% improvement on another system. Any time we look up the same context string sucessivly (imagine ls -lZ) we should hit this cache hot. A cache miss should have a relatively minor affect on performance next to doing the full table search. All operations on the cache are done COMPLETELY lockless. We know that all struct sidtab_node objects created will never be deleted until a new policy is loaded thus we never have to worry about a pointer being dereferenced. Since we also know that pointer assignment is atomic we know that the cache will always have valid pointers. Given this information we implement a FIFO cache in an array of 3 pointers. Every result (whether a cache hit or table lookup) will be places in the 0 spot of the cache and the rest of the entries moved down one spot. The 3rd entry will be lost. Races are possible and are even likely to happen. Lets assume that 4 tasks are hitting sidtab_context_to_sid. The first task checks against the first entry in the cache and it is a miss. Now lets assume a second task updates the cache with a new entry. This will push the first entry back to the second spot. Now the first task might check against the second entry (which it already checked) and will miss again. Now say some third task updates the cache and push the second entry to the third spot. The first task my check the third entry (for the third time!) and again have a miss. At which point it will just do a full table lookup. No big deal! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: do not compute transition labels on mountpoint labeled filesystemsEric Paris2010-12-021-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_inode_init_security computes transitions sids even for filesystems that use mount point labeling. It shouldn't do that. It should just use the mount point label always and no matter what. This causes 2 problems. 1) it makes file creation slower than it needs to be since we calculate the transition sid and 2) it allows files to be created with a different label than the mount point! # id -Z staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 # sesearch --type --class file --source sysadm_t --target tmp_t Found 1 semantic te rules: type_transition sysadm_t tmp_t : file user_tmp_t; # mount -o loop,context="system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0" /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # ls -lZ /mnt/tmp drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found # touch /mnt/tmp/file1 # ls -lZ /mnt/tmp -rw-r--r--. root root staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 file1 drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found Whoops, we have a mount point labeled filesystem tmp_t with a user_tmp_t labeled file! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: merge policydb_index_classes and policydb_index_othersEric Paris2010-11-301-59/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We duplicate functionality in policydb_index_classes() and policydb_index_others(). This patch merges those functions just to make it clear there is nothing special happening here. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | selinux: convert part of the sym_val_to_name array to use flex_arrayEric Paris2010-11-305-68/+127
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The sym_val_to_name type array can be quite large as it grows linearly with the number of types. With known policies having over 5k types these allocations are growing large enough that they are likely to fail. Convert those to flex_array so no allocation is larger than PAGE_SIZE Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | selinux: convert type_val_to_struct to flex_arrayEric Paris2010-11-303-13/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In rawhide type_val_to_struct will allocate 26848 bytes, an order 3 allocations. While this hasn't been seen to fail it isn't outside the realm of possibiliy on systems with severe memory fragmentation. Convert to flex_array so no allocation will ever be bigger than PAGE_SIZE. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: do not set automatic i_ino in selinuxfsEric Paris2010-11-301-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinuxfs carefully uses i_ino to figure out what the inode refers to. The VFS used to generically set this value and we would reset it to something useable. After 85fe4025c616 each filesystem sets this value to a default if needed. Since selinuxfs doesn't use the default value and it can only lead to problems (I'd rather have 2 inodes with i_ino == 0 than one pointing to the wrong data) lets just stop setting a default. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | selinux: rework security_netlbl_secattr_to_sidEric Paris2010-11-301-21/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid is difficult to follow, especially the return codes. Try to make the function obvious. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.cEric Paris2010-11-301-171/+157
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on error. For the most part transition to rc=errno if (failure) goto out; [...] out: cleanup() return rc; Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex functions which have cleanup routines on error. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.cEric Paris2010-11-301-337/+311
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on error. For the most part transition to rc=errno if (failure) goto out; [...] out: cleanup() return rc; Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex functions which have cleanup routines on error. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: standardize return code handling in policydb.cEric Paris2010-11-301-287/+268
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | policydb.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on error. For the most part transition to rc=errno if (failure) goto out; [...] out: cleanup() return rc; Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex functions which have cleanup routines on error. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | | Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2011-01-102-17/+21
|\ \ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/smack/smack_lsm.c Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Ok'd by Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | Merge branch 'vfs-scale-working' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-01-071-6/+10
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin * 'vfs-scale-working' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin: (57 commits) fs: scale mntget/mntput fs: rename vfsmount counter helpers fs: implement faster dentry memcmp fs: prefetch inode data in dcache lookup fs: improve scalability of pseudo filesystems fs: dcache per-inode inode alias locking fs: dcache per-bucket dcache hash locking bit_spinlock: add required includes kernel: add bl_list xfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation btrfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation ext2,3,4: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation fs: provide simple rcu-walk generic_check_acl implementation fs: provide rcu-walk aware permission i_ops fs: rcu-walk aware d_revalidate method fs: cache optimise dentry and inode for rcu-walk fs: dcache reduce branches in lookup path fs: dcache remove d_mounted fs: fs_struct use seqlock fs: rcu-walk for path lookup ...
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