diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sandbox/win/src')
160 files changed, 28218 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/Wow64.cc b/sandbox/win/src/Wow64.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5098647 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/Wow64.cc @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/wow64.h" + +#include <sstream> + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_process.h" + +namespace { + +// Holds the information needed for the interception of NtMapViewOfSection on +// 64 bits. +// Warning: do not modify this definition without changing also the code on the +// 64 bit helper process. +struct PatchInfo32 { + HANDLE dll_load; // Event to signal the broker. + ULONG pad1; + HANDLE continue_load; // Event to wait for the broker. + ULONG pad2; + HANDLE section; // First argument of the call. + ULONG pad3; + void* orig_MapViewOfSection; + ULONG original_high; + void* signal_and_wait; + ULONG pad4; + void* patch_location; + ULONG patch_high; +}; + +// Size of the 64 bit service entry. +const SIZE_T kServiceEntry64Size = 0x10; + +// Removes the interception of ntdll64. +bool Restore64Code(HANDLE child, PatchInfo32* patch_info) { + PatchInfo32 local_patch_info; + SIZE_T actual; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(child, patch_info, &local_patch_info, + sizeof(local_patch_info), &actual)) + return false; + if (sizeof(local_patch_info) != actual) + return false; + + if (local_patch_info.original_high) + return false; + if (local_patch_info.patch_high) + return false; + + char buffer[kServiceEntry64Size]; + + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(child, local_patch_info.orig_MapViewOfSection, + &buffer, kServiceEntry64Size, &actual)) + return false; + if (kServiceEntry64Size != actual) + return false; + + if (!::WriteProcessMemory(child, local_patch_info.patch_location, &buffer, + kServiceEntry64Size, &actual)) + return false; + if (kServiceEntry64Size != actual) + return false; + return true; +} + +typedef BOOL (WINAPI* IsWow64ProcessFunction)(HANDLE process, BOOL* wow64); + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +Wow64::~Wow64() { + if (dll_load_) + ::CloseHandle(dll_load_); + + if (continue_load_) + ::CloseHandle(continue_load_); +} + +// The basic idea is to allocate one page of memory on the child, and initialize +// the first part of it with our version of PatchInfo32. Then launch the helper +// process passing it that address on the child. The helper process will patch +// the 64 bit version of NtMapViewOfFile, and the interception will signal the +// first event on the buffer. We'll be waiting on that event and after the 32 +// bit version of ntdll is loaded, we'll remove the interception and return to +// our caller. +bool Wow64::WaitForNtdll() { + if (base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance()->wow64_status() != + base::win::OSInfo::WOW64_ENABLED) + return true; + + const size_t page_size = 4096; + + // Create some default manual reset un-named events, not signaled. + dll_load_ = ::CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL); + continue_load_ = ::CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL); + HANDLE current_process = ::GetCurrentProcess(); + HANDLE remote_load, remote_continue; + DWORD access = EVENT_MODIFY_STATE | SYNCHRONIZE; + if (!::DuplicateHandle(current_process, dll_load_, child_->Process(), + &remote_load, access, FALSE, 0)) + return false; + if (!::DuplicateHandle(current_process, continue_load_, child_->Process(), + &remote_continue, access, FALSE, 0)) + return false; + + void* buffer = ::VirtualAllocEx(child_->Process(), NULL, page_size, + MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); + DCHECK(buffer); + if (!buffer) + return false; + + PatchInfo32* patch_info = reinterpret_cast<PatchInfo32*>(buffer); + PatchInfo32 local_patch_info = {0}; + local_patch_info.dll_load = remote_load; + local_patch_info.continue_load = remote_continue; + SIZE_T written; + if (!::WriteProcessMemory(child_->Process(), patch_info, &local_patch_info, + offsetof(PatchInfo32, section), &written)) + return false; + if (offsetof(PatchInfo32, section) != written) + return false; + + if (!RunWowHelper(buffer)) + return false; + + // The child is intercepted on 64 bit, go on and wait for our event. + if (!DllMapped()) + return false; + + // The 32 bit version is available, cleanup the child. + return Restore64Code(child_->Process(), patch_info); +} + +bool Wow64::RunWowHelper(void* buffer) { + COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(buffer) <= sizeof(DWORD), unsupported_64_bits); + + // Get the path to the helper (beside the exe). + wchar_t prog_name[MAX_PATH]; + GetModuleFileNameW(NULL, prog_name, MAX_PATH); + std::wstring path(prog_name); + size_t name_pos = path.find_last_of(L"\\"); + if (std::wstring::npos == name_pos) + return false; + path.resize(name_pos + 1); + + std::wstringstream command; + command << std::hex << std::showbase << L"\"" << path << + L"wow_helper.exe\" " << child_->ProcessId() << " " << + bit_cast<ULONG>(buffer); + + scoped_ptr_malloc<wchar_t> writable_command(_wcsdup(command.str().c_str())); + + STARTUPINFO startup_info = {0}; + startup_info.cb = sizeof(startup_info); + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation process_info; + if (!::CreateProcess(NULL, writable_command.get(), NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, + NULL, &startup_info, process_info.Receive())) + return false; + + DWORD reason = ::WaitForSingleObject(process_info.process_handle(), INFINITE); + + DWORD code; + bool ok = + ::GetExitCodeProcess(process_info.process_handle(), &code) ? true : false; + + if (WAIT_TIMEOUT == reason) + return false; + + return ok && (0 == code); +} + +// First we must wake up the child, then wait for dll loads on the child until +// the one we care is loaded; at that point we must suspend the child again. +bool Wow64::DllMapped() { + if (1 != ::ResumeThread(child_->MainThread())) { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + + for (;;) { + DWORD reason = ::WaitForSingleObject(dll_load_, INFINITE); + if (WAIT_TIMEOUT == reason || WAIT_ABANDONED == reason) + return false; + + if (!::ResetEvent(dll_load_)) + return false; + + bool found = NtdllPresent(); + if (found) { + if (::SuspendThread(child_->MainThread())) + return false; + } + + if (!::SetEvent(continue_load_)) + return false; + + if (found) + return true; + } +} + +bool Wow64::NtdllPresent() { + const size_t kBufferSize = 512; + char buffer[kBufferSize]; + SIZE_T read; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(child_->Process(), ntdll_, &buffer, kBufferSize, + &read)) + return false; + if (kBufferSize != read) + return false; + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/Wow64.h b/sandbox/win/src/Wow64.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..472297e --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/Wow64.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_WOW64_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_WOW64_H__ + +#include <windows.h> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +class TargetProcess; + +// This class wraps the code needed to interact with the Windows On Windows +// subsystem on 64 bit OSes, from the point of view of interceptions. +class Wow64 { + public: + Wow64(TargetProcess* child, HMODULE ntdll) + : child_(child), ntdll_(ntdll), dll_load_(NULL), continue_load_(NULL) {} + ~Wow64(); + + // Waits for the 32 bit DLL to get loaded on the child process. This function + // will return immediately if not running under WOW, or launch the helper + // process and wait until ntdll is ready. + bool WaitForNtdll(); + + private: + // Runs the WOW helper process, passing the address of a buffer allocated on + // the child (one page). + bool RunWowHelper(void* buffer); + + // This method receives "notifications" whenever a DLL is mapped on the child. + bool DllMapped(); + + // Returns true if ntdll.dll is mapped on the child. + bool NtdllPresent(); + + TargetProcess* child_; // Child process. + HMODULE ntdll_; // ntdll on the parent. + HANDLE dll_load_; // Event that is signaled on dll load. + HANDLE continue_load_; // Event to signal to continue execution on the child. + DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(Wow64); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_WOW64_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/Wow64_64.cc b/sandbox/win/src/Wow64_64.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5218077 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/Wow64_64.cc @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Wow64 implementation for native 64-bit Windows (in other words, never WOW). + +#include "sandbox/src/wow64.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +Wow64::~Wow64() { +} + +bool Wow64::WaitForNtdll() { + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/acl.cc b/sandbox/win/src/acl.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4869bb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/acl.cc @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/acl.h" + +#include <aclapi.h> +#include <sddl.h> + +#include "base/logging.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +bool GetDefaultDacl(HANDLE token, + scoped_ptr_malloc<TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL>* default_dacl) { + if (token == NULL) + return false; + + DCHECK(default_dacl != NULL); + + unsigned long length = 0; + ::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenDefaultDacl, NULL, 0, &length); + if (length == 0) { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + + TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL* acl = + reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL*>(malloc(length)); + default_dacl->reset(acl); + + if (!::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenDefaultDacl, default_dacl->get(), + length, &length)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool AddSidToDacl(const Sid& sid, ACL* old_dacl, ACCESS_MASK access, + ACL** new_dacl) { + EXPLICIT_ACCESS new_access = {0}; + new_access.grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS; + new_access.grfAccessPermissions = access; + new_access.grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE; + + new_access.Trustee.pMultipleTrustee = NULL; + new_access.Trustee.MultipleTrusteeOperation = NO_MULTIPLE_TRUSTEE; + new_access.Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID; + new_access.Trustee.ptstrName = reinterpret_cast<LPWSTR>( + const_cast<SID*>(sid.GetPSID())); + + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != ::SetEntriesInAcl(1, &new_access, old_dacl, new_dacl)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool AddSidToDefaultDacl(HANDLE token, const Sid& sid, ACCESS_MASK access) { + if (token == NULL) + return false; + + scoped_ptr_malloc<TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL> default_dacl; + if (!GetDefaultDacl(token, &default_dacl)) + return false; + + ACL* new_dacl = NULL; + if (!AddSidToDacl(sid, default_dacl->DefaultDacl, access, &new_dacl)) + return false; + + TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL new_token_dacl = {0}; + new_token_dacl.DefaultDacl = new_dacl; + + BOOL ret = ::SetTokenInformation(token, TokenDefaultDacl, &new_token_dacl, + sizeof(new_token_dacl)); + ::LocalFree(new_dacl); + return (TRUE == ret); +} + +bool AddUserSidToDefaultDacl(HANDLE token, ACCESS_MASK access) { + DWORD size = sizeof(TOKEN_USER) + SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE; + TOKEN_USER* token_user = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_USER*>(malloc(size)); + + scoped_ptr_malloc<TOKEN_USER> token_user_ptr(token_user); + + if (!::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, token_user, size, &size)) + return false; + + return AddSidToDefaultDacl(token, + reinterpret_cast<SID*>(token_user->User.Sid), + access); +} + +bool AddKnownSidToKernelObject(HANDLE object, const Sid& sid, + ACCESS_MASK access) { + PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR descriptor = NULL; + PACL old_dacl = NULL; + PACL new_dacl = NULL; + + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != ::GetSecurityInfo(object, SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, + DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, NULL, NULL, + &old_dacl, NULL, &descriptor)) + return false; + + if (!AddSidToDacl(sid.GetPSID(), old_dacl, access, &new_dacl)) { + ::LocalFree(descriptor); + return false; + } + + DWORD result = ::SetSecurityInfo(object, SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, + DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, NULL, NULL, + new_dacl, NULL); + + ::LocalFree(new_dacl); + ::LocalFree(descriptor); + + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != result) + return false; + + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/acl.h b/sandbox/win/src/acl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d452011 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/acl.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_ACL_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_ACL_H_ + +#include <windows.h> + +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sid.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Returns the default dacl from the token passed in. +bool GetDefaultDacl(HANDLE token, + scoped_ptr_malloc<TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL>* default_dacl); + +// Appends an ACE represented by |sid| and |access| to |old_dacl|. If the +// function succeeds, new_dacl contains the new dacl and must be freed using +// LocalFree. +bool AddSidToDacl(const Sid& sid, ACL* old_dacl, ACCESS_MASK access, + ACL** new_dacl); + +// Adds and ACE represented by |sid| and |access| to the default dacl present +// in the token. +bool AddSidToDefaultDacl(HANDLE token, const Sid& sid, ACCESS_MASK access); + +// Adds an ACE represented by the user sid and |access| to the default dacl +// present in the token. +bool AddUserSidToDefaultDacl(HANDLE token, ACCESS_MASK access); + +// Adds an ACE represented by |known_sid| and |access| to the dacl of the kernel +// object referenced by |object|. +bool AddKnownSidToKernelObject(HANDLE object, const Sid& sid, + ACCESS_MASK access); + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_ACL_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/broker_services.cc b/sandbox/win/src/broker_services.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f46abe --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/broker_services.cc @@ -0,0 +1,405 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/broker_services.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "base/threading/platform_thread.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_process.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win2k_threadpool.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { + +// Utility function to associate a completion port to a job object. +bool AssociateCompletionPort(HANDLE job, HANDLE port, void* key) { + JOBOBJECT_ASSOCIATE_COMPLETION_PORT job_acp = { key, port }; + return ::SetInformationJobObject(job, + JobObjectAssociateCompletionPortInformation, + &job_acp, sizeof(job_acp))? true : false; +} + +// Utility function to do the cleanup necessary when something goes wrong +// while in SpawnTarget and we must terminate the target process. +sandbox::ResultCode SpawnCleanup(sandbox::TargetProcess* target, DWORD error) { + if (0 == error) + error = ::GetLastError(); + + target->Terminate(); + delete target; + ::SetLastError(error); + return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; +} + +// the different commands that you can send to the worker thread that +// executes TargetEventsThread(). +enum { + THREAD_CTRL_NONE, + THREAD_CTRL_REMOVE_PEER, + THREAD_CTRL_QUIT, + THREAD_CTRL_LAST, +}; + +// Helper structure that allows the Broker to associate a job notification +// with a job object and with a policy. +struct JobTracker { + HANDLE job; + sandbox::PolicyBase* policy; + JobTracker(HANDLE cjob, sandbox::PolicyBase* cpolicy) + : job(cjob), policy(cpolicy) { + } +}; + +// Helper structure that allows the broker to track peer processes +struct PeerTracker { + HANDLE wait_object; + base::win::ScopedHandle process; + DWORD id; + HANDLE job_port; + PeerTracker(DWORD process_id, HANDLE broker_job_port) + : wait_object(NULL), id(process_id), job_port(broker_job_port) { + } +}; + +void DeregisterPeerTracker(PeerTracker* peer) { + // Deregistration shouldn't fail, but we leak rather than crash if it does. + if (::UnregisterWaitEx(peer->wait_object, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)) { + delete peer; + } else { + NOTREACHED(); + } +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +BrokerServicesBase::BrokerServicesBase() + : thread_pool_(NULL), job_port_(NULL), no_targets_(NULL), + job_thread_(NULL) { +} + +// The broker uses a dedicated worker thread that services the job completion +// port to perform policy notifications and associated cleanup tasks. +ResultCode BrokerServicesBase::Init() { + if ((NULL != job_port_) || (NULL != thread_pool_)) + return SBOX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_CALL; + + ::InitializeCriticalSection(&lock_); + + job_port_ = ::CreateIoCompletionPort(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL, 0, 0); + if (NULL == job_port_) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + no_targets_ = ::CreateEventW(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL); + + job_thread_ = ::CreateThread(NULL, 0, // Default security and stack. + TargetEventsThread, this, NULL, NULL); + if (NULL == job_thread_) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +// The destructor should only be called when the Broker process is terminating. +// Since BrokerServicesBase is a singleton, this is called from the CRT +// termination handlers, if this code lives on a DLL it is called during +// DLL_PROCESS_DETACH in other words, holding the loader lock, so we cannot +// wait for threads here. +BrokerServicesBase::~BrokerServicesBase() { + // If there is no port Init() was never called successfully. + if (!job_port_) + return; + + // Closing the port causes, that no more Job notifications are delivered to + // the worker thread and also causes the thread to exit. This is what we + // want to do since we are going to close all outstanding Jobs and notifying + // the policy objects ourselves. + ::PostQueuedCompletionStatus(job_port_, 0, THREAD_CTRL_QUIT, FALSE); + ::CloseHandle(job_port_); + + if (WAIT_TIMEOUT == ::WaitForSingleObject(job_thread_, 1000)) { + // Cannot clean broker services. + NOTREACHED(); + return; + } + + JobTrackerList::iterator it; + for (it = tracker_list_.begin(); it != tracker_list_.end(); ++it) { + JobTracker* tracker = (*it); + FreeResources(tracker); + delete tracker; + } + ::CloseHandle(job_thread_); + delete thread_pool_; + ::CloseHandle(no_targets_); + + // Cancel the wait events and delete remaining peer trackers. + for (PeerTrackerMap::iterator it = peer_map_.begin(); + it != peer_map_.end(); ++it) { + DeregisterPeerTracker(it->second); + } + + // If job_port_ isn't NULL, assumes that the lock has been initialized. + if (job_port_) + ::DeleteCriticalSection(&lock_); +} + +TargetPolicy* BrokerServicesBase::CreatePolicy() { + // If you change the type of the object being created here you must also + // change the downcast to it in SpawnTarget(). + return new PolicyBase; +} + +void BrokerServicesBase::FreeResources(JobTracker* tracker) { + if (NULL != tracker->policy) { + BOOL res = ::TerminateJobObject(tracker->job, SBOX_ALL_OK); + DCHECK(res); + // Closing the job causes the target process to be destroyed so this + // needs to happen before calling OnJobEmpty(). + res = ::CloseHandle(tracker->job); + DCHECK(res); + // In OnJobEmpty() we don't actually use the job handle directly. + tracker->policy->OnJobEmpty(tracker->job); + tracker->policy->Release(); + tracker->policy = NULL; + } +} + +// The worker thread stays in a loop waiting for asynchronous notifications +// from the job objects. Right now we only care about knowing when the last +// process on a job terminates, but in general this is the place to tell +// the policy about events. +DWORD WINAPI BrokerServicesBase::TargetEventsThread(PVOID param) { + if (NULL == param) + return 1; + + base::PlatformThread::SetName("BrokerEvent"); + + BrokerServicesBase* broker = reinterpret_cast<BrokerServicesBase*>(param); + HANDLE port = broker->job_port_; + HANDLE no_targets = broker->no_targets_; + + int target_counter = 0; + ::ResetEvent(no_targets); + + while (true) { + DWORD events = 0; + ULONG_PTR key = 0; + LPOVERLAPPED ovl = NULL; + + if (!::GetQueuedCompletionStatus(port, &events, &key, &ovl, INFINITE)) + // this call fails if the port has been closed before we have a + // chance to service the last packet which is 'exit' anyway so + // this is not an error. + return 1; + + if (key > THREAD_CTRL_LAST) { + // The notification comes from a job object. There are nine notifications + // that jobs can send and some of them depend on the job attributes set. + JobTracker* tracker = reinterpret_cast<JobTracker*>(key); + + switch (events) { + case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO: { + // The job object has signaled that the last process associated + // with it has terminated. Assuming there is no way for a process + // to appear out of thin air in this job, it safe to assume that + // we can tell the policy to destroy the target object, and for + // us to release our reference to the policy object. + FreeResources(tracker); + break; + } + + case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS: { + ++target_counter; + if (1 == target_counter) { + ::ResetEvent(no_targets); + } + break; + } + + case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_EXIT_PROCESS: + case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ABNORMAL_EXIT_PROCESS: { + { + AutoLock lock(&broker->lock_); + broker->child_process_ids_.erase(reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(ovl)); + } + --target_counter; + if (0 == target_counter) + ::SetEvent(no_targets); + + DCHECK(target_counter >= 0); + break; + } + + case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_LIMIT: { + break; + } + + default: { + NOTREACHED(); + break; + } + } + } else if (THREAD_CTRL_REMOVE_PEER == key) { + // Remove a process from our list of peers. + AutoLock lock(&broker->lock_); + PeerTrackerMap::iterator it = + broker->peer_map_.find(reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(ovl)); + DeregisterPeerTracker(it->second); + broker->peer_map_.erase(it); + } else if (THREAD_CTRL_QUIT == key) { + // The broker object is being destroyed so the thread needs to exit. + return 0; + } else { + // We have not implemented more commands. + NOTREACHED(); + } + } + + NOTREACHED(); + return 0; +} + +// SpawnTarget does all the interesting sandbox setup and creates the target +// process inside the sandbox. +ResultCode BrokerServicesBase::SpawnTarget(const wchar_t* exe_path, + const wchar_t* command_line, + TargetPolicy* policy, + PROCESS_INFORMATION* target_info) { + if (!exe_path) + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + + if (!policy) + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + + // Even though the resources touched by SpawnTarget can be accessed in + // multiple threads, the method itself cannot be called from more than + // 1 thread. This is to protect the global variables used while setting up + // the child process. + static DWORD thread_id = ::GetCurrentThreadId(); + DCHECK(thread_id == ::GetCurrentThreadId()); + + AutoLock lock(&lock_); + + // This downcast is safe as long as we control CreatePolicy() + PolicyBase* policy_base = static_cast<PolicyBase*>(policy); + + // Construct the tokens and the job object that we are going to associate + // with the soon to be created target process. + HANDLE initial_token_temp; + HANDLE lockdown_token_temp; + DWORD win_result = policy_base->MakeTokens(&initial_token_temp, + &lockdown_token_temp); + base::win::ScopedHandle initial_token(initial_token_temp); + base::win::ScopedHandle lockdown_token(lockdown_token_temp); + + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != win_result) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + HANDLE job_temp; + win_result = policy_base->MakeJobObject(&job_temp); + base::win::ScopedHandle job(job_temp); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != win_result) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + if (ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS == ::GetLastError()) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + // Construct the thread pool here in case it is expensive. + // The thread pool is shared by all the targets + if (NULL == thread_pool_) + thread_pool_ = new Win2kThreadPool(); + + // Create the TargetProces object and spawn the target suspended. Note that + // Brokerservices does not own the target object. It is owned by the Policy. + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation process_info; + TargetProcess* target = new TargetProcess(initial_token.Take(), + lockdown_token.Take(), + job, + thread_pool_); + + std::wstring desktop = policy_base->GetAlternateDesktop(); + + win_result = target->Create(exe_path, command_line, + desktop.empty() ? NULL : desktop.c_str(), + &process_info); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != win_result) + return SpawnCleanup(target, win_result); + + // Now the policy is the owner of the target. + if (!policy_base->AddTarget(target)) { + return SpawnCleanup(target, 0); + } + + // We are going to keep a pointer to the policy because we'll call it when + // the job object generates notifications using the completion port. + policy_base->AddRef(); + scoped_ptr<JobTracker> tracker(new JobTracker(job.Take(), policy_base)); + if (!AssociateCompletionPort(tracker->job, job_port_, tracker.get())) + return SpawnCleanup(target, 0); + // Save the tracker because in cleanup we might need to force closing + // the Jobs. + tracker_list_.push_back(tracker.release()); + child_process_ids_.insert(process_info.process_id()); + + *target_info = process_info.Take(); + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + + +ResultCode BrokerServicesBase::WaitForAllTargets() { + ::WaitForSingleObject(no_targets_, INFINITE); + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +bool BrokerServicesBase::IsActiveTarget(DWORD process_id) { + AutoLock lock(&lock_); + return child_process_ids_.find(process_id) != child_process_ids_.end() || + peer_map_.find(process_id) != peer_map_.end(); +} + +VOID CALLBACK BrokerServicesBase::RemovePeer(PVOID parameter, BOOLEAN timeout) { + PeerTracker* peer = reinterpret_cast<PeerTracker*>(parameter); + // Don't check the return code because we this may fail (safely) at shutdown. + ::PostQueuedCompletionStatus(peer->job_port, 0, THREAD_CTRL_REMOVE_PEER, + reinterpret_cast<LPOVERLAPPED>(peer->id)); +} + +ResultCode BrokerServicesBase::AddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) { + scoped_ptr<PeerTracker> peer(new PeerTracker(::GetProcessId(peer_process), + job_port_)); + if (!peer->id) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + HANDLE process_handle; + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), peer_process, + ::GetCurrentProcess(), &process_handle, + SYNCHRONIZE, FALSE, 0)) { + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + } + peer->process.Set(process_handle); + + AutoLock lock(&lock_); + if (!peer_map_.insert(std::make_pair(peer->id, peer.get())).second) + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + + if (!::RegisterWaitForSingleObject( + &peer->wait_object, peer->process, RemovePeer, peer.get(), INFINITE, + WT_EXECUTEONLYONCE | WT_EXECUTEINWAITTHREAD)) { + peer_map_.erase(peer->id); + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + } + + // Release the pointer since it will be cleaned up by the callback. + peer.release(); + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/broker_services.h b/sandbox/win/src/broker_services.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d9c730 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/broker_services.h @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_BROKER_SERVICES_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_BROKER_SERVICES_H__ + +#include <list> +#include <map> +#include <set> +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/job.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win2k_threadpool.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { + +struct JobTracker; +struct PeerTracker; + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +class PolicyBase; + +// BrokerServicesBase --------------------------------------------------------- +// Broker implementation version 0 +// +// This is an implementation of the interface BrokerServices and +// of the associated TargetProcess interface. In this implementation +// TargetProcess is a friend of BrokerServices where the later manages a +// collection of the former. +class BrokerServicesBase : public BrokerServices, + public SingletonBase<BrokerServicesBase> { + public: + BrokerServicesBase(); + + ~BrokerServicesBase(); + + // The next five methods are the BrokerServices interface + virtual ResultCode Init(); + + virtual TargetPolicy* CreatePolicy(); + + virtual ResultCode SpawnTarget(const wchar_t* exe_path, + const wchar_t* command_line, + TargetPolicy* policy, + PROCESS_INFORMATION* target); + + virtual ResultCode WaitForAllTargets(); + + virtual ResultCode AddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process); + + // Checks if the supplied process ID matches one of the broker's active + // target processes + // Returns: + // true if there is an active target process for this ID, otherwise false. + bool IsActiveTarget(DWORD process_id); + + private: + // Releases the Job and notifies the associated Policy object to its + // resources as well. + static void FreeResources(JobTracker* tracker); + + // The routine that the worker thread executes. It is in charge of + // notifications and cleanup-related tasks. + static DWORD WINAPI TargetEventsThread(PVOID param); + + // Removes a target peer from the process list if it expires. + static VOID CALLBACK RemovePeer(PVOID parameter, BOOLEAN timeout); + + // The completion port used by the job objects to communicate events to + // the worker thread. + HANDLE job_port_; + + // Handle to a manual-reset event that is signaled when the total target + // process count reaches zero. + HANDLE no_targets_; + + // Handle to the worker thread that reacts to job notifications. + HANDLE job_thread_; + + // Lock used to protect the list of targets from being modified by 2 + // threads at the same time. + CRITICAL_SECTION lock_; + + // provides a pool of threads that are used to wait on the IPC calls. + ThreadProvider* thread_pool_; + + // List of the trackers for closing and cleanup purposes. + typedef std::list<JobTracker*> JobTrackerList; + JobTrackerList tracker_list_; + + // Maps peer process IDs to the saved handle and wait event. + // Prevents peer callbacks from accessing the broker after destruction. + typedef std::map<DWORD, PeerTracker*> PeerTrackerMap; + PeerTrackerMap peer_map_; + + // Provides a fast lookup to identify sandboxed processes. + std::set<DWORD> child_process_ids_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(BrokerServicesBase); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_BROKER_SERVICES_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_client.h b/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_client.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e92c1d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_client.h @@ -0,0 +1,483 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_CLIENT_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_CLIENT_H_ + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" + +// This header defines the CrossCall(..) family of templated functions +// Their purpose is to simulate the syntax of regular call but to generate +// and IPC from the client-side. +// +// The basic pattern is to +// 1) use template argument deduction to compute the size of each +// parameter and the appropriate copy method +// 2) pack the parameters in the appropriate ActualCallParams< > object +// 3) call the IPC interface IPCProvider::DoCall( ) +// +// The general interface of CrossCall is: +// ResultCode CrossCall(IPCProvider& ipc_provider, +// uint32 tag, +// const Par1& p1, const Par2& p2,...pn +// CrossCallReturn* answer) +// +// where: +// ipc_provider: is a specific implementation of the ipc transport see +// sharedmem_ipc_server.h for an example. +// tag : is the unique id for this IPC call. Is used to route the call to +// the appropriate service. +// p1, p2,.. pn : The input parameters of the IPC. Use only simple types +// and wide strings (can add support for others). +// answer : If the IPC was successful. The server-side answer is here. The +// interpretation of the answer is private to client and server. +// +// The return value is ALL_OK if the IPC was delivered to the server, other +// return codes indicate that the IPC transport failed to deliver it. +namespace sandbox { + +// this is the assumed channel size. This can be overridden in a given +// IPC implementation. +const uint32 kIPCChannelSize = 1024; + +// The copy helper uses templates to deduce the appropriate copy function to +// copy the input parameters in the buffer that is going to be send across the +// IPC. These template facility can be made more sophisticated as need arises. + +// The default copy helper. It catches the general case where no other +// specialized template matches better. We set the type to ULONG_TYPE, so this +// only works with objects whose size is 32 bits. +template<typename T> +class CopyHelper { + public: + CopyHelper(const T& t) : t_(t) {} + + // Returns the pointer to the start of the input. + const void* GetStart() const { + return &t_; + } + + // Update the stored value with the value in the buffer. This is not + // supported for this type. + bool Update(void* buffer) { + // Not supported; + return true; + } + + // Returns the size of the input in bytes. + uint32 GetSize() const { + return sizeof(T); + } + + // Returns true if the current type is used as an In or InOut parameter. + bool IsInOut() { + return false; + } + + // Returns this object's type. + ArgType GetType() { + COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(T) == sizeof(uint32), need_specialization); + return ULONG_TYPE; + } + + private: + const T& t_; +}; + +// This copy helper template specialization if for the void pointer +// case both 32 and 64 bit. +template<> +class CopyHelper<void*> { + public: + CopyHelper(void* t) : t_(t) {} + + // Returns the pointer to the start of the input. + const void* GetStart() const { + return &t_; + } + + // Update the stored value with the value in the buffer. This is not + // supported for this type. + bool Update(void* buffer) { + // Not supported; + return true; + } + + // Returns the size of the input in bytes. + uint32 GetSize() const { + return sizeof(t_); + } + + // Returns true if the current type is used as an In or InOut parameter. + bool IsInOut() { + return false; + } + + // Returns this object's type. + ArgType GetType() { + return VOIDPTR_TYPE; + } + + private: + const void* t_; +}; + +// This copy helper template specialization catches the cases where the +// parameter is a pointer to a string. +template<> +class CopyHelper<const wchar_t*> { + public: + CopyHelper(const wchar_t* t) + : t_(t) { + } + + // Returns the pointer to the start of the string. + const void* GetStart() const { + return t_; + } + + // Update the stored value with the value in the buffer. This is not + // supported for this type. + bool Update(void* buffer) { + // Not supported; + return true; + } + + // Returns the size of the string in bytes. We define a NULL string to + // be of zero length. + uint32 GetSize() const { + __try { + return (!t_) ? 0 : static_cast<uint32>(StringLength(t_) * sizeof(t_[0])); + } + __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + return kuint32max; + } + } + + // Returns true if the current type is used as an In or InOut parameter. + bool IsInOut() { + return false; + } + + ArgType GetType() { + return WCHAR_TYPE; + } + + private: + // We provide our not very optimized version of wcslen(), since we don't + // want to risk having the linker use the version in the CRT since the CRT + // might not be present when we do an early IPC call. + static size_t __cdecl StringLength(const wchar_t* wcs) { + const wchar_t *eos = wcs; + while (*eos++); + return static_cast<size_t>(eos - wcs - 1); + } + + const wchar_t* t_; +}; + +// Specialization for non-const strings. We just reuse the implementation of the +// const string specialization. +template<> +class CopyHelper<wchar_t*> : public CopyHelper<const wchar_t*> { + public: + typedef CopyHelper<const wchar_t*> Base; + CopyHelper(wchar_t* t) : Base(t) {} + + const void* GetStart() const { + return Base::GetStart(); + } + + bool Update(void* buffer) { + return Base::Update(buffer); + } + + uint32 GetSize() const { + return Base::GetSize(); + } + + bool IsInOut() { + return Base::IsInOut(); + } + + ArgType GetType() { + return Base::GetType(); + } +}; + +// Specialization for wchar_t arrays strings. We just reuse the implementation +// of the const string specialization. +template<size_t n> +class CopyHelper<const wchar_t[n]> : public CopyHelper<const wchar_t*> { + public: + typedef const wchar_t array[n]; + typedef CopyHelper<const wchar_t*> Base; + CopyHelper(array t) : Base(t) {} + + const void* GetStart() const { + return Base::GetStart(); + } + + bool Update(void* buffer) { + return Base::Update(buffer); + } + + uint32 GetSize() const { + return Base::GetSize(); + } + + bool IsInOut() { + return Base::IsInOut(); + } + + ArgType GetType() { + return Base::GetType(); + } +}; + +// Generic encapsulation class containing a pointer to a buffer and the +// size of the buffer. It is used by the IPC to be able to pass in/out +// parameters. +class InOutCountedBuffer : public CountedBuffer { + public: + InOutCountedBuffer(void* buffer, uint32 size) : CountedBuffer(buffer, size) {} +}; + +// This copy helper template specialization catches the cases where the +// parameter is a an input/output buffer. +template<> +class CopyHelper<InOutCountedBuffer> { + public: + CopyHelper(const InOutCountedBuffer t) : t_(t) {} + + // Returns the pointer to the start of the string. + const void* GetStart() const { + return t_.Buffer(); + } + + // Updates the buffer with the value from the new buffer in parameter. + bool Update(void* buffer) { + // We are touching user memory, this has to be done from inside a try + // except. + __try { + memcpy(t_.Buffer(), buffer, t_.Size()); + } + __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + return false; + } + return true; + } + + // Returns the size of the string in bytes. We define a NULL string to + // be of zero length. + uint32 GetSize() const { + return t_.Size(); + } + + // Returns true if the current type is used as an In or InOut parameter. + bool IsInOut() { + return true; + } + + ArgType GetType() { + return INOUTPTR_TYPE; + } + + private: + const InOutCountedBuffer t_; +}; + +// The following two macros make it less error prone the generation +// of CrossCall functions with ever more input parameters. + +#define XCALL_GEN_PARAMS_OBJ(num, params) \ + typedef ActualCallParams<num, kIPCChannelSize> ActualParams; \ + void* raw_mem = ipc_provider.GetBuffer(); \ + if (NULL == raw_mem) \ + return SBOX_ERROR_NO_SPACE; \ + ActualParams* params = new(raw_mem) ActualParams(tag); + +#define XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(num, params) \ + COMPILE_ASSERT(kMaxIpcParams >= num, too_many_parameters); \ + CopyHelper<Par##num> ch##num(p##num); \ + if (!params->CopyParamIn(num - 1, ch##num.GetStart(), ch##num.GetSize(), \ + ch##num.IsInOut(), ch##num.GetType())) \ + return SBOX_ERROR_NO_SPACE; + +#define XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(num, params) \ + if (!ch##num.Update(params->GetParamPtr(num-1))) {\ + ipc_provider.FreeBuffer(raw_mem); \ + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; \ + } + +#define XCALL_GEN_FREE_CHANNEL() \ + ipc_provider.FreeBuffer(raw_mem); + +// CrossCall template with one input parameter +template <typename IPCProvider, typename Par1> +ResultCode CrossCall(IPCProvider& ipc_provider, uint32 tag, const Par1& p1, + CrossCallReturn* answer) { + XCALL_GEN_PARAMS_OBJ(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(1, call_params); + + ResultCode result = ipc_provider.DoCall(call_params, answer); + + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) { + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_FREE_CHANNEL(); + } + + return result; +} + +// CrossCall template with two input parameters. +template <typename IPCProvider, typename Par1, typename Par2> +ResultCode CrossCall(IPCProvider& ipc_provider, uint32 tag, const Par1& p1, + const Par2& p2, CrossCallReturn* answer) { + XCALL_GEN_PARAMS_OBJ(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(2, call_params); + + ResultCode result = ipc_provider.DoCall(call_params, answer); + + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) { + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_FREE_CHANNEL(); + } + return result; +} + +// CrossCall template with three input parameters. +template <typename IPCProvider, typename Par1, typename Par2, typename Par3> +ResultCode CrossCall(IPCProvider& ipc_provider, uint32 tag, const Par1& p1, + const Par2& p2, const Par3& p3, CrossCallReturn* answer) { + XCALL_GEN_PARAMS_OBJ(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(3, call_params); + + ResultCode result = ipc_provider.DoCall(call_params, answer); + + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) { + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_FREE_CHANNEL(); + } + return result; +} + +// CrossCall template with four input parameters. +template <typename IPCProvider, typename Par1, typename Par2, typename Par3, + typename Par4> +ResultCode CrossCall(IPCProvider& ipc_provider, uint32 tag, const Par1& p1, + const Par2& p2, const Par3& p3, const Par4& p4, + CrossCallReturn* answer) { + XCALL_GEN_PARAMS_OBJ(4, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(4, call_params); + + ResultCode result = ipc_provider.DoCall(call_params, answer); + + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) { + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(4, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_FREE_CHANNEL(); + } + return result; +} + +// CrossCall template with five input parameters. +template <typename IPCProvider, typename Par1, typename Par2, typename Par3, + typename Par4, typename Par5> +ResultCode CrossCall(IPCProvider& ipc_provider, uint32 tag, const Par1& p1, + const Par2& p2, const Par3& p3, const Par4& p4, + const Par5& p5, CrossCallReturn* answer) { + XCALL_GEN_PARAMS_OBJ(5, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(4, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(5, call_params); + + ResultCode result = ipc_provider.DoCall(call_params, answer); + + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) { + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(4, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(5, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_FREE_CHANNEL(); + } + return result; +} + +// CrossCall template with six input parameters. +template <typename IPCProvider, typename Par1, typename Par2, typename Par3, + typename Par4, typename Par5, typename Par6> +ResultCode CrossCall(IPCProvider& ipc_provider, uint32 tag, const Par1& p1, + const Par2& p2, const Par3& p3, const Par4& p4, + const Par5& p5, const Par6& p6, CrossCallReturn* answer) { + XCALL_GEN_PARAMS_OBJ(6, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(4, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(5, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(6, call_params); + + ResultCode result = ipc_provider.DoCall(call_params, answer); + + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) { + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(4, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(5, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(6, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_FREE_CHANNEL(); + } + return result; +} + +// CrossCall template with seven input parameters. +template <typename IPCProvider, typename Par1, typename Par2, typename Par3, + typename Par4, typename Par5, typename Par6, typename Par7> +ResultCode CrossCall(IPCProvider& ipc_provider, uint32 tag, const Par1& p1, + const Par2& p2, const Par3& p3, const Par4& p4, + const Par5& p5, const Par6& p6, const Par7& p7, + CrossCallReturn* answer) { + XCALL_GEN_PARAMS_OBJ(7, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(4, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(5, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(6, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_COPY_PARAM(7, call_params); + + ResultCode result = ipc_provider.DoCall(call_params, answer); + + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) { + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(1, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(2, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(3, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(4, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(5, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(6, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_UPDATE_PARAM(7, call_params); + XCALL_GEN_FREE_CHANNEL(); + } + return result; +} +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_CLIENT_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_params.h b/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_params.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4c047b --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_params.h @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_PARAMS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_PARAMS_H__ + +#include <windows.h> +#include <lmaccess.h> + +#include <memory> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/internal_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace { + +// Increases |value| until there is no need for padding given an int64 +// alignment. Returns the increased value. +uint32 Align(uint32 value) { + uint32 alignment = sizeof(int64); + return ((value + alignment - 1) / alignment) * alignment; +} + +} +// This header is part of CrossCall: the sandbox inter-process communication. +// This header defines the basic types used both in the client IPC and in the +// server IPC code. CrossCallParams and ActualCallParams model the input +// parameters of an IPC call and CrossCallReturn models the output params and +// the return value. +// +// An IPC call is defined by its 'tag' which is a (uint32) unique identifier +// that is used to route the IPC call to the proper server. Every tag implies +// a complete call signature including the order and type of each parameter. +// +// Like most IPC systems. CrossCall is designed to take as inputs 'simple' +// types such as integers and strings. Classes, generic arrays or pointers to +// them are not supported. +// +// Another limitation of CrossCall is that the return value and output +// parameters can only be uint32 integers. Returning complex structures or +// strings is not supported. + +namespace sandbox { + +// max number of extended return parameters. See CrossCallReturn +const size_t kExtendedReturnCount = 8; + +// Union of multiple types to be used as extended results +// in the CrossCallReturn. +union MultiType { + uint32 unsigned_int; + void* pointer; + HANDLE handle; + ULONG_PTR ulong_ptr; +}; + +// Maximum number of IPC parameters currently supported. +// To increase this value, we have to: +// - Add another Callback typedef to Dispatcher. +// - Add another case to the switch on SharedMemIPCServer::InvokeCallback. +// - Add another case to the switch in GetActualAndMaxBufferSize +const int kMaxIpcParams = 9; + +// Contains the information about a parameter in the ipc buffer. +struct ParamInfo { + ArgType type_; + uint32 offset_; + uint32 size_; +}; + +// Models the return value and the return parameters of an IPC call +// currently limited to one status code and eight generic return values +// which cannot be pointers to other data. For x64 ports this structure +// might have to use other integer types. +struct CrossCallReturn { + // the IPC tag. It should match the original IPC tag. + uint32 tag; + // The result of the IPC operation itself. + ResultCode call_outcome; + // the result of the IPC call as executed in the server. The interpretation + // of this value depends on the specific service. + union { + NTSTATUS nt_status; + DWORD win32_result; + }; + // Number of extended return values. + uint32 extended_count; + // for calls that should return a windows handle. It is found here. + HANDLE handle; + // The array of extended values. + MultiType extended[kExtendedReturnCount]; +}; + +// CrossCallParams base class that models the input params all packed in a +// single compact memory blob. The representation can vary but in general a +// given child of this class is meant to represent all input parameters +// necessary to make a IPC call. +// +// This class cannot have virtual members because its assumed the IPC +// parameters start from the 'this' pointer to the end, which is defined by +// one of the subclasses +// +// Objects of this class cannot be constructed directly. Only derived +// classes have the proper knowledge to construct it. +class CrossCallParams { + public: + // Returns the tag (ipc unique id) associated with this IPC. + uint32 GetTag() const { + return tag_; + } + + // Returns the beggining of the buffer where the IPC params can be stored. + // prior to an IPC call + const void* GetBuffer() const { + return this; + } + + // Returns how many parameter this IPC call should have. + const uint32 GetParamsCount() const { + return params_count_; + } + + // Returns a pointer to the CrossCallReturn structure. + CrossCallReturn* GetCallReturn() { + return &call_return; + } + + // Returns TRUE if this call contains InOut parameters. + const bool IsInOut() const { + return (1 == is_in_out_); + } + + // Tells the CrossCall object if it contains InOut parameters. + void SetIsInOut(bool value) { + if (value) + is_in_out_ = 1; + else + is_in_out_ = 0; + } + + protected: + // constructs the IPC call params. Called only from the derived classes + CrossCallParams(uint32 tag, uint32 params_count) + : tag_(tag), + params_count_(params_count), + is_in_out_(0) { + } + + private: + uint32 tag_; + uint32 is_in_out_; + CrossCallReturn call_return; + const uint32 params_count_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(CrossCallParams); +}; + +// ActualCallParams models an specific IPC call parameters with respect to the +// storage allocation that the packed parameters should need. +// NUMBER_PARAMS: the number of parameters, valid from 1 to N +// BLOCK_SIZE: the total storage that the NUMBER_PARAMS parameters can take, +// typically the block size is defined by the channel size of the underlying +// ipc mechanism. +// In practice this class is used to levergage C++ capacity to properly +// calculate sizes and displacements given the possibility of the packed params +// blob to be complex. +// +// As is, this class assumes that the layout of the blob is as follows. Assume +// that NUMBER_PARAMS = 2 and a 32-bit build: +// +// [ tag 4 bytes] +// [ IsOnOut 4 bytes] +// [ call return 52 bytes] +// [ params count 4 bytes] +// [ parameter 0 type 4 bytes] +// [ parameter 0 offset 4 bytes] ---delta to ---\ +// [ parameter 0 size 4 bytes] | +// [ parameter 1 type 4 bytes] | +// [ parameter 1 offset 4 bytes] ---------------|--\ +// [ parameter 1 size 4 bytes] | | +// [ parameter 2 type 4 bytes] | | +// [ parameter 2 offset 4 bytes] ----------------------\ +// [ parameter 2 size 4 bytes] | | | +// |---------------------------| | | | +// | value 0 (x bytes) | <--------------/ | | +// | value 1 (y bytes) | <-----------------/ | +// | | | +// | end of buffer | <---------------------/ +// |---------------------------| +// +// Note that the actual number of params is NUMBER_PARAMS + 1 +// so that the size of each actual param can be computed from the difference +// between one parameter and the next down. The offset of the last param +// points to the end of the buffer and the type and size are undefined. +// +template <size_t NUMBER_PARAMS, size_t BLOCK_SIZE> +class ActualCallParams : public CrossCallParams { + public: + // constructor. Pass the ipc unique tag as input + explicit ActualCallParams(uint32 tag) + : CrossCallParams(tag, NUMBER_PARAMS) { + param_info_[0].offset_ = parameters_ - reinterpret_cast<char*>(this); + } + + // Testing-only constructor. Allows setting the |number_params| to a + // wrong value. + ActualCallParams(uint32 tag, uint32 number_params) + : CrossCallParams(tag, number_params) { + param_info_[0].offset_ = parameters_ - reinterpret_cast<char*>(this); + } + + // Testing-only method. Allows setting the apparent size to a wrong value. + // returns the previous size. + uint32 OverrideSize(uint32 new_size) { + uint32 previous_size = param_info_[NUMBER_PARAMS].offset_; + param_info_[NUMBER_PARAMS].offset_ = new_size; + return previous_size; + } + + // Copies each paramter into the internal buffer. For each you must supply: + // index: 0 for the first param, 1 for the next an so on + bool CopyParamIn(uint32 index, const void* parameter_address, uint32 size, + bool is_in_out, ArgType type) { + if (index >= NUMBER_PARAMS) { + return false; + } + + if (kuint32max == size) { + // Memory error while getting the size. + return false; + } + + if (size && !parameter_address) { + return false; + } + + if (param_info_[index].offset_ > sizeof(*this)) { + // It does not fit, abort copy. + return false; + } + + char* dest = reinterpret_cast<char*>(this) + param_info_[index].offset_; + + // We might be touching user memory, this has to be done from inside a try + // except. + __try { + memcpy(dest, parameter_address, size); + } + __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + return false; + } + + // Set the flag to tell the broker to update the buffer once the call is + // made. + if (is_in_out) + SetIsInOut(true); + + param_info_[index + 1].offset_ = Align(param_info_[index].offset_ + + size); + param_info_[index].size_ = size; + param_info_[index].type_ = type; + return true; + } + + // Returns a pointer to a parameter in the memory section. + void* GetParamPtr(size_t index) { + return reinterpret_cast<char*>(this) + param_info_[index].offset_; + } + + // Returns the total size of the buffer. Only valid once all the paramters + // have been copied in with CopyParamIn. + uint32 GetSize() const { + return param_info_[NUMBER_PARAMS].offset_; + } + + protected: + ActualCallParams() : CrossCallParams(0, NUMBER_PARAMS) { } + + private: + ParamInfo param_info_[NUMBER_PARAMS + 1]; + char parameters_[BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(CrossCallParams) + - sizeof(ParamInfo) * (NUMBER_PARAMS + 1)]; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ActualCallParams); +}; + +COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(ActualCallParams<1, 1024>) == 1024, bad_size_buffer); +COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(ActualCallParams<2, 1024>) == 1024, bad_size_buffer); +COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(ActualCallParams<3, 1024>) == 1024, bad_size_buffer); + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_PARAMS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_server.cc b/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_server.