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authormarkus@chromium.org <markus@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2013-02-26 01:39:39 +0000
committermarkus@chromium.org <markus@chromium.org@0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98>2013-02-26 01:39:39 +0000
commit083fe1e0bc4ead809af46a75fbb979cc95e7491d (patch)
treed4a47bc54dc91671fc917968e7ad5ed6203b474b /content
parent3124fbfa6a99ad601c71bb2edf403ddb5cdf080b (diff)
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SECCOMP-BPF: Refactor the BPF sandbox API to use objects rather than "static" methods.
This change allows us to stack multiple instances of the sandbox. Also, split up headers in a generally saner fashion. BUG=130662 TEST=sandbox_linux_unittests Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12223109 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184541 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
Diffstat (limited to 'content')
-rw-r--r--content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc80
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc b/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
index 2f39971..9789ae6 100644
--- a/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
+++ b/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <ucontext.h>
@@ -1230,14 +1232,14 @@ bool IsBaselinePolicyWatched(int sysno) {
}
}
-ErrorCode BaselinePolicy(int sysno) {
+ErrorCode BaselinePolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno) {
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__)
if (sysno == __NR_socketpair) {
// Only allow AF_UNIX, PF_UNIX. Crash if anything else is seen.
COMPILE_ASSERT(AF_UNIX == PF_UNIX, af_unix_pf_unix_different);
- return Sandbox::Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, AF_UNIX,
+ return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, AF_UNIX,
ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
- Sandbox::Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL));
+ sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL));
}
#endif
if (IsBaselinePolicyAllowed(sysno)) {
@@ -1265,14 +1267,15 @@ ErrorCode BaselinePolicy(int sysno) {
if (IsBaselinePolicyWatched(sysno)) {
// Previously unseen syscalls. TODO(jln): some of these should
// be denied gracefully right away.
- return Sandbox::Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
+ return sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
}
// In any other case crash the program with our SIGSYS handler
- return Sandbox::Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
+ return sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
}
// x86_64/i386 for now. Needs to be adapted and tested for ARM.
-ErrorCode GpuProcessPolicy(int sysno, void *broker_process) {
+ErrorCode GpuProcessPolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno,
+ void *broker_process) {
switch(sysno) {
case __NR_ioctl:
#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
@@ -1282,7 +1285,7 @@ ErrorCode GpuProcessPolicy(int sysno, void *broker_process) {
return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
case __NR_open:
case __NR_openat:
- return Sandbox::Trap(GpuOpenSIGSYS_Handler, broker_process);
+ return sandbox->Trap(GpuOpenSIGSYS_Handler, broker_process);
default:
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__)
if (IsSystemVSharedMemory(sysno))
@@ -1292,74 +1295,76 @@ ErrorCode GpuProcessPolicy(int sysno, void *broker_process) {
return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
// Default on the baseline policy.
- return BaselinePolicy(sysno);
+ return BaselinePolicy(sandbox, sysno);
}
}
// x86_64/i386 for now. Needs to be adapted and tested for ARM.
// A GPU broker policy is the same as a GPU policy with open and
// openat allowed.
-ErrorCode GpuBrokerProcessPolicy(int sysno, void*) {
+ErrorCode GpuBrokerProcessPolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno, void *aux) {
+ // "aux" would typically be NULL, when called from
+ // "EnableGpuBrokerPolicyCallBack"
switch(sysno) {
case __NR_open:
case __NR_openat:
return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
default:
- return GpuProcessPolicy(sysno, NULL);
+ return GpuProcessPolicy(sandbox, sysno, aux);
}
}
// Allow clone for threads, crash if anything else is attempted.
// Don't restrict on ASAN.
-ErrorCode RestrictCloneToThreads() {
+ErrorCode RestrictCloneToThreads(Sandbox *sandbox) {
// Glibc's pthread.
if (!RunningOnASAN()) {
- return Sandbox::Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+ return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_SIGHAND |
CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM | CLONE_SETTLS |
CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID,
ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
- Sandbox::Trap(ReportCloneFailure, NULL));
+ sandbox->Trap(ReportCloneFailure, NULL));
} else {
return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
}
}
-ErrorCode RestrictPrctl() {
+ErrorCode RestrictPrctl(Sandbox *sandbox) {
// Allow PR_SET_NAME, PR_SET_DUMPABLE, PR_GET_DUMPABLE. Will need to add
// seccomp compositing in the future.
