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authorachuith@chromium.org <achuith@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2011-10-25 08:37:07 +0000
committerachuith@chromium.org <achuith@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2011-10-25 08:37:07 +0000
commit5edbc0fbe36ee7cf6b281c4ee3307add2aa89036 (patch)
treec34075acc750116f85b1d712b0cc250dbbbaec3c
parentd881b80bf18b85c71cec936024fa5340f4be75e2 (diff)
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Revert 107075 - Disallow wildcards from matching top-level registry controlled domains during cert validation.
BUG=100442 TEST=net_unittests:X509CertificateNameVerifyTest.* Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8362023 TBR=rsleevi@chromium.org Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8381032 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@107078 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
-rw-r--r--net/base/x509_certificate.cc32
-rw-r--r--net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc19
2 files changed, 10 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate.cc
index 451583b..9158388 100644
--- a/net/base/x509_certificate.cc
+++ b/net/base/x509_certificate.cc
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/base/net_util.h"
#include "net/base/pem_tokenizer.h"
-#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domain.h"
namespace net {
@@ -508,36 +507,17 @@ bool X509Certificate::VerifyHostname(
// |reference_domain| is the remainder of |host| after the leading host
// component is stripped off, but includes the leading dot e.g.
// "www.f.com" -> ".f.com".
- // If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no
- // dots) then |reference_domain| will be empty.
+ // If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no dots)
+ // then |reference_domain| will be empty.
base::StringPiece reference_host, reference_domain;
SplitOnChar(reference_name, '.', &reference_host, &reference_domain);
bool allow_wildcards = false;
if (!reference_domain.empty()) {
DCHECK(reference_domain.starts_with("."));
-
- // Do not allow wildcards for registry controlled domains, so as to
- // prevent accepting *.com or *.co.uk as valid presented names. Passing
- // true for |allow_unknown_registries| so that top-level domains which are
- // unknown (intranet domains, new TLDs/gTLDs not yet recognized) are
- // treated as registry-controlled domains. Because the |reference_domain|
- // must contain at least one name component that is not registry
- // controlled, this ensures that all reference names have at least three
- // domain components in order to permit wildcards.
- size_t registry_length =
- RegistryControlledDomainService::GetRegistryLength(reference_name,
- true);
- // As the |reference_name| was already canonicalized, this should never
- // happen.
- CHECK_NE(registry_length, std::string::npos);
-
- // Subtracting 1 to account for the leading dot in |reference_domain|.
- bool is_registry_controlled = registry_length != 0 &&
- registry_length == (reference_domain.size() - 1);
-
- // Additionally, do not attempt wildcard matching for purely numeric
- // hostnames.
- allow_wildcards = !is_registry_controlled &&
+ // We required at least 3 components (i.e. 2 dots) as a basic protection
+ // against too-broad wild-carding.
+ // Also we don't attempt wildcard matching on a purely numerical hostname.
+ allow_wildcards = reference_domain.rfind('.') != 0 &&
reference_name.find_first_not_of("0123456789.") != std::string::npos;
}
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
index d61750b..9ba1124 100644
--- a/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
+++ b/net/base/x509_certificate_unittest.cc
@@ -1298,6 +1298,7 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = {
"xn--poema-*.com.br,"
"xn--*-9qae5a.com.br,"
"*--poema-9qae5a.com.br" },
+ { true, "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.com.br" },
// The following are adapted from the examples quoted from
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
// (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
@@ -1311,21 +1312,12 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = {
{ true, "baz1.example.net", "baz*.example.net" },
{ true, "foobaz.example.net", "*baz.example.net" },
{ true, "buzz.example.net", "b*z.example.net" },
- // Wildcards should not be valid for registry-controlled domains, and for
- // unknown/unrecognized domains, at least three domain components must be
- // present.
- { true, "www.test.example", "*.test.example" },
- { true, "test.example.co.uk", "*.example.co.uk" },
- { false, "test.example", "*.example" },
- { false, "example.co.uk", "*.co.uk" },
+ // Wildcards should not be valid unless there are at least three name
+ // components.
+ { true, "h.co.uk", "*.co.uk" },
{ false, "foo.com", "*.com" },
{ false, "foo.us", "*.us" },
{ false, "foo", "*" },
- // IDN variants of wildcards and registry-controlled domains.
- { true, "www.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br" },
- { true, "test.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h", "*.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h" },
- { false, "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.com.br" },
- { false, "example.xn--mgbaam7a8h", "*.xn--mgbaam7a8h" },
// Multiple wildcards are not valid.
{ false, "foo.example.com", "*.*.com" },
{ false, "foo.bar.example.com", "*.bar.*.com" },
@@ -1346,9 +1338,6 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = {
{ false, "example.com.", "*.com" },
{ false, "example.com.", "*.com." },
{ false, "foo.", "*." },
- { false, "foo", "*." },
- { false, "foo.co.uk", "*.co.uk." },
- { false, "foo.co.uk.", "*.co.uk." },
// IP addresses in common name; IPv4 only.
{ true, "127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1" },
{ true, "192.168.1.1", "192.168.1.1" },