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f40b677 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_server.cc @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <string> +#include <vector> + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "base/logging.h" + +// This code performs the ipc message validation. Potential security flaws +// on the ipc are likelier to be found in this code than in the rest of +// the ipc code. + +namespace { + +// The buffer for a message must match the max channel size. +const size_t kMaxBufferSize = sandbox::kIPCChannelSize; + +} + +namespace sandbox { + +// Returns the actual size for the parameters in an IPC buffer. Returns +// zero if the |param_count| is zero or too big. +uint32 GetActualBufferSize(uint32 param_count, void* buffer_base) { + // The template types are used to calculate the maximum expected size. + typedef ActualCallParams<1, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP1; + typedef ActualCallParams<2, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP2; + typedef ActualCallParams<3, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP3; + typedef ActualCallParams<4, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP4; + typedef ActualCallParams<5, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP5; + typedef ActualCallParams<6, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP6; + typedef ActualCallParams<7, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP7; + typedef ActualCallParams<8, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP8; + typedef ActualCallParams<9, kMaxBufferSize> ActualCP9; + + // Retrieve the actual size and the maximum size of the params buffer. + switch (param_count) { + case 0: + return 0; + case 1: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP1*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + case 2: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP2*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + case 3: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP3*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + case 4: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP4*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + case 5: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP5*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + case 6: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP6*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + case 7: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP7*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + case 8: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP8*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + case 9: + return reinterpret_cast<ActualCP9*>(buffer_base)->GetSize(); + default: + NOTREACHED(); + return 0; + } +} + +CrossCallParamsEx::CrossCallParamsEx() + :CrossCallParams(0, 0) { +} + +// We override the delete operator because the object's backing memory +// is hand allocated in CreateFromBuffer. We don't override the new operator +// because the constructors are private so there is no way to mismatch +// new & delete. +void CrossCallParamsEx::operator delete(void* raw_memory) throw() { + if (NULL == raw_memory) { + // C++ standard allows 'delete 0' behavior. + return; + } + delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(raw_memory); +} + +// This function uses a SEH try block so cannot use C++ objects that +// have destructors or else you get Compiler Error C2712. So no DCHECKs +// inside this function. +CrossCallParamsEx* CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(void* buffer_base, + uint32 buffer_size, + uint32* output_size) { + // IMPORTANT: Everything inside buffer_base and derived from it such + // as param_count and declared_size is untrusted. + if (NULL == buffer_base) { + return NULL; + } + if (buffer_size < sizeof(CrossCallParams)) { + return NULL; + } + if (buffer_size > kMaxBufferSize) { + return NULL; + } + + char* backing_mem = NULL; + uint32 param_count = 0; + uint32 declared_size; + uint32 min_declared_size; + CrossCallParamsEx* copied_params = NULL; + + // Touching the untrusted buffer is done under a SEH try block. This + // will catch memory access violations so we don't crash. + __try { + CrossCallParams* call_params = + reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParams*>(buffer_base); + + // Check against the minimum size given the number of stated params + // if too small we bail out. + param_count = call_params->GetParamsCount(); + min_declared_size = sizeof(CrossCallParams) + + ((param_count + 1) * sizeof(ParamInfo)); + + if ((buffer_size < min_declared_size) || + (sizeof(CrossCallParamsEx) > min_declared_size)) { + // Minimal computed size bigger than existing buffer or param_count + // integer overflow. + return NULL; + } + + // Retrieve the declared size which if it fails returns 0. + declared_size = GetActualBufferSize(param_count, buffer_base); + + if ((declared_size > buffer_size) || + (declared_size < min_declared_size)) { + // Declared size is bigger than buffer or smaller than computed size + // or param_count 0 or bigger than 9. + return NULL; + } + + // Now we copy the actual amount of the message. + *output_size = declared_size; + backing_mem = new char[declared_size]; + copied_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParamsEx*>(backing_mem); + memcpy(backing_mem, call_params, declared_size); + + // Check params count in case it got changed right before the memcpy. + if (copied_params->GetParamsCount() != param_count) { + delete [] backing_mem; + return NULL; + } + + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + // In case of a windows exception we know it occurred while touching the + // untrusted buffer so we bail out as is. + delete [] backing_mem; + return NULL; + } + + const char* last_byte = &backing_mem[declared_size]; + const char* first_byte = &backing_mem[min_declared_size]; + + // Verify here that all and each parameters make sense. This is done in the + // local copy. + for (uint32 ix =0; ix != param_count; ++ix) { + uint32 size = 0; + ArgType type; + char* address = reinterpret_cast<char*>( + copied_params->GetRawParameter(ix, &size, &type)); + if ((NULL == address) || // No null params. + (INVALID_TYPE >= type) || (LAST_TYPE <= type) || // Unknown type. + (address < backing_mem) || // Start cannot point before buffer. + (address < first_byte) || // Start cannot point too low. + (address > last_byte) || // Start cannot point past buffer. + ((address + size) < address) || // Invalid size. + ((address + size) > last_byte)) { // End cannot point past buffer. + // Malformed. + delete[] backing_mem; + return NULL; + } + } + // The parameter buffer looks good. + return copied_params; +} + +// Accessors to the parameters in the raw buffer. +void* CrossCallParamsEx::GetRawParameter(uint32 index, uint32* size, + ArgType* type) { + if (index >= GetParamsCount()) { + return NULL; + } + // The size is always computed from the parameter minus the next + // parameter, this works because the message has an extra parameter slot + *size = param_info_[index].size_; + *type = param_info_[index].type_; + + return param_info_[index].offset_ + reinterpret_cast<char*>(this); +} + +// Covers common case for 32 bit integers. +bool CrossCallParamsEx::GetParameter32(uint32 index, uint32* param) { + uint32 size = 0; + ArgType type; + void* start = GetRawParameter(index, &size, &type); + if ((NULL == start) || (4 != size) || (ULONG_TYPE != type)) { + return false; + } + // Copy the 4 bytes. + *(reinterpret_cast<uint32*>(param)) = *(reinterpret_cast<uint32*>(start)); + return true; +} + +bool CrossCallParamsEx::GetParameterVoidPtr(uint32 index, void** param) { + uint32 size = 0; + ArgType type; + void* start = GetRawParameter(index, &size, &type); + if ((NULL == start) || (sizeof(void*) != size) || (VOIDPTR_TYPE != type)) { + return false; + } + *param = *(reinterpret_cast<void**>(start)); + return true; +} + +// Covers the common case of reading a string. Note that the string is not +// scanned for invalid characters. +bool CrossCallParamsEx::GetParameterStr(uint32 index, std::wstring* string) { + uint32 size = 0; + ArgType type; + void* start = GetRawParameter(index, &size, &type); + if (WCHAR_TYPE != type) { + return false; + } + + // Check if this is an empty string. + if (size == 0) { + *string = L""; + return true; + } + + if ((NULL == start) || ((size % sizeof(wchar_t)) != 0)) { + return false; + } + string->append(reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(start), size/(sizeof(wchar_t))); + return true; +} + +bool CrossCallParamsEx::GetParameterPtr(uint32 index, uint32 expected_size, + void** pointer) { + uint32 size = 0; + ArgType type; + void* start = GetRawParameter(index, &size, &type); + + if ((size != expected_size) || (INOUTPTR_TYPE != type)) { + return false; + } + + if (NULL == start) { + return false; + } + + *pointer = start; + return true; +} + +void SetCallError(ResultCode error, CrossCallReturn* call_return) { + call_return->call_outcome = error; + call_return->extended_count = 0; +} + +void SetCallSuccess(CrossCallReturn* call_return) { + call_return->call_outcome = SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +Dispatcher* Dispatcher::OnMessageReady(IPCParams* ipc, + CallbackGeneric* callback) { + DCHECK(callback); + std::vector<IPCCall>::iterator it = ipc_calls_.begin(); + for (; it != ipc_calls_.end(); ++it) { + if (it->params.Matches(ipc)) { + *callback = it->callback; + return this; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_server.h b/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_server.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59445f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/crosscall_server.h @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_SERVER_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_SERVER_H_ + +#include <string> +#include <vector> +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/callback.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_params.h" + +// This is the IPC server interface for CrossCall: The IPC for the Sandbox +// On the server, CrossCall needs two things: +// 1) threads: Or better said, someone to provide them, that is what the +// ThreadProvider interface is defined for. These thread(s) are +// the ones that will actually execute the IPC data retrieval. +// +// 2) a dispatcher: This interface represents the way to route and process +// an IPC call given the IPC tag. +// +// The other class included here CrossCallParamsEx is the server side version +// of the CrossCallParams class of /sandbox/crosscall_params.h The difference +// is that the sever version is paranoid about the correctness of the IPC +// message and will do all sorts of verifications. +// +// A general diagram of the interaction is as follows: +// +// ------------ +// | | +// ThreadProvider <--(1)Register--| IPC | +// | | Implemen | +// | | -tation | +// (2) | | OnMessage +// IPC fired --callback ------>| |--(3)---> Dispatcher +// | | +// ------------ +// +// The IPC implementation sits as a middleman between the handling of the +// specifics of scheduling a thread to service the IPC and the multiple +// entities that can potentially serve each particular IPC. +namespace sandbox { + +class InterceptionManager; + +// This function signature is required as the callback when an IPC call fires. +// context: a user-defined pointer that was set using ThreadProvider +// reason: 0 if the callback was fired because of a timeout. +// 1 if the callback was fired because of an event. +typedef void (__stdcall * CrossCallIPCCallback)(void* context, + unsigned char reason); + +// ThreadProvider models a thread factory. The idea is to decouple thread +// creation and lifetime from the inner guts of the IPC. The contract is +// simple: +// - the IPC implementation calls RegisterWait with a waitable object that +// becomes signaled when an IPC arrives and needs to be serviced. +// - when the waitable object becomes signaled, the thread provider conjures +// a thread that calls the callback (CrossCallIPCCallback) function +// - the callback function tries its best not to block and return quickly +// and should not assume that the next callback will use the same thread +// - when the callback returns the ThreadProvider owns again the thread +// and can destroy it or keep it around. +class ThreadProvider { + public: + // Registers a waitable object with the thread provider. + // client: A number to associate with all the RegisterWait calls, typically + // this is the address of the caller object. This parameter cannot + // be zero. + // waitable_object : a kernel object that can be waited on + // callback: a function pointer which is the function that will be called + // when the waitable object fires + // context: a user-provider pointer that is passed back to the callback + // when its called + virtual bool RegisterWait(const void* client, HANDLE waitable_object, + CrossCallIPCCallback callback, + void* context) = 0; + + // Removes all the registrations done with the same cookie parameter. + // This frees internal thread pool resources. + virtual bool UnRegisterWaits(void* cookie) = 0; + virtual ~ThreadProvider() {} +}; + +// Models the server-side of the original input parameters. +// Provides IPC buffer validation and it is capable of reading the parameters +// out of the IPC buffer. +class CrossCallParamsEx : public CrossCallParams { + public: + // Factory constructor. Pass an IPCbuffer (and buffer size) that contains a + // pending IPCcall. This constructor will: + // 1) validate the IPC buffer. returns NULL is the IPCbuffer is malformed. + // 2) make a copy of the IPCbuffer (parameter capture) + static CrossCallParamsEx* CreateFromBuffer(void* buffer_base, + uint32 buffer_size, + uint32* output_size); + + // Provides IPCinput parameter raw access: + // index : the parameter to read; 0 is the first parameter + // returns NULL if the parameter is non-existent. If it exists it also + // returns the size in *size + void* GetRawParameter(uint32 index, uint32* size, ArgType* type); + + // Gets a parameter that is four bytes in size. + // Returns false if the parameter does not exist or is not 32 bits wide. + bool GetParameter32(uint32 index, uint32* param); + + // Gets a parameter that is void pointer in size. + // Returns false if the parameter does not exist or is not void pointer sized. + bool GetParameterVoidPtr(uint32 index, void** param); + + // Gets a parameter that is a string. Returns false if the parameter does not + // exist. + bool GetParameterStr(uint32 index, std::wstring* string); + + // Gets a parameter that is an in/out buffer. Returns false is the parameter + // does not exist or if the size of the actual parameter is not equal to the + // expected size. + bool GetParameterPtr(uint32 index, uint32 expected_size, void** pointer); + + // Frees the memory associated with the IPC parameters. + static void operator delete(void* raw_memory) throw(); + + private: + // Only the factory method CreateFromBuffer can construct these objects. + CrossCallParamsEx(); + + ParamInfo param_info_[1]; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(CrossCallParamsEx); +}; + +// Simple helper function that sets the members of CrossCallReturn +// to the proper state to signal a basic error. +void SetCallError(ResultCode error, CrossCallReturn* call_return); + +// Sets the internal status of call_return to signify the that IPC call +// completed successfully. +void SetCallSuccess(CrossCallReturn* call_return); + +// Represents the client process that initiated the IPC which boils down to the +// process handle and the job object handle that contains the client process. +struct ClientInfo { + HANDLE process; + HANDLE job_object; + DWORD process_id; +}; + +// All IPC-related information to be passed to the IPC handler. +struct IPCInfo { + int ipc_tag; + const ClientInfo* client_info; + CrossCallReturn return_info; +}; + +// This structure identifies IPC signatures. +struct IPCParams { + int ipc_tag; + ArgType args[kMaxIpcParams]; + + bool Matches(IPCParams* other) const { + return !memcmp(this, other, sizeof(*other)); + } +}; + +// Models an entity that can process an IPC message or it can route to another +// one that could handle it. When an IPC arrives the IPC implementation will: +// 1) call OnMessageReady() with the tag of the pending IPC. If the dispatcher +// returns NULL it means that it cannot handle this IPC but if it returns +// non-null, it must be the pointer to a dispatcher that can handle it. +// 2) When the IPC finally obtains a valid Dispatcher the IPC +// implementation creates a CrossCallParamsEx from the raw IPC buffer. +// 3) It calls the returned callback, with the IPC info and arguments. +class Dispatcher { + public: + // Called from the IPC implementation to handle a specific IPC message. + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*CallbackGeneric)(); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback0)(IPCInfo* ipc); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback1)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback2)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1, void* p2); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback3)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1, void* p2, + void* p3); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback4)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1, void* p2, + void* p3, void* p4); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback5)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1, void* p2, + void* p3, void* p4, void* p5); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback6)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1, void* p2, + void* p3, void* p4, void* p5, void* p6); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback7)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1, void* p2, + void* p3, void* p4, void* p5, void* p6, + void* p7); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback8)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1, void* p2, + void* p3, void* p4, void* p5, void* p6, + void* p7, void* p8); + typedef bool (Dispatcher::*Callback9)(IPCInfo* ipc, void* p1, void* p2, + void* p3, void* p4, void* p5, void* p6, + void* p7, void* p8, void* p9); + + // Called from the IPC implementation when an IPC message is ready override + // on a derived class to handle a set of IPC messages. Return NULL if your + // subclass does not handle the message or return the pointer to the subclass + // that can handle it. + virtual Dispatcher* OnMessageReady(IPCParams* ipc, CallbackGeneric* callback); + + // Called when a target proces is created, to setup the interceptions related + // with the given service (IPC). + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service) = 0; + + virtual ~Dispatcher() {} + + protected: + // Structure that defines an IPC Call with all the parameters and the handler. + struct IPCCall { + IPCParams params; + CallbackGeneric callback; + }; + + // List of IPC Calls supported by the class. + std::vector<IPCCall> ipc_calls_; +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_CROSSCALL_SERVER_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/dep.cc b/sandbox/win/src/dep.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4995601 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/dep.cc @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/dep.h" + +#include <windows.h> + +#include "base/logging.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +namespace { + +// These values are in the Windows 2008 SDK but not in the previous ones. Define +// the values here until we're sure everyone updated their SDK. +#ifndef PROCESS_DEP_ENABLE +#define PROCESS_DEP_ENABLE 0x00000001 +#endif +#ifndef PROCESS_DEP_DISABLE_ATL_THUNK_EMULATION +#define PROCESS_DEP_DISABLE_ATL_THUNK_EMULATION 0x00000002 +#endif + +// SetProcessDEPPolicy is declared in the Windows 2008 SDK. +typedef BOOL (WINAPI *FnSetProcessDEPPolicy)(DWORD dwFlags); + +enum PROCESS_INFORMATION_CLASS { + ProcessExecuteFlags = 0x22, +}; + +// Flags named as per their usage. +const int MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_ENABLE = 1; +const int MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_DISABLE = 2; +const int MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_ATL7_THUNK_EMULATION = 4; +const int MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_PERMANENT = 8; + +// Not exactly the right signature but that will suffice. +typedef HRESULT (WINAPI *FnNtSetInformationProcess)( + HANDLE ProcessHandle, + PROCESS_INFORMATION_CLASS ProcessInformationClass, + PVOID ProcessInformation, + ULONG ProcessInformationLength); + +} // namespace + +bool SetCurrentProcessDEP(DepEnforcement enforcement) { +#ifdef _WIN64 + // DEP is always on in x64. + return enforcement != DEP_DISABLED; +#endif + // Only available on Windows XP SP2 and Windows Server 2003 SP1. + // For reference: http://www.uninformed.org/?v=2&a=4 + FnNtSetInformationProcess NtSetInformationProc = + reinterpret_cast<FnNtSetInformationProcess>( + GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"), + "NtSetInformationProcess")); + + if (!NtSetInformationProc) + return false; + + // Flags being used as per SetProcessDEPPolicy on Vista SP1. + ULONG dep_flags; + switch (enforcement) { + case DEP_DISABLED: + // 2 + dep_flags = MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_DISABLE; + break; + case DEP_ENABLED: + // 9 + dep_flags = MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_PERMANENT | MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_ENABLE; + break; + case DEP_ENABLED_ATL7_COMPAT: + // 0xD + dep_flags = MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_PERMANENT | MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_ENABLE | + MEM_EXECUTE_OPTION_ATL7_THUNK_EMULATION; + break; + default: + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + + HRESULT status = NtSetInformationProc(GetCurrentProcess(), + ProcessExecuteFlags, + &dep_flags, + sizeof(dep_flags)); + return SUCCEEDED(status); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/dep.h b/sandbox/win/src/dep.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9016285 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/dep.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_DEP_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_DEP_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +enum DepEnforcement { + // DEP is completely disabled. + DEP_DISABLED, + // DEP is permanently enforced. + DEP_ENABLED, + // DEP with support for ATL7 thunking is permanently enforced. + DEP_ENABLED_ATL7_COMPAT, +}; + +// Change the Data Execution Prevention (DEP) status for the current process. +// Once enabled, it cannot be disabled. +bool SetCurrentProcessDEP(DepEnforcement enforcement); + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_DEP_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/dep_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/dep_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91d4e67 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/dep_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/dep.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +namespace { + +BYTE kReturnCode[] = { + // ret + 0xC3, +}; + +typedef void (*NullFunction)(); + +// This doesn't fail on Vista Service Pack 0 but it does on XP SP2 and Vista +// SP1. I guess this is a bug in Vista SP0 w.r.t .data PE section. Needs +// investigation to be sure it is a bug and not an error on my part. +bool GenerateDepException() { + bool result = false; + __try { + void* code = kReturnCode; + // Call this code. + reinterpret_cast<NullFunction>(code)(); + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + result = true; + } + return result; +} + +bool GenerateDepAtl7Exception() { + // TODO(maruel): bug 1207762 Somehow test ATL7 + return GenerateDepException(); +} + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int CheckDepLevel(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (1 != argc) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + int flag = _wtoi(argv[0]); + switch (flag) { + case 1: + // DEP is completely disabled. + if (!SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_DISABLED)) { + if (!IsXPSP2OrLater()) + // That's fine. + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } + if (GenerateDepException()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + if (GenerateDepAtl7Exception()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + case 2: + // DEP is enabled with ATL7 thunk support. + if (!SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_ENABLED_ATL7_COMPAT)) { + if (!IsXPSP2OrLater()) + // That's fine. + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } + if (!GenerateDepException()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + if (GenerateDepAtl7Exception()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + case 3: + // DEP is enabled. + if (!SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_ENABLED)) { + if (!IsXPSP2OrLater()) + // That's fine. + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } + if (!GenerateDepException()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + if (!GenerateDepAtl7Exception()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + case 4: + // DEP can't be disabled. + if (!SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_ENABLED)) { + if (!IsXPSP2OrLater()) + // That's fine. + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + if (SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_DISABLED)) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } + // Verify that it is still enabled. + if (!GenerateDepException()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + if (!GenerateDepAtl7Exception()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + case 5: + // DEP can't be disabled. + if (!SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_ENABLED_ATL7_COMPAT)) { + if (!IsXPSP2OrLater()) + // That's fine. + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + if (SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_DISABLED)) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } + // Verify that it is still enabled. + if (!GenerateDepException()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + if (!GenerateDepAtl7Exception()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + case 6: + // DEP can't be disabled. + if (!SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_ENABLED)) { + if (!IsXPSP2OrLater()) + // That's fine. + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + if (SetCurrentProcessDEP(DEP_ENABLED_ATL7_COMPAT)) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } + // Verify that it is still enabled. + if (!GenerateDepException()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + if (!GenerateDepAtl7Exception()) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + default: + return SBOX_TEST_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; +} + +} // namespace + +// This test is disabled. See bug 1275842 +TEST(DepTest, DISABLED_TestDepDisable) { + TestRunner runner(JOB_UNPROTECTED, USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_INTERACTIVE); + + runner.SetTimeout(INFINITE); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckDepLevel 1")); + // TODO(maruel): bug 1207762 Somehow test ATL7 + // EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckDepLevel 2")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckDepLevel 3")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckDepLevel 4")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckDepLevel 5")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckDepLevel 6")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/eat_resolver.cc b/sandbox/win/src/eat_resolver.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f057006 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/eat_resolver.cc @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/eat_resolver.h" + +#include "base/win/pe_image.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +NTSTATUS EatResolverThunk::Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used) { + NTSTATUS ret = Init(target_module, interceptor_module, target_name, + interceptor_name, interceptor_entry_point, + thunk_storage, storage_bytes); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + + if (!eat_entry_) + return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + size_t thunk_bytes = GetInternalThunkSize(); + +#if defined(_WIN64) + // We have two thunks, in order: the return path and the forward path. + if (!SetInternalThunk(thunk_storage, storage_bytes, NULL, target_)) + return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + storage_bytes -= thunk_bytes; + thunk_storage = reinterpret_cast<char*>(thunk_storage) + thunk_bytes; +#endif + + if (!SetInternalThunk(thunk_storage, storage_bytes, target_, interceptor_)) + return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + AutoProtectMemory memory; + memory.ChangeProtection(eat_entry_, sizeof(DWORD), PAGE_READWRITE); + + // Perform the patch. +#pragma warning(push) +#pragma warning(disable: 4311) + // These casts generate warnings because they are 32 bit specific. + *eat_entry_ = reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(thunk_storage) - + reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(target_module); +#pragma warning(pop) + + if (NULL != storage_used) + *storage_used = GetThunkSize(); + + return ret; +} + +NTSTATUS EatResolverThunk::ResolveTarget(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + void** address) { + DCHECK_NT(address); + if (!module) + return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + base::win::PEImage pe(module); + if (!pe.VerifyMagic()) + return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT; + + eat_entry_ = pe.GetExportEntry(function_name); + + if (!eat_entry_) + return STATUS_PROCEDURE_NOT_FOUND; + + *address = pe.RVAToAddr(*eat_entry_); + + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +size_t EatResolverThunk::GetThunkSize() const { +#if defined(_WIN64) + return GetInternalThunkSize() * 2; +#else + return GetInternalThunkSize(); +#endif +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/eat_resolver.h b/sandbox/win/src/eat_resolver.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d5b3e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/eat_resolver.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_EAT_RESOLVER_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_EAT_RESOLVER_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/resolver.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform exports table interceptions. +class EatResolverThunk : public ResolverThunk { + public: + EatResolverThunk() : eat_entry_(NULL) {} + virtual ~EatResolverThunk() {} + + // Implementation of Resolver::Setup. + virtual NTSTATUS Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used); + + // Implementation of Resolver::ResolveTarget. + virtual NTSTATUS ResolveTarget(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + void** address); + + // Implementation of Resolver::GetThunkSize. + virtual size_t GetThunkSize() const; + + private: + // The entry to patch. + DWORD* eat_entry_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(EatResolverThunk); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_EAT_RESOLVER_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/file_policy_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/file_policy_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df1e903 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/file_policy_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,598 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <algorithm> +#include <cctype> + +#include <windows.h> +#include <winioctl.h> + +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/test_utils.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +#define BINDNTDLL(name) \ + name ## Function name = reinterpret_cast<name ## Function>( \ + ::GetProcAddress(::GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"), #name)) + +namespace sandbox { + +const ULONG kSharing = FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_DELETE; + +// Creates a file using different desired access. Returns if the call succeeded +// or not. The first argument in argv is the filename. If the second argument +// is "read", we try read only access. Otherwise we try read-write access. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int File_Create(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 2) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + bool read = (_wcsicmp(argv[0], L"Read") == 0); + + if (read) { + base::win::ScopedHandle file1(CreateFile( + argv[1], GENERIC_READ, kSharing, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL)); + base::win::ScopedHandle file2(CreateFile( + argv[1], FILE_EXECUTE, kSharing, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL)); + + if (file1.Get() && file2.Get()) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } else { + base::win::ScopedHandle file1(CreateFile( + argv[1], GENERIC_ALL, kSharing, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL)); + base::win::ScopedHandle file2(CreateFile( + argv[1], GENERIC_READ | FILE_WRITE_DATA, kSharing, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, + 0, NULL)); + + if (file1.Get() && file2.Get()) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } +} + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int File_Win32Create(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 1) { + SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + } + + std::wstring full_path = MakePathToSys(argv[0], false); + if (full_path.empty()) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + } + + HANDLE file = ::CreateFileW(full_path.c_str(), GENERIC_READ, kSharing, + NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL); + + if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE != file) { + ::CloseHandle(file); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } else { + if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } else { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + } + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// Creates the file in parameter using the NtCreateFile api and returns if the +// call succeeded or not. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int File_CreateSys32(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + BINDNTDLL(NtCreateFile); + BINDNTDLL(RtlInitUnicodeString); + if (!NtCreateFile || !RtlInitUnicodeString) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + if (argc != 1) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + std::wstring file(argv[0]); + if (0 != _wcsnicmp(file.c_str(), kNTObjManPrefix, kNTObjManPrefixLen)) + file = MakePathToSys(argv[0], true); + + UNICODE_STRING object_name; + RtlInitUnicodeString(&object_name, file.c_str()); + + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitializeObjectAttributes(&obj_attributes, &object_name, + OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL); + + HANDLE handle; + IO_STATUS_BLOCK io_block = {0}; + NTSTATUS status = NtCreateFile(&handle, FILE_READ_DATA, &obj_attributes, + &io_block, NULL, 0, kSharing, FILE_OPEN, + 0, NULL, 0); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { + ::CloseHandle(handle); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } else if (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED == status) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } else if (STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND == status) { + return SBOX_TEST_NOT_FOUND; + } + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +// Opens the file in parameter using the NtOpenFile api and returns if the +// call succeeded or not. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int File_OpenSys32(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + BINDNTDLL(NtOpenFile); + BINDNTDLL(RtlInitUnicodeString); + if (!NtOpenFile || !RtlInitUnicodeString) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + if (argc != 1) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + std::wstring file = MakePathToSys(argv[0], true); + UNICODE_STRING object_name; + RtlInitUnicodeString(&object_name, file.c_str()); + + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitializeObjectAttributes(&obj_attributes, &object_name, + OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL); + + HANDLE handle; + IO_STATUS_BLOCK io_block = {0}; + NTSTATUS status = NtOpenFile(&handle, FILE_READ_DATA, &obj_attributes, + &io_block, kSharing, 0); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { + ::CloseHandle(handle); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } else if (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED == status) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } else if (STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND == status) { + return SBOX_TEST_NOT_FOUND; + } + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int File_GetDiskSpace(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + std::wstring sys_path = MakePathToSys(L"", false); + if (sys_path.empty()) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + } + ULARGE_INTEGER free_user = {0}; + ULARGE_INTEGER total = {0}; + ULARGE_INTEGER free_total = {0}; + if (::GetDiskFreeSpaceExW(sys_path.c_str(), &free_user, &total, + &free_total)) { + if ((total.QuadPart != 0) && (free_total.QuadPart !=0)) { + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + } else { + if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } else { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + } + } + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// Move a file using the MoveFileEx api and returns if the call succeeded or +// not. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int File_Rename(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 2) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + if (::MoveFileEx(argv[0], argv[1], 0)) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + + if (::GetLastError() != ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; +} + +// Query the attributes of file in parameter using the NtQueryAttributesFile api +// and NtQueryFullAttributesFile and returns if the call succeeded or not. The +// second argument in argv is "d" or "f" telling if we expect the attributes to +// specify a file or a directory. The expected attribute has to match the real +// attributes for the call to be successful. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int File_QueryAttributes(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + BINDNTDLL(NtQueryAttributesFile); + BINDNTDLL(NtQueryFullAttributesFile); + BINDNTDLL(RtlInitUnicodeString); + if (!NtQueryAttributesFile || !NtQueryFullAttributesFile || + !RtlInitUnicodeString) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + if (argc != 2) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + bool expect_directory = (L'd' == argv[1][0]); + + UNICODE_STRING object_name; + std::wstring file = MakePathToSys(argv[0], true); + RtlInitUnicodeString(&object_name, file.c_str()); + + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitializeObjectAttributes(&obj_attributes, &object_name, + OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL); + + FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION info = {0}; + FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION full_info = {0}; + NTSTATUS status1 = NtQueryAttributesFile(&obj_attributes, &info); + NTSTATUS status2 = NtQueryFullAttributesFile(&obj_attributes, &full_info); + + if (status1 != status2) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + if (NT_SUCCESS(status1)) { + if (info.FileAttributes != full_info.FileAttributes) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + bool is_directory1 = (info.FileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0; + if (expect_directory == is_directory1) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } else if (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED == status1) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } else if (STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND == status1) { + return SBOX_TEST_NOT_FOUND; + } + + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, DenyNtCreateCalc) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY, + L"calc.exe")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"File_CreateSys32 calc.exe")); + + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"File_CreateSys32 calc.exe")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, AllowNtCreateCalc) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, L"calc.exe")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"File_CreateSys32 calc.exe")); + + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"File_CreateSys32 calc.exe")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, AllowNtCreateWithNativePath) { + std::wstring calc = MakePathToSys(L"calc.exe", false); + std::wstring nt_path; + ASSERT_TRUE(GetNtPathFromWin32Path(calc, &nt_path)); + TestRunner runner; + runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, nt_path.c_str()); + + wchar_t buff[MAX_PATH]; + ::wsprintfW(buff, L"File_CreateSys32 %s", nt_path.c_str()); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(buff)); + + std::transform(nt_path.begin(), nt_path.end(), nt_path.begin(), std::tolower); + ::wsprintfW(buff, L"File_CreateSys32 %s", nt_path.c_str()); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(buff)); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, AllowReadOnly) { + TestRunner runner; + + // Create a temp file because we need write access to it. + wchar_t temp_directory[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name[MAX_PATH]; + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempPath(MAX_PATH, temp_directory), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name), 0u); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, + temp_file_name)); + + wchar_t command_read[MAX_PATH + 20] = {0}; + wsprintf(command_read, L"File_Create Read \"%ls\"", temp_file_name); + wchar_t command_write[MAX_PATH + 20] = {0}; + wsprintf(command_write, L"File_Create Write \"%ls\"", temp_file_name); + + // Verify that we have read access after revert. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(command_read)); + + // Verify that we don't have write access after revert. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(command_write)); + + // Verify that we really have write access to the file. + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(command_write)); + + DeleteFile(temp_file_name); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, AllowWildcard) { + TestRunner runner; + + // Create a temp file because we need write access to it. + wchar_t temp_directory[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name[MAX_PATH]; + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempPath(MAX_PATH, temp_directory), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name), 0u); + + wcscat_s(temp_directory, MAX_PATH, L"*"); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, temp_directory)); + + wchar_t command_write[MAX_PATH + 20] = {0}; + wsprintf(command_write, L"File_Create Write \"%ls\"", temp_file_name); + + // Verify that we have write access after revert. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(command_write)); + + DeleteFile(temp_file_name); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, AllowNtCreatePatternRule) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, L"App*.dll")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_OpenSys32 appmgmts.dll")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"File_OpenSys32 appwiz.cpl")); + + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_OpenSys32 appmgmts.dll")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"File_OpenSys32 appwiz.cpl")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, CheckNotFound) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, L"n*.dll")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_NOT_FOUND, + runner.RunTest(L"File_OpenSys32 notfound.dll")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, CheckNoLeak) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"File_CreateSys32 notfound.exe")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, TestQueryAttributesFile) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, + L"appmgmts.dll")); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, + L"notfound.exe")); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, L"drivers")); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_QUERY, + L"ipconfig.exe")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_QueryAttributes drivers d")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_QueryAttributes appmgmts.dll f")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_QueryAttributes ipconfig.exe f")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_QueryAttributes ftp.exe f")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_NOT_FOUND, + runner.RunTest(L"File_QueryAttributes notfound.exe f")); +} + +// Makes sure that we don't leak information when there is not policy to allow +// a path. +TEST(FilePolicyTest, TestQueryAttributesFileNoPolicy) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_QueryAttributes ftp.exe f")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_QueryAttributes notfound.exe f")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, TestRename) { + TestRunner runner; + + // Give access to the temp directory. + wchar_t temp_directory[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name1[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name2[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name3[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name4[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name5[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name6[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name7[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name8[MAX_PATH]; + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempPath(MAX_PATH, temp_directory), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name1), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name2), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name3), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name4), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name5), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name6), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name7), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name8), 0u); + + + // Add rules to make file1->file2 succeed. + ASSERT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, temp_file_name1)); + ASSERT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, temp_file_name2)); + + // Add rules to make file3->file4 fail. + ASSERT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, temp_file_name3)); + ASSERT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, + temp_file_name4)); + + // Add rules to make file5->file6 fail. + ASSERT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, + temp_file_name5)); + ASSERT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, temp_file_name6)); + + // Add rules to make file7->no_pol_file fail. + ASSERT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, temp_file_name7)); + + // Delete the files where the files are going to be renamed to. + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name2); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name4); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name6); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name8); + + + wchar_t command[MAX_PATH*2 + 20] = {0}; + wsprintf(command, L"File_Rename \"%ls\" \"%ls\"", temp_file_name1, + temp_file_name2); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(command)); + + wsprintf(command, L"File_Rename \"%ls\" \"%ls\"", temp_file_name3, + temp_file_name4); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(command)); + + wsprintf(command, L"File_Rename \"%ls\" \"%ls\"", temp_file_name5, + temp_file_name6); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(command)); + + wsprintf(command, L"File_Rename \"%ls\" \"%ls\"", temp_file_name7, + temp_file_name8); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(command)); + + + // Delete all the files in case they are still there. + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name1); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name2); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name3); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name4); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name5); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name6); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name7); + ::DeleteFile(temp_file_name8); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, OpenSys32FilesDenyBecauseOfDir) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY, + L"notepad.exe")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"File_Win32Create notepad.exe")); + + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_Win32Create notepad.exe")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, OpenSys32FilesAllowNotepad) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, + L"notepad.exe")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_Win32Create notepad.exe")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"File_Win32Create calc.exe")); + + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"File_Win32Create notepad.exe")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"File_Win32Create calc.exe")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, FileGetDiskSpace) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"File_GetDiskSpace")); + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"File_GetDiskSpace")); + + // Add an 'allow' rule in the windows\system32 such that GetDiskFreeSpaceEx + // succeeds (it does an NtOpenFile) but windows\system32\notepad.exe is + // denied since there is no wild card in the rule. + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRuleSys32(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY, L"")); + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"File_GetDiskSpace")); + + runner.SetTestState(AFTER_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"File_GetDiskSpace")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"File_Win32Create notepad.exe")); +} + +TEST(FilePolicyTest, TestReparsePoint) { + TestRunner runner; + + // Create a temp file because we need write access to it. + wchar_t temp_directory[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t temp_file_name[MAX_PATH]; + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempPath(MAX_PATH, temp_directory), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, temp_file_name), 0u); + + // Delete the file and create a directory instead. + ASSERT_TRUE(::DeleteFile(temp_file_name)); + ASSERT_TRUE(::CreateDirectory(temp_file_name, NULL)); + + // Create a temporary file in the subfolder. + std::wstring subfolder = temp_file_name; + std::wstring temp_file_title = subfolder.substr(subfolder.rfind(L"\\") + 1); + std::wstring temp_file = subfolder + L"\\file_" + temp_file_title; + + HANDLE file = ::CreateFile(temp_file.c_str(), FILE_ALL_ACCESS, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, + CREATE_ALWAYS, 0, NULL); + ASSERT_TRUE(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE != file); + ASSERT_TRUE(::CloseHandle(file)); + + // Create a temporary file in the temp directory. + std::wstring temp_dir = temp_directory; + std::wstring temp_file_in_temp = temp_dir + L"file_" + temp_file_title; + file = ::CreateFile(temp_file_in_temp.c_str(), FILE_ALL_ACCESS, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, + CREATE_ALWAYS, 0, NULL); + ASSERT_TRUE(file != NULL); + ASSERT_TRUE(::CloseHandle(file)); + + // Give write access to the temp directory. + std::wstring temp_dir_wildcard = temp_dir + L"*"; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, + temp_dir_wildcard.c_str())); + + // Prepare the command to execute. + std::wstring command_write; + command_write += L"File_Create Write \""; + command_write += temp_file; + command_write += L"\""; + + // Verify that we have write access to the original file + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(command_write.c_str())); + + // Replace the subfolder by a reparse point to %temp%. + ::DeleteFile(temp_file.c_str()); + HANDLE dir = ::CreateFile(subfolder.c_str(), FILE_ALL_ACCESS, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, + OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, NULL); + EXPECT_TRUE(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE != dir); + + std::wstring temp_dir_nt; + temp_dir_nt += L"\\??\\"; + temp_dir_nt += temp_dir; + EXPECT_TRUE(SetReparsePoint(dir, temp_dir_nt.c_str())); + EXPECT_TRUE(::CloseHandle(dir)); + + // Try to open the file again. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(command_write.c_str())); + + // Remove the reparse point. + dir = ::CreateFile(subfolder.c_str(), FILE_ALL_ACCESS, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, + FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, + NULL); + EXPECT_TRUE(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE != dir); + EXPECT_TRUE(DeleteReparsePoint(dir)); + EXPECT_TRUE(::CloseHandle(dir)); + + // Cleanup. + EXPECT_TRUE(::DeleteFile(temp_file_in_temp.c_str())); + EXPECT_TRUE(::RemoveDirectory(subfolder.c_str())); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.cc b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71a6f02 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.cc @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/filesystem_dispatcher.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/filesystem_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/filesystem_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_broker.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +FilesystemDispatcher::FilesystemDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base) + : policy_base_(policy_base) { + static const IPCCall create_params = { + {IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, + ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>(&FilesystemDispatcher::NtCreateFile) + }; + + static const IPCCall open_file = { + {IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, + ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>(&FilesystemDispatcher::NtOpenFile) + }; + + static const IPCCall attribs = { + {IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, INOUTPTR_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &FilesystemDispatcher::NtQueryAttributesFile) + }; + + static const IPCCall full_attribs = { + {IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, INOUTPTR_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &FilesystemDispatcher::NtQueryFullAttributesFile) + }; + + static const IPCCall set_info = { + {IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, VOIDPTR_TYPE, INOUTPTR_TYPE, INOUTPTR_TYPE, + ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &FilesystemDispatcher::NtSetInformationFile) + }; + + ipc_calls_.push_back(create_params); + ipc_calls_.push_back(open_file); + ipc_calls_.push_back(attribs); + ipc_calls_.push_back(full_attribs); + ipc_calls_.push_back(set_info); +} + +bool FilesystemDispatcher::SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, + int service) { + switch (service) { + case IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG: + return INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtCreateFile, CREATE_FILE_ID, 48); + + case IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG: + return INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenFile, OPEN_FILE_ID, 28); + + case IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG: + return INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtQueryAttributesFile, QUERY_ATTRIB_FILE_ID, + 12); + + case IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG: + return INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtQueryFullAttributesFile, + QUERY_FULL_ATTRIB_FILE_ID, 12); + + case IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG: + return INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtSetInformationFile, SET_INFO_FILE_ID, 24); + + default: + return false; + } +} + +bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtCreateFile( + IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, DWORD desired_access, + DWORD file_attributes, DWORD share_access, DWORD create_disposition, + DWORD create_options) { + if (!PreProcessName(*name, name)) { + // The path requested might contain a reparse point. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + const wchar_t* filename = name->c_str(); + + ULONG broker = TRUE; + CountedParameterSet<OpenFile> params; + params[OpenFile::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(filename); + params[OpenFile::ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(desired_access); + params[OpenFile::OPTIONS] = ParamPickerMake(create_options); + params[OpenFile::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + // To evaluate the policy we need to call back to the policy object. We + // are just middlemen in the operation since is the FileSystemPolicy which + // knows what to do. + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + HANDLE handle; + ULONG_PTR io_information = 0; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + if (!FileSystemPolicy::CreateFileAction(result, *ipc->client_info, *name, + attributes, desired_access, + file_attributes, share_access, + create_disposition, create_options, + &handle, &nt_status, + &io_information)) { + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.extended[0].ulong_ptr = io_information; + ipc->return_info.nt_status = nt_status; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtOpenFile( + IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, DWORD desired_access, + DWORD share_access, DWORD open_options) { + if (!PreProcessName(*name, name)) { + // The path requested might contain a reparse point. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + const wchar_t* filename = name->c_str(); + + ULONG broker = TRUE; + CountedParameterSet<OpenFile> params; + params[OpenFile::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(filename); + params[OpenFile::ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(desired_access); + params[OpenFile::OPTIONS] = ParamPickerMake(open_options); + params[OpenFile::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + // To evaluate the policy we need to call back to the policy object. We + // are just middlemen in the operation since is the FileSystemPolicy which + // knows what to do. + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + HANDLE handle; + ULONG_PTR io_information = 0; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + if (!FileSystemPolicy::OpenFileAction(result, *ipc->client_info, *name, + attributes, desired_access, + share_access, open_options, &handle, + &nt_status, &io_information)) { + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.extended[0].ulong_ptr = io_information; + ipc->return_info.nt_status = nt_status; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtQueryAttributesFile( + IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, CountedBuffer* info) { + if (sizeof(FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION) != info->Size()) + return false; + + if (!PreProcessName(*name, name)) { + // The path requested might contain a reparse point. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + ULONG broker = TRUE; + const wchar_t* filename = name->c_str(); + CountedParameterSet<FileName> params; + params[FileName::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(filename); + params[FileName::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + // To evaluate the policy we need to call back to the policy object. We + // are just middlemen in the operation since is the FileSystemPolicy which + // knows what to do. + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + + FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION* information = + reinterpret_cast<FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION*>(info->Buffer()); + NTSTATUS nt_status; + if (!FileSystemPolicy::QueryAttributesFileAction(result, *ipc->client_info, + *name, attributes, + information, &nt_status)) { + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = nt_status; + return true; +} + +bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtQueryFullAttributesFile( + IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, CountedBuffer* info) { + if (sizeof(FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION) != info->Size()) + return false; + + if (!PreProcessName(*name, name)) { + // The path requested might contain a reparse point. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + ULONG broker = TRUE; + const wchar_t* filename = name->c_str(); + CountedParameterSet<FileName> params; + params[FileName::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(filename); + params[FileName::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + // To evaluate the policy we need to call back to the policy object. We + // are just middlemen in the operation since is the FileSystemPolicy which + // knows what to do. + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy( + IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, params.GetBase()); + + FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION* information = + reinterpret_cast<FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION*>(info->Buffer()); + NTSTATUS nt_status; + if (!FileSystemPolicy::QueryFullAttributesFileAction(result, + *ipc->client_info, + *name, attributes, + information, + &nt_status)) { + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = nt_status; + return true; +} + +bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtSetInformationFile( + IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE handle, CountedBuffer* status, CountedBuffer* info, + DWORD length, DWORD info_class) { + if (sizeof(IO_STATUS_BLOCK) != status->Size()) + return false; + if (length != info->Size()) + return false; + + FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION* rename_info = + reinterpret_cast<FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION*>(info->Buffer()); + + if (!IsSupportedRenameCall(rename_info, length, info_class)) + return false; + + std::wstring name; + name.assign(rename_info->FileName, rename_info->FileNameLength / + sizeof(rename_info->FileName[0])); + if (!PreProcessName(name, &name)) { + // The path requested might contain a reparse point. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + ULONG broker = TRUE; + const wchar_t* filename = name.c_str(); + CountedParameterSet<FileName> params; + params[FileName::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(filename); + params[FileName::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + // To evaluate the policy we need to call back to the policy object. We + // are just middlemen in the operation since is the FileSystemPolicy which + // knows what to do. + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + + IO_STATUS_BLOCK* io_status = + reinterpret_cast<IO_STATUS_BLOCK*>(status->Buffer()); + NTSTATUS nt_status; + if (!FileSystemPolicy::SetInformationFileAction(result, *ipc->client_info, + handle, rename_info, length, + info_class, io_status, + &nt_status)) { + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = nt_status; + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.h b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d828715 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_DISPATCHER_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_DISPATCHER_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This class handles file system-related IPC calls. +class FilesystemDispatcher : public Dispatcher { + public: + explicit FilesystemDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base); + ~FilesystemDispatcher() {} + + // Dispatcher interface. + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service); + + private: + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtCreateFile in the target. + bool NtCreateFile(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, + DWORD desired_access, DWORD file_attributes, + DWORD share_access, DWORD create_disposition, + DWORD create_options); + + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtOpenFile in the target. + bool NtOpenFile(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, + DWORD desired_access, DWORD share_access, + DWORD create_options); + + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtQueryAttributesFile in the + // target. + bool NtQueryAttributesFile(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, + CountedBuffer* info); + + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtQueryFullAttributesFile in + // the target. + bool NtQueryFullAttributesFile(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, + DWORD attributes, CountedBuffer* info); + + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtSetInformationFile with the + // rename information class. + bool NtSetInformationFile(IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE handle, CountedBuffer* status, + CountedBuffer* info, DWORD length, + DWORD info_class); + + PolicyBase* policy_base_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(FilesystemDispatcher); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_DISPATCHER_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_interception.cc b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_interception.