diff options
author | achuith@chromium.org <achuith@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98> | 2011-10-25 08:37:07 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | achuith@chromium.org <achuith@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98> | 2011-10-25 08:37:07 +0000 |
commit | 5edbc0fbe36ee7cf6b281c4ee3307add2aa89036 (patch) | |
tree | c34075acc750116f85b1d712b0cc250dbbbaec3c | |
parent | d881b80bf18b85c71cec936024fa5340f4be75e2 (diff) | |
download | chromium_src-5edbc0fbe36ee7cf6b281c4ee3307add2aa89036.zip chromium_src-5edbc0fbe36ee7cf6b281c4ee3307add2aa89036.tar.gz chromium_src-5edbc0fbe36ee7cf6b281c4ee3307add2aa89036.tar.bz2 |
Revert 107075 - Disallow wildcards from matching top-level registry controlled domains during cert validation.
BUG=100442
TEST=net_unittests:X509CertificateNameVerifyTest.*
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8362023
TBR=rsleevi@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8381032
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@107078 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
-rw-r--r-- | net/base/x509_certificate.cc | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc | 19 |
2 files changed, 10 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate.cc index 451583b..9158388 100644 --- a/net/base/x509_certificate.cc +++ b/net/base/x509_certificate.cc @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ #include "net/base/net_errors.h" #include "net/base/net_util.h" #include "net/base/pem_tokenizer.h" -#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domain.h" namespace net { @@ -508,36 +507,17 @@ bool X509Certificate::VerifyHostname( // |reference_domain| is the remainder of |host| after the leading host // component is stripped off, but includes the leading dot e.g. // "www.f.com" -> ".f.com". - // If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no - // dots) then |reference_domain| will be empty. + // If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no dots) + // then |reference_domain| will be empty. base::StringPiece reference_host, reference_domain; SplitOnChar(reference_name, '.', &reference_host, &reference_domain); bool allow_wildcards = false; if (!reference_domain.empty()) { DCHECK(reference_domain.starts_with(".")); - - // Do not allow wildcards for registry controlled domains, so as to - // prevent accepting *.com or *.co.uk as valid presented names. Passing - // true for |allow_unknown_registries| so that top-level domains which are - // unknown (intranet domains, new TLDs/gTLDs not yet recognized) are - // treated as registry-controlled domains. Because the |reference_domain| - // must contain at least one name component that is not registry - // controlled, this ensures that all reference names have at least three - // domain components in order to permit wildcards. - size_t registry_length = - RegistryControlledDomainService::GetRegistryLength(reference_name, - true); - // As the |reference_name| was already canonicalized, this should never - // happen. - CHECK_NE(registry_length, std::string::npos); - - // Subtracting 1 to account for the leading dot in |reference_domain|. - bool is_registry_controlled = registry_length != 0 && - registry_length == (reference_domain.size() - 1); - - // Additionally, do not attempt wildcard matching for purely numeric - // hostnames. - allow_wildcards = !is_registry_controlled && + // We required at least 3 components (i.e. 2 dots) as a basic protection + // against too-broad wild-carding. + // Also we don't attempt wildcard matching on a purely numerical hostname. + allow_wildcards = reference_domain.rfind('.') != 0 && reference_name.find_first_not_of("0123456789.") != std::string::npos; } diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc index d61750b..9ba1124 100644 --- a/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc +++ b/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc @@ -1298,6 +1298,7 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = { "xn--poema-*.com.br," "xn--*-9qae5a.com.br," "*--poema-9qae5a.com.br" }, + { true, "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.com.br" }, // The following are adapted from the examples quoted from // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3 // (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but @@ -1311,21 +1312,12 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = { { true, "baz1.example.net", "baz*.example.net" }, { true, "foobaz.example.net", "*baz.example.net" }, { true, "buzz.example.net", "b*z.example.net" }, - // Wildcards should not be valid for registry-controlled domains, and for - // unknown/unrecognized domains, at least three domain components must be - // present. - { true, "www.test.example", "*.test.example" }, - { true, "test.example.co.uk", "*.example.co.uk" }, - { false, "test.example", "*.example" }, - { false, "example.co.uk", "*.co.uk" }, + // Wildcards should not be valid unless there are at least three name + // components. + { true, "h.co.uk", "*.co.uk" }, { false, "foo.com", "*.com" }, { false, "foo.us", "*.us" }, { false, "foo", "*" }, - // IDN variants of wildcards and registry-controlled domains. - { true, "www.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br" }, - { true, "test.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h", "*.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h" }, - { false, "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.com.br" }, - { false, "example.xn--mgbaam7a8h", "*.xn--mgbaam7a8h" }, // Multiple wildcards are not valid. { false, "foo.example.com", "*.*.com" }, { false, "foo.bar.example.com", "*.bar.*.com" }, @@ -1346,9 +1338,6 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = { { false, "example.com.", "*.com" }, { false, "example.com.", "*.com." }, { false, "foo.", "*." }, - { false, "foo", "*." }, - { false, "foo.co.uk", "*.co.uk." }, - { false, "foo.co.uk.", "*.co.uk." }, // IP addresses in common name; IPv4 only. { true, "127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1" }, { true, "192.168.1.1", "192.168.1.1" }, |