// PR_SET_PTRACER is used by breakpad but not needed anymore.
- return Sandbox::Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+ return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
PR_SET_NAME, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
- Sandbox::Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+ sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
- Sandbox::Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+ sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
PR_GET_DUMPABLE, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
- Sandbox::Trap(ReportPrctlFailure, NULL))));
+ sandbox->Trap(ReportPrctlFailure, NULL))));
}
-ErrorCode RestrictIoctl() {
+ErrorCode RestrictIoctl(Sandbox *sandbox) {
// Allow TCGETS and FIONREAD, trap to ReportIoctlFailure otherwise.
- return Sandbox::Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_64BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, TCGETS,
+ return sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_64BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, TCGETS,
ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
- Sandbox::Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_64BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, FIONREAD,
+ sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_64BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, FIONREAD,
ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
- Sandbox::Trap(ReportIoctlFailure, NULL)));
+ sandbox->Trap(ReportIoctlFailure, NULL)));
}
-ErrorCode RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
+ErrorCode RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno, void *) {
switch (sysno) {
case __NR_clone:
- return RestrictCloneToThreads();
+ return RestrictCloneToThreads(sandbox);
case __NR_ioctl:
// Restrict IOCTL on x86_64.
if (IsArchitectureX86_64()) {
- return RestrictIoctl();
+ return RestrictIoctl(sandbox);
} else {
return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
}
case __NR_prctl:
- return RestrictPrctl();
+ return RestrictPrctl(sandbox);
// Allow the system calls below.
case __NR_fdatasync:
case __NR_fsync:
@@ -1397,11 +1402,11 @@ ErrorCode RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
#endif
// Default on the baseline policy.
- return BaselinePolicy(sysno);
+ return BaselinePolicy(sandbox, sysno);
}
}
-ErrorCode FlashProcessPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
+ErrorCode FlashProcessPolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno, void *) {
switch (sysno) {
case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
case __NR_sched_setscheduler:
@@ -1421,18 +1426,18 @@ ErrorCode FlashProcessPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
#endif
// Default on the baseline policy.
- return BaselinePolicy(sysno);
+ return BaselinePolicy(sandbox, sysno);
}
}
-ErrorCode BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
+ErrorCode BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno, void *) {
if (!Sandbox::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
// TODO(jln) we should not have to do that in a trivial policy.
return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
}
if (IsDebug(sysno) || IsNuma(sysno))
- return Sandbox::Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
+ return sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
}
@@ -1440,7 +1445,7 @@ ErrorCode BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
// Allow all syscalls.
// This will still deny x32 or IA32 calls in 64 bits mode or
// 64 bits system calls in compatibility mode.
-ErrorCode AllowAllPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
+ErrorCode AllowAllPolicy(Sandbox *, int sysno, void *) {
if (!Sandbox::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
// TODO(jln) we should not have to do that in a trivial policy.
return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
@@ -1536,9 +1541,14 @@ Sandbox::EvaluateSyscall GetProcessSyscallPolicy(
// broker_process can be NULL if there is no need for one.
void StartSandboxWithPolicy(Sandbox::EvaluateSyscall syscall_policy,
BrokerProcess* broker_process) {
-
- Sandbox::SetSandboxPolicy(syscall_policy, broker_process);
- Sandbox::StartSandbox();
+ // Starting the sandbox is a one-way operation. The kernel doesn't allow
+ // us to unload a sandbox policy after it has been started. Nonetheless,
+ // in order to make the use of the "Sandbox" object easier, we allow for
+ // the object to be destroyed after the sandbox has been started. Note that
+ // doing so does not stop the sandbox.
+ Sandbox sandbox;
+ sandbox.SetSandboxPolicy(syscall_policy, broker_process);
+ sandbox.StartSandbox();
}
// Initialize the seccomp-bpf sandbox.