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cdc10ff --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_interception.cc @@ -0,0 +1,351 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/filesystem_interception.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_target.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtCreateFile(NtCreateFileFunction orig_CreateFile, + PHANDLE file, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, + PLARGE_INTEGER allocation_size, + ULONG file_attributes, ULONG sharing, + ULONG disposition, ULONG options, + PVOID ea_buffer, ULONG ea_length) { + // Check if the process can open it first. + NTSTATUS status = orig_CreateFile(file, desired_access, object_attributes, + io_status, allocation_size, + file_attributes, sharing, disposition, + options, ea_buffer, ea_length); + if (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED != status) + return status; + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return status; + + do { + if (!ValidParameter(file, sizeof(HANDLE), WRITE)) + break; + if (!ValidParameter(io_status, sizeof(IO_STATUS_BLOCK), WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + wchar_t* name; + uint32 attributes = 0; + NTSTATUS ret = AllocAndCopyName(object_attributes, &name, &attributes, + NULL); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || NULL == name) + break; + + ULONG broker = FALSE; + CountedParameterSet<OpenFile> params; + params[OpenFile::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(name); + params[OpenFile::ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(desired_access); + params[OpenFile::OPTIONS] = ParamPickerMake(options); + params[OpenFile::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + if (!QueryBroker(IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, params.GetBase())) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + // The following call must match in the parameters with + // FilesystemDispatcher::ProcessNtCreateFile. + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, name, attributes, + desired_access, file_attributes, sharing, + disposition, options, &answer); + + operator delete(name, NT_ALLOC); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(answer.nt_status)) + return answer.nt_status; + + __try { + *file = answer.handle; + io_status->Status = answer.nt_status; + io_status->Information = answer.extended[0].ulong_ptr; + status = io_status->Status; + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenFile(NtOpenFileFunction orig_OpenFile, PHANDLE file, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, ULONG sharing, + ULONG options) { + // Check if the process can open it first. + NTSTATUS status = orig_OpenFile(file, desired_access, object_attributes, + io_status, sharing, options); + if (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED != status) + return status; + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return status; + + do { + if (!ValidParameter(file, sizeof(HANDLE), WRITE)) + break; + if (!ValidParameter(io_status, sizeof(IO_STATUS_BLOCK), WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + wchar_t* name; + uint32 attributes; + NTSTATUS ret = AllocAndCopyName(object_attributes, &name, &attributes, + NULL); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || NULL == name) + break; + + ULONG broker = FALSE; + CountedParameterSet<OpenFile> params; + params[OpenFile::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(name); + params[OpenFile::ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(desired_access); + params[OpenFile::OPTIONS] = ParamPickerMake(options); + params[OpenFile::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + if (!QueryBroker(IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, params.GetBase())) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, name, attributes, + desired_access, sharing, options, &answer); + + operator delete(name, NT_ALLOC); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(answer.nt_status)) + return answer.nt_status; + + __try { + *file = answer.handle; + io_status->Status = answer.nt_status; + io_status->Information = answer.extended[0].ulong_ptr; + status = io_status->Status; + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtQueryAttributesFile( + NtQueryAttributesFileFunction orig_QueryAttributes, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PFILE_BASIC_INFORMATION file_attributes) { + // Check if the process can query it first. + NTSTATUS status = orig_QueryAttributes(object_attributes, file_attributes); + if (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED != status) + return status; + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return status; + + do { + if (!ValidParameter(file_attributes, sizeof(FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION), WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + wchar_t* name = NULL; + uint32 attributes = 0; + NTSTATUS ret = AllocAndCopyName(object_attributes, &name, &attributes, + NULL); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || NULL == name) + break; + + InOutCountedBuffer file_info(file_attributes, + sizeof(FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION)); + + ULONG broker = FALSE; + CountedParameterSet<FileName> params; + params[FileName::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(name); + params[FileName::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + if (!QueryBroker(IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, params.GetBase())) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, name, + attributes, file_info, &answer); + + operator delete(name, NT_ALLOC); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + return answer.nt_status; + + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtQueryFullAttributesFile( + NtQueryFullAttributesFileFunction orig_QueryFullAttributes, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION file_attributes) { + // Check if the process can query it first. + NTSTATUS status = orig_QueryFullAttributes(object_attributes, + file_attributes); + if (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED != status) + return status; + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return status; + + do { + if (!ValidParameter(file_attributes, sizeof(FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION), + WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + wchar_t* name = NULL; + uint32 attributes = 0; + NTSTATUS ret = AllocAndCopyName(object_attributes, &name, &attributes, + NULL); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || NULL == name) + break; + + InOutCountedBuffer file_info(file_attributes, + sizeof(FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION)); + + ULONG broker = FALSE; + CountedParameterSet<FileName> params; + params[FileName::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(name); + params[FileName::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + if (!QueryBroker(IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, params.GetBase())) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, name, + attributes, file_info, &answer); + + operator delete(name, NT_ALLOC); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + return answer.nt_status; + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtSetInformationFile( + NtSetInformationFileFunction orig_SetInformationFile, HANDLE file, + PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, PVOID file_info, ULONG length, + FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS file_info_class) { + // Check if the process can open it first. + NTSTATUS status = orig_SetInformationFile(file, io_status, file_info, length, + file_info_class); + if (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED != status) + return status; + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return status; + + do { + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + if (!ValidParameter(io_status, sizeof(IO_STATUS_BLOCK), WRITE)) + break; + + if (!ValidParameter(file_info, length, READ)) + break; + + FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION* file_rename_info = + reinterpret_cast<FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION*>(file_info); + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes; + UNICODE_STRING object_name; + InitializeObjectAttributes(&object_attributes, &object_name, 0, NULL, NULL); + + __try { + if (!IsSupportedRenameCall(file_rename_info, length, file_info_class)) + break; + + object_attributes.RootDirectory = file_rename_info->RootDirectory; + object_name.Buffer = file_rename_info->FileName; + object_name.Length = object_name.MaximumLength = + static_cast<USHORT>(file_rename_info->FileNameLength); + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + + wchar_t* name; + NTSTATUS ret = AllocAndCopyName(&object_attributes, &name, NULL, NULL); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || !name) + break; + + ULONG broker = FALSE; + CountedParameterSet<FileName> params; + params[FileName::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(name); + params[FileName::BROKER] = ParamPickerMake(broker); + + if (!QueryBroker(IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, params.GetBase())) + break; + + InOutCountedBuffer io_status_buffer(io_status, sizeof(IO_STATUS_BLOCK)); + // This is actually not an InOut buffer, only In, but using InOut facility + // really helps to simplify the code. + InOutCountedBuffer file_info_buffer(file_info, length); + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, file, + io_status_buffer, file_info_buffer, length, + file_info_class, &answer); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + status = answer.nt_status; + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_interception.h b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_interception.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8d9e58 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_interception.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_INTERCEPTION_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_INTERCEPTION_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +extern "C" { + +// Interception of NtCreateFile on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtCreateFile( + NtCreateFileFunction orig_CreateFile, PHANDLE file, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, PLARGE_INTEGER allocation_size, + ULONG file_attributes, ULONG sharing, ULONG disposition, ULONG options, + PVOID ea_buffer, ULONG ea_length); + +// Interception of NtOpenFile on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenFile( + NtOpenFileFunction orig_OpenFile, PHANDLE file, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, + ULONG sharing, ULONG options); + +// Interception of NtQueryAtttributesFile on the child process. +// It should never be called directly. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtQueryAttributesFile( + NtQueryAttributesFileFunction orig_QueryAttributes, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PFILE_BASIC_INFORMATION file_attributes); + +// Interception of NtQueryFullAtttributesFile on the child process. +// It should never be called directly. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtQueryFullAttributesFile( + NtQueryFullAttributesFileFunction orig_QueryAttributes, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION file_attributes); + +// Interception of NtSetInformationFile on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtSetInformationFile( + NtSetInformationFileFunction orig_SetInformationFile, HANDLE file, + PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, PVOID file_information, ULONG length, + FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS file_information_class); + +} // extern "C" + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_INTERCEPTION_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.cc b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..385f4ae --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.cc @@ -0,0 +1,387 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <string> + +#include "sandbox/src/filesystem_policy.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { + +NTSTATUS NtCreateFileInTarget(HANDLE* target_file_handle, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* obj_attributes, + IO_STATUS_BLOCK* io_status_block, + ULONG file_attributes, + ULONG share_access, + ULONG create_disposition, + ULONG create_options, + PVOID ea_buffer, + ULONG ea_lenght, + HANDLE target_process) { + NtCreateFileFunction NtCreateFile = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtCreateFile", &NtCreateFile); + + HANDLE local_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + NTSTATUS status = NtCreateFile(&local_handle, desired_access, obj_attributes, + io_status_block, NULL, file_attributes, + share_access, create_disposition, + create_options, ea_buffer, ea_lenght); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { + return status; + } + + if (!sandbox::SameObject(local_handle, obj_attributes->ObjectName->Buffer)) { + // The handle points somewhere else. Fail the operation. + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + target_process, target_file_handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace. + +namespace sandbox { + +bool FileSystemPolicy::GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy) { + std::wstring mod_name(name); + if (mod_name.empty()) { + return false; + } + + // Don't do any pre-processing if the name starts like the the native + // object manager style. + if (0 != _wcsnicmp(mod_name.c_str(), kNTObjManPrefix, kNTObjManPrefixLen)) { + // TODO(cpu) bug 32224: This prefix add is a hack because we don't have the + // infrastructure to normalize names. In any case we need to escape the + // question marks. + if (!PreProcessName(mod_name, &mod_name)) { + // The path to be added might contain a reparse point. + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + if (0 != mod_name.compare(0, kNTPrefixLen, kNTPrefix)) { + // TODO(nsylvain): Find a better way to do name resolution. Right now we + // take the name and we expand it. + mod_name.insert(0, L"\\/?/?\\"); + name = mod_name.c_str(); + } + } + + EvalResult result = ASK_BROKER; + + // List of supported calls for the filesystem. + const unsigned kCallNtCreateFile = 0x1; + const unsigned kCallNtOpenFile = 0x2; + const unsigned kCallNtQueryAttributesFile = 0x4; + const unsigned kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile = 0x8; + const unsigned kCallNtSetInfoRename = 0x10; + + DWORD rule_to_add = kCallNtOpenFile | kCallNtCreateFile | + kCallNtQueryAttributesFile | + kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile | kCallNtSetInfoRename; + + PolicyRule create(result); + PolicyRule open(result); + PolicyRule query(result); + PolicyRule query_full(result); + PolicyRule rename(result); + + switch (semantics) { + case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY: { + open.AddNumberMatch(IF, OpenFile::OPTIONS, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE, AND); + create.AddNumberMatch(IF, OpenFile::OPTIONS, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE, AND); + break; + } + case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY: { + // We consider all flags that are not known to be readonly as potentially + // used for write. + DWORD allowed_flags = FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | + FILE_READ_EA | SYNCHRONIZE | FILE_EXECUTE | + GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_EXECUTE | READ_CONTROL; + DWORD restricted_flags = ~allowed_flags; + open.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenFile::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND); + create.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenFile::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND); + + // Read only access don't work for rename. + rule_to_add &= ~kCallNtSetInfoRename; + break; + } + case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_QUERY: { + // Here we don't want to add policy for the open or the create. + rule_to_add &= ~(kCallNtOpenFile | kCallNtCreateFile | + kCallNtSetInfoRename); + break; + } + case TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY: { + break; + } + default: { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + } + + if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtCreateFile) && + (!create.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenFile::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) || + !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, &create))) { + return false; + } + + if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtOpenFile) && + (!open.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenFile::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) || + !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, &open))) { + return false; + } + + if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtQueryAttributesFile) && + (!query.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) || + !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, &query))) { + return false; + } + + if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtQueryFullAttributesFile) && + (!query_full.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) + || !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, + &query_full))) { + return false; + } + + if ((rule_to_add & kCallNtSetInfoRename) && + (!rename.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) || + !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, &rename))) { + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +// Right now we insert two rules, to be evaluated before any user supplied rule: +// - go to the broker if the path doesn't look like the paths that we push on +// the policy (namely \??\something). +// - go to the broker if it looks like this is a short-name path. +// +// It is possible to add a rule to go to the broker in any case; it would look +// something like: +// rule = new PolicyRule(ASK_BROKER); +// rule->AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, FileName::BROKER, TRUE, AND); +// policy->AddRule(service, rule); +bool FileSystemPolicy::SetInitialRules(LowLevelPolicy* policy) { + PolicyRule format(ASK_BROKER); + PolicyRule short_name(ASK_BROKER); + + bool rv = format.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, FileName::BROKER, TRUE, AND); + rv &= format.AddStringMatch(IF_NOT, FileName::NAME, L"\\/?/?\\*", + CASE_SENSITIVE); + + rv &= short_name.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, FileName::BROKER, TRUE, AND); + rv &= short_name.AddStringMatch(IF, FileName::NAME, L"*~*", CASE_SENSITIVE); + + if (!rv || !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, &format)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, &short_name)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, &format)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, &short_name)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, &format)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, &short_name)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, &format)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, &short_name)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, &format)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, &short_name)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool FileSystemPolicy::CreateFileAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &file, + uint32 attributes, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 file_attributes, + uint32 share_access, + uint32 create_disposition, + uint32 create_options, + HANDLE *handle, + NTSTATUS* nt_status, + ULONG_PTR *io_information) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means create the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return false; + } + IO_STATUS_BLOCK io_block = {0}; + UNICODE_STRING uni_name = {0}; + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitObjectAttribs(file, attributes, NULL, &obj_attributes, &uni_name); + *nt_status = NtCreateFileInTarget(handle, desired_access, &obj_attributes, + &io_block, file_attributes, share_access, + create_disposition, create_options, NULL, + 0, client_info.process); + + *io_information = io_block.Information; + return true; +} + +bool FileSystemPolicy::OpenFileAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &file, + uint32 attributes, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 share_access, + uint32 open_options, + HANDLE *handle, + NTSTATUS* nt_status, + ULONG_PTR *io_information) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means open the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + // An NtOpen is equivalent to an NtCreate with FileAttributes = 0 and + // CreateDisposition = FILE_OPEN. + IO_STATUS_BLOCK io_block = {0}; + UNICODE_STRING uni_name = {0}; + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitObjectAttribs(file, attributes, NULL, &obj_attributes, &uni_name); + *nt_status = NtCreateFileInTarget(handle, desired_access, &obj_attributes, + &io_block, 0, share_access, FILE_OPEN, + open_options, NULL, 0, + client_info.process); + + *io_information = io_block.Information; + return true; +} + +bool FileSystemPolicy::QueryAttributesFileAction( + EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &file, + uint32 attributes, + FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION* file_info, + NTSTATUS* nt_status) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means query the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + NtQueryAttributesFileFunction NtQueryAttributesFile = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryAttributesFile", &NtQueryAttributesFile); + + UNICODE_STRING uni_name = {0}; + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitObjectAttribs(file, attributes, NULL, &obj_attributes, &uni_name); + *nt_status = NtQueryAttributesFile(&obj_attributes, file_info); + + return true; +} + +bool FileSystemPolicy::QueryFullAttributesFileAction( + EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &file, + uint32 attributes, + FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION* file_info, + NTSTATUS* nt_status) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means query the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + NtQueryFullAttributesFileFunction NtQueryFullAttributesFile = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryFullAttributesFile", &NtQueryFullAttributesFile); + + UNICODE_STRING uni_name = {0}; + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitObjectAttribs(file, attributes, NULL, &obj_attributes, &uni_name); + *nt_status = NtQueryFullAttributesFile(&obj_attributes, file_info); + + return true; +} + +bool FileSystemPolicy::SetInformationFileAction( + EvalResult eval_result, const ClientInfo& client_info, + HANDLE target_file_handle, void* file_info, uint32 length, + uint32 info_class, IO_STATUS_BLOCK* io_block, + NTSTATUS* nt_status) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means open the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + NtSetInformationFileFunction NtSetInformationFile = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtSetInformationFile", &NtSetInformationFile); + + HANDLE local_handle = NULL; + if (!::DuplicateHandle(client_info.process, target_file_handle, + ::GetCurrentProcess(), &local_handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + base::win::ScopedHandle handle(local_handle); + + FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS file_info_class = + static_cast<FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS>(info_class); + *nt_status = NtSetInformationFile(local_handle, io_block, file_info, length, + file_info_class); + + return true; +} + +bool PreProcessName(const std::wstring& path, std::wstring* new_path) { + ConvertToLongPath(path, new_path); + + bool reparsed = false; + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != IsReparsePoint(*new_path, &reparsed)) + return false; + + // We can't process reparsed file. + return !reparsed; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.h b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5010a9f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_POLICY_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_POLICY_H__ + +#include <string> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +enum EvalResult; + +// This class centralizes most of the knowledge related to file system policy +class FileSystemPolicy { + public: + // Creates the required low-level policy rules to evaluate a high-level + // policy rule for File IO, in particular open or create actions. + // 'name' is the file or directory name. + // 'semantics' is the desired semantics for the open or create. + // 'policy' is the policy generator to which the rules are going to be added. + static bool GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy); + + // Add basic file system rules. + static bool SetInitialRules(LowLevelPolicy* policy); + + // Performs the desired policy action on a create request with an + // API that is compatible with the IPC-received parameters. + // 'client_info' : the target process that is making the request. + // 'eval_result' : The desired policy action to accomplish. + // 'file' : The target file or directory. + static bool CreateFileAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &file, + uint32 attributes, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 file_attributes, + uint32 share_access, + uint32 create_disposition, + uint32 create_options, + HANDLE* handle, + NTSTATUS* nt_status, + ULONG_PTR* io_information); + + // Performs the desired policy action on an open request with an + // API that is compatible with the IPC-received parameters. + // 'client_info' : the target process that is making the request. + // 'eval_result' : The desired policy action to accomplish. + // 'file' : The target file or directory. + static bool OpenFileAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &file, + uint32 attributes, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 share_access, + uint32 open_options, + HANDLE* handle, + NTSTATUS* nt_status, + ULONG_PTR* io_information); + + // Performs the desired policy action on a query request with an + // API that is compatible with the IPC-received parameters. + static bool QueryAttributesFileAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &file, + uint32 attributes, + FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION* file_info, + NTSTATUS* nt_status); + + // Performs the desired policy action on a query request with an + // API that is compatible with the IPC-received parameters. + static bool QueryFullAttributesFileAction( + EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &file, + uint32 attributes, + FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION* file_info, + NTSTATUS* nt_status); + + // Performs the desired policy action on a set_info request with an + // API that is compatible with the IPC-received parameters. + static bool SetInformationFileAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + HANDLE target_file_handle, + void* file_info, + uint32 length, + uint32 info_class, + IO_STATUS_BLOCK* io_block, + NTSTATUS* nt_status); +}; + +// Expands the path and check if it's a reparse point. Returns false if +// we cannot determine or if there is an unexpected error. In that case +// the path cannot be trusted. +bool PreProcessName(const std::wstring& path, std::wstring* new_path); + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_FILESYSTEM_POLICY_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer.cc b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d79f2c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer.cc @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/handle_closer.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/internal_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { + +template<typename T> T RoundUpToWordSize(T v) { + if (size_t mod = v % sizeof(size_t)) + v += sizeof(size_t) - mod; + return v; +} + +template<typename T> T* RoundUpToWordSize(T* v) { + return reinterpret_cast<T*>(RoundUpToWordSize(reinterpret_cast<size_t>(v))); +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +// Memory buffer mapped from the parent, with the list of handles. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HandleCloserInfo* g_handles_to_close; + +HandleCloser::HandleCloser() {} + +ResultCode HandleCloser::AddHandle(const char16* handle_type, + const char16* handle_name) { + if (!handle_type) + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + + HandleMap::iterator names = handles_to_close_.find(handle_type); + if (names == handles_to_close_.end()) { // We have no entries for this type. + std::pair<HandleMap::iterator, bool> result = handles_to_close_.insert( + HandleMap::value_type(handle_type, HandleMap::mapped_type())); + names = result.first; + if (handle_name) + names->second.insert(handle_name); + } else if (!handle_name) { // Now we need to close all handles of this type. + names->second.clear(); + } else if (!names->second.empty()) { // Add another name for this type. + names->second.insert(handle_name); + } // If we're already closing all handles of type then we're done. + + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +size_t HandleCloser::GetBufferSize() { + size_t bytes_total = offsetof(HandleCloserInfo, handle_entries); + + for (HandleMap::iterator i = handles_to_close_.begin(); + i != handles_to_close_.end(); ++i) { + size_t bytes_entry = offsetof(HandleListEntry, handle_type) + + (i->first.size() + 1) * sizeof(char16); + for (HandleMap::mapped_type::iterator j = i->second.begin(); + j != i->second.end(); ++j) { + bytes_entry += ((*j).size() + 1) * sizeof(char16); + } + + // Round up to the nearest multiple of word size. + bytes_entry = RoundUpToWordSize(bytes_entry); + bytes_total += bytes_entry; + } + + return bytes_total; +} + +bool HandleCloser::InitializeTargetHandles(TargetProcess* target) { + // Do nothing on an empty list (global pointer already initialized to NULL). + if (handles_to_close_.empty()) + return true; + + size_t bytes_needed = GetBufferSize(); + scoped_array<size_t> local_buffer( + new size_t[bytes_needed / sizeof(size_t)]); + + if (!SetupHandleList(local_buffer.get(), bytes_needed)) + return false; + + HANDLE child = target->Process(); + + // Allocate memory in the target process without specifying the address + void* remote_data = ::VirtualAllocEx(child, NULL, bytes_needed, + MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE); + if (NULL == remote_data) + return false; + + // Copy the handle buffer over. + SIZE_T bytes_written; + BOOL result = ::WriteProcessMemory(child, remote_data, local_buffer.get(), + bytes_needed, &bytes_written); + if (!result || bytes_written != bytes_needed) { + ::VirtualFreeEx(child, remote_data, 0, MEM_RELEASE); + return false; + } + + g_handles_to_close = reinterpret_cast<HandleCloserInfo*>(remote_data); + + ResultCode rc = target->TransferVariable("g_handles_to_close", + &g_handles_to_close, + sizeof(g_handles_to_close)); + + return (SBOX_ALL_OK == rc); +} + +bool HandleCloser::SetupHandleList(void* buffer, size_t buffer_bytes) { + ::ZeroMemory(buffer, buffer_bytes); + HandleCloserInfo* handle_info = reinterpret_cast<HandleCloserInfo*>(buffer); + handle_info->record_bytes = buffer_bytes; + handle_info->num_handle_types = handles_to_close_.size(); + + char16* output = reinterpret_cast<char16*>(&handle_info->handle_entries[0]); + char16* end = reinterpret_cast<char16*>( + reinterpret_cast<char*>(buffer) + buffer_bytes); + for (HandleMap::iterator i = handles_to_close_.begin(); + i != handles_to_close_.end(); ++i) { + if (output >= end) + return false; + HandleListEntry* list_entry = reinterpret_cast<HandleListEntry*>(output); + output = &list_entry->handle_type[0]; + + // Copy the typename and set the offset and count. + i->first._Copy_s(output, i->first.size(), i->first.size()); + *(output += i->first.size()) = L'\0'; + output++; + list_entry->offset_to_names = reinterpret_cast<char*>(output) - + reinterpret_cast<char*>(list_entry); + list_entry->name_count = i->second.size(); + + // Copy the handle names. + for (HandleMap::mapped_type::iterator j = i->second.begin(); + j != i->second.end(); ++j) { + output = std::copy((*j).begin(), (*j).end(), output) + 1; + } + + // Round up to the nearest multiple of sizeof(size_t). + output = RoundUpToWordSize(output); + list_entry->record_bytes = reinterpret_cast<char*>(output) - + reinterpret_cast<char*>(list_entry); + } + + DCHECK_EQ(reinterpret_cast<size_t>(output), reinterpret_cast<size_t>(end)); + return output <= end; +} + +bool HandleCloser::SetupHandleInterceptions(InterceptionManager* manager) { + // We need to intercept CreateThread if we're closing ALPC port clients. + HandleMap::iterator names = handles_to_close_.find(L"ALPC Port"); + if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_VISTA && + names != handles_to_close_.end() && + (names->second.empty() || names->second.size() == 0)) { + if (!INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, kKerneldllName, CreateThread, + CREATE_THREAD_ID, 28)) { + return false; + } + if (!INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, kKerneldllName, GetUserDefaultLCID, + GET_USER_DEFAULT_LCID_ID, 4)) { + return false; + } + + return true; + } + + return true; +} + +bool GetHandleName(HANDLE handle, string16* handle_name) { + static NtQueryObject QueryObject = NULL; + if (!QueryObject) + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &QueryObject); + + ULONG size = MAX_PATH; + scoped_ptr<UNICODE_STRING> name; + NTSTATUS result; + + do { + name.reset(reinterpret_cast<UNICODE_STRING*>(new BYTE[size])); + result = QueryObject(handle, ObjectNameInformation, name.get(), + size, &size); + } while (result == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH || + result == STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW); + + if (NT_SUCCESS(result) && name->Buffer && name->Length) + handle_name->assign(name->Buffer, name->Length / sizeof(wchar_t)); + else + handle_name->clear(); + + return NT_SUCCESS(result); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer.h b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f680169 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_CLOSER_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_CLOSER_H_ + +#include <map> +#include <set> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/string16.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_process.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This is a map of handle-types to names that we need to close in the +// target process. A null set means we need to close all handles of the +// given type. +typedef std::map<const string16, std::set<const string16> > HandleMap; + +// Type and set of corresponding handle names to close. +struct HandleListEntry { + size_t record_bytes; // Rounded to sizeof(size_t) bytes. + size_t offset_to_names; // Nul terminated strings of name_count names. + size_t name_count; + char16 handle_type[1]; +}; + +// Global parameters and a pointer to the list of entries. +struct HandleCloserInfo { + size_t record_bytes; // Rounded to sizeof(size_t) bytes. + size_t num_handle_types; + struct HandleListEntry handle_entries[1]; +}; + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HandleCloserInfo* g_handle_closer_info; + +// Adds handles to close after lockdown. +class HandleCloser { + public: + HandleCloser(); + + // Adds a handle that will be closed in the target process after lockdown. + // A NULL value for handle_name indicates all handles of the specified type. + // An empty string for handle_name indicates the handle is unnamed. + ResultCode AddHandle(const char16* handle_type, const char16* handle_name); + + // Serializes and copies the closer table into the target process. + bool InitializeTargetHandles(TargetProcess* target); + + // Adds any interceptions that may be required due to closed system handles. + bool SetupHandleInterceptions(InterceptionManager* manager); + + private: + // Calculates the memory needed to copy the serialized handles list (rounded + // to the nearest machine-word size). + size_t GetBufferSize(); + + // Serializes the handle list into the target process. + bool SetupHandleList(void* buffer, size_t buffer_bytes); + + HandleMap handles_to_close_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(HandleCloser); +}; + +// Returns the object manager's name associated with a handle +bool GetHandleName(HANDLE handle, string16* handle_name); + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_CLOSER_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_agent.cc b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_agent.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b5ac97 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_agent.cc @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/handle_closer_agent.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { + +// Returns type infomation for an NT object. This routine is expected to be +// called for invalid handles so it catches STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE exceptions +// that can be generated when handle tracing is enabled. +NTSTATUS QueryObjectTypeInformation(HANDLE handle, + void* buffer, + ULONG* size) { + static NtQueryObject QueryObject = NULL; + if (!QueryObject) + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &QueryObject); + + NTSTATUS status = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + __try { + status = QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, buffer, *size, size); + } __except(GetExceptionCode() == STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE ? + EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER : EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_SEARCH) { + status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + return status; +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +// Memory buffer mapped from the parent, with the list of handles. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HandleCloserInfo* g_handles_to_close = NULL; + +bool HandleCloserAgent::NeedsHandlesClosed() { + return g_handles_to_close != NULL; +} + +// Reads g_handles_to_close and creates the lookup map. +void HandleCloserAgent::InitializeHandlesToClose() { + CHECK(g_handles_to_close != NULL); + + // Grab the header. + HandleListEntry* entry = g_handles_to_close->handle_entries; + for (size_t i = 0; i < g_handles_to_close->num_handle_types; ++i) { + // Set the type name. + char16* input = entry->handle_type; + HandleMap::mapped_type& handle_names = handles_to_close_[input]; + input = reinterpret_cast<char16*>(reinterpret_cast<char*>(entry) + + entry->offset_to_names); + // Grab all the handle names. + for (size_t j = 0; j < entry->name_count; ++j) { + std::pair<HandleMap::mapped_type::iterator, bool> name + = handle_names.insert(input); + CHECK(name.second); + input += name.first->size() + 1; + } + + // Move on to the next entry. + entry = reinterpret_cast<HandleListEntry*>(reinterpret_cast<char*>(entry) + + entry->record_bytes); + + DCHECK(reinterpret_cast<char16*>(entry) >= input); + DCHECK(reinterpret_cast<char16*>(entry) - input < + sizeof(size_t) / sizeof(char16)); + } + + // Clean up the memory we copied over. + ::VirtualFree(g_handles_to_close, 0, MEM_RELEASE); + g_handles_to_close = NULL; +} + +bool HandleCloserAgent::CloseHandles() { + DWORD handle_count = UINT_MAX; + const int kInvalidHandleThreshold = 100; + const size_t kHandleOffset = sizeof(HANDLE); + + if (!::GetProcessHandleCount(::GetCurrentProcess(), &handle_count)) + return false; + + // Set up buffers for the type info and the name. + std::vector<BYTE> type_info_buffer(sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)); + OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info = + reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(&(type_info_buffer[0])); + string16 handle_name; + HANDLE handle = NULL; + int invalid_count = 0; + + // Keep incrementing until we hit the number of handles reported by + // GetProcessHandleCount(). If we hit a very long sequence of invalid + // handles we assume that we've run past the end of the table. + while (handle_count && invalid_count < kInvalidHandleThreshold) { + reinterpret_cast<size_t&>(handle) += kHandleOffset; + NTSTATUS rc; + + // Get the type name, reusing the buffer. + ULONG size = static_cast<ULONG>(type_info_buffer.size()); + rc = QueryObjectTypeInformation(handle, type_info, &size); + while (rc == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH || + rc == STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW) { + type_info_buffer.resize(size + sizeof(wchar_t)); + type_info = reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>( + &(type_info_buffer[0])); + rc = QueryObjectTypeInformation(handle, type_info, &size); + // Leave padding for the nul terminator. + if (NT_SUCCESS(0) && size == type_info_buffer.size()) + rc = STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + if (!NT_SUCCESS(rc) || !type_info->Name.Buffer) { + ++invalid_count; + continue; + } + + --handle_count; + type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0'; + + // Check if we're looking for this type of handle. + HandleMap::iterator result = + handles_to_close_.find(type_info->Name.Buffer); + if (result != handles_to_close_.end()) { + HandleMap::mapped_type& names = result->second; + // Empty set means close all handles of this type; otherwise check name. + if (!names.empty()) { + // Move on to the next handle if this name doesn't match. + if (!GetHandleName(handle, &handle_name) || !names.count(handle_name)) + continue; + } + + if (!::SetHandleInformation(handle, HANDLE_FLAG_PROTECT_FROM_CLOSE, 0)) + return false; + if (!::CloseHandle(handle)) + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_agent.h b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_agent.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c74987c --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_agent.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_CLOSER_AGENT_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_CLOSER_AGENT_H_ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/string16.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_closer.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Target process code to close the handle list copied over from the broker. +class HandleCloserAgent { + public: + HandleCloserAgent() {} + + // Reads the serialized list from the broker and creates the lookup map. + void InitializeHandlesToClose(); + + // Closes any handles matching those in the lookup map. + bool CloseHandles(); + + // True if we have handles waiting to be closed + static bool NeedsHandlesClosed(); + + private: + HandleMap handles_to_close_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(HandleCloserAgent); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_CLOSER_AGENT_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81b6db2 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_closer_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "base/stringprintf.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_closer_agent.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace { + +const wchar_t *kFileExtensions[] = { L".1", L".2", L".3", L".4" }; + +// Returns a handle to a unique marker file that can be retrieved between runs. +HANDLE GetMarkerFile(const wchar_t *extension) { + wchar_t path_buffer[MAX_PATH + 1]; + CHECK(::GetTempPath(MAX_PATH, path_buffer)); + string16 marker_path = path_buffer; + marker_path += L"\\sbox_marker_"; + + // Generate a unique value from the exe's size and timestamp. + CHECK(::GetModuleFileName(NULL, path_buffer, MAX_PATH)); + base::win::ScopedHandle module(::CreateFile(path_buffer, + FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, + OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL)); + CHECK(module.IsValid()); + FILETIME timestamp; + CHECK(::GetFileTime(module, ×tamp, NULL, NULL)); + marker_path += base::StringPrintf(L"%08x%08x%08x", + ::GetFileSize(module, NULL), + timestamp.dwLowDateTime, + timestamp.dwHighDateTime); + marker_path += extension; + + // Make the file delete-on-close so cleanup is automatic. + return CreateFile(marker_path.c_str(), FILE_ALL_ACCESS, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, + NULL, OPEN_ALWAYS, FILE_FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE, NULL); +} + +// Used by the thread pool tests. +HANDLE finish_event; +const int kWaitCount = 20; + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +// Checks for the presence of a list of files (in object path form). +// Format: CheckForFileHandle (Y|N) \path\to\file1 [\path\to\file2 ...] +// - Y or N depending if the file should exist or not. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int CheckForFileHandles(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc < 2) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_RUN_TEST; + bool should_find = argv[0][0] == L'Y'; + if (argv[0][1] != L'\0' || !should_find && argv[0][0] != L'N') + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_RUN_TEST; + + static int state = BEFORE_INIT; + switch (state++) { + case BEFORE_INIT: + // Create a unique marker file that is open while the test is running. + // The handles leak, but it will be closed by the test or on exit. + for (int i = 0; i < arraysize(kFileExtensions); ++i) + EXPECT_NE(GetMarkerFile(kFileExtensions[i]), INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + + case AFTER_REVERT: { + // Brute force the handle table to find what we're looking for. + DWORD handle_count = UINT_MAX; + const int kInvalidHandleThreshold = 100; + const size_t kHandleOffset = sizeof(HANDLE); + HANDLE handle = NULL; + int invalid_count = 0; + string16 handle_name; + + if (!::GetProcessHandleCount(::GetCurrentProcess(), &handle_count)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_RUN_TEST; + + while (handle_count && invalid_count < kInvalidHandleThreshold) { + reinterpret_cast<size_t&>(handle) += kHandleOffset; + if (GetHandleName(handle, &handle_name)) { + for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { + if (handle_name == argv[i]) + return should_find ? SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED : SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + --handle_count; + } else { + ++invalid_count; + } + } + + return should_find ? SBOX_TEST_FAILED : SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + + default: // Do nothing. + break; + } + + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +TEST(HandleCloserTest, CheckForMarkerFiles) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.SetTimeout(2000); + runner.SetTestState(EVERY_STATE); + sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = runner.GetPolicy(); + + string16 command = string16(L"CheckForFileHandles Y"); + for (int i = 0; i < arraysize(kFileExtensions); ++i) { + string16 handle_name; + base::win::ScopedHandle marker(GetMarkerFile(kFileExtensions[i])); + CHECK(marker.IsValid()); + CHECK(sandbox::GetHandleName(marker, &handle_name)); + command += (L" "); + command += handle_name; + } + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(command.c_str())) << + "Failed: " << command; +} + +TEST(HandleCloserTest, CloseMarkerFiles) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.SetTimeout(2000); + runner.SetTestState(EVERY_STATE); + sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = runner.GetPolicy(); + + string16 command = string16(L"CheckForFileHandles N"); + for (int i = 0; i < arraysize(kFileExtensions); ++i) { + string16 handle_name; + base::win::ScopedHandle marker(GetMarkerFile(kFileExtensions[i])); + CHECK(marker.IsValid()); + CHECK(sandbox::GetHandleName(marker, &handle_name)); + CHECK_EQ(policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", handle_name.c_str()), + SBOX_ALL_OK); + command += (L" "); + command += handle_name; + } + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(command.c_str())) << + "Failed: " << command; +} + +void WINAPI ThreadPoolTask(void* event, BOOLEAN timeout) { + static volatile LONG waiters_remaining = kWaitCount; + CHECK(!timeout); + CHECK(::CloseHandle(event)); + if (::InterlockedDecrement(&waiters_remaining) == 0) + CHECK(::SetEvent(finish_event)); +} + +// Run a thread pool inside a sandbox without a CSRSS connection. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int RunThreadPool(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + HANDLE wait_list[20]; + CHECK(finish_event = ::CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL)); + + // Set up a bunch of waiters. + HANDLE pool = NULL; + for (int i = 0; i < kWaitCount; ++i) { + HANDLE event = ::CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL); + CHECK(event); + CHECK(::RegisterWaitForSingleObject(&pool, event, ThreadPoolTask, event, + INFINITE, WT_EXECUTEONLYONCE)); + wait_list[i] = event; + } + + // Signal all the waiters. + for (int i = 0; i < kWaitCount; ++i) + CHECK(::SetEvent(wait_list[i])); + + CHECK_EQ(::WaitForSingleObject(finish_event, INFINITE), WAIT_OBJECT_0); + CHECK(::CloseHandle(finish_event)); + + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +TEST(HandleCloserTest, RunThreadPool) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.SetTimeout(2000); + runner.SetTestState(AFTER_REVERT); + sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = runner.GetPolicy(); + + // Sever the CSRSS connection by closing ALPC ports inside the sandbox. + CHECK_EQ(policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"ALPC Port", NULL), SBOX_ALL_OK); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"RunThreadPool")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_dispatcher.cc b/sandbox/win/src/handle_dispatcher.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a18cee --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_dispatcher.cc @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/handle_dispatcher.h" + +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_broker.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +HandleDispatcher::HandleDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base) + : policy_base_(policy_base) { + static const IPCCall duplicate_handle_proxy = { + {IPC_DUPLICATEHANDLEPROXY_TAG, VOIDPTR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, + ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>(&HandleDispatcher::DuplicateHandleProxy) + }; + + ipc_calls_.push_back(duplicate_handle_proxy); +} + +bool HandleDispatcher::SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, + int service) { + // We perform no interceptions for handles right now. + switch (service) { + case IPC_DUPLICATEHANDLEPROXY_TAG: + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +bool HandleDispatcher::DuplicateHandleProxy(IPCInfo* ipc, + HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options) { + NTSTATUS error; + static NtQueryObject QueryObject = NULL; + if (!QueryObject) + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &QueryObject); + + // Get a copy of the handle for use in the broker process. + HANDLE handle_temp; + if (!::DuplicateHandle(ipc->client_info->process, source_handle, + ::GetCurrentProcess(), &handle_temp, + 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ipc->return_info.win32_result = ::GetLastError(); + return false; + } + base::win::ScopedHandle handle(handle_temp); + + // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14). + BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)]; + OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info = + reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer); + ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t); + error = QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(error)) { + ipc->return_info.win32_result = error; + return false; + } + type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0'; + + CountedParameterSet<HandleTarget> params; + params[HandleTarget::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(type_info->Name.Buffer); + params[HandleTarget::TARGET] = ParamPickerMake(target_process_id); + + EvalResult eval = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_DUPLICATEHANDLEPROXY_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + ipc->return_info.win32_result = + HandlePolicy::DuplicateHandleProxyAction(eval, *ipc->client_info, + source_handle, + target_process_id, + &ipc->return_info.handle, + desired_access, options); + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox + diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_dispatcher.h b/sandbox/win/src/handle_dispatcher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1abc28 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_dispatcher.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_DISPATCHER_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_DISPATCHER_H_ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This class handles handle-related IPC calls. +class HandleDispatcher : public Dispatcher { + public: + explicit HandleDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base); + ~HandleDispatcher() {} + + // Dispatcher interface. + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service); + + private: + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to + // TargetServices::DuplicateHandle() in the target. + bool DuplicateHandleProxy(IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options); + + PolicyBase* policy_base_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(HandleDispatcher); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_DISPATCHER_H_ + diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_interception.cc b/sandbox/win/src/handle_interception.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f7b9f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_interception.cc @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/handle_interception.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +ResultCode DuplicateHandleProxy(HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE* target_handle, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options) { + *target_handle = NULL; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + return SBOX_ERROR_NO_SPACE; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_DUPLICATEHANDLEPROXY_TAG, + source_handle, target_process_id, + desired_access, options, &answer); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + return code; + + if (answer.win32_result) { + ::SetLastError(answer.nt_status); + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + } + + *target_handle = answer.handle; + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +} // namespace sandbox + diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_interception.h b/sandbox/win/src/handle_interception.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..543c7ba --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_interception.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_INTERCEPTION_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_INTERCEPTION_H_ + +namespace sandbox { + +// TODO(jschuh) Add an interception to catch dangerous DuplicateHandle calls. + +ResultCode DuplicateHandleProxy(HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE* target_handle, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options); + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_INTERCEPTION_H_ + diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy.cc b/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..355dda8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy.cc @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/handle_policy.h" + +#include <string> + +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/broker_services.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +bool HandlePolicy::GenerateRules(const wchar_t* type_name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy) { + PolicyRule duplicate_rule(ASK_BROKER); + + switch (semantics) { + case TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY: { + if (!duplicate_rule.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, HandleTarget::TARGET, + ::GetCurrentProcessId(), EQUAL)) { + return false; + } + break; + } + + case TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_BROKER: { + if (!duplicate_rule.AddNumberMatch(IF, HandleTarget::TARGET, + ::GetCurrentProcessId(), EQUAL)) { + return false; + } + break; + } + + default: + return false; + } + if (!duplicate_rule.AddStringMatch(IF, HandleTarget::NAME, type_name, + CASE_INSENSITIVE)) { + return false; + } + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_DUPLICATEHANDLEPROXY_TAG, &duplicate_rule)) { + return false; + } + return true; +} + +DWORD HandlePolicy::DuplicateHandleProxyAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE* target_handle, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means duplicate the handle. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + base::win::ScopedHandle remote_target_process; + if (target_process_id != ::GetCurrentProcessId()) { + // Sandboxed children are dynamic, so we check that manually. + if (!BrokerServicesBase::GetInstance()->IsActiveTarget(target_process_id)) { + return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + remote_target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE, + target_process_id)); + if (!remote_target_process.IsValid()) + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + // If the policy didn't block us and we have no valid target, then the broker + // (this process) is the valid target. + HANDLE target_process = remote_target_process.IsValid() ? + remote_target_process : ::GetCurrentProcess(); + DWORD result = ERROR_SUCCESS; + if (!::DuplicateHandle(client_info.process, source_handle, target_process, + target_handle, desired_access, FALSE, + options)) { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace sandbox + diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy.h b/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c3b7156 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_POLICY_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_POLICY_H_ + +#include <string> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +enum EvalResult; + +// This class centralizes most of the knowledge related to handle policy. +class HandlePolicy { + public: + // Creates the required low-level policy rules to evaluate a high-level + // policy rule for handles, in particular duplicate action. + static bool GenerateRules(const wchar_t* type_name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy); + + // Processes a 'TargetPolicy::DuplicateHandle()' request from the target. + static DWORD DuplicateHandleProxyAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE* target_handle, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_POLICY_H_ + diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..05eb39b --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_policy_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "base/stringprintf.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Just waits for the supplied number of milliseconds. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int Handle_WaitProcess(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 1) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + ::Sleep(::wcstoul(argv[0], NULL, 10)); + return SBOX_TEST_TIMED_OUT; +} + +// Attempts to duplicate an event handle into the target process. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int Handle_DuplicateEvent(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 1) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + // Create a test event to use as a handle. + base::win::ScopedHandle test_event; + test_event.Set(::CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, TRUE, NULL)); + if (!test_event.IsValid()) + return SBOX_TEST_FIRST_ERROR; + + // Get the target process ID. + DWORD target_process_id = ::wcstoul(argv[0], NULL, 10); + + HANDLE handle = NULL; + ResultCode result = SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->DuplicateHandle( + test_event, target_process_id, &handle, 0, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS); + + return (result == SBOX_ALL_OK) ? SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED : SBOX_TEST_DENIED; +} + +// Tests that duplicating an object works only when the policy allows it. +TEST(HandlePolicyTest, DuplicateHandle) { + TestRunner target; + TestRunner runner; + + // Kick off an asynchronous target process for testing. + target.SetAsynchronous(true); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, target.RunTest(L"Handle_WaitProcess 30000")); + + // First test that we fail to open the event. + std::wstring cmd_line = base::StringPrintf(L"Handle_DuplicateEvent %d", + target.process_id()); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(cmd_line.c_str())); + + // Now successfully open the event after adding a duplicate handle rule. + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, + TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, + L"Event")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(cmd_line.c_str())); +} + +// Tests that duplicating an object works only when the policy allows it. +TEST(HandlePolicyTest, DuplicatePeerHandle) { + TestRunner target; + TestRunner runner; + + // Kick off an asynchronous target process for testing. + target.SetAsynchronous(true); + target.SetUnsandboxed(true); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, target.RunTest(L"Handle_WaitProcess 30000")); + + // First test that we fail to open the event. + std::wstring cmd_line = base::StringPrintf(L"Handle_DuplicateEvent %d", + target.process_id()); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(cmd_line.c_str())); + + // Now successfully open the event after adding a duplicate handle rule. + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, + TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, + L"Event")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(cmd_line.c_str())); +} + +// Tests that duplicating an object works only when the policy allows it. +TEST(HandlePolicyTest, DuplicateBrokerHandle) { + TestRunner runner; + + // First test that we fail to open the event. + std::wstring cmd_line = base::StringPrintf(L"Handle_DuplicateEvent %d", + ::GetCurrentProcessId()); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(cmd_line.c_str())); + + // Add the peer rule and make sure we fail again. + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, + TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, + L"Event")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(cmd_line.c_str())); + + + // Now successfully open the event after adding a broker handle rule. + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, + TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_BROKER, + L"Event")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(cmd_line.c_str())); +} + +} // namespace sandbox + diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_table.cc b/sandbox/win/src/handle_table.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c7fcf0a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_table.cc @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/handle_table.h" + +#include <algorithm> +#include <cstdlib> + +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { + +bool CompareHandleEntries(const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION& a, + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION& b) { + return a.ProcessId < b.ProcessId; +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeProcess = L"Process"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeThread = L"Thread"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeFile = L"File"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeDirectory = L"Directory"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeKey = L"Key"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeWindowStation = L"WindowStation"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeDesktop = L"Desktop"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeService = L"Service"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeMutex = L"Mutex"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeSemaphore = L"Semaphore"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeEvent = L"Event"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeTimer = L"Timer"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeNamedPipe = L"NamedPipe"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeJobObject = L"JobObject"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeFileMap = L"FileMap"; +const char16* HandleTable::kTypeAlpcPort = L"ALPC Port"; + +HandleTable::HandleTable() { + static NtQuerySystemInformation QuerySystemInformation = NULL; + if (!QuerySystemInformation) + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQuerySystemInformation", &QuerySystemInformation); + + ULONG size = 0x15000; + NTSTATUS result; + do { + handle_info_buffer_.resize(size); + result = QuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation, + handle_info_internal(), size, &size); + } while (result == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + + // We failed, so make an empty table. + if (!NT_SUCCESS(result)) { + handle_info_buffer_.resize(0); + return; + } + + // Sort it to make process lookups faster. + std::sort(handle_info_internal()->Information, + handle_info_internal()->Information + + handle_info_internal()->NumberOfHandles, CompareHandleEntries); +} + +HandleTable::Iterator HandleTable::HandlesForProcess(ULONG process_id) const { + SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION key; + key.ProcessId = process_id; + + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* start = handle_info()->Information; + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* finish = + &handle_info()->Information[handle_info()->NumberOfHandles]; + + start = std::lower_bound(start, finish, key, CompareHandleEntries); + if (start->ProcessId != process_id) + return Iterator(*this, finish, finish); + finish = std::upper_bound(start, finish, key, CompareHandleEntries); + return Iterator(*this, start, finish); +} + +HandleTable::HandleEntry::HandleEntry( + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* handle_info_entry) + : handle_entry_(handle_info_entry), last_entry_(0) { +} + +void HandleTable::HandleEntry::UpdateInfo(UpdateType flag) { + static NtQueryObject QueryObject = NULL; + if (!QueryObject) + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &QueryObject); + + NTSTATUS result; + + // Always update the basic type info, but grab the names as needed. + if (needs_info_update()) { + handle_name_.clear(); + type_name_.clear(); + last_entry_ = handle_entry_; + + // Most handle names are very short, so start small and reuse this buffer. + if (type_info_buffer_.empty()) + type_info_buffer_.resize(sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + + (32 * sizeof(wchar_t))); + ULONG size = static_cast<ULONG>(type_info_buffer_.size()); + result = QueryObject(reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(handle_entry_->Handle), + ObjectTypeInformation, type_info_internal(), size, &size); + while (result == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH) { + type_info_buffer_.resize(size); + result = QueryObject(reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(handle_entry_->Handle), + ObjectTypeInformation, type_info_internal(), size, &size); + } + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(result)) { + type_info_buffer_.clear(); + return; + } + } + + // Don't bother copying out names until we ask for them, and then cache them. + switch (flag) { + case UPDATE_INFO_AND_NAME: + if (type_info_buffer_.size() && handle_name_.empty()) { + ULONG size = MAX_PATH; + scoped_ptr<UNICODE_STRING> name; + do { + name.reset(reinterpret_cast<UNICODE_STRING*>(new BYTE[size])); + result = QueryObject(reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>( + handle_entry_->Handle), ObjectNameInformation, name.get(), + size, &size); + } while (result == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + + if (NT_SUCCESS(result)) { + handle_name_.assign(name->Buffer, name->Length / sizeof(wchar_t)); + } + } + break; + + case UPDATE_INFO_AND_TYPE_NAME: + if (!type_info_buffer_.empty() && type_info_internal()->Name.Buffer && + type_name_.empty()) { + type_name_.assign(type_info_internal()->Name.Buffer, + type_info_internal()->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)); + } + break; + } +} + +const OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* HandleTable::HandleEntry::TypeInfo() { + UpdateInfo(UPDATE_INFO_ONLY); + return type_info_buffer_.empty() ? NULL : type_info_internal(); +} + +const string16& HandleTable::HandleEntry::Name() { + UpdateInfo(UPDATE_INFO_AND_NAME); + return handle_name_; +} + +const string16& HandleTable::HandleEntry::Type() { + UpdateInfo(UPDATE_INFO_AND_TYPE_NAME); + return type_name_; +} + +bool HandleTable::HandleEntry::IsType(const string16& type_string) { + UpdateInfo(UPDATE_INFO_ONLY); + if (type_info_buffer_.empty()) + return false; + return type_string.compare(0, + type_info_internal()->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t), + type_info_internal()->Name.Buffer) == 0; +} + +HandleTable::Iterator::Iterator(const HandleTable& table, + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* start, + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* end) + : table_(table), current_(start), end_(end) { +} + +HandleTable::Iterator::Iterator(const Iterator& it) + : table_(it.table_), current_(it.current_.handle_entry_), end_(it.end_) { +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/handle_table.h b/sandbox/win/src/handle_table.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2b2615 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/handle_table.h @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_TABLE_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_TABLE_H_ + +#include <windows.h> +#include <vector> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/string16.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// HandleTable retrieves the global handle table and provides helper classes +// for iterating through the table and retrieving handle info. +class HandleTable { + public: + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeProcess; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeThread; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeFile; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeDirectory; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeKey; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeWindowStation; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeDesktop; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeService; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeMutex; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeSemaphore; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeEvent; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeTimer; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeNamedPipe; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeJobObject; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeFileMap; + static const char16* HandleTable::kTypeAlpcPort; + + class Iterator; + + // Used by the iterator to provide simple caching accessors to handle data. + class HandleEntry { + public: + bool operator==(const HandleEntry& rhs) const { + return handle_entry_ == rhs.handle_entry_; + } + + bool operator!=(const HandleEntry& rhs) const { + return handle_entry_ != rhs.handle_entry_; + } + + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* handle_entry() const { + return handle_entry_; + } + + const OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* TypeInfo(); + + const string16& Name(); + + const string16& Type(); + + bool IsType(const string16& type_string); + + private: + friend class Iterator; + friend class HandleTable; + + enum UpdateType { + UPDATE_INFO_ONLY, + UPDATE_INFO_AND_NAME, + UPDATE_INFO_AND_TYPE_NAME, + }; + + explicit HandleEntry(const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* handle_info_entry); + + bool needs_info_update() { return handle_entry_ != last_entry_; } + + void UpdateInfo(UpdateType flag); + + OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info_internal() { + return reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>( + &(type_info_buffer_[0])); + } + + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* handle_entry_; + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* last_entry_; + std::vector<BYTE> type_info_buffer_; + string16 handle_name_; + string16 type_name_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(HandleEntry); + }; + + class Iterator { + public: + Iterator(const HandleTable& table, const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* start, + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* stop); + + Iterator(const Iterator& it); + + Iterator& operator++() { + if (++(current_.handle_entry_) == end_) + current_.handle_entry_ = table_.end(); + return *this; + } + + bool operator==(const Iterator& rhs) const { + return current_ == rhs.current_; + } + + bool operator!=(const Iterator& rhs) const { + return current_ != rhs.current_; + } + + HandleEntry& operator*() { return current_; } + + operator const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION*() { + return current_.handle_entry_; + } + + HandleEntry* operator->() { return ¤t_; } + + private: + const HandleTable& table_; + HandleEntry current_; + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* end_; + }; + + HandleTable(); + + Iterator begin() const { + return Iterator(*this, handle_info()->Information, + &handle_info()->Information[handle_info()->NumberOfHandles]); + } + + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX* handle_info() const { + return reinterpret_cast<const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX*>( + &(handle_info_buffer_[0])); + } + + // Returns an iterator to the handles for only the supplied process ID. + Iterator HandlesForProcess(ULONG process_id) const; + const SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION* end() const { + return &handle_info()->Information[handle_info()->NumberOfHandles]; + } + + private: + SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX* handle_info_internal() { + return reinterpret_cast<SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX*>( + &(handle_info_buffer_[0])); + } + + std::vector<BYTE> handle_info_buffer_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(HandleTable); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_HANDLE_TABLE_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/integrity_level_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/integrity_level_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6e0b64 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/integrity_level_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <windows.h> +#include <atlsecurity.h> + +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" + +namespace sandbox { + + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int CheckIntegrityLevel(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + ATL::CAccessToken token; + if (!token.GetEffectiveToken(TOKEN_READ)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + char* buffer[100]; + DWORD buf_size = 100; + if (!::GetTokenInformation(token.GetHandle(), TokenIntegrityLevel, + reinterpret_cast<void*>(buffer), buf_size, + &buf_size)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + TOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL* label = + reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL*>(buffer); + + PSID sid_low = NULL; + if (!::ConvertStringSidToSid(L"S-1-16-4096", &sid_low)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + BOOL is_low_sid = ::EqualSid(label->Label.Sid, sid_low); + + ::LocalFree(sid_low); + + if (is_low_sid) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; +} + +TEST(IntegrityLevelTest, TestLowILReal) { + if (base::win::GetVersion() != base::win::VERSION_VISTA) + return; + + TestRunner runner(JOB_LOCKDOWN, USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_INTERACTIVE); + + runner.SetTimeout(INFINITE); + + runner.GetPolicy()->SetIntegrityLevel(INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckIntegrityLevel")); + + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckIntegrityLevel")); +} + +TEST(DelayedIntegrityLevelTest, TestLowILDelayed) { + if (base::win::GetVersion() != base::win::VERSION_VISTA) + return; + + TestRunner runner(JOB_LOCKDOWN, USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_INTERACTIVE); + + runner.SetTimeout(INFINITE); + + runner.GetPolicy()->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckIntegrityLevel")); + + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckIntegrityLevel")); +} + +TEST(IntegrityLevelTest, TestNoILChange) { + if (base::win::GetVersion() != base::win::VERSION_VISTA) + return; + + TestRunner runner(JOB_LOCKDOWN, USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_INTERACTIVE); + + runner.SetTimeout(INFINITE); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"CheckIntegrityLevel")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interception.cc b/sandbox/win/src/interception.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a850c6e --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interception.cc @@ -0,0 +1,551 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// For information about interceptions as a whole see +// http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox . + +#include <set> + +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "base/win/pe_image.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception_internal.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/service_resolver.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_interceptions.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_process.h" +#include "sandbox/src/wow64.h" + +namespace { + +const char kMapViewOfSectionName[] = "NtMapViewOfSection"; +const char kUnmapViewOfSectionName[] = "NtUnmapViewOfSection"; + +// Standard allocation granularity and page size for Windows. +const size_t kAllocGranularity = 65536; +const size_t kPageSize = 4096; + +// Find a random offset within 64k and aligned to ceil(log2(size)). +size_t GetGranularAlignedRandomOffset(size_t size) { + CHECK_LE(size, kAllocGranularity); + unsigned int offset; + + do { + rand_s(&offset); + offset &= (kAllocGranularity - 1); + } while (offset > (kAllocGranularity - size)); + + // Find an alignment between 64 and the page size (4096). + size_t align_size = kPageSize; + for (size_t new_size = align_size / 2; new_size >= size; new_size /= 2) { + align_size = new_size; + } + return offset & ~(align_size - 1); +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT SharedMemory* g_interceptions; + +// Table of the unpatched functions that we intercept. Mapped from the parent. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT OriginalFunctions g_originals = { NULL }; + +// Magic constant that identifies that this function is not to be patched. +const char kUnloadDLLDummyFunction[] = "@"; + +InterceptionManager::InterceptionManager(TargetProcess* child_process, + bool relaxed) + : child_(child_process), names_used_(false), relaxed_(relaxed) { + child_->AddRef(); +} +InterceptionManager::~InterceptionManager() { + child_->Release(); +} + +bool InterceptionManager::AddToPatchedFunctions( + const wchar_t* dll_name, const char* function_name, + InterceptionType interception_type, const void* replacement_code_address, + InterceptorId id) { + InterceptionData function; + function.type = interception_type; + function.id = id; + function.dll = dll_name; + function.function = function_name; + function.interceptor_address = replacement_code_address; + + interceptions_.push_back(function); + return true; +} + +bool InterceptionManager::AddToPatchedFunctions( + const wchar_t* dll_name, const char* function_name, + InterceptionType interception_type, const char* replacement_function_name, + InterceptorId id) { + InterceptionData function; + function.type = interception_type; + function.id = id; + function.dll = dll_name; + function.function = function_name; + function.interceptor = replacement_function_name; + function.interceptor_address = NULL; + + interceptions_.push_back(function); + names_used_ = true; + return true; +} + +bool InterceptionManager::AddToUnloadModules(const wchar_t* dll_name) { + InterceptionData module_to_unload; + module_to_unload.type = INTERCEPTION_UNLOAD_MODULE; + module_to_unload.dll = dll_name; + // The next two are dummy values that make the structures regular, instead + // of having special cases. They should not be used. + module_to_unload.function = kUnloadDLLDummyFunction; + module_to_unload.interceptor_address = reinterpret_cast<void*>(1); + + interceptions_.push_back(module_to_unload); + return true; +} + +bool InterceptionManager::InitializeInterceptions() { + if (interceptions_.empty()) + return true; // Nothing to do here + + size_t buffer_bytes = GetBufferSize(); + scoped_array<char> local_buffer(new char[buffer_bytes]); + + if (!SetupConfigBuffer(local_buffer.get(), buffer_bytes)) + return false; + + void* remote_buffer; + if (!CopyDataToChild(local_buffer.get(), buffer_bytes, &remote_buffer)) + return false; + + bool hot_patch_needed = (0 != buffer_bytes); + if (!PatchNtdll(hot_patch_needed)) + return false; + + g_interceptions = reinterpret_cast<SharedMemory*>(remote_buffer); + ResultCode rc = child_->TransferVariable("g_interceptions", + &g_interceptions, + sizeof(g_interceptions)); + return (SBOX_ALL_OK == rc); +} + +size_t InterceptionManager::GetBufferSize() const { + std::set<std::wstring> dlls; + size_t buffer_bytes = 0; + + std::list<InterceptionData>::const_iterator it = interceptions_.begin(); + for (; it != interceptions_.end(); ++it) { + // skip interceptions that are performed from the parent + if (!IsInterceptionPerformedByChild(*it)) + continue; + + if (!dlls.count(it->dll)) { + // NULL terminate the dll name on the structure + size_t dll_name_bytes = (it->dll.size() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t); + + // include the dll related size + buffer_bytes += RoundUpToMultiple(offsetof(DllPatchInfo, dll_name) + + dll_name_bytes, sizeof(size_t)); + dlls.insert(it->dll); + } + + // we have to NULL terminate the strings on the structure + size_t strings_chars = it->function.size() + it->interceptor.size() + 2; + + // a new FunctionInfo is required per function + size_t record_bytes = offsetof(FunctionInfo, function) + strings_chars; + record_bytes = RoundUpToMultiple(record_bytes, sizeof(size_t)); + buffer_bytes += record_bytes; + } + + if (0 != buffer_bytes) + // add the part of SharedMemory that we have not counted yet + buffer_bytes += offsetof(SharedMemory, dll_list); + + return buffer_bytes; +} + +// Basically, walk the list of interceptions moving them to the config buffer, +// but keeping together all interceptions that belong to the same dll. +// The config buffer is a local buffer, not the one allocated on the child. +bool InterceptionManager::SetupConfigBuffer(void* buffer, size_t buffer_bytes) { + if (0 == buffer_bytes) + return true; + + DCHECK(buffer_bytes > sizeof(SharedMemory)); + + SharedMemory* shared_memory = reinterpret_cast<SharedMemory*>(buffer); + DllPatchInfo* dll_info = shared_memory->dll_list; + int num_dlls = 0; + + shared_memory->interceptor_base = names_used_ ? child_->MainModule() : NULL; + + buffer_bytes -= offsetof(SharedMemory, dll_list); + buffer = dll_info; + + std::list<InterceptionData>::iterator it = interceptions_.begin(); + for (; it != interceptions_.end();) { + // skip interceptions that are performed from the parent + if (!IsInterceptionPerformedByChild(*it)) { + ++it; + continue; + } + + const std::wstring dll = it->dll; + if (!SetupDllInfo(*it, &buffer, &buffer_bytes)) + return false; + + // walk the interceptions from this point, saving the ones that are + // performed on this dll, and removing the entry from the list. + // advance the iterator before removing the element from the list + std::list<InterceptionData>::iterator rest = it; + for (; rest != interceptions_.end();) { + if (rest->dll == dll) { + if (!SetupInterceptionInfo(*rest, &buffer, &buffer_bytes, dll_info)) + return false; + if (it == rest) + ++it; + rest = interceptions_.erase(rest); + } else { + ++rest; + } + } + dll_info = reinterpret_cast<DllPatchInfo*>(buffer); + ++num_dlls; + } + + shared_memory->num_intercepted_dlls = num_dlls; + return true; +} + +// Fills up just the part that depends on the dll, not the info that depends on +// the actual interception. +bool InterceptionManager::SetupDllInfo(const InterceptionData& data, + void** buffer, + size_t* buffer_bytes) const { + DCHECK(buffer_bytes); + DCHECK(buffer); + DCHECK(*buffer); + + DllPatchInfo* dll_info = reinterpret_cast<DllPatchInfo*>(*buffer); + + // the strings have to be zero terminated + size_t required = offsetof(DllPatchInfo, dll_name) + + (data.dll.size() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t); + required = RoundUpToMultiple(required, sizeof(size_t)); + if (*buffer_bytes < required) + return false; + + *buffer_bytes -= required; + *buffer = reinterpret_cast<char*>(*buffer) + required; + + // set up the dll info to be what we know about it at this time + dll_info->unload_module = (data.type == INTERCEPTION_UNLOAD_MODULE); + dll_info->record_bytes = required; + dll_info->offset_to_functions = required; + dll_info->num_functions = 0; + data.dll._Copy_s(dll_info->dll_name, data.dll.size(), data.dll.size()); + dll_info->dll_name[data.dll.size()] = L'\0'; + + return true; +} + +bool InterceptionManager::SetupInterceptionInfo(const InterceptionData& data, + void** buffer, + size_t* buffer_bytes, + DllPatchInfo* dll_info) const { + DCHECK(buffer_bytes); + DCHECK(buffer); + DCHECK(*buffer); + + if ((dll_info->unload_module) && + (data.function != kUnloadDLLDummyFunction)) { + // Can't specify a dll for both patch and unload. + NOTREACHED(); + } + + FunctionInfo* function = reinterpret_cast<FunctionInfo*>(*buffer); + + size_t name_bytes = data.function.size(); + size_t interceptor_bytes = data.interceptor.size(); + + // the strings at the end of the structure are zero terminated + size_t required = offsetof(FunctionInfo, function) + + name_bytes + interceptor_bytes + 2; + required = RoundUpToMultiple(required, sizeof(size_t)); + if (*buffer_bytes < required) + return false; + + // update the caller's values + *buffer_bytes -= required; + *buffer = reinterpret_cast<char*>(*buffer) + required; + + function->record_bytes = required; + function->type = data.type; + function->id = data.id; + function->interceptor_address = data.interceptor_address; + char* names = function->function; + + data.function._Copy_s(names, name_bytes, name_bytes); + names += name_bytes; + *names++ = '\0'; + + // interceptor follows the function_name + data.interceptor._Copy_s(names, interceptor_bytes, interceptor_bytes); + names += interceptor_bytes; + *names++ = '\0'; + + // update the dll table + dll_info->num_functions++; + dll_info->record_bytes += required; + + return true; +} + +bool InterceptionManager::CopyDataToChild(const void* local_buffer, + size_t buffer_bytes, + void** remote_buffer) const { + DCHECK(NULL != remote_buffer); + if (0 == buffer_bytes) { + *remote_buffer = NULL; + return true; + } + + HANDLE child = child_->Process(); + + // Allocate memory on the target process without specifying the address + void* remote_data = ::VirtualAllocEx(child, NULL, buffer_bytes, + MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE); + if (NULL == remote_data) + return false; + + SIZE_T bytes_written; + BOOL success = ::WriteProcessMemory(child, remote_data, local_buffer, + buffer_bytes, &bytes_written); + if (FALSE == success || bytes_written != buffer_bytes) { + ::VirtualFreeEx(child, remote_data, 0, MEM_RELEASE); + return false; + } + + *remote_buffer = remote_data; + + return true; +} + +// Only return true if the child should be able to perform this interception. +bool InterceptionManager::IsInterceptionPerformedByChild( + const InterceptionData& data) const { + if (INTERCEPTION_INVALID == data.type) + return false; + + if (INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL == data.type) + return false; + + if (data.type >= INTERCEPTION_LAST) + return false; + + std::wstring ntdll(kNtdllName); + if (ntdll == data.dll) + return false; // ntdll has to be intercepted from the parent + + return true; +} + +bool InterceptionManager::PatchNtdll(bool hot_patch_needed) { + // Maybe there is nothing to do + if (!hot_patch_needed && interceptions_.empty()) + return true; + + if (hot_patch_needed) { +#if SANDBOX_EXPORTS + // Make sure the functions are not excluded by the linker. +#if defined(_WIN64) + #pragma comment(linker, "/include:TargetNtMapViewOfSection64") + #pragma comment(linker, "/include:TargetNtUnmapViewOfSection64") +#else + #pragma comment(linker, "/include:_TargetNtMapViewOfSection@44") + #pragma comment(linker, "/include:_TargetNtUnmapViewOfSection@12") +#endif +#endif + ADD_NT_INTERCEPTION(NtMapViewOfSection, MAP_VIEW_OF_SECTION_ID, 44); + ADD_NT_INTERCEPTION(NtUnmapViewOfSection, UNMAP_VIEW_OF_SECTION_ID, 12); + } + + // Reserve a full 64k memory range in the child process. + HANDLE child = child_->Process(); + BYTE* thunk_base = reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>( + ::VirtualAllocEx(child, NULL, kAllocGranularity, + MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_NOACCESS)); + + // Find an aligned, random location within the reserved range. + size_t thunk_bytes = interceptions_.size() * sizeof(ThunkData) + + sizeof(DllInterceptionData); + size_t thunk_offset = GetGranularAlignedRandomOffset(thunk_bytes); + + // Split the base and offset along page boundaries. + thunk_base += thunk_offset & ~(kPageSize - 1); + thunk_offset &= kPageSize - 1; + + // Make an aligned, padded allocation, and move the pointer to our chunk. + size_t thunk_bytes_padded = (thunk_bytes + kPageSize - 1) & kPageSize; + thunk_base = reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>( + ::VirtualAllocEx(child, thunk_base, thunk_bytes_padded, + MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)); + CHECK(thunk_base); // If this fails we'd crash anyway on an invalid access. + DllInterceptionData* thunks = reinterpret_cast<DllInterceptionData*>( + thunk_base + thunk_offset); + + DllInterceptionData dll_data; + dll_data.data_bytes = thunk_bytes; + dll_data.num_thunks = 0; + dll_data.used_bytes = offsetof(DllInterceptionData, thunks); + + // Reset all helpers for a new child. + memset(g_originals, 0, sizeof(g_originals)); + + // this should write all the individual thunks to the child's memory + if (!PatchClientFunctions(thunks, thunk_bytes, &dll_data)) + return false; + + // and now write the first part of the table to the child's memory + SIZE_T written; + bool ok = FALSE != ::WriteProcessMemory(child, thunks, &dll_data, + offsetof(DllInterceptionData, thunks), + &written); + + if (!ok || (offsetof(DllInterceptionData, thunks) != written)) + return false; + + // Attempt to protect all the thunks, but ignore failure + DWORD old_protection; + ::VirtualProtectEx(child, thunks, thunk_bytes, + PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, &old_protection); + + ResultCode ret = child_->TransferVariable("g_originals", g_originals, + sizeof(g_originals)); + + return SBOX_ALL_OK == ret ? true : false; +} + +bool InterceptionManager::PatchClientFunctions(DllInterceptionData* thunks, + size_t thunk_bytes, + DllInterceptionData* dll_data) { + DCHECK(NULL != thunks); + DCHECK(NULL != dll_data); + + HMODULE ntdll_base = ::GetModuleHandle(kNtdllName); + if (!ntdll_base) + return false; + + base::win::PEImage ntdll_image(ntdll_base); + + // Bypass purify's interception. + wchar_t* loader_get = reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>( + ntdll_image.GetProcAddress("LdrGetDllHandle")); + if (loader_get) { + if (!GetModuleHandleHelper(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS | + GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT, + loader_get, &ntdll_base)) + return false; + } + + if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_VISTA) { + Wow64 WowHelper(child_, ntdll_base); + if (!WowHelper.WaitForNtdll()) + return false; + } + + char* interceptor_base = NULL; + +#if SANDBOX_EXPORTS + interceptor_base = reinterpret_cast<char*>(child_->MainModule()); + HMODULE local_interceptor = ::LoadLibrary(child_->Name()); +#endif + + ServiceResolverThunk* thunk; +#if defined(_WIN64) + thunk = new ServiceResolverThunk(child_->Process(), relaxed_); +#else + base::win::OSInfo* os_info = base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance(); + if (os_info->wow64_status() == base::win::OSInfo::WOW64_ENABLED) { + if (os_info->version() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8) + thunk = new Wow64W8ResolverThunk(child_->Process(), relaxed_); + else + thunk = new Wow64ResolverThunk(child_->Process(), relaxed_); + } else if (!IsXPSP2OrLater()) { + thunk = new Win2kResolverThunk(child_->Process(), relaxed_); + } else if (os_info->version() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8) { + thunk = new Win8ResolverThunk(child_->Process(), relaxed_); + } else { + thunk = new ServiceResolverThunk(child_->Process(), relaxed_); + } +#endif + + std::list<InterceptionData>::iterator it = interceptions_.begin(); + for (; it != interceptions_.end(); ++it) { + const std::wstring ntdll(kNtdllName); + if (it->dll != ntdll) + break; + + if (INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL != it->type) + break; + +#if SANDBOX_EXPORTS + // We may be trying to patch by function name. + if (NULL == it->interceptor_address) { + const char* address; + NTSTATUS ret = thunk->ResolveInterceptor(local_interceptor, + it->interceptor.c_str(), + reinterpret_cast<const void**>( + &address)); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + break; + + // Translate the local address to an address on the child. + it->interceptor_address = interceptor_base + (address - + reinterpret_cast<char*>(local_interceptor)); + } +#endif + NTSTATUS ret = thunk->Setup(ntdll_base, + interceptor_base, + it->function.c_str(), + it->interceptor.c_str(), + it->interceptor_address, + &thunks->thunks[dll_data->num_thunks], + thunk_bytes - dll_data->used_bytes, + NULL); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + break; + + DCHECK(!g_originals[it->id]); + g_originals[it->id] = &thunks->thunks[dll_data->num_thunks]; + + dll_data->num_thunks++; + dll_data->used_bytes += sizeof(ThunkData); + } + + delete(thunk); + +#if SANDBOX_EXPORTS + if (NULL != local_interceptor) + ::FreeLibrary(local_interceptor); +#endif + + if (it != interceptions_.end()) + return false; + + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interception.h b/sandbox/win/src/interception.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c02b0ff --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interception.h @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Defines InterceptionManager, the class in charge of setting up interceptions +// for the sandboxed process. For more details see +// http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox . + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_H_ + +#include <list> +#include <string> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/gtest_prod_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +class TargetProcess; +enum InterceptorId; + +// Internal structures used for communication between the broker and the target. +struct DllPatchInfo; +struct DllInterceptionData; + +// The InterceptionManager executes on the parent application, and it is in +// charge of setting up the desired interceptions, and placing the Interception +// Agent into the child application. +// +// The exposed API consists of two methods: AddToPatchedFunctions to set up a +// particular interception, and InitializeInterceptions to actually go ahead and +// perform all interceptions and transfer data to the child application. +// +// The typical usage is something like this: +// +// InterceptionManager interception_manager(child); +// if (!interception_manager.AddToPatchedFunctions( +// L"ntdll.dll", "NtCreateFile", +// sandbox::INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL, &MyNtCreateFile, MY_ID_1)) +// return false; +// +// if (!interception_manager.AddToPatchedFunctions( +// L"kernel32.dll", "CreateDirectoryW", +// sandbox::INTERCEPTION_EAT, L"MyCreateDirectoryW@12", MY_ID_2)) +// return false; +// +// if (!interception_manager.InitializeInterceptions()) { +// DWORD error = ::GetLastError(); +// return false; +// } +// +// Any required syncronization must be performed outside this class. Also, it is +// not possible to perform further interceptions after InitializeInterceptions +// is called. +// +class InterceptionManager { + // The unit test will access private members. + // Allow tests to be marked DISABLED_. Note that FLAKY_ and FAILS_ prefixes + // do not work with sandbox tests. + FRIEND_TEST_ALL_PREFIXES(InterceptionManagerTest, BufferLayout1); + FRIEND_TEST_ALL_PREFIXES(InterceptionManagerTest, BufferLayout2); + + public: + // An interception manager performs interceptions on a given child process. + // If we are allowed to intercept functions that have been patched by somebody + // else, relaxed should be set to true. + // Note: We increase the child's reference count internally. + InterceptionManager(TargetProcess* child_process, bool relaxed); + ~InterceptionManager(); + + // Patches function_name inside dll_name to point to replacement_code_address. + // function_name has to be an exported symbol of dll_name. + // Returns true on success. + // + // The new function should match the prototype and calling convention of the + // function to intercept except for one extra argument (the first one) that + // contains a pointer to the original function, to simplify the development + // of interceptors (for IA32). In x64, there is no extra argument to the + // interceptor, so the provided InterceptorId is used to keep a table of + // intercepted functions so that the interceptor can index that table to get + // the pointer that would have been the first argument (g_originals[id]). + // + // For example, to intercept NtClose, the following code could be used: + // + // typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtCloseFunction) (IN HANDLE Handle); + // NTSTATUS WINAPI MyNtCose(IN NtCloseFunction OriginalClose, + // IN HANDLE Handle) { + // // do something + // // call the original function + // return OriginalClose(Handle); + // } + // + // And in x64: + // + // typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtCloseFunction) (IN HANDLE Handle); + // NTSTATUS WINAPI MyNtCose64(IN HANDLE Handle) { + // // do something + // // call the original function + // NtCloseFunction OriginalClose = g_originals[NT_CLOSE_ID]; + // return OriginalClose(Handle); + // } + bool AddToPatchedFunctions(const wchar_t* dll_name, + const char* function_name, + InterceptionType interception_type, + const void* replacement_code_address, + InterceptorId id); + + // Patches function_name inside dll_name to point to + // replacement_function_name. + bool AddToPatchedFunctions(const wchar_t* dll_name, + const char* function_name, + InterceptionType interception_type, + const char* replacement_function_name, + InterceptorId id); + + // The interception agent will unload the dll with dll_name. + bool AddToUnloadModules(const wchar_t* dll_name); + + // Initializes all interceptions on the client. + // Returns true on success. + // + // The child process must be created suspended, and cannot be resumed until + // after this method returns. In addition, no action should be performed on + // the child that may cause it to resume momentarily, such as injecting + // threads or APCs. + // + // This function must be called only once, after all interceptions have been + // set up using AddToPatchedFunctions. + bool InitializeInterceptions(); + + private: + // Used to store the interception information until the actual set-up. + struct InterceptionData { + InterceptionType type; // Interception type. + InterceptorId id; // Interceptor id. + std::wstring dll; // Name of dll to intercept. + std::string function; // Name of function to intercept. + std::string interceptor; // Name of interceptor function. + const void* interceptor_address; // Interceptor's entry point. + }; + + // Calculates the size of the required configuration buffer. + size_t GetBufferSize() const; + + // Rounds up the size of a given buffer, considering alignment (padding). + // value is the current size of the buffer, and alignment is specified in + // bytes. + static inline size_t RoundUpToMultiple(size_t value, size_t alignment) { + return ((value + alignment -1) / alignment) * alignment; + } + + // Sets up a given buffer with all the information that has to be transfered + // to the child. + // Returns true on success. + // + // The buffer size should be at least the value returned by GetBufferSize + bool SetupConfigBuffer(void* buffer, size_t buffer_bytes); + + // Fills up the part of the transfer buffer that corresponds to information + // about one dll to patch. + // data is the first recorded interception for this dll. + // Returns true on success. + // + // On successful return, buffer will be advanced from it's current position + // to the point where the next block of configuration data should be written + // (the actual interception info), and the current size of the buffer will + // decrease to account the space used by this method. + bool SetupDllInfo(const InterceptionData& data, + void** buffer, size_t* buffer_bytes) const; + + // Fills up the part of the transfer buffer that corresponds to a single + // function to patch. + // dll_info points to the dll being updated with the interception stored on + // data. The buffer pointer and remaining size are updated by this call. + // Returns true on success. + bool SetupInterceptionInfo(const InterceptionData& data, void** buffer, + size_t* buffer_bytes, + DllPatchInfo* dll_info) const; + + // Returns true if this interception is to be performed by the child + // as opposed to from the parent. + bool IsInterceptionPerformedByChild(const InterceptionData& data) const; + + // Allocates a buffer on the child's address space (returned on + // remote_buffer), and fills it with the contents of a local buffer. + // Returns true on success. + bool CopyDataToChild(const void* local_buffer, size_t buffer_bytes, + void** remote_buffer) const; + + // Performs the cold patch (from the parent) of ntdll. + // Returns true on success. + // + // This method will insert additional interceptions to launch the interceptor + // agent on the child process, if there are additional interceptions to do. + bool PatchNtdll(bool hot_patch_needed); + + // Peforms the actual interceptions on ntdll. + // thunks is the memory to store all the thunks for this dll (on the child), + // and dll_data is a local buffer to hold global dll interception info. + // Returns true on success. + bool PatchClientFunctions(DllInterceptionData* thunks, + size_t thunk_bytes, + DllInterceptionData* dll_data); + + // The process to intercept. + TargetProcess* child_; + // Holds all interception info until the call to initialize (perform the + // actual patch). + std::list<InterceptionData> interceptions_; + + // Keep track of patches added by name. + bool names_used_; + + // true if we are allowed to patch already-patched functions. + bool relaxed_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(InterceptionManager); +}; + +// This macro simply calls interception_manager.AddToPatchedFunctions with +// the given service to intercept (INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL), and assumes that +// the interceptor is called "TargetXXX", where XXX is the name of the service. +// Note that num_params is the number of bytes to pop out of the stack for +// the exported interceptor, following the calling convention of a service call +// (WINAPI = with the "C" underscore). +#if SANDBOX_EXPORTS +#if defined(_WIN64) +#define MAKE_SERVICE_NAME(service, params) "Target" # service "64" +#else +#define MAKE_SERVICE_NAME(service, params) "_Target" # service "@" # params +#endif + +#define ADD_NT_INTERCEPTION(service, id, num_params) \ + AddToPatchedFunctions(kNtdllName, #service, \ + sandbox::INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL, \ + MAKE_SERVICE_NAME(service, num_params), id) + +#define INTERCEPT_NT(manager, service, id, num_params) \ + ((&Target##service) ? \ + manager->ADD_NT_INTERCEPTION(service, id, num_params) : false) + +#define INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, dll, function, id, num_params) \ + ((&Target##function) ? \ + manager->AddToPatchedFunctions(dll, #function, sandbox::INTERCEPTION_EAT, \ + MAKE_SERVICE_NAME(function, num_params), \ + id) : \ + false) +#else // SANDBOX_EXPORTS +#if defined(_WIN64) +#define MAKE_SERVICE_NAME(service) &Target##service##64 +#else +#define MAKE_SERVICE_NAME(service) &Target##service +#endif + +#define ADD_NT_INTERCEPTION(service, id, num_params) \ + AddToPatchedFunctions(kNtdllName, #service, \ + sandbox::INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL, \ + MAKE_SERVICE_NAME(service), id) + +#define INTERCEPT_NT(manager, service, id, num_params) \ + manager->ADD_NT_INTERCEPTION(service, id, num_params) + +#define INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, dll, function, id, num_params) \ + manager->AddToPatchedFunctions(dll, #function, sandbox::INTERCEPTION_EAT, \ + MAKE_SERVICE_NAME(function), id) +#endif // SANDBOX_EXPORTS + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interception_agent.cc b/sandbox/win/src/interception_agent.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b40364f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interception_agent.cc @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// For information about interceptions as a whole see +// http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox . + +#include "sandbox/src/interception_agent.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/interception_internal.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/eat_resolver.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep_resolver.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +namespace { + +// Returns true if target lies between base and base + range. +bool IsWithinRange(const void* base, size_t range, const void* target) { + const char* end = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(base) + range; + return reinterpret_cast<const char*>(target) < end; +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +// This is the list of all imported symbols from ntdll.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt; + +// The list of intercepted functions back-pointers. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT OriginalFunctions g_originals; + +// Memory buffer mapped from the parent, with the list of interceptions. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT SharedMemory* g_interceptions = NULL; + +InterceptionAgent* InterceptionAgent::GetInterceptionAgent() { + static InterceptionAgent* s_singleton = NULL; + if (!s_singleton) { + if (!g_interceptions) + return NULL; + + size_t array_bytes = g_interceptions->num_intercepted_dlls * sizeof(void*); + s_singleton = reinterpret_cast<InterceptionAgent*>( + new(NT_ALLOC) char[array_bytes + sizeof(InterceptionAgent)]); + + bool success = s_singleton->Init(g_interceptions); + if (!success) { + operator delete(s_singleton, NT_ALLOC); + s_singleton = NULL; + } + } + return s_singleton; +} + +bool InterceptionAgent::Init(SharedMemory* shared_memory) { + interceptions_ = shared_memory; + for (int i = 0 ; i < shared_memory->num_intercepted_dlls; i++) + dlls_[i] = NULL; + return true; +} + +bool InterceptionAgent::DllMatch(const UNICODE_STRING* full_path, + const UNICODE_STRING* name, + const DllPatchInfo* dll_info) { + UNICODE_STRING current_name; + current_name.Length = static_cast<USHORT>(g_nt.wcslen(dll_info->dll_name) * + sizeof(wchar_t)); + current_name.MaximumLength = current_name.Length; + current_name.Buffer = const_cast<wchar_t*>(dll_info->dll_name); + + BOOLEAN case_insensitive = TRUE; + if (full_path && + !g_nt.RtlCompareUnicodeString(¤t_name, full_path, case_insensitive)) + return true; + + if (name && + !g_nt.RtlCompareUnicodeString(¤t_name, name, case_insensitive)) + return true; + + return false; +} + +bool InterceptionAgent::OnDllLoad(const UNICODE_STRING* full_path, + const UNICODE_STRING* name, + void* base_address) { + DllPatchInfo* dll_info = interceptions_->dll_list; + int i = 0; + for (; i < interceptions_->num_intercepted_dlls; i++) { + if (DllMatch(full_path, name, dll_info)) + break; + + dll_info = reinterpret_cast<DllPatchInfo*>( + reinterpret_cast<char*>(dll_info) + dll_info->record_bytes); + } + + // Return now if the dll is not in our list of interest. + if (i == interceptions_->num_intercepted_dlls) + return true; + + // The dll must be unloaded. + if (dll_info->unload_module) + return false; + + // Purify causes this condition to trigger. + if (dlls_[i]) + return true; + + size_t buffer_bytes = offsetof(DllInterceptionData, thunks) + + dll_info->num_functions * sizeof(ThunkData); + dlls_[i] = reinterpret_cast<DllInterceptionData*>( + new(NT_PAGE, base_address) char[buffer_bytes]); + + DCHECK_NT(dlls_[i]); + if (!dlls_[i]) + return true; + + dlls_[i]->data_bytes = buffer_bytes; + dlls_[i]->num_thunks = 0; + dlls_[i]->base = base_address; + dlls_[i]->used_bytes = offsetof(DllInterceptionData, thunks); + + VERIFY(PatchDll(dll_info, dlls_[i])); + + ULONG old_protect; + SIZE_T real_size = buffer_bytes; + void* to_protect = dlls_[i]; + VERIFY_SUCCESS(g_nt.ProtectVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &to_protect, + &real_size, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, + &old_protect)); + return true; +} + +void InterceptionAgent::OnDllUnload(void* base_address) { + for (int i = 0; i < interceptions_->num_intercepted_dlls; i++) { + if (dlls_[i] && dlls_[i]->base == base_address) { + operator delete(dlls_[i], NT_PAGE); + dlls_[i] = NULL; + break; + } + } +} + +// TODO(rvargas): We have to deal with prebinded dlls. I see two options: change +// the timestamp of the patched dll, or modify the info on the prebinded dll. +// the first approach messes matching of debug symbols, the second one is more +// complicated. +bool InterceptionAgent::PatchDll(const DllPatchInfo* dll_info, + DllInterceptionData* thunks) { + DCHECK_NT(NULL != thunks); + DCHECK_NT(NULL != dll_info); + + const FunctionInfo* function = reinterpret_cast<const FunctionInfo*>( + reinterpret_cast<const char*>(dll_info) + dll_info->offset_to_functions); + + for (int i = 0; i < dll_info->num_functions; i++) { + if (!IsWithinRange(dll_info, dll_info->record_bytes, function->function)) { + NOTREACHED_NT(); + return false; + } + + ResolverThunk* resolver = GetResolver(function->type); + if (!resolver) + return false; + + const char* interceptor = function->function + + g_nt.strlen(function->function) + 1; + + if (!IsWithinRange(function, function->record_bytes, interceptor) || + !IsWithinRange(dll_info, dll_info->record_bytes, interceptor)) { + NOTREACHED_NT(); + return false; + } + + NTSTATUS ret = resolver->Setup(thunks->base, + interceptions_->interceptor_base, + function->function, + interceptor, + function->interceptor_address, + &thunks->thunks[i], + sizeof(ThunkData), + NULL); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) { + NOTREACHED_NT(); + return false; + } + + DCHECK_NT(!g_originals[function->id]); + g_originals[function->id] = &thunks->thunks[i]; + + thunks->num_thunks++; + thunks->used_bytes += sizeof(ThunkData); + + function = reinterpret_cast<const FunctionInfo*>( + reinterpret_cast<const char*>(function) + function->record_bytes); + } + + return true; +} + +// This method is called from within the loader lock +ResolverThunk* InterceptionAgent::GetResolver(InterceptionType type) { + static EatResolverThunk* eat_resolver = NULL; + static SidestepResolverThunk* sidestep_resolver = NULL; + static SmartSidestepResolverThunk* smart_sidestep_resolver = NULL; + + if (!eat_resolver) + eat_resolver = new(NT_ALLOC) EatResolverThunk; + +#if !defined(_WIN64) + // Sidestep is not supported for x64. + if (!sidestep_resolver) + sidestep_resolver = new(NT_ALLOC) SidestepResolverThunk; + + if (!smart_sidestep_resolver) + smart_sidestep_resolver = new(NT_ALLOC) SmartSidestepResolverThunk; +#endif + + switch (type) { + case INTERCEPTION_EAT: + return eat_resolver; + case INTERCEPTION_SIDESTEP: + return sidestep_resolver; + case INTERCEPTION_SMART_SIDESTEP: + return smart_sidestep_resolver; + default: + NOTREACHED_NT(); + } + + return NULL; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interception_agent.h b/sandbox/win/src/interception_agent.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10679dd --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interception_agent.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Defines InterceptionAgent, the class in charge of setting up interceptions +// from the inside of the sandboxed process. For more details see +// http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox . + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_AGENT_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_AGENT_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Internal structures used for communication between the broker and the target. +struct DllInterceptionData; +struct SharedMemory; +struct DllPatchInfo; + +class ResolverThunk; + +// The InterceptionAgent executes on the target application, and it is in charge +// of setting up the desired interceptions or indicating what module needs to +// be unloaded. +// +// The exposed API consists of three methods: GetInterceptionAgent to retrieve +// the single class instance, OnDllLoad and OnDllUnload to process a dll being +// loaded and unloaded respectively. +// +// This class assumes that it will get called for every dll being loaded, +// starting with kernel32, so the singleton will be instantiated from within the +// loader lock. +class InterceptionAgent { + public: + // Returns the single InterceptionAgent object for this process. + static InterceptionAgent* GetInterceptionAgent(); + + // This method should be invoked whenever a new dll is loaded to perform the + // required patches. If the return value is false, this dll should not be + // allowed to load. + // + // full_path is the (optional) full name of the module being loaded and name + // is the internal module name. If full_path is provided, it will be used + // before the internal name to determine if we care about this dll. + bool OnDllLoad(const UNICODE_STRING* full_path, const UNICODE_STRING* name, + void* base_address); + + // Performs cleanup when a dll is unloaded. + void OnDllUnload(void* base_address); + + private: + ~InterceptionAgent() {} + + // Performs initialization of the singleton. + bool Init(SharedMemory* shared_memory); + + // Returns true if we are interested on this dll. dll_info is an entry of the + // list of intercepted dlls. + bool DllMatch(const UNICODE_STRING* full_path, const UNICODE_STRING* name, + const DllPatchInfo* dll_info); + + // Performs the patching of the dll loaded at base_address. + // The patches to perform are described on dll_info, and thunks is the thunk + // storage for the whole dll. + // Returns true on success. + bool PatchDll(const DllPatchInfo* dll_info, DllInterceptionData* thunks); + + // Returns a resolver for a given interception type. + ResolverThunk* GetResolver(InterceptionType type); + + // Shared memory containing the list of functions to intercept. + SharedMemory* interceptions_; + + // Array of thunk data buffers for the intercepted dlls. This object singleton + // is allocated with a placement new with enough space to hold the complete + // array of pointers, not just the first element. + DllInterceptionData* dlls_[1]; + + DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(InterceptionAgent); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_AGENT_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interception_internal.h b/sandbox/win/src/interception_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3c401c --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interception_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Defines InterceptionManager, the class in charge of setting up interceptions +// for the sandboxed process. For more details see: +// http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox . + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_INTERNAL_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_INTERNAL_H_ + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +const int kMaxThunkDataBytes = 64; + +enum InterceptorId; + +// The following structures contain variable size fields at the end, and will be +// used to transfer information between two processes. In order to guarantee +// our ability to follow the chain of structures, the alignment should be fixed, +// hence this pragma. +#pragma pack(push, 4) + +// Structures for the shared memory that contains patching information +// for the InterceptionAgent. +// A single interception: +struct FunctionInfo { + size_t record_bytes; // rounded to sizeof(size_t) bytes + InterceptionType type; + InterceptorId id; + const void* interceptor_address; + char function[1]; // placeholder for null terminated name + // char interceptor[] // followed by the interceptor function +}; + +// A single dll: +struct DllPatchInfo { + size_t record_bytes; // rounded to sizeof(size_t) bytes + size_t offset_to_functions; + int num_functions; + bool unload_module; + wchar_t dll_name[1]; // placeholder for null terminated name + // FunctionInfo function_info[] // followed by the functions to intercept +}; + +// All interceptions: +struct SharedMemory { + int num_intercepted_dlls; + void* interceptor_base; + DllPatchInfo dll_list[1]; // placeholder for the list of dlls +}; + +// Dummy single thunk: +struct ThunkData { + char data[kMaxThunkDataBytes]; +}; + +// In-memory representation of the interceptions for a given dll: +struct DllInterceptionData { + size_t data_bytes; + size_t used_bytes; + void* base; + int num_thunks; +#if defined(_WIN64) + int dummy; // Improve alignment. +#endif + ThunkData thunks[1]; +}; + +#pragma pack(pop) + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTION_INTERNAL_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interception_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/interception_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0dd98d --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interception_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file contains unit tests for InterceptionManager. +// The tests require private information so the whole interception.cc file is +// included from this file. + +#include <windows.h> + +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception_internal.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_process.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Walks the settings buffer, verifying that the values make sense and counting +// objects. +// Arguments: +// buffer (in): the buffer to walk. +// size (in): buffer size +// num_dlls (out): count of the dlls on the buffer. +// num_function (out): count of intercepted functions. +// num_names (out): count of named interceptor functions. +void WalkBuffer(void* buffer, size_t size, int* num_dlls, int* num_functions, + int* num_names) { + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != buffer); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != num_functions); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != num_names); + *num_dlls = *num_functions = *num_names = 0; + SharedMemory *memory = reinterpret_cast<SharedMemory*>(buffer); + + ASSERT_GT(size, sizeof(SharedMemory)); + DllPatchInfo *dll = &memory->dll_list[0]; + + for (int i = 0; i < memory->num_intercepted_dlls; i++) { + ASSERT_NE(0u, wcslen(dll->dll_name)); + ASSERT_EQ(0u, dll->record_bytes % sizeof(size_t)); + ASSERT_EQ(0u, dll->offset_to_functions % sizeof(size_t)); + ASSERT_NE(0, dll->num_functions); + + FunctionInfo *function = reinterpret_cast<FunctionInfo*>( + reinterpret_cast<char*>(dll) + dll->offset_to_functions); + + for (int j = 0; j < dll->num_functions; j++) { + ASSERT_EQ(0u, function->record_bytes % sizeof(size_t)); + + char* name = function->function; + size_t length = strlen(name); + ASSERT_NE(0u, length); + name += length + 1; + + // look for overflows + ASSERT_GT(reinterpret_cast<char*>(buffer) + size, name + strlen(name)); + + // look for a named interceptor + if (strlen(name)) { + (*num_names)++; + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == function->interceptor_address); + } else { + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != function->interceptor_address); + } + + (*num_functions)++; + function = reinterpret_cast<FunctionInfo*>( + reinterpret_cast<char*>(function) + function->record_bytes); + } + + (*num_dlls)++; + dll = reinterpret_cast<DllPatchInfo*>(reinterpret_cast<char*>(dll) + + dll->record_bytes); + } +} + +TEST(InterceptionManagerTest, BufferLayout1) { + wchar_t exe_name[MAX_PATH]; + ASSERT_NE(0u, GetModuleFileName(NULL, exe_name, MAX_PATH - 1)); + + TargetProcess *target = MakeTestTargetProcess(::GetCurrentProcess(), + ::GetModuleHandle(exe_name)); + + InterceptionManager interceptions(target, true); + + // Any pointer will do for a function pointer. + void* function = &interceptions; + + // We don't care about the interceptor id. + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"ntdll.dll", "NtCreateFile", + INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL, function, + OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"kernel32.dll", "CreateFileEx", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"kernel32.dll", "SomeFileEx", + INTERCEPTION_SMART_SIDESTEP, function, + OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"user32.dll", "FindWindow", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"kernel32.dll", "CreateMutex", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"user32.dll", "PostMsg", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"user32.dll", "PostMsg", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, "replacement", + OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"comctl.dll", "SaveAsDlg", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"ntdll.dll", "NtClose", + INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL, function, + OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"ntdll.dll", "NtOpenFile", + INTERCEPTION_SIDESTEP, function, + OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"some.dll", "Superfn", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"comctl.dll", "SaveAsDlg", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, "a", OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"comctl.dll", "SaveAsDlg", + INTERCEPTION_SIDESTEP, "ab", OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"comctl.dll", "SaveAsDlg", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, "abc", OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"a.dll", "p", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"b.dll", + "TheIncredibleCallToSaveTheWorld", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"a.dll", "BIsLame", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"a.dll", "ARules", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_KEY_ID); + + // Verify that all interceptions were added + ASSERT_EQ(18, interceptions.interceptions_.size()); + + size_t buffer_size = interceptions.GetBufferSize(); + scoped_array<BYTE> local_buffer(new BYTE[buffer_size]); + + ASSERT_TRUE(interceptions.SetupConfigBuffer(local_buffer.get(), + buffer_size)); + + // At this point, the interceptions should have been separated into two + // groups: one group with the local ("cold") interceptions, consisting of + // everything from ntdll and stuff set as INTRECEPTION_SERVICE_CALL, and + // another group with the interceptions belonging to dlls that will be "hot" + // patched on the client. The second group lives on local_buffer, and the + // first group remains on the list of interceptions (inside the object + // "interceptions"). There are 3 local interceptions (of ntdll); the + // other 15 have to be sent to the child to be performed "hot". + EXPECT_EQ(3, interceptions.interceptions_.size()); + + int num_dlls, num_functions, num_names; + WalkBuffer(local_buffer.get(), buffer_size, &num_dlls, &num_functions, + &num_names); + + // The 15 interceptions on the buffer (to the child) should be grouped on 6 + // dlls. Only four interceptions are using an explicit name for the + // interceptor function. + EXPECT_EQ(6, num_dlls); + EXPECT_EQ(15, num_functions); + EXPECT_EQ(4, num_names); +} + +TEST(InterceptionManagerTest, BufferLayout2) { + wchar_t exe_name[MAX_PATH]; + ASSERT_NE(0u, GetModuleFileName(NULL, exe_name, MAX_PATH - 1)); + + TargetProcess *target = MakeTestTargetProcess(::GetCurrentProcess(), + ::GetModuleHandle(exe_name)); + + InterceptionManager interceptions(target, true); + + // Any pointer will do for a function pointer. + void* function = &interceptions; + interceptions.AddToUnloadModules(L"some01.dll"); + // We don't care about the interceptor id. + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"ntdll.dll", "NtCreateFile", + INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL, function, + OPEN_FILE_ID); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"kernel32.dll", "CreateFileEx", + INTERCEPTION_EAT, function, OPEN_FILE_ID); + interceptions.AddToUnloadModules(L"some02.dll"); + interceptions.AddToPatchedFunctions(L"kernel32.dll", "SomeFileEx", + INTERCEPTION_SMART_SIDESTEP, function, + OPEN_FILE_ID); + // Verify that all interceptions were added + ASSERT_EQ(5, interceptions.interceptions_.size()); + + size_t buffer_size = interceptions.GetBufferSize(); + scoped_array<BYTE> local_buffer(new BYTE[buffer_size]); + + ASSERT_TRUE(interceptions.SetupConfigBuffer(local_buffer.get(), + buffer_size)); + + // At this point, the interceptions should have been separated into two + // groups: one group with the local ("cold") interceptions, and another + // group with the interceptions belonging to dlls that will be "hot" + // patched on the client. The second group lives on local_buffer, and the + // first group remains on the list of interceptions, in this case just one. + EXPECT_EQ(1, interceptions.interceptions_.size()); + + int num_dlls, num_functions, num_names; + WalkBuffer(local_buffer.get(), buffer_size, &num_dlls, &num_functions, + &num_names); + + EXPECT_EQ(3, num_dlls); + EXPECT_EQ(4, num_functions); + EXPECT_EQ(0, num_names); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interceptors.h b/sandbox/win/src/interceptors.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67b0900 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interceptors.h @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTORS_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTORS_H_ + +#if defined(_WIN64) +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors_64.h" +#endif + +namespace sandbox { + +enum InterceptorId { + // Internal use: + MAP_VIEW_OF_SECTION_ID = 0, + UNMAP_VIEW_OF_SECTION_ID, + // Policy broker: + SET_INFORMATION_THREAD_ID, + OPEN_THREAD_TOKEN_ID, + OPEN_THREAD_TOKEN_EX_ID, + OPEN_TREAD_ID, + OPEN_PROCESS_ID, + OPEN_PROCESS_TOKEN_ID, + OPEN_PROCESS_TOKEN_EX_ID, + // Filesystem dispatcher: + CREATE_FILE_ID, + OPEN_FILE_ID, + QUERY_ATTRIB_FILE_ID, + QUERY_FULL_ATTRIB_FILE_ID, + SET_INFO_FILE_ID, + // Named pipe dispatcher: + CREATE_NAMED_PIPE_ID, + // Process-thread dispatcher: + CREATE_PROCESSW_ID, + CREATE_PROCESSA_ID, + // Registry dispatcher: + CREATE_KEY_ID, + OPEN_KEY_ID, + OPEN_KEY_EX_ID, + // Sync dispatcher: + CREATE_EVENT_ID, + OPEN_EVENT_ID, + // CSRSS bypasses for HandleCloser: + CREATE_THREAD_ID, + GET_USER_DEFAULT_LCID_ID, + INTERCEPTOR_MAX_ID +}; + +typedef void* OriginalFunctions[INTERCEPTOR_MAX_ID]; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTORS_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interceptors_64.cc b/sandbox/win/src/interceptors_64.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c068010 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interceptors_64.cc @@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors_64.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/filesystem_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/named_pipe_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_target.h" +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/registry_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sync_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_interceptions.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt; +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT OriginalFunctions g_originals; + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtMapViewOfSection64( + HANDLE section, HANDLE process, PVOID *base, ULONG_PTR zero_bits, + SIZE_T commit_size, PLARGE_INTEGER offset, PSIZE_T view_size, + SECTION_INHERIT inherit, ULONG allocation_type, ULONG protect) { + NtMapViewOfSectionFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtMapViewOfSectionFunction>(g_originals[MAP_VIEW_OF_SECTION_ID]); + + return TargetNtMapViewOfSection(orig_fn, section, process, base, zero_bits, + commit_size, offset, view_size, inherit, + allocation_type, protect); +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtUnmapViewOfSection64(HANDLE process, PVOID base) { + NtUnmapViewOfSectionFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtUnmapViewOfSectionFunction>(g_originals[UNMAP_VIEW_OF_SECTION_ID]); + return TargetNtUnmapViewOfSection(orig_fn, process, base); +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtSetInformationThread64( + HANDLE thread, NT_THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS thread_info_class, + PVOID thread_information, ULONG thread_information_bytes) { + NtSetInformationThreadFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtSetInformationThreadFunction>(g_originals[SET_INFORMATION_THREAD_ID]); + return TargetNtSetInformationThread(orig_fn, thread, thread_info_class, + thread_information, + thread_information_bytes); +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThreadToken64( + HANDLE thread, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOLEAN open_as_self, + PHANDLE token) { + NtOpenThreadTokenFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenThreadTokenFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_THREAD_TOKEN_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenThreadToken(orig_fn, thread, desired_access, open_as_self, + token); +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThreadTokenEx64( + HANDLE thread, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOLEAN open_as_self, + ULONG handle_attributes, PHANDLE token) { + NtOpenThreadTokenExFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenThreadTokenExFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_THREAD_TOKEN_EX_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenThreadTokenEx(orig_fn, thread, desired_access, + open_as_self, handle_attributes, token); +} + +HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateThread64( + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, SIZE_T stack_size, + LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE start_address, PVOID parameter, DWORD creation_flags, + LPDWORD thread_id) { + CreateThreadFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + CreateThreadFunction>(g_originals[CREATE_THREAD_ID]); + return TargetCreateThread(orig_fn, thread_attributes, stack_size, + start_address, parameter, creation_flags, + thread_id); +} + +LCID WINAPI TargetGetUserDefaultLCID64(void) { + GetUserDefaultLCIDFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + GetUserDefaultLCIDFunction>(g_originals[GET_USER_DEFAULT_LCID_ID]); + return TargetGetUserDefaultLCID(orig_fn); +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtCreateFile64( + PHANDLE file, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, + PLARGE_INTEGER allocation_size, ULONG file_attributes, ULONG sharing, + ULONG disposition, ULONG options, PVOID ea_buffer, ULONG ea_length) { + NtCreateFileFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtCreateFileFunction>(g_originals[CREATE_FILE_ID]); + return TargetNtCreateFile(orig_fn, file, desired_access, object_attributes, + io_status, allocation_size, file_attributes, + sharing, disposition, options, ea_buffer, + ea_length); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenFile64( + PHANDLE file, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, + ULONG sharing, ULONG options) { + NtOpenFileFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenFileFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_FILE_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenFile(orig_fn, file, desired_access, object_attributes, + io_status, sharing, options); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtQueryAttributesFile64( + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PFILE_BASIC_INFORMATION file_attributes) { + NtQueryAttributesFileFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtQueryAttributesFileFunction>(g_originals[QUERY_ATTRIB_FILE_ID]); + return TargetNtQueryAttributesFile(orig_fn, object_attributes, + file_attributes); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtQueryFullAttributesFile64( + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION file_attributes) { + NtQueryFullAttributesFileFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtQueryFullAttributesFileFunction>( + g_originals[QUERY_FULL_ATTRIB_FILE_ID]); + return TargetNtQueryFullAttributesFile(orig_fn, object_attributes, + file_attributes); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtSetInformationFile64( + HANDLE file, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, PVOID file_information, + ULONG length, FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS file_information_class) { + NtSetInformationFileFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtSetInformationFileFunction>(g_originals[SET_INFO_FILE_ID]); + return TargetNtSetInformationFile(orig_fn, file, io_status, file_information, + length, file_information_class); +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateNamedPipeW64( + LPCWSTR pipe_name, DWORD open_mode, DWORD pipe_mode, DWORD max_instance, + DWORD out_buffer_size, DWORD in_buffer_size, DWORD default_timeout, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes) { + CreateNamedPipeWFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + CreateNamedPipeWFunction>(g_originals[CREATE_NAMED_PIPE_ID]); + return TargetCreateNamedPipeW(orig_fn, pipe_name, open_mode, pipe_mode, + max_instance, out_buffer_size, in_buffer_size, + default_timeout, security_attributes); +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThread64( + PHANDLE thread, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PCLIENT_ID client_id) { + NtOpenThreadFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenThreadFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_TREAD_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenThread(orig_fn, thread, desired_access, object_attributes, + client_id); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcess64( + PHANDLE process, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PCLIENT_ID client_id) { + NtOpenProcessFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenProcessFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_PROCESS_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenProcess(orig_fn, process, desired_access, + object_attributes, client_id); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcessToken64( + HANDLE process, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, PHANDLE token) { + NtOpenProcessTokenFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenProcessTokenFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_PROCESS_TOKEN_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenProcessToken(orig_fn, process, desired_access, token); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcessTokenEx64( + HANDLE process, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, ULONG handle_attributes, + PHANDLE token) { + NtOpenProcessTokenExFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenProcessTokenExFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_PROCESS_TOKEN_EX_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenProcessTokenEx(orig_fn, process, desired_access, + handle_attributes, token); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT BOOL WINAPI TargetCreateProcessW64( + LPCWSTR application_name, LPWSTR command_line, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, BOOL inherit_handles, DWORD flags, + LPVOID environment, LPCWSTR current_directory, LPSTARTUPINFOW startup_info, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION process_information) { + CreateProcessWFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + CreateProcessWFunction>(g_originals[CREATE_PROCESSW_ID]); + return TargetCreateProcessW(orig_fn, application_name, command_line, + process_attributes, thread_attributes, + inherit_handles, flags, environment, + current_directory, startup_info, + process_information); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT BOOL WINAPI TargetCreateProcessA64( + LPCSTR application_name, LPSTR command_line, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, BOOL inherit_handles, DWORD flags, + LPVOID environment, LPCSTR current_directory, LPSTARTUPINFOA startup_info, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION process_information) { + CreateProcessAFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + CreateProcessAFunction>(g_originals[CREATE_PROCESSA_ID]); + return TargetCreateProcessA(orig_fn, application_name, command_line, + process_attributes, thread_attributes, + inherit_handles, flags, environment, + current_directory, startup_info, + process_information); +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtCreateKey64( + PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, ULONG title_index, + PUNICODE_STRING class_name, ULONG create_options, PULONG disposition) { + NtCreateKeyFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtCreateKeyFunction>(g_originals[CREATE_KEY_ID]); + return TargetNtCreateKey(orig_fn, key, desired_access, object_attributes, + title_index, class_name, create_options, + disposition); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenKey64( + PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes) { + NtOpenKeyFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenKeyFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_KEY_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenKey(orig_fn, key, desired_access, object_attributes); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenKeyEx64( + PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, ULONG open_options) { + NtOpenKeyExFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + NtOpenKeyExFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_KEY_EX_ID]); + return TargetNtOpenKeyEx(orig_fn, key, desired_access, object_attributes, + open_options); +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateEventW64( + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes, BOOL manual_reset, + BOOL initial_state, LPCWSTR name) { + CreateEventWFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + CreateEventWFunction>(g_originals[CREATE_EVENT_ID]); + return TargetCreateEventW(orig_fn, security_attributes, manual_reset, + initial_state, name); +} + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetOpenEventW64( + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOL inherit_handle, LPCWSTR name) { + OpenEventWFunction orig_fn = reinterpret_cast< + OpenEventWFunction>(g_originals[OPEN_EVENT_ID]); + return TargetOpenEventW(orig_fn, desired_access, inherit_handle, name); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/interceptors_64.h b/sandbox/win/src/interceptors_64.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50355a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/interceptors_64.h @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTORS_64_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTORS_64_H_ + +namespace sandbox { + +extern "C" { + +// Interception of NtMapViewOfSection on the child process. +// It should never be called directly. This function provides the means to +// detect dlls being loaded, so we can patch them if needed. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtMapViewOfSection64( + HANDLE section, HANDLE process, PVOID *base, ULONG_PTR zero_bits, + SIZE_T commit_size, PLARGE_INTEGER offset, PSIZE_T view_size, + SECTION_INHERIT inherit, ULONG allocation_type, ULONG protect); + +// Interception of NtUnmapViewOfSection on the child process. +// It should never be called directly. This function provides the means to +// detect dlls being unloaded, so we can clean up our interceptions. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtUnmapViewOfSection64(HANDLE process, + PVOID base); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Interceptors without IPC. + +// Interception of NtSetInformationThread on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtSetInformationThread64( + HANDLE thread, NT_THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS thread_info_class, + PVOID thread_information, ULONG thread_information_bytes); + +// Interception of NtOpenThreadToken on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThreadToken64( + HANDLE thread, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOLEAN open_as_self, + PHANDLE token); + +// Interception of NtOpenThreadTokenEx on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThreadTokenEx64( + HANDLE thread, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOLEAN open_as_self, + ULONG handle_attributes, PHANDLE token); + +// Interception of CreateThread on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateThread64( + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, SIZE_T stack_size, + LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE start_address, PVOID parameter, + DWORD creation_flags, LPDWORD thread_id); + +// Interception of GetUserDefaultLCID on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT LCID WINAPI TargetGetUserDefaultLCID64(); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Interceptors handled by the file system dispatcher. + +// Interception of NtCreateFile on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtCreateFile64( + PHANDLE file, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, + PLARGE_INTEGER allocation_size, ULONG file_attributes, ULONG sharing, + ULONG disposition, ULONG options, PVOID ea_buffer, ULONG ea_length); + +// Interception of NtOpenFile on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenFile64( + PHANDLE file, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, + ULONG sharing, ULONG options); + +// Interception of NtQueryAtttributesFile on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtQueryAttributesFile64( + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PFILE_BASIC_INFORMATION file_attributes); + +// Interception of NtQueryFullAtttributesFile on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtQueryFullAttributesFile64( + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION file_attributes); + +// Interception of NtSetInformationFile on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtSetInformationFile64( + HANDLE file, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK io_status, PVOID file_information, + ULONG length, FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS file_information_class); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Interceptors handled by the named pipe dispatcher. + +// Interception of CreateNamedPipeW in kernel32.dll +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateNamedPipeW64( + LPCWSTR pipe_name, DWORD open_mode, DWORD pipe_mode, DWORD max_instance, + DWORD out_buffer_size, DWORD in_buffer_size, DWORD default_timeout, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Interceptors handled by the process-thread dispatcher. + +// Interception of NtOpenThread on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThread64( + PHANDLE thread, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PCLIENT_ID client_id); + +// Interception of NtOpenProcess on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcess64( + PHANDLE process, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, PCLIENT_ID client_id); + +// Interception of NtOpenProcessToken on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcessToken64( + HANDLE process, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, PHANDLE token); + +// Interception of NtOpenProcessTokenEx on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcessTokenEx64( + HANDLE process, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, ULONG handle_attributes, + PHANDLE token); + +// Interception of CreateProcessW in kernel32.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT BOOL WINAPI TargetCreateProcessW64( + LPCWSTR application_name, LPWSTR command_line, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, BOOL inherit_handles, DWORD flags, + LPVOID environment, LPCWSTR current_directory, LPSTARTUPINFOW startup_info, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION process_information); + +// Interception of CreateProcessA in kernel32.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT BOOL WINAPI TargetCreateProcessA64( + LPCSTR application_name, LPSTR command_line, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, BOOL inherit_handles, DWORD flags, + LPVOID environment, LPCSTR current_directory, LPSTARTUPINFOA startup_info, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION process_information); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Interceptors handled by the registry dispatcher. + +// Interception of NtCreateKey on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtCreateKey64( + PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, ULONG title_index, + PUNICODE_STRING class_name, ULONG create_options, PULONG disposition); + +// Interception of NtOpenKey on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenKey64( + PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes); + +// Interception of NtOpenKeyEx on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenKeyEx64( + PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, ULONG open_options); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Interceptors handled by the sync dispatcher. + +// Interception of CreateEventW on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateEventW64( + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes, BOOL manual_reset, + BOOL initial_state, LPCWSTR name); + +// Interception of OpenEventW on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetOpenEventW64( + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOL inherit_handle, LPCWSTR name); + +} // extern "C" + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_INTERCEPTORS_64_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/internal_types.h b/sandbox/win/src/internal_types.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db969aa --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/internal_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_INTERNAL_TYPES_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_INTERNAL_TYPES_H_ + +namespace sandbox { + +const wchar_t kNtdllName[] = L"ntdll.dll"; +const wchar_t kKerneldllName[] = L"kernel32.dll"; + +// Defines the supported C++ types encoding to numeric id. Like a poor's man +// RTTI. Note that true C++ RTTI will not work because the types are not +// polymorphic anyway. +enum ArgType { + INVALID_TYPE = 0, + WCHAR_TYPE, + ULONG_TYPE, + UNISTR_TYPE, + VOIDPTR_TYPE, + INPTR_TYPE, + INOUTPTR_TYPE, + LAST_TYPE +}; + +// Encapsulates a pointer to a buffer and the size of the buffer. +class CountedBuffer { + public: + CountedBuffer(void* buffer, uint32 size) : size_(size), buffer_(buffer) {} + + uint32 Size() const { + return size_; + } + + void* Buffer() const { + return buffer_; + } + + private: + uint32 size_; + void* buffer_; +}; + +// Helper class to convert void-pointer packed ints for both +// 32 and 64 bit builds. This construct is non-portable. +class IPCInt { + public: + explicit IPCInt(void* buffer) { + buffer_.vp = buffer; + } + + explicit IPCInt(unsigned __int32 i32) { + buffer_.vp = NULL; + buffer_.i32 = i32; + } + + unsigned __int32 As32Bit() const { + return buffer_.i32; + } + + void* AsVoidPtr() const { + return buffer_.vp; + } + + private: + union U { + void* vp; + unsigned __int32 i32; + } buffer_; +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_INTERNAL_TYPES_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/ipc_ping_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/ipc_ping_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..410fd6a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/ipc_ping_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Tests that the IPC is working by issuing a special IPC that is not exposed +// in the public API. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int IPC_Ping(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 1) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + TargetServices* ts = SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices(); + if (NULL == ts) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + // Downcast because we have internal knowledge of the object returned. + TargetServicesBase* ts_base = reinterpret_cast<TargetServicesBase*>(ts); + + int version = 0; + if (L'1' == argv[0][0]) + version = 1; + else + version = 2; + + if (!ts_base->TestIPCPing(version)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + ::Sleep(1); + if (!ts_base->TestIPCPing(version)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// The IPC ping test should work before and after the token drop. +TEST(IPCTest, IPCPingTestSimple) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.SetTimeout(2000); + runner.SetTestState(EVERY_STATE); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"IPC_Ping 1")); +} + +TEST(IPCTest, IPCPingTestWithOutput) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.SetTimeout(2000); + runner.SetTestState(EVERY_STATE); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"IPC_Ping 2")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"IPC_Ping 2")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/ipc_tags.h b/sandbox/win/src/ipc_tags.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e3a806 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/ipc_tags.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_IPC_TAGS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_IPC_TAGS_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +enum { + IPC_UNUSED_TAG = 0, + IPC_PING1_TAG, // Takes a cookie in parameters and returns the cookie + // multiplied by 2 and the tick_count. Used for testing only. + IPC_PING2_TAG, // Takes an in/out cookie in parameters and modify the cookie + // to be multiplied by 3. Used for testing only. + IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG, + IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG, + IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, + IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG, + IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG, + IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG, + IPC_NTOPENTHREAD_TAG, + IPC_NTOPENPROCESS_TAG, + IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKEN_TAG, + IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKENEX_TAG, + IPC_CREATEPROCESSW_TAG, + IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG, + IPC_OPENEVENT_TAG, + IPC_NTCREATEKEY_TAG, + IPC_NTOPENKEY_TAG, + IPC_DUPLICATEHANDLEPROXY_TAG, + IPC_LAST_TAG +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_IPC_TAGS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/ipc_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/ipc_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1fb7c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/ipc_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,641 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Helper function to make the fake shared memory with some +// basic elements initialized. +IPCControl* MakeChannels(size_t channel_size, size_t total_shared_size, + size_t* base_start) { + // Allocate memory + char* mem = new char[total_shared_size]; + memset(mem, 0, total_shared_size); + // Calculate how many channels we can fit in the shared memory. + total_shared_size -= offsetof(IPCControl, channels); + size_t channel_count = + total_shared_size / (sizeof(ChannelControl) + channel_size); + // Calculate the start of the first channel. + *base_start = (sizeof(ChannelControl)* channel_count) + + offsetof(IPCControl, channels); + // Setup client structure. + IPCControl* client_control = reinterpret_cast<IPCControl*>(mem); + client_control->channels_count = channel_count; + return client_control; +} + +enum TestFixMode { + FIX_NO_EVENTS, + FIX_PONG_READY, + FIX_PONG_NOT_READY +}; + +void FixChannels(IPCControl* client_control, size_t base_start, + size_t channel_size, TestFixMode mode) { + for (size_t ix = 0; ix != client_control->channels_count; ++ix) { + ChannelControl& channel = client_control->channels[ix]; + channel.channel_base = base_start; + channel.state = kFreeChannel; + if (mode != FIX_NO_EVENTS) { + BOOL signaled = (FIX_PONG_READY == mode)? TRUE : FALSE; + channel.ping_event = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + channel.pong_event = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, signaled, NULL); + } + base_start += channel_size; + } +} + +void CloseChannelEvents(IPCControl* client_control) { + for (size_t ix = 0; ix != client_control->channels_count; ++ix) { + ChannelControl& channel = client_control->channels[ix]; + ::CloseHandle(channel.ping_event); + ::CloseHandle(channel.pong_event); + } +} + +TEST(IPCTest, ChannelMaker) { + // Test that our testing rig is computing offsets properly. We should have + // 5 channnels and the offset to the first channel is 108 bytes in 32 bits + // and 216 in 64 bits. + size_t channel_start = 0; + IPCControl* client_control = MakeChannels(12 * 64, 4096, &channel_start); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != client_control); + EXPECT_EQ(5, client_control->channels_count); +#if defined(_WIN64) + EXPECT_EQ(216, channel_start); +#else + EXPECT_EQ(108, channel_start); +#endif + delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); +} + +TEST(IPCTest, ClientLockUnlock) { + // Make 7 channels of kIPCChannelSize (1kb) each. Test that we lock and + // unlock channels properly. + size_t base_start = 0; + IPCControl* client_control = + MakeChannels(kIPCChannelSize, 4096 * 2, &base_start); + FixChannels(client_control, base_start, kIPCChannelSize, FIX_NO_EVENTS); + + char* mem = reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); + SharedMemIPCClient client(mem); + + // Test that we lock the first 3 channels in sequence. + void* buff0 = client.GetBuffer(); + EXPECT_TRUE(mem + client_control->channels[0].channel_base == buff0); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[3].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[4].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[5].state); + + void* buff1 = client.GetBuffer(); + EXPECT_TRUE(mem + client_control->channels[1].channel_base == buff1); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[3].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[4].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[5].state); + + void* buff2 = client.GetBuffer(); + EXPECT_TRUE(mem + client_control->channels[2].channel_base == buff2); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[3].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[4].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[5].state); + + // Test that we unlock and re-lock the right channel. + client.FreeBuffer(buff1); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[3].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[4].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[5].state); + + void* buff2b = client.GetBuffer(); + EXPECT_TRUE(mem + client_control->channels[1].channel_base == buff2b); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[3].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[4].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[5].state); + + client.FreeBuffer(buff0); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[3].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[4].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[5].state); + + delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); +} + +TEST(IPCTest, CrossCallStrPacking) { + // This test tries the CrossCall object with null and non-null string + // combination of parameters, integer types and verifies that the unpacker + // can read them properly. + size_t base_start = 0; + IPCControl* client_control = + MakeChannels(kIPCChannelSize, 4096 * 4, &base_start); + client_control->server_alive = HANDLE(1); + FixChannels(client_control, base_start, kIPCChannelSize, FIX_PONG_READY); + + char* mem = reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); + SharedMemIPCClient client(mem); + + CrossCallReturn answer; + uint32 tag1 = 666; + const wchar_t text[] = L"98765 - 43210"; + std::wstring copied_text; + CrossCallParamsEx* actual_params; + + CrossCall(client, tag1, text, &answer); + actual_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParamsEx*>(client.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_EQ(1, actual_params->GetParamsCount()); + EXPECT_EQ(tag1, actual_params->GetTag()); + EXPECT_TRUE(actual_params->GetParameterStr(0, &copied_text)); + EXPECT_STREQ(text, copied_text.c_str()); + + // Check with an empty string. + uint32 tag2 = 777; + const wchar_t* null_text = NULL; + CrossCall(client, tag2, null_text, &answer); + actual_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParamsEx*>(client.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_EQ(1, actual_params->GetParamsCount()); + EXPECT_EQ(tag2, actual_params->GetTag()); + uint32 param_size = 1; + ArgType type = INVALID_TYPE; + void* param_addr = actual_params->GetRawParameter(0, ¶m_size, &type); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != param_addr); + EXPECT_EQ(0, param_size); + EXPECT_EQ(WCHAR_TYPE, type); + EXPECT_TRUE(actual_params->GetParameterStr(0, &copied_text)); + + uint32 tag3 = 888; + param_size = 1; + copied_text.clear(); + + // Check with an empty string and a non-empty string. + CrossCall(client, tag3, null_text, text, &answer); + actual_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParamsEx*>(client.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_EQ(2, actual_params->GetParamsCount()); + EXPECT_EQ(tag3, actual_params->GetTag()); + type = INVALID_TYPE; + param_addr = actual_params->GetRawParameter(0, ¶m_size, &type); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != param_addr); + EXPECT_EQ(0, param_size); + EXPECT_EQ(WCHAR_TYPE, type); + EXPECT_TRUE(actual_params->GetParameterStr(0, &copied_text)); + EXPECT_TRUE(actual_params->GetParameterStr(1, &copied_text)); + EXPECT_STREQ(text, copied_text.c_str()); + + param_size = 1; + std::wstring copied_text_p0, copied_text_p2; + + const wchar_t text2[] = L"AeFG"; + CrossCall(client, tag1, text2, null_text, text, &answer); + actual_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParamsEx*>(client.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_EQ(3, actual_params->GetParamsCount()); + EXPECT_EQ(tag1, actual_params->GetTag()); + EXPECT_TRUE(actual_params->GetParameterStr(0, &copied_text_p0)); + EXPECT_STREQ(text2, copied_text_p0.c_str()); + EXPECT_TRUE(actual_params->GetParameterStr(2, &copied_text_p2)); + EXPECT_STREQ(text, copied_text_p2.c_str()); + type = INVALID_TYPE; + param_addr = actual_params->GetRawParameter(1, ¶m_size, &type); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != param_addr); + EXPECT_EQ(0, param_size); + EXPECT_EQ(WCHAR_TYPE, type); + + CloseChannelEvents(client_control); + delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); +} + +TEST(IPCTest, CrossCallIntPacking) { + // Check handling for regular 32 bit integers used in Windows. + size_t base_start = 0; + IPCControl* client_control = + MakeChannels(kIPCChannelSize, 4096 * 4, &base_start); + client_control->server_alive = HANDLE(1); + FixChannels(client_control, base_start, kIPCChannelSize, FIX_PONG_READY); + + uint32 tag1 = 999; + uint32 tag2 = 111; + const wchar_t text[] = L"godzilla"; + CrossCallParamsEx* actual_params; + + char* mem = reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); + SharedMemIPCClient client(mem); + + CrossCallReturn answer; + DWORD dw = 0xE6578; + CrossCall(client, tag2, dw, &answer); + actual_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParamsEx*>(client.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_EQ(1, actual_params->GetParamsCount()); + EXPECT_EQ(tag2, actual_params->GetTag()); + ArgType type = INVALID_TYPE; + uint32 param_size = 1; + void* param_addr = actual_params->GetRawParameter(0, ¶m_size, &type); + ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(dw), param_size); + EXPECT_EQ(ULONG_TYPE, type); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != param_addr); + EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(&dw, param_addr, param_size)); + + // Check handling for windows HANDLES. + HANDLE h = HANDLE(0x70000500); + CrossCall(client, tag1, text, h, &answer); + actual_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParamsEx*>(client.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_EQ(2, actual_params->GetParamsCount()); + EXPECT_EQ(tag1, actual_params->GetTag()); + type = INVALID_TYPE; + param_addr = actual_params->GetRawParameter(1, ¶m_size, &type); + ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(h), param_size); + EXPECT_EQ(VOIDPTR_TYPE, type); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != param_addr); + EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(&h, param_addr, param_size)); + + // Check combination of 32 and 64 bits. + CrossCall(client, tag2, h, dw, h, &answer); + actual_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParamsEx*>(client.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_EQ(3, actual_params->GetParamsCount()); + EXPECT_EQ(tag2, actual_params->GetTag()); + type = INVALID_TYPE; + param_addr = actual_params->GetRawParameter(0, ¶m_size, &type); + ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(h), param_size); + EXPECT_EQ(VOIDPTR_TYPE, type); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != param_addr); + EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(&h, param_addr, param_size)); + type = INVALID_TYPE; + param_addr = actual_params->GetRawParameter(1, ¶m_size, &type); + ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(dw), param_size); + EXPECT_EQ(ULONG_TYPE, type); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != param_addr); + EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(&dw, param_addr, param_size)); + type = INVALID_TYPE; + param_addr = actual_params->GetRawParameter(2, ¶m_size, &type); + ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(h), param_size); + EXPECT_EQ(VOIDPTR_TYPE, type); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != param_addr); + EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(&h, param_addr, param_size)); + + CloseChannelEvents(client_control); + delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); +} + +TEST(IPCTest, CrossCallValidation) { + // First a sanity test with a well formed parameter object. + unsigned long value = 124816; + const uint32 kTag = 33; + const uint32 kBufferSize = 256; + ActualCallParams<1, kBufferSize> params_1(kTag); + params_1.CopyParamIn(0, &value, sizeof(value), false, ULONG_TYPE); + void* buffer = const_cast<void*>(params_1.GetBuffer()); + + uint32 out_size = 0; + CrossCallParamsEx* ccp = 0; + ccp = CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(buffer, params_1.GetSize(), + &out_size); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != ccp); + EXPECT_TRUE(ccp->GetBuffer() != buffer); + EXPECT_EQ(kTag, ccp->GetTag()); + EXPECT_EQ(1, ccp->GetParamsCount()); + delete[] (reinterpret_cast<char*>(ccp)); + +#if defined(NDEBUG) + // Test hat we handle integer overflow on the number of params + // correctly. We use a test-only ctor for ActualCallParams that + // allows to create malformed cross-call buffers. + const int32 kPtrDiffSz = sizeof(ptrdiff_t); + for (int32 ix = -1; ix != 3; ++ix) { + uint32 fake_num_params = (kuint32max / kPtrDiffSz) + ix; + ActualCallParams<1, kBufferSize> params_2(kTag, fake_num_params); + params_2.CopyParamIn(0, &value, sizeof(value), false, ULONG_TYPE); + buffer = const_cast<void*>(params_2.GetBuffer()); + + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != buffer); + ccp = CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(buffer, params_1.GetSize(), + &out_size); + // If the buffer is malformed the return is NULL. + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == ccp); + } +#endif // defined(NDEBUG) + + ActualCallParams<1, kBufferSize> params_3(kTag, 1); + params_3.CopyParamIn(0, &value, sizeof(value), false, ULONG_TYPE); + buffer = const_cast<void*>(params_3.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != buffer); + + uint32 correct_size = params_3.OverrideSize(1); + ccp = CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(buffer, kBufferSize, &out_size); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == ccp); + + // The correct_size is 8 bytes aligned. + params_3.OverrideSize(correct_size - 7); + ccp = CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(buffer, kBufferSize, &out_size); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == ccp); + + params_3.OverrideSize(correct_size); + ccp = CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(buffer, kBufferSize, &out_size); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != ccp); + + // Make sure that two parameters work as expected. + ActualCallParams<2, kBufferSize> params_4(kTag, 2); + params_4.CopyParamIn(0, &value, sizeof(value), false, ULONG_TYPE); + params_4.CopyParamIn(1, buffer, sizeof(buffer), false, VOIDPTR_TYPE); + buffer = const_cast<void*>(params_4.GetBuffer()); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != buffer); + + ccp = CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(buffer, kBufferSize, &out_size); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != ccp); + +#if defined(_WIN64) + correct_size = params_4.OverrideSize(1); + params_4.OverrideSize(correct_size - 1); + ccp = CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(buffer, kBufferSize, &out_size); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == ccp); +#endif +} + +// This structure is passed to the mock server threads to simulate +// the server side IPC so it has the required kernel objects. +struct ServerEvents { + HANDLE ping; + HANDLE pong; + volatile LONG* state; + HANDLE mutex; +}; + +// This is the server thread that quicky answers an IPC and exits. +DWORD WINAPI QuickResponseServer(PVOID param) { + ServerEvents* events = reinterpret_cast<ServerEvents*>(param); + DWORD wait_result = 0; + wait_result = ::WaitForSingleObject(events->ping, INFINITE); + ::InterlockedExchange(events->state, kAckChannel); + ::SetEvent(events->pong); + return wait_result; +} + +class CrossCallParamsMock : public CrossCallParams { + public: + CrossCallParamsMock(uint32 tag, uint32 params_count) + : CrossCallParams(tag, params_count) { + } + private: + void* params[4]; +}; + +void FakeOkAnswerInChannel(void* channel) { + CrossCallReturn* answer = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallReturn*>(channel); + answer->call_outcome = SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +// Create two threads that will quickly answer IPCs; the first one +// using channel 1 (channel 0 is busy) and one using channel 0. No time-out +// should occur. +TEST(IPCTest, ClientFastServer) { + const size_t channel_size = kIPCChannelSize; + size_t base_start = 0; + IPCControl* client_control = + MakeChannels(channel_size, 4096 * 2, &base_start); + FixChannels(client_control, base_start, kIPCChannelSize, FIX_PONG_NOT_READY); + client_control->server_alive = ::CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, NULL); + + char* mem = reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); + SharedMemIPCClient client(mem); + + ServerEvents events = {0}; + events.ping = client_control->channels[1].ping_event; + events.pong = client_control->channels[1].pong_event; + events.state = &client_control->channels[1].state; + + HANDLE t1 = ::CreateThread(NULL, 0, QuickResponseServer, &events, 0, NULL); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != t1); + ::CloseHandle(t1); + + void* buff0 = client.GetBuffer(); + EXPECT_TRUE(mem + client_control->channels[0].channel_base == buff0); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + + void* buff1 = client.GetBuffer(); + EXPECT_TRUE(mem + client_control->channels[1].channel_base == buff1); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, client_control->channels[1].ipc_tag); + + uint32 tag = 7654; + CrossCallReturn answer; + CrossCallParamsMock* params1 = new(buff1) CrossCallParamsMock(tag, 1); + FakeOkAnswerInChannel(buff1); + + ResultCode result = client.DoCall(params1, &answer); + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) + client.FreeBuffer(buff1); + + EXPECT_TRUE(SBOX_ALL_OK == result); + EXPECT_EQ(tag, client_control->channels[1].ipc_tag); + EXPECT_EQ(kBusyChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + + HANDLE t2 = ::CreateThread(NULL, 0, QuickResponseServer, &events, 0, NULL); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != t2); + ::CloseHandle(t2); + + client.FreeBuffer(buff0); + events.ping = client_control->channels[0].ping_event; + events.pong = client_control->channels[0].pong_event; + events.state = &client_control->channels[0].state; + + tag = 4567; + CrossCallParamsMock* params2 = new(buff0) CrossCallParamsMock(tag, 1); + FakeOkAnswerInChannel(buff0); + + result = client.DoCall(params2, &answer); + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) + client.FreeBuffer(buff0); + + EXPECT_TRUE(SBOX_ALL_OK == result); + EXPECT_EQ(tag, client_control->channels[0].ipc_tag); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[1].state); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[2].state); + + CloseChannelEvents(client_control); + ::CloseHandle(client_control->server_alive); + + delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); +} + +// This is the server thread that very slowly answers an IPC and exits. Note +// that the pong event needs to be signaled twice. +DWORD WINAPI SlowResponseServer(PVOID param) { + ServerEvents* events = reinterpret_cast<ServerEvents*>(param); + DWORD wait_result = 0; + wait_result = ::WaitForSingleObject(events->ping, INFINITE); + ::Sleep(kIPCWaitTimeOut1 + kIPCWaitTimeOut2 + 200); + ::InterlockedExchange(events->state, kAckChannel); + ::SetEvent(events->pong); + return wait_result; +} + +// This thread's job is to keep the mutex locked. +DWORD WINAPI MainServerThread(PVOID param) { + ServerEvents* events = reinterpret_cast<ServerEvents*>(param); + DWORD wait_result = 0; + wait_result = ::WaitForSingleObject(events->mutex, INFINITE); + Sleep(kIPCWaitTimeOut1 * 20); + return wait_result; +} + +// Creates a server thread that answers the IPC so slow that is guaranteed to +// trigger the time-out code path in the client. A second thread is created +// to hold locked the server_alive mutex: this signals the client that the +// server is not dead and it retries the wait. +TEST(IPCTest, ClientSlowServer) { + size_t base_start = 0; + IPCControl* client_control = + MakeChannels(kIPCChannelSize, 4096*2, &base_start); + FixChannels(client_control, base_start, kIPCChannelSize, FIX_PONG_NOT_READY); + client_control->server_alive = ::CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, NULL); + + char* mem = reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); + SharedMemIPCClient client(mem); + + ServerEvents events = {0}; + events.ping = client_control->channels[0].ping_event; + events.pong = client_control->channels[0].pong_event; + events.state = &client_control->channels[0].state; + + HANDLE t1 = ::CreateThread(NULL, 0, SlowResponseServer, &events, 0, NULL); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != t1); + ::CloseHandle(t1); + + ServerEvents events2 = {0}; + events2.pong = events.pong; + events2.mutex = client_control->server_alive; + + HANDLE t2 = ::CreateThread(NULL, 0, MainServerThread, &events2, 0, NULL); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != t2); + ::CloseHandle(t2); + + ::Sleep(1); + + void* buff0 = client.GetBuffer(); + uint32 tag = 4321; + CrossCallReturn answer; + CrossCallParamsMock* params1 = new(buff0) CrossCallParamsMock(tag, 1); + FakeOkAnswerInChannel(buff0); + + ResultCode result = client.DoCall(params1, &answer); + if (SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR != result) + client.FreeBuffer(buff0); + + EXPECT_TRUE(SBOX_ALL_OK == result); + EXPECT_EQ(tag, client_control->channels[0].ipc_tag); + EXPECT_EQ(kFreeChannel, client_control->channels[0].state); + + CloseChannelEvents(client_control); + ::CloseHandle(client_control->server_alive); + delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); +} + +// This test-only IPC dispatcher has two handlers with the same signature +// but only CallOneHandler should be used. +class UnitTestIPCDispatcher : public Dispatcher { + public: + enum { + CALL_ONE_TAG = 78, + CALL_TWO_TAG = 87 + }; + + UnitTestIPCDispatcher(); + ~UnitTestIPCDispatcher() {}; + + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service) { + return true; + } + + private: + bool CallOneHandler(IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE p1, DWORD p2) { + ipc->return_info.extended[0].handle = p1; + ipc->return_info.extended[1].unsigned_int = p2; + return true; + } + + bool CallTwoHandler(IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE p1, DWORD p2) { + return true; + } +}; + +UnitTestIPCDispatcher::UnitTestIPCDispatcher() { + static const IPCCall call_one = { + {CALL_ONE_TAG, VOIDPTR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &UnitTestIPCDispatcher::CallOneHandler) + }; + static const IPCCall call_two = { + {CALL_TWO_TAG, VOIDPTR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &UnitTestIPCDispatcher::CallTwoHandler) + }; + ipc_calls_.push_back(call_one); + ipc_calls_.push_back(call_two); +} + +// This test does most of the shared memory IPC client-server roundtrip +// and tests the packing, unpacking and call dispatching. +TEST(IPCTest, SharedMemServerTests) { + size_t base_start = 0; + IPCControl* client_control = + MakeChannels(kIPCChannelSize, 4096, &base_start); + client_control->server_alive = HANDLE(1); + FixChannels(client_control, base_start, kIPCChannelSize, FIX_PONG_READY); + + char* mem = reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); + SharedMemIPCClient client(mem); + + CrossCallReturn answer; + HANDLE bar = HANDLE(191919); + DWORD foo = 6767676; + CrossCall(client, UnitTestIPCDispatcher::CALL_ONE_TAG, bar, foo, &answer); + void* buff = client.GetBuffer(); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != buff); + + UnitTestIPCDispatcher dispatcher; + // Since we are directly calling InvokeCallback, most of this structure + // can be set to NULL. + sandbox::SharedMemIPCServer::ServerControl srv_control = { + NULL, NULL, kIPCChannelSize, NULL, + reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control), + NULL, &dispatcher, {0} }; + + sandbox::CrossCallReturn call_return = {0}; + EXPECT_TRUE(SharedMemIPCServer::InvokeCallback(&srv_control, buff, + &call_return)); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_ALL_OK, call_return.call_outcome); + EXPECT_TRUE(bar == call_return.extended[0].handle); + EXPECT_EQ(foo, call_return.extended[1].unsigned_int); + + CloseChannelEvents(client_control); + delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(client_control); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/job.cc b/sandbox/win/src/job.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ed3a77 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/job.cc @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/job.h" + +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +Job::~Job() { + if (job_handle_) + ::CloseHandle(job_handle_); +}; + +DWORD Job::Init(JobLevel security_level, wchar_t *job_name, + DWORD ui_exceptions) { + if (job_handle_) + return ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED; + + job_handle_ = ::CreateJobObject(NULL, // No security attribute + job_name); + if (!job_handle_) + return ::GetLastError(); + + JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION jeli = {0}; + JOBOBJECT_BASIC_UI_RESTRICTIONS jbur = {0}; + + // Set the settings for the different security levels. Note: The higher levels + // inherit from the lower levels. + switch (security_level) { + case JOB_LOCKDOWN: { + jeli.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags |= + JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_DIE_ON_UNHANDLED_EXCEPTION; + } + case JOB_RESTRICTED: { + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass |= JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_WRITECLIPBOARD; + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass |= JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD; + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass |= JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES; + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass |= JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_GLOBALATOMS; + } + case JOB_LIMITED_USER: { + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass |= JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS; + jeli.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags |= JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_ACTIVE_PROCESS; + jeli.BasicLimitInformation.ActiveProcessLimit = 1; + } + case JOB_INTERACTIVE: { + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass |= JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS; + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass |= JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP; + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass |= JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS; + } + case JOB_UNPROTECTED: { + // The JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE flag is not supported on + // Windows 2000. We need a mechanism on Windows 2000 to ensure + // that processes in the job are terminated when the job is closed + if (base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_PRE_XP) + break; + + jeli.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags |= + JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE; + break; + } + default: { + return ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; + } + } + + if (FALSE == ::SetInformationJobObject(job_handle_, + JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, + &jeli, + sizeof(jeli))) { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + jbur.UIRestrictionsClass = jbur.UIRestrictionsClass & (~ui_exceptions); + if (FALSE == ::SetInformationJobObject(job_handle_, + JobObjectBasicUIRestrictions, + &jbur, + sizeof(jbur))) { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +DWORD Job::UserHandleGrantAccess(HANDLE handle) { + if (!job_handle_) + return ERROR_NO_DATA; + + if (!::UserHandleGrantAccess(handle, + job_handle_, + TRUE)) { // Access allowed. + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +HANDLE Job::Detach() { + HANDLE handle_temp = job_handle_; + job_handle_ = NULL; + return handle_temp; +} + +DWORD Job::AssignProcessToJob(HANDLE process_handle) { + if (!job_handle_) + return ERROR_NO_DATA; + + if (FALSE == ::AssignProcessToJobObject(job_handle_, process_handle)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/job.h b/sandbox/win/src/job.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3f6738 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/job.h @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_JOB_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_JOB_H_ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token_utils.