From 23e09dca1062825ecbac06d9a56c1b745d7bd774 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2016 09:44:53 -0800 Subject: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory corruptions, crashes, OOM... Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable. This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels. Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem. Change-Id: I7b3a4b234eee4e3b2b2766f4d61a44d92e76095d Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 417ebb7..167e069 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_wmem_max); set_sndbuf: sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK; - sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF); + sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF); /* Wake up sending tasks if we upped the value. */ sk->sk_write_space(sk); break; @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ set_rcvbuf: * returning the value we actually used in getsockopt * is the most desirable behavior. */ - sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF); + sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF); break; case SO_RCVBUFFORCE: -- cgit v1.1