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Handles the creation of job objects based on a security profile. +// Sample usage: +// Job job; +// job.Init(JOB_LOCKDOWN, NULL); //no job name +// job.AssignProcessToJob(process_handle); +class Job { + public: + Job() : job_handle_(NULL) { } + + ~Job(); + + // Initializes and creates the job object. The security of the job is based + // on the security_level parameter. + // job_name can be NULL if the job is unnamed. + // If the chosen profile has too many ui restrictions, you can disable some + // by specifying them in the ui_exceptions parameters. + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + DWORD Init(JobLevel security_level, wchar_t *job_name, DWORD ui_exceptions); + + // Assigns the process referenced by process_handle to the job. + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + DWORD AssignProcessToJob(HANDLE process_handle); + + // Grants access to "handle" to the job. All processes in the job can + // subsequently recognize and use the handle. + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + DWORD UserHandleGrantAccess(HANDLE handle); + + // Revokes ownership to the job handle and returns it. The destructor of the + // class won't close the handle when called. + // If the object is not yet initialized, it returns 0. + HANDLE Detach(); + + private: + // Handle to the job referenced by the object. + HANDLE job_handle_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Job); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_JOB_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/job_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/job_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f386f1f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/job_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file contains unit tests for the job object. + +#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" +#include "sandbox/src/job.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Tests the creation and destruction of the job. +TEST(JobTest, TestCreation) { + // Scope the creation of Job. + { + // Create the job. + Job job; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job.Init(JOB_LOCKDOWN, L"my_test_job_name", 0)); + + // check if the job exists. + HANDLE job_handle = ::OpenJobObjectW(GENERIC_ALL, FALSE, + L"my_test_job_name"); + ASSERT_TRUE(job_handle != NULL); + + if (job_handle) + CloseHandle(job_handle); + } + + // Check if the job is destroyed when the object goes out of scope. + HANDLE job_handle = ::OpenJobObjectW(GENERIC_ALL, FALSE, L"my_test_job_name"); + ASSERT_TRUE(job_handle == NULL); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, ::GetLastError()); +} + +// Tests the method "Detach". +TEST(JobTest, TestDetach) { + HANDLE job_handle; + // Scope the creation of Job. + { + // Create the job. + Job job; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job.Init(JOB_LOCKDOWN, L"my_test_job_name", 0)); + + job_handle = job.Detach(); + ASSERT_TRUE(job_handle != NULL); + } + + // Check to be sure that the job is still alive even after the object is gone + // out of scope. + HANDLE job_handle_dup = ::OpenJobObjectW(GENERIC_ALL, FALSE, + L"my_test_job_name"); + ASSERT_TRUE(job_handle_dup != NULL); + + // Remove all references. + if (job_handle_dup) + ::CloseHandle(job_handle_dup); + + if (job_handle) + ::CloseHandle(job_handle); + + // Check if the jbo is really dead. + job_handle = ::OpenJobObjectW(GENERIC_ALL, FALSE, L"my_test_job_name"); + ASSERT_TRUE(job_handle == NULL); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, ::GetLastError()); +} + +// Tests the ui exceptions +TEST(JobTest, TestExceptions) { + HANDLE job_handle; + // Scope the creation of Job. + { + // Create the job. + Job job; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job.Init(JOB_LOCKDOWN, L"my_test_job_name", + JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD)); + + job_handle = job.Detach(); + ASSERT_TRUE(job_handle != NULL); + + JOBOBJECT_BASIC_UI_RESTRICTIONS jbur = {0}; + DWORD size = sizeof(jbur); + BOOL result = ::QueryInformationJobObject(job_handle, + JobObjectBasicUIRestrictions, + &jbur, size, &size); + ASSERT_TRUE(result); + + ASSERT_EQ(jbur.UIRestrictionsClass & JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD, 0); + ::CloseHandle(job_handle); + } + + // Scope the creation of Job. + { + // Create the job. + Job job; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job.Init(JOB_LOCKDOWN, L"my_test_job_name", 0)); + + job_handle = job.Detach(); + ASSERT_TRUE(job_handle != NULL); + + JOBOBJECT_BASIC_UI_RESTRICTIONS jbur = {0}; + DWORD size = sizeof(jbur); + BOOL result = ::QueryInformationJobObject(job_handle, + JobObjectBasicUIRestrictions, + &jbur, size, &size); + ASSERT_TRUE(result); + + ASSERT_EQ(jbur.UIRestrictionsClass & JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD, + JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD); + ::CloseHandle(job_handle); + } +} + +// Tests the error case when the job is initialized twice. +TEST(JobTest, DoubleInit) { + // Create the job. + Job job; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job.Init(JOB_LOCKDOWN, L"my_test_job_name", 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED, job.Init(JOB_LOCKDOWN, L"test", 0)); +} + +// Tests the error case when we use a method and the object is not yet +// initialized. +TEST(JobTest, NoInit) { + Job job; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_NO_DATA, job.UserHandleGrantAccess(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_NO_DATA, job.AssignProcessToJob(NULL)); + ASSERT_TRUE(job.Detach() == NULL); +} + +// Tests the initialization of the job with different security level. +TEST(JobTest, SecurityLevel) { + Job job1; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job1.Init(JOB_LOCKDOWN, L"job1", 0)); + + Job job2; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job2.Init(JOB_RESTRICTED, L"job2", 0)); + + Job job3; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job3.Init(JOB_LIMITED_USER, L"job3", 0)); + + Job job4; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job4.Init(JOB_INTERACTIVE, L"job4", 0)); + + Job job5; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job5.Init(JOB_UNPROTECTED, L"job5", 0)); + + Job job6; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS, job6.Init( + static_cast<JobLevel>(JOB_UNPROTECTED+1), L"job6", 0)); +} + +// Tests the method "AssignProcessToJob". +TEST(JobTest, ProcessInJob) { + // Create the job. + Job job; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job.Init(JOB_UNPROTECTED, L"job_test_process", 0)); + + BOOL result = FALSE; + + wchar_t notepad[] = L"notepad"; + STARTUPINFO si = { sizeof(si) }; + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation pi; + result = ::CreateProcess(NULL, notepad, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, + pi.Receive()); + ASSERT_TRUE(result); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, job.AssignProcessToJob(pi.process_handle())); + + // Get the job handle. + HANDLE job_handle = job.Detach(); + + // Check if the process is in the job. + JOBOBJECT_BASIC_PROCESS_ID_LIST jbpidl = {0}; + DWORD size = sizeof(jbpidl); + result = ::QueryInformationJobObject(job_handle, + JobObjectBasicProcessIdList, + &jbpidl, size, &size); + EXPECT_TRUE(result); + + EXPECT_EQ(1, jbpidl.NumberOfAssignedProcesses); + EXPECT_EQ(1, jbpidl.NumberOfProcessIdsInList); + EXPECT_EQ(pi.process_id(), jbpidl.ProcessIdList[0]); + + EXPECT_TRUE(::TerminateProcess(pi.process_handle(), 0)); + + EXPECT_TRUE(::CloseHandle(job_handle)); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_dispatcher.cc b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_dispatcher.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0569784 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_dispatcher.cc @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/named_pipe_dispatcher.h" + +#include "base/basictypes.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/named_pipe_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/named_pipe_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_broker.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" + + +namespace sandbox { + +NamedPipeDispatcher::NamedPipeDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base) + : policy_base_(policy_base) { + static const IPCCall create_params = { + {IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, + ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>(&NamedPipeDispatcher::CreateNamedPipe) + }; + + ipc_calls_.push_back(create_params); +} + +bool NamedPipeDispatcher::SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, + int service) { + if (IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG == service) + return INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, L"kernel32.dll", CreateNamedPipeW, + CREATE_NAMED_PIPE_ID, 36); + + return false; +} + +bool NamedPipeDispatcher::CreateNamedPipe( + IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD open_mode, DWORD pipe_mode, + DWORD max_instances, DWORD out_buffer_size, DWORD in_buffer_size, + DWORD default_timeout) { + const wchar_t* pipe_name = name->c_str(); + CountedParameterSet<NameBased> params; + params[NameBased::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(pipe_name); + + EvalResult eval = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + + HANDLE pipe; + DWORD ret = NamedPipePolicy::CreateNamedPipeAction(eval, *ipc->client_info, + *name, open_mode, + pipe_mode, max_instances, + out_buffer_size, + in_buffer_size, + default_timeout, &pipe); + + ipc->return_info.win32_result = ret; + ipc->return_info.handle = pipe; + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_dispatcher.h b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_dispatcher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87a68b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_dispatcher.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_DISPATCHER_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_DISPATCHER_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This class handles named pipe related IPC calls. +class NamedPipeDispatcher : public Dispatcher { + public: + explicit NamedPipeDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base); + ~NamedPipeDispatcher() {} + + // Dispatcher interface. + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service); + + private: + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to CreateNamedPipeW() in the + // target. + bool CreateNamedPipe(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD open_mode, + DWORD pipe_mode, DWORD max_instances, + DWORD out_buffer_size, DWORD in_buffer_size, + DWORD default_timeout); + + PolicyBase* policy_base_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(NamedPipeDispatcher); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_DISPATCHER_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_interception.cc b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_interception.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4599441 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_interception.cc @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/named_pipe_interception.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_target.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateNamedPipeW( + CreateNamedPipeWFunction orig_CreateNamedPipeW, LPCWSTR pipe_name, + DWORD open_mode, DWORD pipe_mode, DWORD max_instance, DWORD out_buffer_size, + DWORD in_buffer_size, DWORD default_timeout, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes) { + HANDLE pipe = orig_CreateNamedPipeW(pipe_name, open_mode, pipe_mode, + max_instance, out_buffer_size, + in_buffer_size, default_timeout, + security_attributes); + if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE != pipe) + return pipe; + + DWORD original_error = ::GetLastError(); + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + + // We don't support specific Security Attributes. + if (security_attributes) + return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + + do { + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + CountedParameterSet<NameBased> params; + params[NameBased::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(pipe_name); + + if (!QueryBroker(IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG, params.GetBase())) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG, pipe_name, + open_mode, pipe_mode, max_instance, + out_buffer_size, in_buffer_size, + default_timeout, &answer); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + ::SetLastError(answer.win32_result); + + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != answer.win32_result) + return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + + return answer.handle; + } while (false); + + ::SetLastError(original_error); + return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_interception.h b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_interception.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e2b334 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_interception.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_INTERCEPTION_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_INTERCEPTION_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +extern "C" { + +typedef HANDLE (WINAPI *CreateNamedPipeWFunction) ( + LPCWSTR lpName, + DWORD dwOpenMode, + DWORD dwPipeMode, + DWORD nMaxInstances, + DWORD nOutBufferSize, + DWORD nInBufferSize, + DWORD nDefaultTimeOut, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpSecurityAttributes); + +// Interception of CreateNamedPipeW in kernel32.dll +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateNamedPipeW( + CreateNamedPipeWFunction orig_CreateNamedPipeW, LPCWSTR pipe_name, + DWORD open_mode, DWORD pipe_mode, DWORD max_instance, DWORD out_buffer_size, + DWORD in_buffer_size, DWORD default_timeout, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes); + +} // extern "C" + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_INTERCEPTION_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy.cc b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00182cf --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy.cc @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/named_pipe_policy.h" + +#include <string> + +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace { + +// Creates a named pipe and duplicates the handle to 'target_process'. The +// remaining parameters are the same as CreateNamedPipeW(). +HANDLE CreateNamedPipeHelper(HANDLE target_process, LPCWSTR pipe_name, + DWORD open_mode, DWORD pipe_mode, + DWORD max_instances, DWORD out_buffer_size, + DWORD in_buffer_size, DWORD default_timeout, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes) { + HANDLE pipe = ::CreateNamedPipeW(pipe_name, open_mode, pipe_mode, + max_instances, out_buffer_size, + in_buffer_size, default_timeout, + security_attributes); + if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == pipe) + return pipe; + + HANDLE new_pipe; + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), pipe, target_process, &new_pipe, + 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | + DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(pipe); + return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + } + + return new_pipe; +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +bool NamedPipePolicy::GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy) { + if (TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY != semantics) { + return false; + } + PolicyRule pipe(ASK_BROKER); + if (!pipe.AddStringMatch(IF, NameBased::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE)) { + return false; + } + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG, &pipe)) { + return false; + } + return true; +} + +DWORD NamedPipePolicy::CreateNamedPipeAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &name, + DWORD open_mode, DWORD pipe_mode, + DWORD max_instances, + DWORD out_buffer_size, + DWORD in_buffer_size, + DWORD default_timeout, + HANDLE* pipe) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means create the pipe. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + *pipe = CreateNamedPipeHelper(client_info.process, name.c_str(), + open_mode, pipe_mode, max_instances, + out_buffer_size, in_buffer_size, + default_timeout, NULL); + + if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == *pipe) + return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy.h b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b6b09d --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_POLICY_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_POLICY_H__ + +#include <string> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +enum EvalResult; + +// This class centralizes most of the knowledge related to named pipe creation. +class NamedPipePolicy { + public: + // Creates the required low-level policy rules to evaluate a high-level. + // policy rule for named pipe creation + // 'name' is the named pipe to be created + // 'semantics' is the desired semantics. + // 'policy' is the policy generator to which the rules are going to be added. + static bool GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy); + + // Processes a 'CreateNamedPipeW()' request from the target. + static DWORD CreateNamedPipeAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &name, + DWORD open_mode, DWORD pipe_mode, + DWORD max_instances, + DWORD out_buffer_size, + DWORD in_buffer_size, + DWORD default_timeout, HANDLE* pipe); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_NAMED_PIPE_POLICY_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11ddbc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" + +namespace sandbox { + + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int NamedPipe_Create(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 1) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + } + if ((NULL == argv) || (NULL == argv[0])) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + } + + HANDLE pipe = ::CreateNamedPipeW(argv[0], + PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, + PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE, 1, 4096, + 4096, 2000, NULL); + if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == pipe) + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + + OVERLAPPED overlapped = {0}; + overlapped.hEvent = ::CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, TRUE, NULL); + BOOL result = ::ConnectNamedPipe(pipe, &overlapped); + + if (!result) { + DWORD error = ::GetLastError(); + if (ERROR_PIPE_CONNECTED != error && + ERROR_IO_PENDING != error) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + } + + if (!::CloseHandle(pipe)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + ::CloseHandle(overlapped.hEvent); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// Tests if we can create a pipe in the sandbox. On XP, the sandbox can create +// a pipe without any help but it fails on Vista, this is why we do not test +// the "denied" case. +TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipe) { + TestRunner runner; + // TODO(nsylvain): This policy is wrong because "*" is a valid char in a + // namedpipe name. Here we apply it like a wildcard. http://b/893603 + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, + TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, + L"\\\\.\\pipe\\test*")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\testbleh")); +} + +// The same test as CreatePipe but this time using strict interceptions. +TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipeStrictInterceptions) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.GetPolicy()->SetStrictInterceptions(); + + // TODO(nsylvain): This policy is wrong because "*" is a valid char in a + // namedpipe name. Here we apply it like a wildcard. http://b/893603 + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, + TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, + L"\\\\.\\pipe\\test*")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\testbleh")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/nt_internals.h b/sandbox/win/src/nt_internals.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe4fcd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/nt_internals.h @@ -0,0 +1,611 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file holds definitions related to the ntdll API. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_NT_INTERNALS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_NT_INTERNALS_H__ + +#include <windows.h> + +typedef LONG NTSTATUS; +#define NT_SUCCESS(st) (st >= 0) + +#define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L) +#define STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW ((NTSTATUS)0x80000005L) +#define STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000001L) +#define STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000002L) +#define STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000004L) +#ifndef STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER +// It is now defined in Windows 2008 SDK. +#define STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ((NTSTATUS)0xC000000DL) +#endif +#define STATUS_CONFLICTING_ADDRESSES ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000018L) +#define STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000022L) +#define STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000023L) +#define STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000034L) +#define STATUS_PROCEDURE_NOT_FOUND ((NTSTATUS)0xC000007AL) +#define STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT ((NTSTATUS)0xC000007BL) +#define STATUS_NO_TOKEN ((NTSTATUS)0xC000007CL) + +#define CURRENT_PROCESS ((HANDLE) -1) +#define CURRENT_THREAD ((HANDLE) -2) +#define NtCurrentProcess CURRENT_PROCESS + +typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING { + USHORT Length; + USHORT MaximumLength; + PWSTR Buffer; +} UNICODE_STRING; +typedef UNICODE_STRING *PUNICODE_STRING; +typedef const UNICODE_STRING *PCUNICODE_STRING; + +typedef struct _STRING { + USHORT Length; + USHORT MaximumLength; + PCHAR Buffer; +} STRING; +typedef STRING *PSTRING; + +typedef STRING ANSI_STRING; +typedef PSTRING PANSI_STRING; +typedef CONST PSTRING PCANSI_STRING; + +typedef STRING OEM_STRING; +typedef PSTRING POEM_STRING; +typedef CONST STRING* PCOEM_STRING; + +#define OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE 0x00000040L + +typedef struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES { + ULONG Length; + HANDLE RootDirectory; + PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName; + ULONG Attributes; + PVOID SecurityDescriptor; + PVOID SecurityQualityOfService; +} OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES; +typedef OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES *POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES; + +#define InitializeObjectAttributes(p, n, a, r, s) { \ + (p)->Length = sizeof(OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES);\ + (p)->RootDirectory = r;\ + (p)->Attributes = a;\ + (p)->ObjectName = n;\ + (p)->SecurityDescriptor = s;\ + (p)->SecurityQualityOfService = NULL;\ +} + +typedef struct _IO_STATUS_BLOCK { + union { + NTSTATUS Status; + PVOID Pointer; + }; + ULONG_PTR Information; +} IO_STATUS_BLOCK, *PIO_STATUS_BLOCK; + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// File IO + +// Create disposition values. + +#define FILE_SUPERSEDE 0x00000000 +#define FILE_OPEN 0x00000001 +#define FILE_CREATE 0x00000002 +#define FILE_OPEN_IF 0x00000003 +#define FILE_OVERWRITE 0x00000004 +#define FILE_OVERWRITE_IF 0x00000005 +#define FILE_MAXIMUM_DISPOSITION 0x00000005 + +// Create/open option flags. + +#define FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE 0x00000001 +#define FILE_WRITE_THROUGH 0x00000002 +#define FILE_SEQUENTIAL_ONLY 0x00000004 +#define FILE_NO_INTERMEDIATE_BUFFERING 0x00000008 + +#define FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_ALERT 0x00000010 +#define FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT 0x00000020 +#define FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE 0x00000040 +#define FILE_CREATE_TREE_CONNECTION 0x00000080 + +#define FILE_COMPLETE_IF_OPLOCKED 0x00000100 +#define FILE_NO_EA_KNOWLEDGE 0x00000200 +#define FILE_OPEN_REMOTE_INSTANCE 0x00000400 +#define FILE_RANDOM_ACCESS 0x00000800 + +#define FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE 0x00001000 +#define FILE_OPEN_BY_FILE_ID 0x00002000 +#define FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT 0x00004000 +#define FILE_NO_COMPRESSION 0x00008000 + +#define FILE_RESERVE_OPFILTER 0x00100000 +#define FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT 0x00200000 +#define FILE_OPEN_NO_RECALL 0x00400000 +#define FILE_OPEN_FOR_FREE_SPACE_QUERY 0x00800000 + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtCreateFileFunction)( + OUT PHANDLE FileHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, + OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, + IN PLARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize OPTIONAL, + IN ULONG FileAttributes, + IN ULONG ShareAccess, + IN ULONG CreateDisposition, + IN ULONG CreateOptions, + IN PVOID EaBuffer OPTIONAL, + IN ULONG EaLength); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenFileFunction)( + OUT PHANDLE FileHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, + OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, + IN ULONG ShareAccess, + IN ULONG OpenOptions); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtCloseFunction)( + IN HANDLE Handle); + +typedef enum _FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS { + FileRenameInformation = 10 +} FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS, *PFILE_INFORMATION_CLASS; + +typedef struct _FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION { + BOOLEAN ReplaceIfExists; + HANDLE RootDirectory; + ULONG FileNameLength; + WCHAR FileName[1]; +} FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION, *PFILE_RENAME_INFORMATION; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtSetInformationFileFunction)( + IN HANDLE FileHandle, + OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, + IN PVOID FileInformation, + IN ULONG Length, + IN FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInformationClass); + +typedef struct FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION { + LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; + LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; + LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; + LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; + ULONG FileAttributes; +} FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION, *PFILE_BASIC_INFORMATION; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtQueryAttributesFileFunction)( + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, + OUT PFILE_BASIC_INFORMATION FileAttributes); + +typedef struct _FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION { + LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; + LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; + LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; + LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; + LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize; + LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile; + ULONG FileAttributes; +} FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION, *PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtQueryFullAttributesFileFunction)( + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, + OUT PFILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION FileAttributes); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Sections + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtCreateSectionFunction)( + OUT PHANDLE SectionHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes OPTIONAL, + IN PLARGE_INTEGER MaximumSize OPTIONAL, + IN ULONG SectionPageProtection, + IN ULONG AllocationAttributes, + IN HANDLE FileHandle OPTIONAL); + +typedef ULONG SECTION_INHERIT; +#define ViewShare 1 +#define ViewUnmap 2 + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtMapViewOfSectionFunction)( + IN HANDLE SectionHandle, + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN OUT PVOID *BaseAddress, + IN ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, + IN SIZE_T CommitSize, + IN OUT PLARGE_INTEGER SectionOffset OPTIONAL, + IN OUT PSIZE_T ViewSize, + IN SECTION_INHERIT InheritDisposition, + IN ULONG AllocationType, + IN ULONG Win32Protect); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtUnmapViewOfSectionFunction)( + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN PVOID BaseAddress); + +typedef enum _SECTION_INFORMATION_CLASS { + SectionBasicInformation = 0, + SectionImageInformation +} SECTION_INFORMATION_CLASS; + +typedef struct _SECTION_BASIC_INFORMATION { + PVOID BaseAddress; + ULONG Attributes; + LARGE_INTEGER Size; +} SECTION_BASIC_INFORMATION, *PSECTION_BASIC_INFORMATION; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtQuerySectionFunction)( + IN HANDLE SectionHandle, + IN SECTION_INFORMATION_CLASS SectionInformationClass, + OUT PVOID SectionInformation, + IN SIZE_T SectionInformationLength, + OUT PSIZE_T ReturnLength OPTIONAL); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Process and Thread + +typedef struct _CLIENT_ID { + PVOID UniqueProcess; + PVOID UniqueThread; +} CLIENT_ID, *PCLIENT_ID; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenThreadFunction) ( + OUT PHANDLE ThreadHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, + IN PCLIENT_ID ClientId); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenProcessFunction) ( + OUT PHANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, + IN PCLIENT_ID ClientId); + +typedef enum _NT_THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS { + ThreadBasicInformation, + ThreadTimes, + ThreadPriority, + ThreadBasePriority, + ThreadAffinityMask, + ThreadImpersonationToken, + ThreadDescriptorTableEntry, + ThreadEnableAlignmentFaultFixup, + ThreadEventPair, + ThreadQuerySetWin32StartAddress, + ThreadZeroTlsCell, + ThreadPerformanceCount, + ThreadAmILastThread, + ThreadIdealProcessor, + ThreadPriorityBoost, + ThreadSetTlsArrayAddress, + ThreadIsIoPending, + ThreadHideFromDebugger +} NT_THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS, *PNT_THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtSetInformationThreadFunction) ( + IN HANDLE ThreadHandle, + IN NT_THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS ThreadInformationClass, + IN PVOID ThreadInformation, + IN ULONG ThreadInformationLength); + +// Partial definition only: +typedef enum _PROCESSINFOCLASS { + ProcessBasicInformation = 0 +} PROCESSINFOCLASS; + +typedef PVOID PPEB; +typedef PVOID KPRIORITY; + +typedef struct _PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION { + NTSTATUS ExitStatus; + PPEB PebBaseAddress; + KAFFINITY AffinityMask; + KPRIORITY BasePriority; + ULONG UniqueProcessId; + ULONG InheritedFromUniqueProcessId; +} PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION, *PPROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtQueryInformationProcessFunction)( + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN PROCESSINFOCLASS ProcessInformationClass, + OUT PVOID ProcessInformation, + IN ULONG ProcessInformationLength, + OUT PULONG ReturnLength OPTIONAL); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenThreadTokenFunction) ( + IN HANDLE ThreadHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN BOOLEAN OpenAsSelf, + OUT PHANDLE TokenHandle); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenThreadTokenExFunction) ( + IN HANDLE ThreadHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN BOOLEAN OpenAsSelf, + IN ULONG HandleAttributes, + OUT PHANDLE TokenHandle); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenProcessTokenFunction) ( + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + OUT PHANDLE TokenHandle); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenProcessTokenExFunction) ( + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN ULONG HandleAttributes, + OUT PHANDLE TokenHandle); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI * RtlCreateUserThreadFunction)( + IN HANDLE Process, + IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR ThreadSecurityDescriptor, + IN BOOLEAN CreateSuspended, + IN ULONG ZeroBits, + IN SIZE_T MaximumStackSize, + IN SIZE_T CommittedStackSize, + IN LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE StartAddress, + IN PVOID Parameter, + OUT PHANDLE Thread, + OUT PCLIENT_ID ClientId); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Registry + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtCreateKeyFunction)( + OUT PHANDLE KeyHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, + IN ULONG TitleIndex, + IN PUNICODE_STRING Class OPTIONAL, + IN ULONG CreateOptions, + OUT PULONG Disposition OPTIONAL); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenKeyFunction)( + OUT PHANDLE KeyHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtOpenKeyExFunction)( + OUT PHANDLE KeyHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, + IN DWORD open_options); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtDeleteKeyFunction)( + IN HANDLE KeyHandle); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Memory + +// Don't really need this structure right now. +typedef PVOID PRTL_HEAP_PARAMETERS; + +typedef PVOID (WINAPI *RtlCreateHeapFunction)( + IN ULONG Flags, + IN PVOID HeapBase OPTIONAL, + IN SIZE_T ReserveSize OPTIONAL, + IN SIZE_T CommitSize OPTIONAL, + IN PVOID Lock OPTIONAL, + IN PRTL_HEAP_PARAMETERS Parameters OPTIONAL); + +typedef PVOID (WINAPI *RtlDestroyHeapFunction)( + IN PVOID HeapHandle); + +typedef PVOID (WINAPI *RtlAllocateHeapFunction)( + IN PVOID HeapHandle, + IN ULONG Flags, + IN SIZE_T Size); + +typedef BOOLEAN (WINAPI *RtlFreeHeapFunction)( + IN PVOID HeapHandle, + IN ULONG Flags, + IN PVOID HeapBase); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtAllocateVirtualMemoryFunction) ( + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN OUT PVOID *BaseAddress, + IN ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, + IN OUT PSIZE_T RegionSize, + IN ULONG AllocationType, + IN ULONG Protect); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtFreeVirtualMemoryFunction) ( + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN OUT PVOID *BaseAddress, + IN OUT PSIZE_T RegionSize, + IN ULONG FreeType); + +typedef enum _MEMORY_INFORMATION_CLASS { + MemoryBasicInformation = 0, + MemoryWorkingSetList, + MemorySectionName, + MemoryBasicVlmInformation +} MEMORY_INFORMATION_CLASS; + +typedef struct _MEMORY_SECTION_NAME { // Information Class 2 + UNICODE_STRING SectionFileName; +} MEMORY_SECTION_NAME, *PMEMORY_SECTION_NAME; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtQueryVirtualMemoryFunction)( + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN PVOID BaseAddress, + IN MEMORY_INFORMATION_CLASS MemoryInformationClass, + OUT PVOID MemoryInformation, + IN ULONG MemoryInformationLength, + OUT PULONG ReturnLength OPTIONAL); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtProtectVirtualMemoryFunction)( + IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, + IN OUT PVOID* BaseAddress, + IN OUT PSIZE_T ProtectSize, + IN ULONG NewProtect, + OUT PULONG OldProtect); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Objects + +typedef enum _OBJECT_INFORMATION_CLASS { + ObjectBasicInformation, + ObjectNameInformation, + ObjectTypeInformation, + ObjectAllInformation, + ObjectDataInformation +} OBJECT_INFORMATION_CLASS, *POBJECT_INFORMATION_CLASS; + +typedef struct _OBJDIR_INFORMATION { + UNICODE_STRING ObjectName; + UNICODE_STRING ObjectTypeName; + BYTE Data[1]; +} OBJDIR_INFORMATION; + +typedef struct _PUBLIC_OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION { + ULONG Attributes; + ACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess; + ULONG HandleCount; + ULONG PointerCount; + ULONG Reserved[10]; // reserved for internal use +} PUBLIC_OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION, *PPUBLIC_OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION; + +typedef struct __PUBLIC_OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION { + UNICODE_STRING TypeName; + ULONG Reserved[22]; // reserved for internal use +} PUBLIC_OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION, *PPUBLIC_OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION; + +typedef enum _POOL_TYPE { + NonPagedPool, + PagedPool, + NonPagedPoolMustSucceed, + ReservedType, + NonPagedPoolCacheAligned, + PagedPoolCacheAligned, + NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedMustS +} POOL_TYPE; + +typedef struct _OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION { + ULONG Attributes; + ACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess; + ULONG HandleCount; + ULONG PointerCount; + ULONG PagedPoolUsage; + ULONG NonPagedPoolUsage; + ULONG Reserved[3]; + ULONG NameInformationLength; + ULONG TypeInformationLength; + ULONG SecurityDescriptorLength; + LARGE_INTEGER CreateTime; +} OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION, *POBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION; + +typedef struct _OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION { + UNICODE_STRING Name; + ULONG TotalNumberOfObjects; + ULONG TotalNumberOfHandles; + ULONG TotalPagedPoolUsage; + ULONG TotalNonPagedPoolUsage; + ULONG TotalNamePoolUsage; + ULONG TotalHandleTableUsage; + ULONG HighWaterNumberOfObjects; + ULONG HighWaterNumberOfHandles; + ULONG HighWaterPagedPoolUsage; + ULONG HighWaterNonPagedPoolUsage; + ULONG HighWaterNamePoolUsage; + ULONG HighWaterHandleTableUsage; + ULONG InvalidAttributes; + GENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping; + ULONG ValidAccess; + BOOLEAN SecurityRequired; + BOOLEAN MaintainHandleCount; + USHORT MaintainTypeList; + POOL_TYPE PoolType; + ULONG PagedPoolUsage; + ULONG NonPagedPoolUsage; +} OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION, *POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION; + +typedef enum _SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS { + SystemHandleInformation = 16 +} SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS; + +typedef struct _SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION { + USHORT ProcessId; + USHORT CreatorBackTraceIndex; + UCHAR ObjectTypeNumber; + UCHAR Flags; + USHORT Handle; + PVOID Object; + ACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess; +} SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION, *PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION; + +typedef struct _SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX { + ULONG NumberOfHandles; + SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION Information[1]; +} SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX, *PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX; + +typedef struct _OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION { + UNICODE_STRING ObjectName; +} OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION, *POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION; + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtQueryObjectFunction)( + IN HANDLE Handle, + IN OBJECT_INFORMATION_CLASS ObjectInformationClass, + OUT PVOID ObjectInformation OPTIONAL, + IN ULONG ObjectInformationLength, + OUT PULONG ReturnLength OPTIONAL); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtDuplicateObjectFunction)( + IN HANDLE SourceProcess, + IN HANDLE SourceHandle, + IN HANDLE TargetProcess, + OUT PHANDLE TargetHandle, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, + IN ULONG Attributes, + IN ULONG Options); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtSignalAndWaitForSingleObjectFunction)( + IN HANDLE HandleToSignal, + IN HANDLE HandleToWait, + IN BOOLEAN Alertable, + IN PLARGE_INTEGER Timeout OPTIONAL); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtQuerySystemInformation)( + IN SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS SystemInformationClass, + OUT PVOID SystemInformation, + IN ULONG SystemInformationLength, + OUT PULONG ReturnLength); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NtQueryObject)( + IN HANDLE Handle, + IN OBJECT_INFORMATION_CLASS ObjectInformationClass, + OUT PVOID ObjectInformation, + IN ULONG ObjectInformationLength, + OUT PULONG ReturnLength); + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Strings + +typedef int (__cdecl *_strnicmpFunction)( + IN const char* _Str1, + IN const char* _Str2, + IN size_t _MaxCount); + +typedef size_t (__cdecl *strlenFunction)( + IN const char * _Str); + +typedef size_t (__cdecl *wcslenFunction)( + IN const wchar_t* _Str); + +typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeStringFunction)( + IN OUT PUNICODE_STRING DestinationString, + IN PANSI_STRING SourceString, + IN BOOLEAN AllocateDestinationString); + +typedef LONG (WINAPI *RtlCompareUnicodeStringFunction)( + IN PCUNICODE_STRING String1, + IN PCUNICODE_STRING String2, + IN BOOLEAN CaseInSensitive); + +typedef VOID (WINAPI *RtlInitUnicodeStringFunction) ( + IN OUT PUNICODE_STRING DestinationString, + IN PCWSTR SourceString); + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_NT_INTERNALS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_broker.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_broker.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61c64c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_broker.cc @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <map> + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_broker.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/win/pe_image.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_target.h" +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_process.h" + +// This code executes on the broker side, as a callback from the policy on the +// target side (the child). + +namespace sandbox { + +// This is the list of all imported symbols from ntdll.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt; + +#define INIT_GLOBAL_NT(member) \ + g_nt.member = reinterpret_cast<Nt##member##Function>( \ + ntdll_image.GetProcAddress("Nt" #member)); \ + if (NULL == g_nt.member) \ + return false + +#define INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(member) \ + g_nt.member = reinterpret_cast<member##Function>( \ + ntdll_image.GetProcAddress(#member)); \ + if (NULL == g_nt.member) \ + return false + +bool SetupNtdllImports(TargetProcess *child) { + HMODULE ntdll = ::GetModuleHandle(kNtdllName); + base::win::PEImage ntdll_image(ntdll); + + // Bypass purify's interception. + wchar_t* loader_get = reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>( + ntdll_image.GetProcAddress("LdrGetDllHandle")); + if (loader_get) { + GetModuleHandleHelper(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS | + GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT, + loader_get, &ntdll); + } + + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(AllocateVirtualMemory); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(Close); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(DuplicateObject); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(FreeVirtualMemory); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(MapViewOfSection); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(ProtectVirtualMemory); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(QueryInformationProcess); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(QueryObject); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(QuerySection); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(QueryVirtualMemory); + INIT_GLOBAL_NT(UnmapViewOfSection); + + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlAllocateHeap); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlCompareUnicodeString); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlCreateHeap); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlCreateUserThread); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlDestroyHeap); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlFreeHeap); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(_strnicmp); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(strlen); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(wcslen); + +#ifndef NDEBUG + // Verify that the structure is fully initialized. + for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(g_nt)/sizeof(void*); i++) + DCHECK(reinterpret_cast<char**>(&g_nt)[i]); +#endif + ResultCode ret = child->TransferVariable("g_nt", &g_nt, sizeof(g_nt)); + + return SBOX_ALL_OK == ret ? true : false; +} + +#undef INIT_GLOBAL_NT +#undef INIT_GLOBAL_RTL + +bool SetupBasicInterceptions(InterceptionManager* manager) { + // Interceptions provided by process_thread_policy, without actual policy. + if (!INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenThread, OPEN_TREAD_ID, 20) || + !INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenProcess, OPEN_PROCESS_ID, 20) || + !INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenProcessToken, OPEN_PROCESS_TOKEN_ID, 16)) + return false; + + // Interceptions with neither policy nor IPC. + if (!INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtSetInformationThread, SET_INFORMATION_THREAD_ID, + 20) || + !INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenThreadToken, OPEN_THREAD_TOKEN_ID, 20)) + return false; + + if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_XP) { + // Bug 27218: We don't have dispatch for some x64 syscalls. + // This one is also provided by process_thread_policy. + if (!INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenProcessTokenEx, OPEN_PROCESS_TOKEN_EX_ID, + 20)) + return false; + + return INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenThreadTokenEx, OPEN_THREAD_TOKEN_EX_ID, + 24); + } + + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_broker.h b/sandbox/win/src/policy_broker.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd2602a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_broker.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_BROKER_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_BROKER_H_ + +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +class TargetProcess; + +// Sets up interceptions not controlled by explicit policies. +bool SetupBasicInterceptions(InterceptionManager* manager); + +// Sets up imports from NTDLL for the given target process so the interceptions +// can work. +bool SetupNtdllImports(TargetProcess *child); + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_BROKER_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_opcodes.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_opcodes.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d9ceef --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_opcodes.cc @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace { +const unsigned short kMaxUniStrSize = 0xfffc; + +bool InitStringUnicode(const wchar_t* source, size_t length, + UNICODE_STRING* ustring) { + ustring->Buffer = const_cast<wchar_t*>(source); + ustring->Length = static_cast<USHORT>(length) * sizeof(wchar_t); + if (length > kMaxUniStrSize) { + return false; + } + ustring->MaximumLength = (NULL != source) ? + ustring->Length + sizeof(wchar_t) : 0; + return true; +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt; + +// Note: The opcodes are implemented as functions (as opposed to classes derived +// from PolicyOpcode) because you should not add more member variables to the +// PolicyOpcode class since it would cause object slicing on the target. So to +// enforce that (instead of just trusting the developer) the opcodes became +// just functions. +// +// In the code that follows I have keep the evaluation function and the factory +// function together to stress the close relationship between both. For example, +// only the factory method and the evaluation function know the stored argument +// order and meaning. + +template <int> +EvalResult OpcodeEval(PolicyOpcode* opcode, const ParameterSet* pp, + MatchContext* match); + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Opcode OpAlwaysFalse: +// Does not require input parameter. + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeOpAlwaysFalse(uint32 options) { + return MakeBase(OP_ALWAYS_FALSE, options, -1); +} + +template <> +EvalResult OpcodeEval<OP_ALWAYS_FALSE>(PolicyOpcode* opcode, + const ParameterSet* param, + MatchContext* context) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(opcode); + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(param); + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(context); + return EVAL_FALSE; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Opcode OpAlwaysTrue: +// Does not require input parameter. + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeOpAlwaysTrue(uint32 options) { + return MakeBase(OP_ALWAYS_TRUE, options, -1); +} + +template <> +EvalResult OpcodeEval<OP_ALWAYS_TRUE>(PolicyOpcode* opcode, + const ParameterSet* param, + MatchContext* context) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(opcode); + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(param); + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(context); + return EVAL_TRUE; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Opcode OpAction: +// Does not require input parameter. +// Argument 0 contains the actual action to return. + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeOpAction(EvalResult action, + uint32 options) { + PolicyOpcode* opcode = MakeBase(OP_ACTION, options, 0); + if (NULL == opcode) return NULL; + opcode->SetArgument(0, action); + return opcode; +} + +template <> +EvalResult OpcodeEval<OP_ACTION>(PolicyOpcode* opcode, + const ParameterSet* param, + MatchContext* context) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(param); + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(context); + int action = 0; + opcode->GetArgument(0, &action); + return static_cast<EvalResult>(action); +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Opcode OpNumberMatch: +// Requires a unsigned long or void* in selected_param +// Argument 0 is the stored number to match. +// Argument 1 is the C++ type of the 0th argument. + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeOpNumberMatch(int16 selected_param, + unsigned long match, + uint32 options) { + PolicyOpcode* opcode = MakeBase(OP_NUMBER_MATCH, options, selected_param); + if (NULL == opcode) return NULL; + opcode->SetArgument(0, match); + opcode->SetArgument(1, ULONG_TYPE); + return opcode; +} + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeOpVoidPtrMatch(int16 selected_param, + const void* match, + uint32 options) { + PolicyOpcode* opcode = MakeBase(OP_NUMBER_MATCH, options, selected_param); + if (NULL == opcode) return NULL; + opcode->SetArgument(0, match); + opcode->SetArgument(1, VOIDPTR_TYPE); + return opcode; +} + +template <> +EvalResult OpcodeEval<OP_NUMBER_MATCH>(PolicyOpcode* opcode, + const ParameterSet* param, + MatchContext* context) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(context); + unsigned long value_ulong = 0; + if (param->Get(&value_ulong)) { + unsigned long match_ulong = 0; + opcode->GetArgument(0, &match_ulong); + return (match_ulong != value_ulong)? EVAL_FALSE : EVAL_TRUE; + } else { + const void* value_ptr = NULL; + if (param->Get(&value_ptr)) { + const void* match_ptr = NULL; + opcode->GetArgument(0, &match_ptr); + return (match_ptr != value_ptr)? EVAL_FALSE : EVAL_TRUE; + } + } + return EVAL_ERROR; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Opcode OpUlongMatchRange +// Requires a unsigned long in selected_param. +// Argument 0 is the stored lower bound to match. +// Argument 1 is the stored upper bound to match. + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeOpUlongMatchRange(int16 selected_param, + unsigned long lower_bound, + unsigned long upper_bound, + uint32 options) { + if (lower_bound > upper_bound) { + return false; + } + PolicyOpcode* opcode = MakeBase(OP_ULONG_MATCH_RANGE, options, + selected_param); + if (NULL == opcode) return NULL; + opcode->SetArgument(0, lower_bound); + opcode->SetArgument(1, upper_bound); + return opcode; +} + +template <> +EvalResult OpcodeEval<OP_ULONG_MATCH_RANGE>(PolicyOpcode* opcode, + const ParameterSet* param, + MatchContext* context) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(context); + unsigned long value = 0; + if (!param->Get(&value)) return EVAL_ERROR; + + unsigned long lower_bound = 0; + unsigned long upper_bound = 0; + opcode->GetArgument(0, &lower_bound); + opcode->GetArgument(1, &upper_bound); + return((lower_bound <= value) && (upper_bound >= value))? + EVAL_TRUE : EVAL_FALSE; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Opcode OpUlongAndMatch: +// Requires a unsigned long in selected_param. +// Argument 0 is the stored number to match. + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeOpUlongAndMatch(int16 selected_param, + unsigned long match, + uint32 options) { + PolicyOpcode* opcode = MakeBase(OP_ULONG_AND_MATCH, options, selected_param); + if (NULL == opcode) return NULL; + opcode->SetArgument(0, match); + return opcode; +} + +template <> +EvalResult OpcodeEval<OP_ULONG_AND_MATCH>(PolicyOpcode* opcode, + const ParameterSet* param, + MatchContext* context) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(context); + unsigned long value = 0; + if (!param->Get(&value)) return EVAL_ERROR; + + unsigned long number = 0; + opcode->GetArgument(0, &number); + return (number & value)? EVAL_TRUE : EVAL_FALSE; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Opcode OpWStringMatch: +// Requires a wchar_t* in selected_param. +// Argument 0 is the byte displacement of the stored string. +// Argument 1 is the lenght in chars of the stored string. +// Argument 2 is the offset to apply on the input string. It has special values. +// as noted in the header file. +// Argument 3 is the string matching options. + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeOpWStringMatch(int16 selected_param, + const wchar_t* match_str, + int start_position, + StringMatchOptions match_opts, + uint32 options) { + if (NULL == match_str) { + return NULL; + } + if ('\0' == match_str[0]) { + return NULL; + } + + int lenght = lstrlenW(match_str); + + PolicyOpcode* opcode = MakeBase(OP_WSTRING_MATCH, options, selected_param); + if (NULL == opcode) { + return NULL; + } + ptrdiff_t delta_str = AllocRelative(opcode, match_str, wcslen(match_str)+1); + if (0 == delta_str) { + return NULL; + } + opcode->SetArgument(0, delta_str); + opcode->SetArgument(1, lenght); + opcode->SetArgument(2, start_position); + opcode->SetArgument(3, match_opts); + return opcode; +} + +template<> +EvalResult OpcodeEval<OP_WSTRING_MATCH>(PolicyOpcode* opcode, + const ParameterSet* param, + MatchContext* context) { + if (NULL == context) { + return EVAL_ERROR; + } + const wchar_t* source_str = NULL; + if (!param->Get(&source_str)) return EVAL_ERROR; + + int start_position = 0; + int match_len = 0; + unsigned int match_opts = 0; + opcode->GetArgument(1, &match_len); + opcode->GetArgument(2, &start_position); + opcode->GetArgument(3, &match_opts); + + const wchar_t* match_str = opcode->GetRelativeString(0); + // Advance the source string to the last successfully evaluated position + // according to the match context. + source_str = &source_str[context->position]; + int source_len = static_cast<int>(g_nt.wcslen(source_str)); + + if (0 == source_len) { + // If we reached the end of the source string there is nothing we can + // match against. + return EVAL_FALSE; + } + if (match_len > source_len) { + // There can't be a positive match when the target string is bigger than + // the source string + return EVAL_FALSE; + } + + BOOL case_sensitive = (match_opts & CASE_INSENSITIVE) ? TRUE : FALSE; + + // We have three cases, depending on the value of start_pos: + // Case 1. We skip N characters and compare once. + // Case 2: We skip to the end and compare once. + // Case 3: We match the first substring (if we find any). + if (start_position >= 0) { + if (kSeekToEnd == start_position) { + start_position = source_len - match_len; + } else if (match_opts & EXACT_LENGHT) { + // A sub-case of case 3 is when the EXACT_LENGHT flag is on + // the match needs to be not just substring but full match. + if ((match_len + start_position) != source_len) { + return EVAL_FALSE; + } + } + + // Advance start_pos characters. Warning! this does not consider + // utf16 encodings (surrogate pairs) or other Unicode 'features'. + source_str += start_position; + + // Since we skipped, lets reevaluate just the lengths again. + if ((match_len + start_position) > source_len) { + return EVAL_FALSE; + } + + UNICODE_STRING match_ustr; + InitStringUnicode(match_str, match_len, &match_ustr); + UNICODE_STRING source_ustr; + InitStringUnicode(source_str, match_len, &source_ustr); + + if (0 == g_nt.RtlCompareUnicodeString(&match_ustr, &source_ustr, + case_sensitive)) { + // Match! update the match context. + context->position += start_position + match_len; + return EVAL_TRUE; + } else { + return EVAL_FALSE; + } + } else if (start_position < 0) { + UNICODE_STRING match_ustr; + InitStringUnicode(match_str, match_len, &match_ustr); + UNICODE_STRING source_ustr; + InitStringUnicode(source_str, match_len, &source_ustr); + + do { + if (0 == g_nt.RtlCompareUnicodeString(&match_ustr, &source_ustr, + case_sensitive)) { + // Match! update the match context. + context->position += (source_ustr.Buffer - source_str) + match_len; + return EVAL_TRUE; + } + ++source_ustr.Buffer; + --source_len; + } while (source_len >= match_len); + } + return EVAL_FALSE; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// OpcodeMaker (other member functions). + +PolicyOpcode* OpcodeFactory::MakeBase(OpcodeID opcode_id, + uint32 options, + int16 selected_param) { + if (memory_size() < sizeof(PolicyOpcode)) { + return NULL; + } + + // Create opcode using placement-new on the buffer memory. + PolicyOpcode* opcode = new(memory_top_) PolicyOpcode(); + + // Fill in the standard fields, that every opcode has. + memory_top_ += sizeof(PolicyOpcode); + opcode->opcode_id_ = opcode_id; + opcode->options_ = static_cast<int16>(options); + opcode->parameter_ = selected_param; + return opcode; +} + +ptrdiff_t OpcodeFactory::AllocRelative(void* start, const wchar_t* str, + size_t lenght) { + size_t bytes = lenght * sizeof(wchar_t); + if (memory_size() < bytes) { + return 0; + } + memory_bottom_ -= bytes; + if (reinterpret_cast<UINT_PTR>(memory_bottom_) & 1) { + // TODO(cpu) replace this for something better. + ::DebugBreak(); + } + memcpy(memory_bottom_, str, bytes); + ptrdiff_t delta = memory_bottom_ - reinterpret_cast<char*>(start); + return delta; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Opcode evaluation dispatchers. + +// This function is the one and only entry for evaluating any opcode. It is +// in charge of applying any relevant opcode options and calling EvaluateInner +// were the actual dispatch-by-id is made. It would seem at first glance that +// the dispatch should be done by virtual function (vtable) calls but you have +// to remember that the opcodes are made in the broker process and copied as +// raw memory to the target process. + +EvalResult PolicyOpcode::Evaluate(const ParameterSet* call_params, + size_t param_count, MatchContext* match) { + if (NULL == call_params) { + return EVAL_ERROR; + } + const ParameterSet* selected_param = NULL; + if (parameter_ >= 0) { + if (static_cast<size_t>(parameter_) >= param_count) { + return EVAL_ERROR; + } + selected_param = &call_params[parameter_]; + } + EvalResult result = EvaluateHelper(selected_param, match); + + // Apply the general options regardless of the particular type of opcode. + if (kPolNone == options_) { + return result; + } + + if (options_ & kPolNegateEval) { + if (EVAL_TRUE == result) { + result = EVAL_FALSE; + } else if (EVAL_FALSE == result) { + result = EVAL_TRUE; + } else if (EVAL_ERROR != result) { + result = EVAL_ERROR; + } + } + if (NULL != match) { + if (options_ & kPolClearContext) { + match->Clear(); + } + if (options_ & kPolUseOREval) { + match->options = kPolUseOREval; + } + } + return result; +} + +#define OPCODE_EVAL(op, x, y, z) case op: return OpcodeEval<op>(x, y, z) + +EvalResult PolicyOpcode::EvaluateHelper(const ParameterSet* parameters, + MatchContext* match) { + switch (opcode_id_) { + OPCODE_EVAL(OP_ALWAYS_FALSE, this, parameters, match); + OPCODE_EVAL(OP_ALWAYS_TRUE, this, parameters, match); + OPCODE_EVAL(OP_NUMBER_MATCH, this, parameters, match); + OPCODE_EVAL(OP_ULONG_MATCH_RANGE, this, parameters, match); + OPCODE_EVAL(OP_WSTRING_MATCH, this, parameters, match); + OPCODE_EVAL(OP_ULONG_AND_MATCH, this, parameters, match); + OPCODE_EVAL(OP_ACTION, this, parameters, match); + default: + return EVAL_ERROR; + } +} + +#undef OPCODE_EVAL + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6821413 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h @@ -0,0 +1,380 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_OPCODES_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_OPCODES_H__ + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_params.h" +#include "base/basictypes.h" + +// The low-level policy is implemented using the concept of policy 'opcodes'. +// An opcode is a structure that contains enough information to perform one +// comparison against one single input parameter. For example, an opcode can +// encode just one of the following comparison: +// +// - Is input parameter 3 not equal to NULL? +// - Does input parameter 2 start with L"c:\\"? +// - Is input parameter 5, bit 3 is equal 1? +// +// Each opcode is in fact equivalent to a function invocation where all +// the parameters are known by the opcode except one. So say you have a +// function of this form: +// bool fn(a, b, c, d) with 4 arguments +// +// Then an opcode is: +// op(fn, b, c, d) +// Which stores the function to call and its 3 last arguments +// +// Then and opcode evaluation is: +// op.eval(a) ------------------------> fn(a,b,c,d) +// internally calls +// +// The idea is that complex policy rules can be split into streams of +// opcodes which are evaluated in sequence. The evaluation is done in +// groups of opcodes that have N comparison opcodes plus 1 action opcode: +// +// [comparison 1][comparison 2]...[comparison N][action][comparison 1]... +// ----- evaluation order-----------> +// +// Each opcode group encodes one high-level policy rule. The rule applies +// only if all the conditions on the group evaluate to true. The action +// opcode contains the policy outcome for that particular rule. +// +// Note that this header contains the main building blocks of low-level policy +// but not the low level policy class. +namespace sandbox { + +// These are the possible policy outcomes. Note that some of them might +// not apply and can be removed. Also note that The following values only +// specify what to do, not how to do it and it is acceptable given specific +// cases to ignore the policy outcome. +enum EvalResult { + // Comparison opcode values: + EVAL_TRUE, // Opcode condition evaluated true. + EVAL_FALSE, // Opcode condition evaluated false. + EVAL_ERROR, // Opcode condition generated an error while evaluating. + // Action opcode values: + ASK_BROKER, // The target must generate an IPC to the broker. On the broker + // side, this means grant access to the resource. + DENY_ACCESS, // No access granted to the resource. + GIVE_READONLY, // Give readonly access to the resource. + GIVE_ALLACCESS, // Give full access to the resource. + GIVE_CACHED, // IPC is not required. Target can return a cached handle. + GIVE_FIRST, // TODO(cpu) + SIGNAL_ALARM, // Unusual activity. Generate an alarm. + FAKE_SUCCESS, // Do not call original function. Just return 'success'. + FAKE_ACCESS_DENIED, // Do not call original function. Just return 'denied' + // and do not do IPC. + TERMINATE_PROCESS, // Destroy target process. Do IPC as well. +}; + +// The following are the implemented opcodes. +enum OpcodeID { + OP_ALWAYS_FALSE, // Evaluates to false (EVAL_FALSE). + OP_ALWAYS_TRUE, // Evaluates to true (EVAL_TRUE). + OP_NUMBER_MATCH, // Match a 32-bit integer as n == a. + OP_ULONG_MATCH_RANGE, // Match an ulong integer as a <= n <= b. + OP_ULONG_AND_MATCH, // Match using bitwise AND; as in: n & a != 0. + OP_WSTRING_MATCH, // Match a string for equality. + OP_ACTION // Evaluates to an action opcode. +}; + +// Options that apply to every opcode. They are specified when creating +// each opcode using OpcodeFactory::MakeOpXXXXX() family of functions +// Do nothing special. +const uint32 kPolNone = 0; + +// Convert EVAL_TRUE into EVAL_FALSE and vice-versa. This allows to express +// negated conditions such as if ( a && !b). +const uint32 kPolNegateEval = 1; + +// Zero the MatchContext context structure. This happens after the opcode +// is evaluated. +const uint32 kPolClearContext = 2; + +// Use OR when evaluating this set of opcodes. The policy evaluator by default +// uses AND when evaluating. Very helpful when +// used with kPolNegateEval. For example if you have a condition best expressed +// as if(! (a && b && c)), the use of this flags allows it to be expressed as +// if ((!a) || (!b) || (!c)). +const uint32 kPolUseOREval = 4; + +// Keeps the evaluation state between opcode evaluations. This is used +// for string matching where the next opcode needs to continue matching +// from the last character position from the current opcode. The match +// context is preserved across opcode evaluation unless an opcode specifies +// as an option kPolClearContext. +struct MatchContext { + size_t position; + uint32 options; + + MatchContext() { + Clear(); + } + + void Clear() { + position = 0; + options = 0; + } +}; + +// Models a policy opcode; that is a condition evaluation were all the +// arguments but one are stored in objects of this class. Use OpcodeFactory +// to create objects of this type. +// This class is just an implementation artifact and not exposed to the +// API clients or visible in the intercepted service. Internally, an +// opcode is just: +// - An integer that identifies the actual opcode. +// - An index to indicate which one is the input argument +// - An array of arguments. +// While an OO hierarchy of objects would have been a natural choice, the fact +// that 1) this code can execute before the CRT is loaded, presents serious +// problems in terms of guarantees about the actual state of the vtables and +// 2) because the opcode objects are generated in the broker process, we need to +// use plain objects. To preserve some minimal type safety templates are used +// when possible. +class PolicyOpcode { + friend class OpcodeFactory; + public: + // Evaluates the opcode. For a typical comparison opcode the return value + // is EVAL_TRUE or EVAL_FALSE. If there was an error in the evaluation the + // the return is EVAL_ERROR. If the opcode is an action opcode then the + // return can take other values such as ASK_BROKER. + // parameters: An array of all input parameters. This argument is normally + // created by the macros POLPARAMS_BEGIN() POLPARAMS_END. + // count: The number of parameters passed as first argument. + // match: The match context that is persisted across the opcode evaluation + // sequence. + EvalResult Evaluate(const ParameterSet* parameters, size_t count, + MatchContext* match); + + // Retrieves a stored argument by index. Valid index values are + // from 0 to < kArgumentCount. + template <typename T> + void GetArgument(size_t index, T* argument) const { + COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(T) <= sizeof(arguments_[0]), invalid_size); + *argument = *reinterpret_cast<const T*>(&arguments_[index].mem); + } + + // Sets a stored argument by index. Valid index values are + // from 0 to < kArgumentCount. + template <typename T> + void SetArgument(size_t index, const T& argument) { + COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(T) <= sizeof(arguments_[0]), invalid_size); + *reinterpret_cast<T*>(&arguments_[index].mem) = argument; + } + + // Retrieves the actual address of an string argument. When using + // GetArgument() to retrieve an index that contains a string, the returned + // value is just an offset to the actual string. + // index: the stored string index. Valid values are from 0 + // to < kArgumentCount. + const wchar_t* GetRelativeString(size_t index) const { + ptrdiff_t str_delta = 0; + GetArgument(index, &str_delta); + const char* delta = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(this) + str_delta; + return reinterpret_cast<const wchar_t*>(delta); + } + + // Returns true if this opcode is an action opcode without actually + // evaluating it. Used to do a quick scan forward to the next opcode group. + bool IsAction() const { + return (OP_ACTION == opcode_id_); + }; + + // Returns the opcode type. + OpcodeID GetID() const { + return opcode_id_; + } + + // Returns the stored options such as kPolNegateEval and others. + uint32 GetOptions() const { + return options_; + } + + // Sets the stored options such as kPolNegateEval. + void SetOptions(int16 options) { + options_ = options; + } + + private: + + static const size_t kArgumentCount = 4; // The number of supported argument. + + struct OpcodeArgument { + UINT_PTR mem; + }; + + // Better define placement new in the class instead of relying on the + // global definition which seems to be fubared. + void* operator new(size_t, void* location) { + return location; + } + + // Helper function to evaluate the opcode. The parameters have the same + // meaning that in Evaluate(). + EvalResult EvaluateHelper(const ParameterSet* parameters, + MatchContext* match); + OpcodeID opcode_id_; + int16 parameter_; + int16 options_; + OpcodeArgument arguments_[PolicyOpcode::kArgumentCount]; +}; + +enum StringMatchOptions { + CASE_SENSITIVE = 0, // Pay or Not attention to the case as defined by + CASE_INSENSITIVE = 1, // RtlCompareUnicodeString windows API. + EXACT_LENGHT = 2 // Don't do substring match. Do full string match. +}; + +// Opcodes that do string comparisons take a parameter that is the starting +// position to perform the comparison so we can do substring matching. There +// are two special values: +// +// Start from the current position and compare strings advancing forward until +// a match is found if any. Similar to CRT strstr(). +const int kSeekForward = -1; +// Perform a match with the end of the string. It only does a single comparison. +const int kSeekToEnd = 0xfffff; + + +// A PolicyBuffer is a variable size structure that contains all the opcodes +// that are to be created or evaluated in sequence. +struct PolicyBuffer { + size_t opcode_count; + PolicyOpcode opcodes[1]; +}; + +// Helper class to create any opcode sequence. This class is normally invoked +// only by the high level policy module or when you need to handcraft a special +// policy. +// The factory works by creating the opcodes using a chunk of memory given +// in the constructor. The opcodes themselves are allocated from the beginning +// (top) of the memory, while any string that an opcode needs is allocated from +// the end (bottom) of the memory. +// +// In essence: +// +// low address ---> [opcode 1] +// [opcode 2] +// [opcode 3] +// | | <--- memory_top_ +// | free | +// | | +// | | <--- memory_bottom_ +// [string 1] +// high address --> [string 2] +// +// Note that this class does not keep track of the number of opcodes made and +// it is designed to be a building block for low-level policy. +// +// Note that any of the MakeOpXXXXX member functions below can return NULL on +// failure. When that happens opcode sequence creation must be aborted. +class OpcodeFactory { + public: + // memory: base pointer to a chunk of memory where the opcodes are created. + // memory_size: the size in bytes of the memory chunk. + OpcodeFactory(char* memory, size_t memory_size) + : memory_top_(memory) { + memory_bottom_ = &memory_top_[memory_size]; + } + + // policy: contains the raw memory where the opcodes are created. + // memory_size: contains the actual size of the policy argument. + OpcodeFactory(PolicyBuffer* policy, size_t memory_size) { + memory_top_ = reinterpret_cast<char*>(&policy->opcodes[0]); + memory_bottom_ = &memory_top_[memory_size]; + } + + // Creates an OpAlwaysFalse opcode. + PolicyOpcode* MakeOpAlwaysFalse(uint32 options); + + // Creates an OpAlwaysFalse opcode. + PolicyOpcode* MakeOpAlwaysTrue(uint32 options); + + // Creates an OpAction opcode. + // action: The action to return when Evaluate() is called. + PolicyOpcode* MakeOpAction(EvalResult action, uint32 options); + + // Creates an OpNumberMatch opcode. + // selected_param: index of the input argument. It must be a ulong or the + // evaluation result will generate a EVAL_ERROR. + // match: the number to compare against the selected_param. + PolicyOpcode* MakeOpNumberMatch(int16 selected_param, unsigned long match, + uint32 options); + + // Creates an OpNumberMatch opcode (void pointers are cast to numbers). + // selected_param: index of the input argument. It must be an void* or the + // evaluation result will generate a EVAL_ERROR. + // match: the pointer numeric value to compare against selected_param. + PolicyOpcode* MakeOpVoidPtrMatch(int16 selected_param, const void* match, + uint32 options); + + // Creates an OpUlongMatchRange opcode using the memory passed in the ctor. + // selected_param: index of the input argument. It must be a ulong or the + // evaluation result will generate a EVAL_ERROR. + // lower_bound, upper_bound: the range to compare against selected_param. + PolicyOpcode* MakeOpUlongMatchRange(int16 selected_param, + unsigned long lower_bound, + unsigned long upper_bound, + uint32 options); + + // Creates an OpWStringMatch opcode using the raw memory passed in the ctor. + // selected_param: index of the input argument. It must be a wide string + // pointer or the evaluation result will generate a EVAL_ERROR. + // match_str: string to compare against selected_param. + // start_position: when its value is from 0 to < 0x7fff it indicates an + // offset from the selected_param string where to perform the comparison. If + // the value is SeekForward then a substring search is performed. If the + // value is SeekToEnd the comparison is performed against the last part of + // the selected_param string. + // Note that the range in the position (0 to 0x7fff) is dictated by the + // current implementation. + // match_opts: Indicates additional matching flags. Currently CaseInsensitive + // is supported. + PolicyOpcode* MakeOpWStringMatch(int16 selected_param, + const wchar_t* match_str, + int start_position, + StringMatchOptions match_opts, + uint32 options); + + // Creates an OpUlongAndMatch opcode using the raw memory passed in the ctor. + // selected_param: index of the input argument. It must be ulong or the + // evaluation result will generate a EVAL_ERROR. + // match: the value to bitwise AND against selected_param. + PolicyOpcode* MakeOpUlongAndMatch(int16 selected_param, + unsigned long match, + uint32 options); + + private: + // Constructs the common part of every opcode. selected_param is the index + // of the input param to use when evaluating the opcode. Pass -1 in + // selected_param to indicate that no input parameter is required. + PolicyOpcode* MakeBase(OpcodeID opcode_id, uint32 options, + int16 selected_param); + + // Allocates (and copies) a string (of size length) inside the buffer and + // returns the displacement with respect to start. + ptrdiff_t AllocRelative(void* start, const wchar_t* str, size_t lenght); + + // Returns the available memory to make opcodes. + size_t memory_size() const { + return memory_bottom_ - memory_top_; + } + + // Points to the lowest currently available address of the memory + // used to make the opcodes. This pointer increments as opcodes are made. + char* memory_top_; + + // Points to the highest currently available address of the memory + // used to make the opcodes. This pointer decrements as opcode strings are + // allocated. + char* memory_bottom_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(OpcodeFactory); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_OPCODES_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_params.h b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_params.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecf454f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_params.h @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_PARAMS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_PARAMS_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/internal_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +// This header defines the classes that allow the low level policy to select +// the input parameters. In order to better make sense of this header is +// recommended that you check policy_engine_opcodes.h first. + +namespace sandbox { + +// Models the set of interesting parameters of an intercepted system call +// normally you don't create objects of this class directly, instead you +// use the POLPARAMS_XXX macros. +// For example, if an intercepted function has the following signature: +// +// NTSTATUS NtOpenFileFunction (PHANDLE FileHandle, +// ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, +// POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, +// PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, +// ULONG ShareAccess, +// ULONG OpenOptions); +// +// You could say that the following parameters are of interest to policy: +// +// POLPARAMS_BEGIN(open_params) +// POLPARAM(DESIRED_ACCESS) +// POLPARAM(OBJECT_NAME) +// POLPARAM(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) +// POLPARAM(IO_STATUS) +// POLPARAM(OPEN_OPTIONS) +// POLPARAMS_END; +// +// and the actual code will use this for defining the parameters: +// +// CountedParameterSet<open_params> p; +// p[open_params::DESIRED_ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(DesiredAccess); +// p[open_params::OBJECT_NAME] = +// ParamPickerMake(ObjectAttributes->ObjectName); +// p[open_params::SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR] = +// ParamPickerMake(ObjectAttributes->SecurityDescriptor); +// p[open_params::IO_STATUS] = ParamPickerMake(IoStatusBlock); +// p[open_params::OPEN_OPTIONS] = ParamPickerMake(OpenOptions); +// +// These will create an stack-allocated array of ParameterSet objects which +// have each 1) the address of the parameter 2) a numeric id that encodes the +// original C++ type. This allows the policy to treat any set of supported +// argument types uniformily and with some type safety. +// +// TODO(cpu): support not fully implemented yet for unicode string and will +// probably add other types as well. +class ParameterSet { + public: + ParameterSet() : real_type_(INVALID_TYPE), address_(NULL) {} + + // Retrieve the stored parameter. If the type does not match ulong fail. + bool Get(unsigned long* destination) const { + if (ULONG_TYPE != real_type_) { + return false; + } + *destination = Void2TypePointerCopy<unsigned long>(); + return true; + } + + // Retrieve the stored parameter. If the type does not match void* fail. + bool Get(const void** destination) const { + if (VOIDPTR_TYPE != real_type_) { + return false; + } + *destination = Void2TypePointerCopy<void*>(); + return true; + } + + // Retrieve the stored parameter. If the type does not match wchar_t* fail. + bool Get(const wchar_t** destination) const { + if (WCHAR_TYPE != real_type_) { + return false; + } + *destination = Void2TypePointerCopy<const wchar_t*>(); + return true; + } + + // False if the parameter is not properly initialized. + bool IsValid() const { + return INVALID_TYPE != real_type_; + } + + protected: + // The constructor can only be called by derived types, which should + // safely provide the real_type and the address of the argument. + ParameterSet(ArgType real_type, const void* address) + : real_type_(real_type), address_(address) { + } + + private: + // This template provides the same functionality as bits_cast but + // it works with pointer while the former works only with references. + template <typename T> + T Void2TypePointerCopy() const { + return *(reinterpret_cast<const T*>(address_)); + } + + ArgType real_type_; + const void* address_; +}; + +// To safely infer the type, we use a set of template specializations +// in ParameterSetEx with a template function ParamPickerMake to do the +// parameter type deduction. + +// Base template class. Not implemented so using unsupported types should +// fail to compile. +template <typename T> +class ParameterSetEx : public ParameterSet { + public: + ParameterSetEx(const void* address); +}; + +template<> +class ParameterSetEx<void const*> : public ParameterSet { + public: + ParameterSetEx(const void* address) + : ParameterSet(VOIDPTR_TYPE, address) {} +}; + +template<> +class ParameterSetEx<void*> : public ParameterSet { + public: + ParameterSetEx(const void* address) + : ParameterSet(VOIDPTR_TYPE, address) {} +}; + + +template<> +class ParameterSetEx<wchar_t*> : public ParameterSet { + public: + ParameterSetEx(const void* address) + : ParameterSet(WCHAR_TYPE, address) {} +}; + +template<> +class ParameterSetEx<wchar_t const*> : public ParameterSet { + public: + ParameterSetEx(const void* address) + : ParameterSet(WCHAR_TYPE, address) {} +}; + + +template<> +class ParameterSetEx<unsigned long> : public ParameterSet { + public: + ParameterSetEx(const void* address) + : ParameterSet(ULONG_TYPE, address) {} +}; + +template<> +class ParameterSetEx<UNICODE_STRING> : public ParameterSet { + public: + ParameterSetEx(const void* address) + : ParameterSet(UNISTR_TYPE, address) {} +}; + +template <typename T> +ParameterSet ParamPickerMake(T& parameter) { + return ParameterSetEx<T>(¶meter); +}; + +struct CountedParameterSetBase { + int count; + ParameterSet parameters[1]; +}; + +// This template defines the actual list of policy parameters for a given +// interception. +// Warning: This template stores the address to the actual variables, in +// other words, the values are not copied. +template <typename T> +struct CountedParameterSet { + CountedParameterSet() : count(T::PolParamLast) {} + + ParameterSet& operator[](typename T::Args n) { + return parameters[n]; + } + + CountedParameterSetBase* GetBase() { + return reinterpret_cast<CountedParameterSetBase*>(this); + } + + int count; + ParameterSet parameters[T::PolParamLast]; +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_PARAMS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_processor.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_processor.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0455d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_processor.cc @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_processor.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +void PolicyProcessor::SetInternalState(size_t index, EvalResult result) { + state_.current_index_ = index; + state_.current_result_ = result; +} + +EvalResult PolicyProcessor::GetAction() const { + return state_.current_result_; +} + +// Decides if an opcode can be skipped (not evaluated) or not. The function +// takes as inputs the opcode and the current evaluation context and returns +// true if the opcode should be skipped or not and also can set keep_skipping +// to false to signal that the current instruction should be skipped but not +// the next after the current one. +bool SkipOpcode(PolicyOpcode& opcode, MatchContext* context, + bool* keep_skipping) { + if (opcode.IsAction()) { + uint32 options = context->options; + context->Clear(); + *keep_skipping = false; + return (kPolUseOREval == options)? false : true; + } + *keep_skipping = true; + return true; +} + +PolicyResult PolicyProcessor::Evaluate(uint32 options, + ParameterSet* parameters, + size_t param_count) { + if (NULL == policy_) { + return NO_POLICY_MATCH; + } + if (0 == policy_->opcode_count) { + return NO_POLICY_MATCH; + } + if (!(kShortEval & options)) { + return POLICY_ERROR; + } + + MatchContext context; + bool evaluation = false; + bool skip_group = false; + SetInternalState(0, EVAL_FALSE); + size_t count = policy_->opcode_count; + + // Loop over all the opcodes Evaluating in sequence. Since we only support + // short circuit evaluation, we stop as soon as we find an 'action' opcode + // and the current evaluation is true. + // + // Skipping opcodes can happen when we are in AND mode (!kPolUseOREval) and + // have got EVAL_FALSE or when we are in OR mode (kPolUseOREval) and got + // EVAL_TRUE. Skipping will stop at the next action opcode or at the opcode + // after the action depending on kPolUseOREval. + + for (size_t ix = 0; ix != count; ++ix) { + PolicyOpcode& opcode = policy_->opcodes[ix]; + // Skipping block. + if (skip_group) { + if (SkipOpcode(opcode, &context, &skip_group)) { + continue; + } + } + // Evaluation block. + EvalResult result = opcode.Evaluate(parameters, param_count, &context); + switch (result) { + case EVAL_FALSE: + evaluation = false; + if (kPolUseOREval != context.options) { + skip_group = true; + } + break; + case EVAL_ERROR: + if (kStopOnErrors & options) { + return POLICY_ERROR; + } + break; + case EVAL_TRUE: + evaluation = true; + if (kPolUseOREval == context.options) { + skip_group = true; + } + break; + default: + // We have evaluated an action. + SetInternalState(ix, result); + return POLICY_MATCH; + } + } + + if (evaluation) { + // Reaching the end of the policy with a positive evaluation is probably + // an error: we did not find a final action opcode? + return POLICY_ERROR; + } + return NO_POLICY_MATCH; +} + + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_processor.h b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_processor.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3327e36 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_processor.h @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_PROCESSOR_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_PROCESSOR_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This header contains the core policy evaluator. In its simplest form +// it evaluates a stream of opcodes assuming that they are laid out in +// memory as opcode groups. +// +// An opcode group has N comparison opcodes plus 1 action opcode. For +// example here we have 3 opcode groups (A, B,C): +// +// [comparison 1] <-- group A start +// [comparison 2] +// [comparison 3] +// [action A ] +// [comparison 1] <-- group B start +// [action B ] +// [comparison 1] <-- group C start +// [comparison 2] +// [action C ] +// +// The opcode evaluator proceeds from the top, evaluating each opcode in +// sequence. An opcode group is evaluated until the first comparison that +// returns false. At that point the rest of the group is skipped and evaluation +// resumes with the first comparison of the next group. When all the comparisons +// in a group have evaluated to true and the action is reached. The group is +// considered a matching group. +// +// In the 'ShortEval' mode evaluation stops when it reaches the end or the first +// matching group. The action opcode from this group is the resulting policy +// action. +// +// In the 'RankedEval' mode evaluation stops only when it reaches the end of the +// the opcode stream. In the process all matching groups are saved and at the +// end the 'best' group is selected (what makes the best is TBD) and the action +// from this group is the resulting policy action. +// +// As explained above, the policy evaluation of a group is a logical AND of +// the evaluation of each opcode. However an opcode can request kPolUseOREval +// which makes the evaluation to use logical OR. Given that each opcode can +// request its evaluation result to be negated with kPolNegateEval you can +// achieve the negation of the total group evaluation. This means that if you +// need to express: +// if (!(c1 && c2 && c3)) +// You can do it by: +// if ((!c1) || (!c2) || (!c3)) +// + +// Possible outcomes of policy evaluation. +enum PolicyResult { + NO_POLICY_MATCH, + POLICY_MATCH, + POLICY_ERROR +}; + +// Policy evaluation flags +// TODO(cpu): implement the options 0 & 4. +// +// Stop evaluating as soon as an error is encountered. +const uint32 kStopOnErrors = 0; +// Ignore all non fatal opcode evaluation errors. +const uint32 kIgnoreErrors = 1; +// Short-circuit evaluation: Only evaluate until opcode group that +// evaluated to true has been found. +const uint32 kShortEval = 2; +// Discussed briefly at the policy design meeting. It will evaluate +// all rules and then return the 'best' rule that evaluated true. +const uint32 kRankedEval = 4; + +// This class evaluates a policy-opcode stream given the memory where the +// opcodes are and an input 'parameter set'. +// +// This class is designed to be callable from interception points +// as low as the NtXXXX service level (it is not currently safe, but +// it is designed to be made safe). +// +// Its usage in an interception is: +// +// POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) +// POLPARAM(param1) +// POLPARAM(param2) +// POLPARAM(param3) +// POLPARAM(param4) +// POLPARAM(param5) +// POLPARAMS_END; +// +// PolicyProcessor pol_evaluator(policy_memory); +// PolicyResult pr = pol_evaluator.Evaluate(ShortEval, eval_params, +// _countof(eval_params)); +// if (NO_POLICY_MATCH == pr) { +// EvalResult policy_action = pol_evaluator.GetAction(); +// // apply policy here... +// } +// +// Where the POLPARAM() arguments are derived from the intercepted function +// arguments, and represent all the 'interesting' policy inputs, and +// policy_memory is a memory buffer containing the opcode stream that is the +// relevant policy for this intercept. +class PolicyProcessor { + public: + // policy_buffer contains opcodes made with OpcodeFactory. They are usually + // created in the broker process and evaluated in the target process. + + // This constructor is just a variant of the previous constructor. + explicit PolicyProcessor(PolicyBuffer* policy) + : policy_(policy) { + SetInternalState(0, EVAL_FALSE); + } + + // Evaluates a policy-opcode stream. See the comments at the top of this + // class for more info. Returns POLICY_MATCH if a rule set was found that + // matches an active policy. + PolicyResult Evaluate(uint32 options, + ParameterSet* parameters, + size_t parameter_count); + + // If the result of Evaluate() was POLICY_MATCH, calling this function returns + // the recommended policy action. + EvalResult GetAction() const; + + private: + struct { + size_t current_index_; + EvalResult current_result_; + } state_; + + // Sets the currently matching action result. + void SetInternalState(size_t index, EvalResult result); + + PolicyBuffer* policy_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(PolicyProcessor); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_ENGINE_PROCESSOR_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f988ccc --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_engine_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_processor.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +#define POLPARAMS_BEGIN(x) sandbox::ParameterSet x[] = { +#define POLPARAM(p) sandbox::ParamPickerMake(p), +#define POLPARAMS_END } + +namespace sandbox { + +bool SetupNtdllImports(); + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, Rules1) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + + // Construct two policy rules that say: + // + // #1 + // If the path is c:\\documents and settings\\* AND + // If the creation mode is 'open existing' AND + // If the security descriptor is null THEN + // Ask the broker. + // + // #2 + // If the security descriptor is null AND + // If the path ends with *.txt AND + // If the creation mode is not 'create new' THEN + // return Access Denied. + + enum FileCreateArgs { + FileNameArg, + CreationDispositionArg, + FlagsAndAttributesArg, + SecurityAttributes + }; + + const size_t policy_sz = 1024; + PolicyBuffer* policy = reinterpret_cast<PolicyBuffer*>(new char[policy_sz]); + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(policy, policy_sz - 0x40); + + // Add rule set #1 + opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(FileNameArg, + L"c:\\documents and settings\\", + 0, CASE_INSENSITIVE, kPolNone); + opcode_maker.MakeOpNumberMatch(CreationDispositionArg, OPEN_EXISTING, + kPolNone); + opcode_maker.MakeOpVoidPtrMatch(SecurityAttributes, (void*)NULL, + kPolNone); + opcode_maker.MakeOpAction(ASK_BROKER, kPolNone); + + // Add rule set #2 + opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(FileNameArg, L".TXT", + kSeekToEnd, CASE_INSENSITIVE, kPolNone); + opcode_maker.MakeOpNumberMatch(CreationDispositionArg, CREATE_NEW, + kPolNegateEval); + opcode_maker.MakeOpAction(FAKE_ACCESS_DENIED, kPolNone); + policy->opcode_count = 7; + + wchar_t* filename = L"c:\\Documents and Settings\\Microsoft\\BLAH.txt"; + unsigned long creation_mode = OPEN_EXISTING; + unsigned long flags = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + void* security_descriptor = NULL; + + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) + POLPARAM(filename) + POLPARAM(creation_mode) + POLPARAM(flags) + POLPARAM(security_descriptor) + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult pr; + PolicyProcessor pol_ev(policy); + + // Test should match the first rule set. + pr = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, pr); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + // Test should still match the first rule set. + pr = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, pr); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + // Changing creation_mode such that evaluation should not match any rule. + creation_mode = CREATE_NEW; + pr = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, pr); + + // Changing creation_mode such that evaluation should match rule #2. + creation_mode = OPEN_ALWAYS; + pr = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, pr); + EXPECT_EQ(FAKE_ACCESS_DENIED, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..401f2e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level.cc @@ -0,0 +1,348 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <string> +#include <map> + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "base/basictypes.h" + +namespace { + + // A single rule can use at most this amount of memory. + const size_t kRuleBufferSize = 1024*4; + + // The possible states of the string matching opcode generator. + enum { + PENDING_NONE, + PENDING_ASTERISK, // Have seen an '*' but have not generated an opcode. + PENDING_QMARK, // Have seen an '?' but have not generated an opcode. + }; + + // The category of the last character seen by the string matching opcode + // generator. + const uint32 kLastCharIsNone = 0; + const uint32 kLastCharIsAlpha = 1; + const uint32 kLastCharIsWild = 2; + const uint32 kLastCharIsAsterisk = kLastCharIsWild + 4; + const uint32 kLastCharIsQuestionM = kLastCharIsWild + 8; +} + +namespace sandbox { + +// Adding a rule is nothing more than pushing it into an stl container. Done() +// is called for the rule in case the code that made the rule in the first +// place has not done it. +bool LowLevelPolicy::AddRule(int service, PolicyRule* rule) { + if (!rule->Done()) { + return false; + } + + PolicyRule* local_rule = new PolicyRule(*rule); + RuleNode node = {local_rule, service}; + rules_.push_back(node); + return true; +} + +LowLevelPolicy::~LowLevelPolicy() { + // Delete all the rules. + typedef std::list<RuleNode> RuleNodes; + for (RuleNodes::iterator it = rules_.begin(); it != rules_.end(); ++it) { + delete it->rule; + } +} + +// Here is where the heavy byte shuffling is done. We take all the rules and +// 'compile' them into a single memory region. Now, the rules are in random +// order so the first step is to reorganize them into a stl map that is keyed +// by the service id and as a value contains a list with all the rules that +// belong to that service. Then we enter the big for-loop where we carve a +// memory zone for the opcodes and the data and call RebindCopy on each rule +// so they all end up nicely packed in the policy_store_. +bool LowLevelPolicy::Done() { + typedef std::list<RuleNode> RuleNodes; + typedef std::list<const PolicyRule*> RuleList; + typedef std::map<uint32, RuleList> Mmap; + Mmap mmap; + + for (RuleNodes::iterator it = rules_.begin(); it != rules_.end(); ++it) { + mmap[it->service].push_back(it->rule); + } + + PolicyBuffer* current_buffer = &policy_store_->data[0]; + char* buffer_end = reinterpret_cast<char*>(current_buffer) + + policy_store_->data_size; + size_t avail_size = policy_store_->data_size; + + for (Mmap::iterator it = mmap.begin(); it != mmap.end(); ++it) { + uint32 service = (*it).first; + if (service >= kMaxServiceCount) { + return false; + } + policy_store_->entry[service] = current_buffer; + + RuleList::iterator rules_it = (*it).second.begin(); + RuleList::iterator rules_it_end = (*it).second.end(); + + size_t svc_opcode_count = 0; + + for (; rules_it != rules_it_end; ++rules_it) { + const PolicyRule* rule = (*rules_it); + size_t op_count = rule->GetOpcodeCount(); + + size_t opcodes_size = op_count * sizeof(PolicyOpcode); + if (avail_size < opcodes_size) { + return false; + } + size_t data_size = avail_size - opcodes_size; + PolicyOpcode* opcodes_start = ¤t_buffer->opcodes[svc_opcode_count]; + if (!rule->RebindCopy(opcodes_start, opcodes_size, + buffer_end, &data_size)) { + return false; + } + size_t used = avail_size - data_size; + buffer_end -= used; + avail_size -= used; + svc_opcode_count += op_count; + } + + current_buffer->opcode_count += svc_opcode_count; + size_t policy_byte_count = (svc_opcode_count * sizeof(PolicyOpcode)) + / sizeof(current_buffer[0]); + current_buffer = ¤t_buffer[policy_byte_count + 1]; + } + + return true; +} + +PolicyRule::PolicyRule(EvalResult action) + : action_(action), done_(false) { + char* memory = new char[sizeof(PolicyBuffer) + kRuleBufferSize]; + buffer_ = reinterpret_cast<PolicyBuffer*>(memory); + buffer_->opcode_count = 0; + opcode_factory_ = new OpcodeFactory(buffer_, + kRuleBufferSize + sizeof(PolicyOpcode)); +} + +PolicyRule::PolicyRule(const PolicyRule& other) { + if (this == &other) + return; + action_ = other.action_; + done_ = other.done_; + size_t buffer_size = sizeof(PolicyBuffer) + kRuleBufferSize; + char* memory = new char[buffer_size]; + buffer_ = reinterpret_cast<PolicyBuffer*>(memory); + memcpy(buffer_, other.buffer_, buffer_size); + + char* opcode_buffer = reinterpret_cast<char*>(&buffer_->opcodes[0]); + char* buffer_end = &opcode_buffer[kRuleBufferSize + sizeof(PolicyOpcode)]; + char* next_opcode = &opcode_buffer[GetOpcodeCount() * sizeof(PolicyOpcode)]; + opcode_factory_ = new OpcodeFactory(next_opcode, buffer_end - next_opcode); +} + +// This function get called from a simple state machine implemented in +// AddStringMatch() which passes the current state (in state) and it passes +// true in last_call if AddStringMatch() has finished processing the input +// pattern string and this would be the last call to generate any pending +// opcode. The skip_count is the currently accumulated number of '?' seen so +// far and once the associated opcode is generated this function sets it back +// to zero. +bool PolicyRule::GenStringOpcode(RuleType rule_type, + StringMatchOptions match_opts, + uint16 parameter, int state, bool last_call, + int* skip_count, std::wstring* fragment) { + + // The last opcode must: + // 1) Always clear the context. + // 2) Preserve the negation. + // 3) Remove the 'OR' mode flag. + uint32 options = kPolNone; + if (last_call) { + if (IF_NOT == rule_type) { + options = kPolClearContext | kPolNegateEval; + } else { + options = kPolClearContext; + } + } else if (IF_NOT == rule_type) { + options = kPolUseOREval | kPolNegateEval; + } + + PolicyOpcode* op = NULL; + + // The fragment string contains the accumulated characters to match with, it + // never contains wildcards (unless they have been escaped) and while there + // is no fragment there is no new string match opcode to generate. + if (fragment->empty()) { + // There is no new opcode to generate but in the last call we have to fix + // the previous opcode because it was really the last but we did not know + // it at that time. + if (last_call && (buffer_->opcode_count > 0)) { + op = &buffer_->opcodes[buffer_->opcode_count - 1]; + op->SetOptions(options); + } + return true; + } + + if (PENDING_ASTERISK == state) { + if (last_call) { + op = opcode_factory_->MakeOpWStringMatch(parameter, fragment->c_str(), + kSeekToEnd, match_opts, + options); + } else { + op = opcode_factory_->MakeOpWStringMatch(parameter, fragment->c_str(), + kSeekForward, match_opts, + options); + } + + } else if (PENDING_QMARK == state) { + op = opcode_factory_->MakeOpWStringMatch(parameter, fragment->c_str(), + *skip_count, match_opts, options); + *skip_count = 0; + } else { + if (last_call) { + match_opts = static_cast<StringMatchOptions>(EXACT_LENGHT | match_opts); + } + op = opcode_factory_->MakeOpWStringMatch(parameter, fragment->c_str(), 0, + match_opts, options); + } + if (NULL == op) { + return false; + } + ++buffer_->opcode_count; + fragment->clear(); + return true; +} + +bool PolicyRule::AddStringMatch(RuleType rule_type, int16 parameter, + const wchar_t* string, + StringMatchOptions match_opts) { + if (done_) { + // Do not allow to add more rules after generating the action opcode. + return false; + } + + const wchar_t* current_char = string; + uint32 last_char = kLastCharIsNone; + int state = PENDING_NONE; + int skip_count = 0; // counts how many '?' we have seen in a row. + std::wstring fragment; // accumulates the non-wildcard part of the string. + + while (L'\0' != *current_char) { + switch (*current_char) { + case L'*': + if (kLastCharIsWild & last_char) { + // '**' and '&*' is an error. + return false; + } + if (!GenStringOpcode(rule_type, match_opts, parameter, + state, false, &skip_count, &fragment)) { + return false; + } + last_char = kLastCharIsAsterisk; + state = PENDING_ASTERISK; + break; + case L'?': + if (kLastCharIsAsterisk == last_char) { + // '*?' is an error. + return false; + } + if (!GenStringOpcode(rule_type, match_opts, parameter, + state, false, &skip_count, &fragment)) { + return false; + } + ++skip_count; + last_char = kLastCharIsQuestionM; + state = PENDING_QMARK; + break; + case L'/': + // Note: "/?" is an escaped '?'. Eat the slash and fall through. + if (L'?' == current_char[1]) { + ++current_char; + } + default: + fragment += *current_char; + last_char = kLastCharIsAlpha; + } + ++current_char; + } + + if (!GenStringOpcode(rule_type, match_opts, parameter, + state, true, &skip_count, &fragment)) { + return false; + } + return true; +} + +bool PolicyRule::AddNumberMatch(RuleType rule_type, int16 parameter, + unsigned long number, RuleOp comparison_op) { + if (done_) { + // Do not allow to add more rules after generating the action opcode. + return false; + } + uint32 opts = (rule_type == IF_NOT)? kPolNegateEval : kPolNone; + + if (EQUAL == comparison_op) { + if (NULL == opcode_factory_->MakeOpNumberMatch(parameter, number, opts)) { + return false; + } + } else if (AND == comparison_op) { + if (NULL == opcode_factory_->MakeOpUlongAndMatch(parameter, number, opts)) { + return false; + } + } + ++buffer_->opcode_count; + return true; +} + +bool PolicyRule::Done() { + if (done_) { + return true; + } + if (NULL == opcode_factory_->MakeOpAction(action_, kPolNone)) { + return false; + } + ++buffer_->opcode_count; + done_ = true; + return true; +} + +bool PolicyRule::RebindCopy(PolicyOpcode* opcode_start, size_t opcode_size, + char* data_start, size_t* data_size) const { + size_t count = buffer_->opcode_count; + for (size_t ix = 0; ix != count; ++ix) { + if (opcode_size < sizeof(PolicyOpcode)) { + return false; + } + PolicyOpcode& opcode = buffer_->opcodes[ix]; + *opcode_start = opcode; + if (OP_WSTRING_MATCH == opcode.GetID()) { + // For this opcode argument 0 is a delta to the string and argument 1 + // is the length (in chars) of the string. + const wchar_t* str = opcode.GetRelativeString(0); + size_t str_len; + opcode.GetArgument(1, &str_len); + str_len = str_len * sizeof(wchar_t); + if ((*data_size) < str_len) { + return false; + } + *data_size -= str_len; + data_start -= str_len; + memcpy(data_start, str, str_len); + // Recompute the string displacement + ptrdiff_t delta = data_start - reinterpret_cast<char*>(opcode_start); + opcode_start->SetArgument(0, delta); + } + ++opcode_start; + opcode_size -= sizeof(PolicyOpcode); + } + + return true; +} + +PolicyRule::~PolicyRule() { + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(buffer_); + delete opcode_factory_; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level.h b/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bf6a46 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level.h @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_LOW_LEVEL_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_LOW_LEVEL_H__ + +#include <list> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" + +// Low level policy classes. +// Built on top of the PolicyOpcode and OpcodeFatory, the low level policy +// provides a way to define rules on strings and numbers but it is unaware +// of Windows specific details or how the Interceptions must be set up. +// To use these classes you construct one or more rules and add them to the +// LowLevelPolicy object like this: +// +// PolicyRule rule1(ASK_BROKER); +// rule1.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"\\\\/?/?\\c:\\*Microsoft*\\*.exe", true); +// rule1.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, 1, CREATE_ALWAYS, EQUAL); +// rule1.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, EQUAL); +// +// PolicyRule rule2(FAKE_SUCCESS); +// rule2.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"\\\\/?/?\\Pipe\\Chrome.*", false)); +// rule2.AddNumberMatch(IF, 1, OPEN_EXISTING, EQUAL)); +// +// LowLevelPolicy policyGen(*policy_memory); +// policyGen.AddRule(kNtCreateFileSvc, &rule1); +// policyGen.AddRule(kNtCreateFileSvc, &rule2); +// policyGen.Done(); +// +// At this point (error checking omitted) the policy_memory can be copied +// to the target process where it can be evaluated. + +namespace sandbox { + +// TODO(cpu): Move this constant to crosscall_client.h. +const size_t kMaxServiceCount = 32; +COMPILE_ASSERT(IPC_LAST_TAG <= kMaxServiceCount, kMaxServiceCount_is_too_low); + +// Defines the memory layout of the policy. This memory is filled by +// LowLevelPolicy object. +// For example: +// +// [Service 0] --points to---\ +// [Service 1] --------------|-----\ +// ...... | | +// [Service N] | | +// [data_size] | | +// [Policy Buffer 0] <-------/ | +// [opcodes of] | +// ....... | +// [Policy Buffer 1] <-------------/ +// [opcodes] +// ....... +// ....... +// [Policy Buffer N] +// [opcodes] +// ....... +// <possibly unused space here> +// ....... +// [opcode string ] +// [opcode string ] +// ....... +// [opcode string ] +struct PolicyGlobal { + PolicyBuffer* entry[kMaxServiceCount]; + size_t data_size; + PolicyBuffer data[1]; +}; + +class PolicyRule; + +// Provides the means to collect rules into a policy store (memory) +class LowLevelPolicy { + public: + // policy_store: must contain allocated memory and the internal + // size fields set to correct values. + explicit LowLevelPolicy(PolicyGlobal* policy_store) + : policy_store_(policy_store) { + } + + // Destroys all the policy rules. + ~LowLevelPolicy(); + + // Adds a rule to be generated when Done() is called. + // service: The id of the service that this rule is associated with, + // for example the 'Open Thread' service or the "Create File" service. + // returns false on error. + bool AddRule(int service, PolicyRule* rule); + + // Generates all the rules added with AddRule() into the memory area + // passed on the constructor. Returns false on error. + bool Done(); + + private: + struct RuleNode { + const PolicyRule* rule; + int service; + }; + std::list<RuleNode> rules_; + PolicyGlobal* policy_store_; + DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(LowLevelPolicy); +}; + +// There are 'if' rules and 'if not' comparisons +enum RuleType { + IF = 0, + IF_NOT = 1, +}; + +// Possible comparisons for numbers +enum RuleOp { + EQUAL, + AND, + RANGE // TODO(cpu): Implement this option. +}; + +// Provides the means to collect a set of comparisons into a single +// rule and its associated action. +class PolicyRule { + friend class LowLevelPolicy; + + public: + explicit PolicyRule(EvalResult action); + PolicyRule(const PolicyRule& other); + ~PolicyRule(); + + // Adds a string comparison to the rule. + // rule_type: possible values are IF and IF_NOT. + // parameter: the expected index of the argument for this rule. For example + // in a 'create file' service the file name argument can be at index 0. + // string: is the desired matching pattern. + // match_opts: if the pattern matching is case sensitive or not. + bool AddStringMatch(RuleType rule_type, int16 parameter, + const wchar_t* string, StringMatchOptions match_opts); + + // Adds a number match comparison to the rule. + // rule_type: possible values are IF and IF_NOT. + // parameter: the expected index of the argument for this rule. + // number: the value to compare the input to. + // comparison_op: the comparison kind (equal, logical and, etc). + bool AddNumberMatch(RuleType rule_type, int16 parameter, + unsigned long number, RuleOp comparison_op); + + // Returns the number of opcodes generated so far. + size_t GetOpcodeCount() const { + return buffer_->opcode_count; + } + + // Called when there is no more comparisons to add. Internally it generates + // the last opcode (the action opcode). Returns false if this operation fails. + bool Done(); + + private: + void operator=(const PolicyRule&); + // Called in a loop from AddStringMatch to generate the required string + // match opcodes. rule_type, match_opts and parameter are the same as + // in AddStringMatch. + bool GenStringOpcode(RuleType rule_type, StringMatchOptions match_opts, + uint16 parameter, int state, bool last_call, + int* skip_count, std::wstring* fragment); + + // Loop over all generated opcodes and copy them to increasing memory + // addresses from opcode_start and copy the extra data (strings usually) into + // decreasing addresses from data_start. Extra data is only present in the + // string evaluation opcodes. + bool RebindCopy(PolicyOpcode* opcode_start, size_t opcode_size, + char* data_start, size_t* data_size) const; + PolicyBuffer* buffer_; + OpcodeFactory* opcode_factory_; + EvalResult action_; + bool done_; +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_LOW_LEVEL_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..20d1777 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_low_level_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,575 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_processor.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +#define POLPARAMS_BEGIN(x) sandbox::ParameterSet x[] = { +#define POLPARAM(p) sandbox::ParamPickerMake(p), +#define POLPARAMS_END } + +namespace sandbox { + +bool SetupNtdllImports(); + +// Testing that we allow opcode generation on valid string patterns. +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, StringPatternsOK) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"c:\\adobe\\ver??\\", CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"*.tmp", CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"c:\\*.doc", CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"c:\\windows\\*", CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"d:\\adobe\\acrobat.exe", + CASE_SENSITIVE)); +} + +// Testing that we signal invalid string patterns. +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, StringPatternsBAD) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_FALSE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"one**two", CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_FALSE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"**three", CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_FALSE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"five?six*?seven", CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_FALSE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"eight?*nine", CASE_SENSITIVE)); +} + +// Helper function to allocate space (on the heap) for policy. +PolicyGlobal* MakePolicyMemory() { + const size_t kTotalPolicySz = 4096*8; + char* mem = new char[kTotalPolicySz]; + memset(mem, 0, kTotalPolicySz); + PolicyGlobal* policy = reinterpret_cast<PolicyGlobal*>(mem); + policy->data_size = kTotalPolicySz - sizeof(PolicyGlobal); + return policy; +} + +// The simplest test using LowLevelPolicy it should test a single opcode which +// does a exact string comparison. +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, SimpleStrMatch) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"z:\\Directory\\domo.txt", + CASE_INSENSITIVE)); + + PolicyGlobal* policy = MakePolicyMemory(); + const uint32 kFakeService = 2; + + LowLevelPolicy policyGen(policy); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kFakeService, &pr)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.Done()); + + wchar_t* filename = L"Z:\\Directory\\domo.txt"; + + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) + POLPARAM(filename) // Argument 0 + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult result; + PolicyProcessor pol_ev(policy->entry[kFakeService]); + + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + filename = L"Z:\\Directory\\domo.txt.tmp"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, SimpleIfNotStrMatch) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF_NOT, 0, L"c:\\Microsoft\\", + CASE_SENSITIVE)); + + PolicyGlobal* policy = MakePolicyMemory(); + const uint32 kFakeService = 2; + LowLevelPolicy policyGen(policy); + + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kFakeService, &pr)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.Done()); + + wchar_t* filename = NULL; + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) + POLPARAM(filename) // Argument 0 + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult result; + PolicyProcessor pol_ev(policy->entry[kFakeService]); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\MicroNerd\\"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\domo.txt"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, SimpleIfNotStrMatchWild1) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF_NOT, 0, L"c:\\Microsoft\\*", + CASE_SENSITIVE)); + + PolicyGlobal* policy = MakePolicyMemory(); + const uint32 kFakeService = 3; + LowLevelPolicy policyGen(policy); + + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kFakeService, &pr)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.Done()); + + wchar_t* filename = NULL; + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) + POLPARAM(filename) // Argument 0 + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult result; + PolicyProcessor pol_ev(policy->entry[kFakeService]); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\domo.txt"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\MicroNerd\\domo.txt"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, SimpleIfNotStrMatchWild2) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF_NOT, 0, L"c:\\Microsoft\\*.txt", + CASE_SENSITIVE)); + + PolicyGlobal* policy = MakePolicyMemory(); + const uint32 kFakeService = 3; + LowLevelPolicy policyGen(policy); + + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kFakeService, &pr)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.Done()); + + wchar_t* filename = NULL; + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) + POLPARAM(filename) // Argument 0 + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult result; + PolicyProcessor pol_ev(policy->entry[kFakeService]); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\domo.txt"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\MicroNerd\\domo.txt"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\domo.bmp"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, IfNotStrMatchTwoRulesWild1) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF_NOT, 0, L"c:\\Microsoft\\*", + CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddNumberMatch(IF, 1, 24, EQUAL)); + + PolicyGlobal* policy = MakePolicyMemory(); + const uint32 kFakeService = 3; + LowLevelPolicy policyGen(policy); + + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kFakeService, &pr)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.Done()); + + wchar_t* filename = NULL; + unsigned long access = 0; + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) + POLPARAM(filename) // Argument 0 + POLPARAM(access) // Argument 1 + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult result; + PolicyProcessor pol_ev(policy->entry[kFakeService]); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\domo.txt"; + access = 24; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\domo.txt"; + access = 42; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\MicroNerd\\domo.txt"; + access = 24; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + filename = L"c:\\Micronesia\\domo.txt"; + access = 42; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, IfNotStrMatchTwoRulesWild2) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddNumberMatch(IF, 1, 24, EQUAL)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF_NOT, 0, L"c:\\GoogleV?\\*.txt", + CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, 66, EQUAL)); + + PolicyGlobal* policy = MakePolicyMemory(); + const uint32 kFakeService = 3; + LowLevelPolicy policyGen(policy); + + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kFakeService, &pr)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.Done()); + + wchar_t* filename = NULL; + unsigned long access = 0; + unsigned long sharing = 66; + + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) + POLPARAM(filename) // Argument 0 + POLPARAM(access) // Argument 1 + POLPARAM(sharing) // Argument 2 + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult result; + PolicyProcessor pol_ev(policy->entry[kFakeService]); + + filename = L"c:\\GoogleV2\\domo.txt"; + access = 24; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\GoogleV2\\domo.bmp"; + access = 24; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + filename = L"c:\\GoogleV23\\domo.txt"; + access = 24; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + + filename = L"c:\\GoogleV2\\domo.txt"; + access = 42; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\Google\\domo.txt"; + access = 24; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + filename = L"c:\\Micronesia\\domo.txt"; + access = 42; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\GoogleV2\\domo.bmp"; + access = 24; + sharing = 0; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +// Testing one single rule in one single service. The service is made to +// resemble NtCreateFile. +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, OneRuleTest) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"c:\\*Microsoft*\\*.txt", + CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, 1, CREATE_ALWAYS, EQUAL)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, EQUAL)); + + PolicyGlobal* policy = MakePolicyMemory(); + + const uint32 kNtFakeCreateFile = 7; + + LowLevelPolicy policyGen(policy); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kNtFakeCreateFile, &pr)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.Done()); + + wchar_t* filename = L"c:\\Documents and Settings\\Microsoft\\BLAH.txt"; + unsigned long creation_mode = OPEN_EXISTING; + unsigned long flags = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + void* security_descriptor = NULL; + + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(eval_params) + POLPARAM(filename) // Argument 0 + POLPARAM(creation_mode) // Argument 1 + POLPARAM(flags) // Argument 2 + POLPARAM(security_descriptor) + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult result; + PolicyProcessor pol_ev(policy->entry[kNtFakeCreateFile]); + + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + creation_mode = CREATE_ALWAYS; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + creation_mode = OPEN_EXISTING; + filename = L"c:\\Other\\Path\\Microsoft\\Another file.txt"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + filename = L"c:\\Other\\Path\\Microsoft\\Another file.txt.tmp"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + flags = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DEVICE; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\Other\\Macrosoft\\Another file.txt"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\1.txt"; + flags = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, pol_ev.GetAction()); + + filename = L"c:\\Microsoft\\1.ttt"; + result = pol_ev.Evaluate(kShortEval, eval_params, _countof(eval_params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +// Testing 3 rules in 3 services. Two of the services resemble File services. +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, ThreeRulesTest) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + PolicyRule pr_pipe(FAKE_SUCCESS); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_pipe.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"\\\\/?/?\\Pipe\\Chrome.*", + CASE_INSENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_pipe.AddNumberMatch(IF, 1, OPEN_EXISTING, EQUAL)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_pipe.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, EQUAL)); + + size_t opc1 = pr_pipe.GetOpcodeCount(); + EXPECT_EQ(3, opc1); + + PolicyRule pr_dump(ASK_BROKER); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_dump.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"\\\\/?/?\\*\\Crash Reports\\*", + CASE_INSENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_dump.AddNumberMatch(IF, 1, CREATE_ALWAYS, EQUAL)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_dump.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, EQUAL)); + + size_t opc2 = pr_dump.GetOpcodeCount(); + EXPECT_EQ(4, opc2); + + PolicyRule pr_winexe(SIGNAL_ALARM); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_winexe.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"\\\\/?/?\\C:\\Windows\\*.exe", + CASE_INSENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_winexe.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, EQUAL)); + + size_t opc3 = pr_winexe.GetOpcodeCount(); + EXPECT_EQ(3, opc3); + + PolicyRule pr_adobe(GIVE_CACHED); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_adobe.AddStringMatch(IF, 0, L"c:\\adobe\\ver?.?\\", + CASE_SENSITIVE)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_adobe.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, EQUAL)); + + size_t opc4 = pr_adobe.GetOpcodeCount(); + EXPECT_EQ(4, opc4); + + PolicyRule pr_none(GIVE_FIRST); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_none.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY, AND)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pr_none.AddNumberMatch(IF, 2, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM, AND)); + + size_t opc5 = pr_none.GetOpcodeCount(); + EXPECT_EQ(2, opc5); + + PolicyGlobal* policy = MakePolicyMemory(); + + const uint32 kNtFakeNone = 4; + const uint32 kNtFakeCreateFile = 5; + const uint32 kNtFakeOpenFile = 6; + + LowLevelPolicy policyGen(policy); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kNtFakeCreateFile, &pr_pipe)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kNtFakeCreateFile, &pr_dump)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kNtFakeCreateFile, &pr_winexe)); + + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kNtFakeOpenFile, &pr_adobe)); + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kNtFakeOpenFile, &pr_pipe)); + + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.AddRule(kNtFakeNone, &pr_none)); + + EXPECT_TRUE(policyGen.Done()); + + // Inspect the policy structure manually. + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == policy->entry[0]); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == policy->entry[1]); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == policy->entry[2]); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == policy->entry[3]); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != policy->entry[4]); // kNtFakeNone. + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != policy->entry[5]); // kNtFakeCreateFile. + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != policy->entry[6]); // kNtFakeOpenFile. + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == policy->entry[7]); + + // The total per service opcode counts now must take in account one + // extra opcode (action opcode) per rule. + ++opc1; + ++opc2; + ++opc3; + ++opc4; + ++opc5; + + size_t tc1 = policy->entry[kNtFakeNone]->opcode_count; + size_t tc2 = policy->entry[kNtFakeCreateFile]->opcode_count; + size_t tc3 = policy->entry[kNtFakeOpenFile]->opcode_count; + + EXPECT_EQ(opc5, tc1); + EXPECT_EQ((opc1 + opc2 + opc3), tc2); + EXPECT_EQ((opc1 + opc4), tc3); + + // Check the type of the first and last opcode of each service. + + EXPECT_EQ(OP_ULONG_AND_MATCH, policy->entry[kNtFakeNone]->opcodes[0].GetID()); + EXPECT_EQ(OP_ACTION, policy->entry[kNtFakeNone]->opcodes[tc1-1].GetID()); + EXPECT_EQ(OP_WSTRING_MATCH, + policy->entry[kNtFakeCreateFile]->opcodes[0].GetID()); + EXPECT_EQ(OP_ACTION, + policy->entry[kNtFakeCreateFile]->opcodes[tc2-1].GetID()); + EXPECT_EQ(OP_WSTRING_MATCH, + policy->entry[kNtFakeOpenFile]->opcodes[0].GetID()); + EXPECT_EQ(OP_ACTION, policy->entry[kNtFakeOpenFile]->opcodes[tc3-1].GetID()); + + // Test the policy evaluation. + + wchar_t* filename = L""; + unsigned long creation_mode = OPEN_EXISTING; + unsigned long flags = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + void* security_descriptor = NULL; + + POLPARAMS_BEGIN(params) + POLPARAM(filename) // Argument 0 + POLPARAM(creation_mode) // Argument 1 + POLPARAM(flags) // Argument 2 + POLPARAM(security_descriptor) + POLPARAMS_END; + + PolicyResult result; + PolicyProcessor eval_CreateFile(policy->entry[kNtFakeCreateFile]); + PolicyProcessor eval_OpenFile(policy->entry[kNtFakeOpenFile]); + PolicyProcessor eval_None(policy->entry[kNtFakeNone]); + + result = eval_CreateFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_OpenFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_None.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"\\\\??\\c:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"; + flags = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM; + result = eval_CreateFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_None.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_OpenFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + flags += FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY; + result = eval_CreateFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_None.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(GIVE_FIRST, eval_None.GetAction()); + result = eval_OpenFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + flags = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + result = eval_CreateFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(SIGNAL_ALARM, eval_CreateFile.GetAction()); + result = eval_None.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_OpenFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"c:\\adobe\\ver3.2\\temp"; + result = eval_CreateFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_None.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_OpenFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(GIVE_CACHED, eval_OpenFile.GetAction()); + + filename = L"c:\\adobe\\ver3.22\\temp"; + result = eval_OpenFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"\\\\??\\c:\\some path\\other path\\crash reports\\some path"; + creation_mode = CREATE_ALWAYS; + result = eval_CreateFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, eval_CreateFile.GetAction()); + result = eval_None.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_OpenFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + + filename = L"\\\\??\\Pipe\\Chrome.12345"; + creation_mode = OPEN_EXISTING; + result = eval_CreateFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(FAKE_SUCCESS, eval_CreateFile.GetAction()); + result = eval_None.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(NO_POLICY_MATCH, result); + result = eval_OpenFile.Evaluate(kShortEval, params, _countof(params)); + EXPECT_EQ(POLICY_MATCH, result); + EXPECT_EQ(FAKE_SUCCESS, eval_OpenFile.GetAction()); + + delete [] reinterpret_cast<char*>(policy); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_opcodes_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_opcodes_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37ccd80 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_opcodes_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + + +#define INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(member) \ + g_nt.##member = reinterpret_cast<##member##Function>( \ + ::GetProcAddress(ntdll, #member)); \ + if (NULL == g_nt.##member) \ + return false + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt; + +bool SetupNtdllImports() { + HMODULE ntdll = ::GetModuleHandle(kNtdllName); + + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlAllocateHeap); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlCompareUnicodeString); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlCreateHeap); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlDestroyHeap); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(RtlFreeHeap); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(_strnicmp); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(strlen); + INIT_GLOBAL_RTL(wcslen); + + return true; +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, ParameterSetTest) { + void* pv1 = reinterpret_cast<void*>(0x477EAA5); + const void* pv2 = reinterpret_cast<void*>(0x987654); + ParameterSet pset1 = ParamPickerMake(pv1); + ParameterSet pset2 = ParamPickerMake(pv2); + + // Test that we can store and retrieve a void pointer: + const void* result1 =0; + unsigned long result2 = 0; + EXPECT_TRUE(pset1.Get(&result1)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pv1 == result1); + EXPECT_FALSE(pset1.Get(&result2)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pset2.Get(&result1)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pv2 == result1); + EXPECT_FALSE(pset2.Get(&result2)); + + // Test that we can store and retrieve a ulong: + unsigned long number = 12747; + ParameterSet pset3 = ParamPickerMake(number); + EXPECT_FALSE(pset3.Get(&result1)); + EXPECT_TRUE(pset3.Get(&result2)); + EXPECT_EQ(number, result2); + + // Test that we can store and retrieve a string: + const wchar_t* txt = L"S231L"; + ParameterSet pset4 = ParamPickerMake(txt); + const wchar_t* result3 = NULL; + EXPECT_TRUE(pset4.Get(&result3)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, wcscmp(txt, result3)); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, OpcodeConstraints) { + // Test that PolicyOpcode has no virtual functions + // because these objects are copied over to other processes + // so they cannot have vtables. + EXPECT_FALSE(__is_polymorphic(PolicyOpcode)); + // Keep developers from adding smarts to the opcodes which should + // be pretty much a bag of bytes with a OO interface. + EXPECT_TRUE(__has_trivial_destructor(PolicyOpcode)); + EXPECT_TRUE(__has_trivial_constructor(PolicyOpcode)); + EXPECT_TRUE(__has_trivial_copy(PolicyOpcode)); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, TrueFalseOpcodes) { + void* dummy = NULL; + ParameterSet ppb1 = ParamPickerMake(dummy); + char memory[1024]; + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(memory, sizeof(memory)); + + // This opcode always evaluates to true. + PolicyOpcode* op1 = opcode_maker.MakeOpAlwaysFalse(kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op1->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, NULL)); + EXPECT_FALSE(op1->IsAction()); + + // This opcode always evaluates to false. + PolicyOpcode* op2 = opcode_maker.MakeOpAlwaysTrue(kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op2->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, NULL)); + + // Nulls not allowed on the params. + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_ERROR, op2->Evaluate(NULL, 0, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_ERROR, op2->Evaluate(NULL, 1, NULL)); + + // True and False opcodes do not 'require' a number of parameters + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op2->Evaluate(&ppb1, 0, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op2->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, NULL)); + + // Test Inverting the logic. Note that inversion is done outside + // any particular opcode evaluation so no need to repeat for all + // opcodes. + PolicyOpcode* op3 = opcode_maker.MakeOpAlwaysFalse(kPolNegateEval); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op3->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, NULL)); + PolicyOpcode* op4 = opcode_maker.MakeOpAlwaysTrue(kPolNegateEval); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op4->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, NULL)); + + // Test that we clear the match context + PolicyOpcode* op5 = opcode_maker.MakeOpAlwaysTrue(kPolClearContext); + MatchContext context; + context.position = 1; + context.options = kPolUseOREval; + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op5->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, &context)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, context.position); + MatchContext context2; + EXPECT_EQ(context2.options, context.options); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, OpcodeMakerCase1) { + // Testing that the opcode maker does not overrun the + // supplied buffer. It should only be able to make 'count' opcodes. + void* dummy = NULL; + ParameterSet ppb1 = ParamPickerMake(dummy); + + char memory[256]; + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(memory, sizeof(memory)); + size_t count = sizeof(memory) / sizeof(PolicyOpcode); + + for (size_t ix =0; ix != count; ++ix) { + PolicyOpcode* op = opcode_maker.MakeOpAlwaysFalse(kPolNone); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != op); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, NULL)); + } + // There should be no room more another opcode: + PolicyOpcode* op1 = opcode_maker.MakeOpAlwaysFalse(kPolNone); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL == op1); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, OpcodeMakerCase2) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + // Testing that the opcode maker does not overrun the + // supplied buffer. It should only be able to make 'count' opcodes. + // The difference with the previous test is that this opcodes allocate + // the string 'txt2' inside the same buffer. + const wchar_t* txt1 = L"1234"; + const wchar_t txt2[] = L"123"; + + ParameterSet ppb1 = ParamPickerMake(txt1); + MatchContext mc1; + + char memory[256]; + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(memory, sizeof(memory)); + size_t count = sizeof(memory) / (sizeof(PolicyOpcode) + sizeof(txt2)); + + // Test that it does not overrun the buffer. + for (size_t ix =0; ix != count; ++ix) { + PolicyOpcode* op = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt2, 0, + CASE_SENSITIVE, + kPolClearContext); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != op); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, &mc1)); + } + + // There should be no room more another opcode: + PolicyOpcode* op1 = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt2, 0, + CASE_SENSITIVE, + kPolNone); + ASSERT_TRUE(NULL == op1); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, IntegerOpcodes) { + const wchar_t* txt = L"abcdef"; + unsigned long num1 = 42; + unsigned long num2 = 113377; + + ParameterSet pp_wrong1 = ParamPickerMake(txt); + ParameterSet pp_num1 = ParamPickerMake(num1); + ParameterSet pp_num2 = ParamPickerMake(num2); + + char memory[128]; + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(memory, sizeof(memory)); + + // Test basic match for unsigned longs 42 == 42 and 42 != 113377. + PolicyOpcode* op_m42 = opcode_maker.MakeOpNumberMatch(0, unsigned long(42), + kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op_m42->Evaluate(&pp_num1, 1, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op_m42->Evaluate(&pp_num2, 1, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_ERROR, op_m42->Evaluate(&pp_wrong1, 1, NULL)); + + // Test basic match for void pointers. + const void* vp = NULL; + ParameterSet pp_num3 = ParamPickerMake(vp); + PolicyOpcode* op_vp_null = opcode_maker.MakeOpVoidPtrMatch(0, NULL, + kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op_vp_null->Evaluate(&pp_num3, 1, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op_vp_null->Evaluate(&pp_num1, 1, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_ERROR, op_vp_null->Evaluate(&pp_wrong1, 1, NULL)); + + // Basic range test [41 43] (inclusive). + PolicyOpcode* op_range1 = opcode_maker.MakeOpUlongMatchRange(0, 41, 43, + kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op_range1->Evaluate(&pp_num1, 1, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op_range1->Evaluate(&pp_num2, 1, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_ERROR, op_range1->Evaluate(&pp_wrong1, 1, NULL)); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, LogicalOpcodes) { + char memory[128]; + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(memory, sizeof(memory)); + + unsigned long num1 = 0x10100702; + ParameterSet pp_num1 = ParamPickerMake(num1); + + PolicyOpcode* op_and1 = opcode_maker.MakeOpUlongAndMatch(0, 0x00100000, + kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op_and1->Evaluate(&pp_num1, 1, NULL)); + PolicyOpcode* op_and2 = opcode_maker.MakeOpUlongAndMatch(0, 0x00000001, + kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op_and2->Evaluate(&pp_num1, 1, NULL)); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, WCharOpcodes1) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + + const wchar_t* txt1 = L"the quick fox jumps over the lazy dog"; + const wchar_t txt2[] = L"the quick"; + const wchar_t txt3[] = L" fox jumps"; + const wchar_t txt4[] = L"the lazy dog"; + const wchar_t txt5[] = L"jumps over"; + const wchar_t txt6[] = L"g"; + + ParameterSet pp_tc1 = ParamPickerMake(txt1); + char memory[512]; + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(memory, sizeof(memory)); + + PolicyOpcode* op1 = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt2, 0, + CASE_SENSITIVE, + kPolNone); + + // Simplest substring match from pos 0. It should be a successful match + // and the match context should be updated. + MatchContext mc1; + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op1->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + EXPECT_TRUE(_countof(txt2) == mc1.position + 1); + + // Matching again should fail and the context should be unmodified. + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op1->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + EXPECT_TRUE(_countof(txt2) == mc1.position + 1); + + // Using the same match context we should continue where we left + // in the previous successful match, + PolicyOpcode* op3 = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt3, 0, + CASE_SENSITIVE, + kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op3->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + EXPECT_TRUE(_countof(txt3) + _countof(txt2) == mc1.position + 2); + + // We now keep on matching but now we skip 6 characters which means + // we skip the string ' over '. And we zero the match context. This is + // the primitive that we use to build '??'. + PolicyOpcode* op4 = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt4, 6, + CASE_SENSITIVE, + kPolClearContext); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op4->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, mc1.position); + + // Test that we can properly match the last part of the string + PolicyOpcode* op4b = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt4, kSeekToEnd, + CASE_SENSITIVE, + kPolClearContext); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op4b->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, mc1.position); + + // Test matching 'jumps over' over the entire string. This is the + // primitive we build '*' from. + PolicyOpcode* op5 = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt5, kSeekForward, + CASE_SENSITIVE, kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op5->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + EXPECT_EQ(24, mc1.position); + + // Test that we don't match because it is not at the end of the string + PolicyOpcode* op5b = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt5, kSeekToEnd, + CASE_SENSITIVE, + kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op5b->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + + // Test that we function if the string does not fit. In this case we + // try to match 'the lazy dog' against 'he lazy dog'. + PolicyOpcode* op6 = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt4, 2, + CASE_SENSITIVE, kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(24, mc1.position); + + // Testing matching against 'g' which should be the last char. + MatchContext mc2; + PolicyOpcode* op7 = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt6, kSeekForward, + CASE_SENSITIVE, kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op7->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc2)); + + // Trying to match again should fail since we are in the last char. + // This also covers a couple of boundary conditions. + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op7->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc2)); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, WCharOpcodes2) { + SetupNtdllImports(); + + const wchar_t* path1 = L"c:\\documents and settings\\Microsoft\\BLAH.txt"; + const wchar_t txt1[] = L"Settings\\microsoft"; + ParameterSet pp_tc1 = ParamPickerMake(path1); + + char memory[256]; + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(memory, sizeof(memory)); + MatchContext mc1; + + // Testing case-insensitive does not buy us much since it this option + // is just passed to the Microsoft API that we use normally, but just for + // coverage, here it is: + PolicyOpcode* op1s = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt1, kSeekForward, + CASE_SENSITIVE, kPolNone); + PolicyOpcode* op1i = opcode_maker.MakeOpWStringMatch(0, txt1, kSeekForward, + CASE_INSENSITIVE, + kPolNone); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_FALSE, op1s->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + EXPECT_EQ(EVAL_TRUE, op1i->Evaluate(&pp_tc1, 1, &mc1)); + EXPECT_EQ(35, mc1.position); +} + +TEST(PolicyEngineTest, ActionOpcodes) { + char memory[256]; + OpcodeFactory opcode_maker(memory, sizeof(memory)); + MatchContext mc1; + void* dummy = NULL; + ParameterSet ppb1 = ParamPickerMake(dummy); + + PolicyOpcode* op1 = opcode_maker.MakeOpAction(ASK_BROKER, kPolNone); + EXPECT_TRUE(op1->IsAction()); + EXPECT_EQ(ASK_BROKER, op1->Evaluate(&ppb1, 1, &mc1)); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_params.h b/sandbox/win/src/policy_params.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1fb3fc --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_params.h @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_PARAMS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_PARAMS_H__ + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_params.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +class ParameterSet; + +// Warning: The following macros store the address to the actual variables, in +// other words, the values are not copied. +#define POLPARAMS_BEGIN(type) class type { public: enum Args { +#define POLPARAM(arg) arg, +#define POLPARAMS_END(type) PolParamLast }; }; \ + typedef sandbox::ParameterSet type##Array [type::PolParamLast]; + +// Policy parameters for file open / create. +POLPARAMS_BEGIN(OpenFile) + POLPARAM(NAME) + POLPARAM(BROKER) // TRUE if called from the broker. + POLPARAM(ACCESS) + POLPARAM(OPTIONS) +POLPARAMS_END(OpenFile) + +// Policy parameter for name-based policies. +POLPARAMS_BEGIN(FileName) + POLPARAM(NAME) + POLPARAM(BROKER) // TRUE if called from the broker. +POLPARAMS_END(FileName) + +COMPILE_ASSERT(OpenFile::NAME == FileName::NAME, to_simplify_fs_policies); +COMPILE_ASSERT(OpenFile::BROKER == FileName::BROKER, to_simplify_fs_policies); + +// Policy parameter for name-based policies. +POLPARAMS_BEGIN(NameBased) + POLPARAM(NAME) +POLPARAMS_END(NameBased) + +// Policy parameters for open event. +POLPARAMS_BEGIN(OpenEventParams) + POLPARAM(NAME) + POLPARAM(ACCESS) +POLPARAMS_END(OpenEventParams) + +// Policy Parameters for reg open / create. +POLPARAMS_BEGIN(OpenKey) + POLPARAM(NAME) + POLPARAM(ACCESS) +POLPARAMS_END(OpenKey) + +// Policy parameter for name-based policies. +POLPARAMS_BEGIN(HandleTarget) + POLPARAM(NAME) + POLPARAM(TARGET) +POLPARAMS_END(HandleTarget) + + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_PARAMS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_target.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_target.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa69892 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_target.cc @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_target.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_processor.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Handle for our private heap. +extern void* g_heap; + +// This is the list of all imported symbols from ntdll.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt; + +// Policy data. +extern void* volatile g_shared_policy_memory; +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT size_t g_shared_policy_size; + +bool QueryBroker(int ipc_id, CountedParameterSetBase* params) { + DCHECK_NT(static_cast<size_t>(ipc_id) < kMaxServiceCount); + DCHECK_NT(g_shared_policy_memory); + DCHECK_NT(g_shared_policy_size > 0); + + if (static_cast<size_t>(ipc_id) >= kMaxServiceCount) + return false; + + PolicyGlobal* global_policy = + reinterpret_cast<PolicyGlobal*>(g_shared_policy_memory); + + if (!global_policy->entry[ipc_id]) + return false; + + PolicyBuffer* policy = reinterpret_cast<PolicyBuffer*>( + reinterpret_cast<char*>(g_shared_policy_memory) + + reinterpret_cast<size_t>(global_policy->entry[ipc_id])); + + if ((reinterpret_cast<size_t>(global_policy->entry[ipc_id]) > + global_policy->data_size) || + (g_shared_policy_size < global_policy->data_size)) { + NOTREACHED_NT(); + return false; + } + + for (int i = 0; i < params->count; i++) { + if (!params->parameters[i].IsValid()) { + NOTREACHED_NT(); + return false; + } + } + + PolicyProcessor processor(policy); + PolicyResult result = processor.Evaluate(kShortEval, params->parameters, + params->count); + DCHECK_NT(POLICY_ERROR != result); + + return POLICY_MATCH == result && ASK_BROKER == processor.GetAction(); +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// Hooks NtSetInformationThread to block RevertToSelf from being +// called before the actual call to LowerToken. +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtSetInformationThread( + NtSetInformationThreadFunction orig_SetInformationThread, HANDLE thread, + NT_THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS thread_info_class, PVOID thread_information, + ULONG thread_information_bytes) { + do { + if (SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->RevertedToSelf()) + break; + if (ThreadImpersonationToken != thread_info_class) + break; + if (!thread_information) + break; + HANDLE token; + if (sizeof(token) > thread_information_bytes) + break; + + NTSTATUS ret = CopyData(&token, thread_information, sizeof(token)); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || NULL != token) + break; + + // This is a revert to self. + return STATUS_SUCCESS; + } while (false); + + return orig_SetInformationThread(thread, thread_info_class, + thread_information, + thread_information_bytes); +} + +// Hooks NtOpenThreadToken to force the open_as_self parameter to be set to +// FALSE if we are still running with the impersonation token. open_as_self set +// to TRUE means that the token will be open using the process token instead of +// the impersonation token. This is bad because the process token does not have +// access to open the thread token. +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThreadToken( + NtOpenThreadTokenFunction orig_OpenThreadToken, HANDLE thread, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOLEAN open_as_self, PHANDLE token) { + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->RevertedToSelf()) + open_as_self = FALSE; + + return orig_OpenThreadToken(thread, desired_access, open_as_self, token); +} + +// See comment for TargetNtOpenThreadToken +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThreadTokenEx( + NtOpenThreadTokenExFunction orig_OpenThreadTokenEx, HANDLE thread, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOLEAN open_as_self, ULONG handle_attributes, + PHANDLE token) { + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->RevertedToSelf()) + open_as_self = FALSE; + + return orig_OpenThreadTokenEx(thread, desired_access, open_as_self, + handle_attributes, token); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_target.h b/sandbox/win/src/policy_target.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a77b47 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_target.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_TARGET_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_TARGET_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +struct CountedParameterSetBase; + +// Performs a policy lookup and returns true if the request should be passed to +// the broker process. +bool QueryBroker(int ipc_id, CountedParameterSetBase* params); + +extern "C" { + +// Interception of NtSetInformationThread on the child process. +// It should never be called directly. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtSetInformationThread( + NtSetInformationThreadFunction orig_SetInformationThread, HANDLE thread, + NT_THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS thread_info_class, PVOID thread_information, + ULONG thread_information_bytes); + +// Interception of NtOpenThreadToken on the child process. +// It should never be called directly +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThreadToken( + NtOpenThreadTokenFunction orig_OpenThreadToken, HANDLE thread, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOLEAN open_as_self, PHANDLE token); + +// Interception of NtOpenThreadTokenEx on the child process. +// It should never be called directly +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThreadTokenEx( + NtOpenThreadTokenExFunction orig_OpenThreadTokenEx, HANDLE thread, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOLEAN open_as_self, ULONG handle_attributes, + PHANDLE token); + +} // extern "C" + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_POLICY_TARGET_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/policy_target_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/policy_target_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aef7548 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/policy_target_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,337 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +#define BINDNTDLL(name) \ + name ## Function name = reinterpret_cast<name ## Function>( \ + ::GetProcAddress(::GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"), #name)) + +// Reverts to self and verify that SetInformationToken was faked. Returns +// SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED if faked and SBOX_TEST_FAILED if not faked. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int PolicyTargetTest_token(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + HANDLE thread_token; + // Get the thread token, using impersonation. + if (!::OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_IMPERSONATE | + TOKEN_DUPLICATE, FALSE, &thread_token)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + ::RevertToSelf(); + ::CloseHandle(thread_token); + + int ret = SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + if (::OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_IMPERSONATE | TOKEN_DUPLICATE, + FALSE, &thread_token)) { + ret = SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + ::CloseHandle(thread_token); + } + return ret; +} + +// Stores the high privilege token on a static variable, change impersonation +// again to that one and verify that we are not interfering anymore with +// RevertToSelf. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int PolicyTargetTest_steal(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + static HANDLE thread_token; + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->RevertedToSelf()) { + if (!::OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_IMPERSONATE | + TOKEN_DUPLICATE, FALSE, &thread_token)) + return ::GetLastError(); + } else { + if (!::SetThreadToken(NULL, thread_token)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + // See if we fake the call again. + int ret = PolicyTargetTest_token(argc, argv); + ::CloseHandle(thread_token); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +// Opens the thread token with and without impersonation. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int PolicyTargetTest_token2(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + HANDLE thread_token; + // Get the thread token, using impersonation. + if (!::OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_IMPERSONATE | + TOKEN_DUPLICATE, FALSE, &thread_token)) + return ::GetLastError(); + ::CloseHandle(thread_token); + + // Get the thread token, without impersonation. + if (!OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_IMPERSONATE | TOKEN_DUPLICATE, + TRUE, &thread_token)) + return ::GetLastError(); + ::CloseHandle(thread_token); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// Opens the thread token with and without impersonation, using +// NtOpenThreadTokenEX. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int PolicyTargetTest_token3(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + BINDNTDLL(NtOpenThreadTokenEx); + if (!NtOpenThreadTokenEx) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + HANDLE thread_token; + // Get the thread token, using impersonation. + NTSTATUS status = NtOpenThreadTokenEx(GetCurrentThread(), + TOKEN_IMPERSONATE | TOKEN_DUPLICATE, + FALSE, 0, &thread_token); + if (status == STATUS_NO_TOKEN) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + ::CloseHandle(thread_token); + + // Get the thread token, without impersonation. + status = NtOpenThreadTokenEx(GetCurrentThread(), + TOKEN_IMPERSONATE | TOKEN_DUPLICATE, TRUE, 0, + &thread_token); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + ::CloseHandle(thread_token); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// Tests that we can open the current thread. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int PolicyTargetTest_thread(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + DWORD thread_id = ::GetCurrentThreadId(); + HANDLE thread = ::OpenThread(SYNCHRONIZE, FALSE, thread_id); + if (!thread) + return ::GetLastError(); + if (!::CloseHandle(thread)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// New thread entry point: do nothing. +DWORD WINAPI PolicyTargetTest_thread_main(void* param) { + ::Sleep(INFINITE); + return 0; +} + +// Tests that we can create a new thread, and open it. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int PolicyTargetTest_thread2(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + // Use default values to create a new thread. + DWORD thread_id; + HANDLE thread = ::CreateThread(NULL, 0, &PolicyTargetTest_thread_main, 0, 0, + &thread_id); + if (!thread) + return ::GetLastError(); + if (!::CloseHandle(thread)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + thread = ::OpenThread(SYNCHRONIZE, FALSE, thread_id); + if (!thread) + return ::GetLastError(); + + if (!::CloseHandle(thread)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// Tests that we can call CreateProcess. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int PolicyTargetTest_process(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + // Use default values to create a new process. + STARTUPINFO startup_info = {0}; + startup_info.cb = sizeof(startup_info); + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation process_info; + if (!::CreateProcessW(L"foo.exe", L"foo.exe", NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, + NULL, NULL, &startup_info, process_info.Receive())) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +TEST(PolicyTargetTest, SetInformationThread) { + TestRunner runner; + if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_XP) { + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_token")); + } + + runner.SetTestState(AFTER_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(ERROR_NO_TOKEN, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_token")); + + runner.SetTestState(EVERY_STATE); + if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_XP) + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_FAILED, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_steal")); +} + +TEST(PolicyTargetTest, OpenThreadToken) { + TestRunner runner; + if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_XP) { + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_token2")); + } + + runner.SetTestState(AFTER_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(ERROR_NO_TOKEN, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_token2")); +} + +TEST(PolicyTargetTest, OpenThreadTokenEx) { + TestRunner runner; + if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_XP) + return; + + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_token3")); + + runner.SetTestState(AFTER_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(ERROR_NO_TOKEN, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_token3")); +} + +TEST(PolicyTargetTest, OpenThread) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_thread")) << + "Opens the current thread"; + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_thread2")) << + "Creates a new thread and opens it"; +} + +TEST(PolicyTargetTest, OpenProcess) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"PolicyTargetTest_process")) << + "Opens a process"; +} + +// Launches the app in the sandbox and ask it to wait in an +// infinite loop. Waits for 2 seconds and then check if the +// desktop associated with the app thread is not the same as the +// current desktop. +TEST(PolicyTargetTest, DesktopPolicy) { + BrokerServices* broker = GetBroker(); + + // Precreate the desktop. + TargetPolicy* temp_policy = broker->CreatePolicy(); + temp_policy->CreateAlternateDesktop(false); + temp_policy->Release(); + + ASSERT_TRUE(broker != NULL); + + // Get the path to the sandboxed app. + wchar_t prog_name[MAX_PATH]; + GetModuleFileNameW(NULL, prog_name, MAX_PATH); + + std::wstring arguments(L"\""); + arguments += prog_name; + arguments += L"\" -child 0 wait"; // Don't care about the "state" argument. + + // Launch the app. + ResultCode result = SBOX_ALL_OK; + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target; + + TargetPolicy* policy = broker->CreatePolicy(); + policy->SetAlternateDesktop(false); + policy->SetTokenLevel(USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_LOCKDOWN); + result = broker->SpawnTarget(prog_name, arguments.c_str(), policy, + target.Receive()); + policy->Release(); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_ALL_OK, result); + + EXPECT_EQ(1, ::ResumeThread(target.thread_handle())); + + EXPECT_EQ(WAIT_TIMEOUT, ::WaitForSingleObject(target.process_handle(), 2000)); + + EXPECT_NE(::GetThreadDesktop(target.thread_id()), + ::GetThreadDesktop(::GetCurrentThreadId())); + + std::wstring desktop_name = policy->GetAlternateDesktop(); + HDESK desk = ::OpenDesktop(desktop_name.c_str(), 0, FALSE, DESKTOP_ENUMERATE); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != desk); + EXPECT_TRUE(::CloseDesktop(desk)); + EXPECT_TRUE(::TerminateProcess(target.process_handle(), 0)); + + ::WaitForSingleObject(target.process_handle(), INFINITE); + + // Close the desktop handle. + temp_policy = broker->CreatePolicy(); + temp_policy->DestroyAlternateDesktop(); + temp_policy->Release(); + + // Make sure the desktop does not exist anymore. + desk = ::OpenDesktop(desktop_name.c_str(), 0, FALSE, DESKTOP_ENUMERATE); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == desk); +} + +// Launches the app in the sandbox and ask it to wait in an +// infinite loop. Waits for 2 seconds and then check if the +// winstation associated with the app thread is not the same as the +// current desktop. +TEST(PolicyTargetTest, WinstaPolicy) { + BrokerServices* broker = GetBroker(); + + // Precreate the desktop. + TargetPolicy* temp_policy = broker->CreatePolicy(); + temp_policy->CreateAlternateDesktop(true); + temp_policy->Release(); + + ASSERT_TRUE(broker != NULL); + + // Get the path to the sandboxed app. + wchar_t prog_name[MAX_PATH]; + GetModuleFileNameW(NULL, prog_name, MAX_PATH); + + std::wstring arguments(L"\""); + arguments += prog_name; + arguments += L"\" -child 0 wait"; // Don't care about the "state" argument. + + // Launch the app. + ResultCode result = SBOX_ALL_OK; + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target; + + TargetPolicy* policy = broker->CreatePolicy(); + policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true); + policy->SetTokenLevel(USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_LOCKDOWN); + result = broker->SpawnTarget(prog_name, arguments.c_str(), policy, + target.Receive()); + policy->Release(); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_ALL_OK, result); + + EXPECT_EQ(1, ::ResumeThread(target.thread_handle())); + + EXPECT_EQ(WAIT_TIMEOUT, ::WaitForSingleObject(target.process_handle(), 2000)); + + EXPECT_NE(::GetThreadDesktop(target.thread_id()), + ::GetThreadDesktop(::GetCurrentThreadId())); + + std::wstring desktop_name = policy->GetAlternateDesktop(); + ASSERT_FALSE(desktop_name.empty()); + + // Make sure there is a backslash, for the window station name. + EXPECT_NE(desktop_name.find_first_of(L'\\'), std::wstring::npos); + + // Isolate the desktop name. + desktop_name = desktop_name.substr(desktop_name.find_first_of(L'\\') + 1); + + HDESK desk = ::OpenDesktop(desktop_name.c_str(), 0, FALSE, DESKTOP_ENUMERATE); + // This should fail if the desktop is really on another window station. + EXPECT_FALSE(NULL != desk); + EXPECT_TRUE(::TerminateProcess(target.process_handle(), 0)); + + ::WaitForSingleObject(target.process_handle(), INFINITE); + + // Close the desktop handle. + temp_policy = broker->CreatePolicy(); + temp_policy->DestroyAlternateDesktop(); + temp_policy->Release(); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/process_policy_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/process_policy_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..783446e --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/process_policy_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <memory> +#include <string> + +#include "base/sys_string_conversions.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace { + +// While the shell API provides better calls than this home brew function +// we use GetSystemWindowsDirectoryW which does not query the registry so +// it is safe to use after revert. +std::wstring MakeFullPathToSystem32(const wchar_t* name) { + wchar_t windows_path[MAX_PATH] = {0}; + ::GetSystemWindowsDirectoryW(windows_path, MAX_PATH); + std::wstring full_path(windows_path); + if (full_path.empty()) { + return full_path; + } + full_path += L"\\system32\\"; + full_path += name; + return full_path; +} + +// Creates a process with the |exe| and |command| parameter using the +// unicode and ascii version of the api. +sandbox::SboxTestResult CreateProcessHelper(const std::wstring &exe, + const std::wstring &command) { + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation pi; + STARTUPINFOW si = {sizeof(si)}; + + const wchar_t *exe_name = NULL; + if (!exe.empty()) + exe_name = exe.c_str(); + + const wchar_t *cmd_line = NULL; + if (!command.empty()) + cmd_line = command.c_str(); + + // Create the process with the unicode version of the API. + sandbox::SboxTestResult ret1 = sandbox::SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + if (!::CreateProcessW(exe_name, const_cast<wchar_t*>(cmd_line), NULL, NULL, + FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, pi.Receive())) { + DWORD last_error = GetLastError(); + if ((ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_QUOTA == last_error) || + (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == last_error) || + (ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND == last_error)) { + ret1 = sandbox::SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } else { + ret1 = sandbox::SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + } else { + ret1 = sandbox::SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + + pi.Close(); + + // Do the same with the ansi version of the api + STARTUPINFOA sia = {sizeof(sia)}; + sandbox::SboxTestResult ret2 = sandbox::SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + std::string narrow_cmd_line; + if (cmd_line) + narrow_cmd_line = base::SysWideToMultiByte(cmd_line, CP_UTF8); + if (!::CreateProcessA( + exe_name ? base::SysWideToMultiByte(exe_name, CP_UTF8).c_str() : NULL, + cmd_line ? const_cast<char*>(narrow_cmd_line.c_str()) : NULL, + NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &sia, pi.Receive())) { + DWORD last_error = GetLastError(); + if ((ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_QUOTA == last_error) || + (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == last_error) || + (ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND == last_error)) { + ret2 = sandbox::SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } else { + ret2 = sandbox::SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + } else { + ret2 = sandbox::SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + + if (ret1 == ret2) + return ret1; + + return sandbox::SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +// Tries to create the process in argv[0] using 7 different ways. +// Since we also try the Ansi and Unicode version of the CreateProcess API, +// The process referenced by argv[0] will be spawned 14 times. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int Process_RunApp(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 1) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + } + if ((NULL == argv) || (NULL == argv[0])) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + } + std::wstring path = MakeFullPathToSystem32(argv[0]); + + // TEST 1: Try with the path in the app_name. + int result1 = CreateProcessHelper(path, std::wstring()); + + // TEST 2: Try with the path in the cmd_line. + std::wstring cmd_line = L"\""; + cmd_line += path; + cmd_line += L"\""; + int result2 = CreateProcessHelper(std::wstring(), cmd_line); + + // TEST 3: Try file name in the cmd_line. + int result3 = CreateProcessHelper(std::wstring(), argv[0]); + + // TEST 4: Try file name in the app_name and current directory sets correctly. + std::wstring system32 = MakeFullPathToSystem32(L""); + wchar_t current_directory[MAX_PATH + 1]; + int result4; + bool test_succeeded = false; + DWORD ret = ::GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, current_directory); + if (0 != ret && ret < MAX_PATH) { + current_directory[ret] = L'\\'; + current_directory[ret+1] = L'\0'; + if (::SetCurrentDirectory(system32.c_str())) { + result4 = CreateProcessHelper(argv[0], std::wstring()); + if (::SetCurrentDirectory(current_directory)) { + test_succeeded = true; + } + } + } + if (!test_succeeded) + result4 = SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + // TEST 5: Try with the path in the cmd_line and arguments. + cmd_line = L"\""; + cmd_line += path; + cmd_line += L"\" /INSERT"; + int result5 = CreateProcessHelper(std::wstring(), cmd_line); + + // TEST 6: Try with the file_name in the cmd_line and arguments. + cmd_line = argv[0]; + cmd_line += L" /INSERT"; + int result6 = CreateProcessHelper(std::wstring(), cmd_line); + + // TEST 7: Try with the path without the drive. + cmd_line = path.substr(path.find(L'\\')); + int result7 = CreateProcessHelper(std::wstring(), cmd_line); + + // Check if they all returned the same thing. + if ((result1 == result2) && (result2 == result3) && (result3 == result4) && + (result4 == result5) && (result5 == result6) && (result6 == result7)) + return result1; + + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +// Creates a process and checks if it's possible to get a handle to it's token. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int Process_GetChildProcessToken(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 1) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + if ((NULL == argv) || (NULL == argv[0])) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + std::wstring path = MakeFullPathToSystem32(argv[0]); + + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation pi; + STARTUPINFOW si = {sizeof(si)}; + + if (!::CreateProcessW(path.c_str(), NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE, CREATE_SUSPENDED, + NULL, NULL, &si, pi.Receive())) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + + HANDLE token = NULL; + BOOL result = + ::OpenProcessToken(pi.process_handle(), TOKEN_IMPERSONATE, &token); + DWORD error = ::GetLastError(); + + base::win::ScopedHandle token_handle(token); + + if (!::TerminateProcess(pi.process_handle(), 0)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + if (result && token) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + + if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == error) + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int Process_OpenToken(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + HANDLE token; + if (!::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &token)) { + if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } + } else { + ::CloseHandle(token); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +TEST(ProcessPolicyTest, TestAllAccess) { + // Check if the "all access" rule fails to be added when the token is too + // powerful. + TestRunner runner; + + // Check the failing case. + runner.GetPolicy()->SetTokenLevel(USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_LOCKDOWN); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED, + runner.GetPolicy()->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, + TargetPolicy::PROCESS_ALL_EXEC, + L"this is not important")); + + // Check the working case. + runner.GetPolicy()->SetTokenLevel(USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_INTERACTIVE); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_ALL_OK, + runner.GetPolicy()->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, + TargetPolicy::PROCESS_ALL_EXEC, + L"this is not important")); +} + +// This test is disabled. See bug 1305476. +TEST(ProcessPolicyTest, DISABLED_RunFindstrExe) { + TestRunner runner; + std::wstring exe_path = MakeFullPathToSystem32(L"findstr.exe"); + std::wstring system32 = MakeFullPathToSystem32(L""); + ASSERT_TRUE(!exe_path.empty()); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, + TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, + exe_path.c_str())); + + // Need to add directory rules for the directories that we use in + // SetCurrentDirectory. + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY, + system32.c_str())); + + wchar_t current_directory[MAX_PATH]; + DWORD ret = ::GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, current_directory); + ASSERT_TRUE(0 != ret && ret < MAX_PATH); + + wcscat_s(current_directory, MAX_PATH, L"\\"); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddFsRule(TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY, + current_directory)); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Process_RunApp findstr.exe")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Process_RunApp calc.exe")); +} + +TEST(ProcessPolicyTest, OpenToken) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Process_OpenToken")); +} + +TEST(ProcessPolicyTest, TestGetProcessTokenMinAccess) { + TestRunner runner; + std::wstring exe_path = MakeFullPathToSystem32(L"findstr.exe"); + ASSERT_TRUE(!exe_path.empty()); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, + TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, + exe_path.c_str())); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"Process_GetChildProcessToken findstr.exe")); +} + +TEST(ProcessPolicyTest, TestGetProcessTokenMaxAccess) { + TestRunner runner(JOB_UNPROTECTED, USER_INTERACTIVE, USER_INTERACTIVE); + std::wstring exe_path = MakeFullPathToSystem32(L"findstr.exe"); + ASSERT_TRUE(!exe_path.empty()); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, + TargetPolicy::PROCESS_ALL_EXEC, + exe_path.c_str())); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"Process_GetChildProcessToken findstr.exe")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_dispatcher.cc b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_dispatcher.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc137a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_dispatcher.cc @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_dispatcher.h" + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_broker.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" + +namespace { + +// Extracts the application name from a command line. +// +// The application name is the first element of the command line. If +// there is no quotes, the first element is delimited by the first space. +// If there are quotes, the first element is delimited by the quotes. +// +// The create process call is smarter than us. It tries really hard to launch +// the process even if the command line is wrong. For example: +// "c:\program files\test param" will first try to launch c:\program.exe then +// c:\program files\test.exe. We don't do that, we stop after at the first +// space when there is no quotes. +std::wstring GetPathFromCmdLine(const std::wstring &cmd_line) { + std::wstring exe_name; + // Check if it starts with '"'. + if (cmd_line[0] == L'\"') { + // Find the position of the second '"', this terminates the path. + std::wstring::size_type pos = cmd_line.find(L'\"', 1); + if (std::wstring::npos == pos) + return cmd_line; + exe_name = cmd_line.substr(1, pos - 1); + } else { + // There is no '"', that means that the appname is terminated at the + // first space. + std::wstring::size_type pos = cmd_line.find(L' '); + if (std::wstring::npos == pos) { + // There is no space, the cmd_line contains only the app_name + exe_name = cmd_line; + } else { + exe_name = cmd_line.substr(0, pos); + } + } + + return exe_name; +} + +// Returns true is the path in parameter is relative. False if it's +// absolute. +bool IsPathRelative(const std::wstring &path) { + // A path is Relative if it's not a UNC path beginnning with \\ or a + // path beginning with a drive. (i.e. X:\) + if (path.find(L"\\\\") == 0 || path.find(L":\\") == 1) + return false; + return true; +} + +// Converts a relative path to an absolute path. +bool ConvertToAbsolutePath(const std::wstring child_current_directory, + bool use_env_path, std::wstring *path) { + wchar_t file_buffer[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t *file_part = NULL; + + // Here we should start by looking at the path where the child application was + // started. We don't have this information yet. + DWORD result = 0; + if (use_env_path) { + // Try with the complete path + result = ::SearchPath(NULL, path->c_str(), NULL, MAX_PATH, file_buffer, + &file_part); + } + + if (0 == result) { + // Try with the current directory of the child + result = ::SearchPath(child_current_directory.c_str(), path->c_str(), NULL, + MAX_PATH, file_buffer, &file_part); + } + + if (0 == result || result >= MAX_PATH) + return false; + + *path = file_buffer; + return true; +} + +} // namespace +namespace sandbox { + +ThreadProcessDispatcher::ThreadProcessDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base) + : policy_base_(policy_base) { + static const IPCCall open_thread = { + {IPC_NTOPENTHREAD_TAG, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &ThreadProcessDispatcher::NtOpenThread) + }; + + static const IPCCall open_process = { + {IPC_NTOPENPROCESS_TAG, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &ThreadProcessDispatcher::NtOpenProcess) + }; + + static const IPCCall process_token = { + {IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKEN_TAG, VOIDPTR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &ThreadProcessDispatcher::NtOpenProcessToken) + }; + + static const IPCCall process_tokenex = { + {IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKENEX_TAG, VOIDPTR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &ThreadProcessDispatcher::NtOpenProcessTokenEx) + }; + + static const IPCCall create_params = { + {IPC_CREATEPROCESSW_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, WCHAR_TYPE, WCHAR_TYPE, INOUTPTR_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + &ThreadProcessDispatcher::CreateProcessW) + }; + + ipc_calls_.push_back(open_thread); + ipc_calls_.push_back(open_process); + ipc_calls_.push_back(process_token); + ipc_calls_.push_back(process_tokenex); + ipc_calls_.push_back(create_params); +} + +bool ThreadProcessDispatcher::SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, + int service) { + switch (service) { + case IPC_NTOPENTHREAD_TAG: + case IPC_NTOPENPROCESS_TAG: + case IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKEN_TAG: + case IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKENEX_TAG: + // There is no explicit policy for these services. + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + + case IPC_CREATEPROCESSW_TAG: + return INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, L"kernel32.dll", CreateProcessW, + CREATE_PROCESSW_ID, 44) && + INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, L"kernel32.dll", CreateProcessA, + CREATE_PROCESSA_ID, 44); + + default: + return false; + } +} + +bool ThreadProcessDispatcher::NtOpenThread(IPCInfo* ipc, DWORD desired_access, + DWORD thread_id) { + HANDLE handle; + NTSTATUS ret = ProcessPolicy::OpenThreadAction(*ipc->client_info, + desired_access, thread_id, + &handle); + ipc->return_info.nt_status = ret; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +bool ThreadProcessDispatcher::NtOpenProcess(IPCInfo* ipc, DWORD desired_access, + DWORD process_id) { + HANDLE handle; + NTSTATUS ret = ProcessPolicy::OpenProcessAction(*ipc->client_info, + desired_access, process_id, + &handle); + ipc->return_info.nt_status = ret; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +bool ThreadProcessDispatcher::NtOpenProcessToken(IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE process, + DWORD desired_access) { + HANDLE handle; + NTSTATUS ret = ProcessPolicy::OpenProcessTokenAction(*ipc->client_info, + process, desired_access, + &handle); + ipc->return_info.nt_status = ret; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +bool ThreadProcessDispatcher::NtOpenProcessTokenEx(IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE process, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD attributes) { + HANDLE handle; + NTSTATUS ret = ProcessPolicy::OpenProcessTokenExAction(*ipc->client_info, + process, + desired_access, + attributes, &handle); + ipc->return_info.nt_status = ret; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +bool ThreadProcessDispatcher::CreateProcessW(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, + std::wstring* cmd_line, + std::wstring* cur_dir, + CountedBuffer* info) { + if (sizeof(PROCESS_INFORMATION) != info->Size()) + return false; + + // Check if there is an application name. + std::wstring exe_name; + if (!name->empty()) + exe_name = *name; + else + exe_name = GetPathFromCmdLine(*cmd_line); + + if (IsPathRelative(exe_name)) { + if (!ConvertToAbsolutePath(*cur_dir, name->empty(), &exe_name)) { + // Cannot find the path. Maybe the file does not exist. + ipc->return_info.win32_result = ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + return true; + } + } + + const wchar_t* const_exe_name = exe_name.c_str(); + CountedParameterSet<NameBased> params; + params[NameBased::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(const_exe_name); + + EvalResult eval = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_CREATEPROCESSW_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + + PROCESS_INFORMATION* proc_info = + reinterpret_cast<PROCESS_INFORMATION*>(info->Buffer()); + // Here we force the app_name to be the one we used for the policy lookup. + // If our logic was wrong, at least we wont allow create a random process. + DWORD ret = ProcessPolicy::CreateProcessWAction(eval, *ipc->client_info, + exe_name, *cmd_line, + proc_info); + + ipc->return_info.win32_result = ret; + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_dispatcher.h b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_dispatcher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45fad03 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_dispatcher.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_DISPATCHER_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_DISPATCHER_H_ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This class handles process and thread-related IPC calls. +class ThreadProcessDispatcher : public Dispatcher { + public: + explicit ThreadProcessDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base); + ~ThreadProcessDispatcher() {} + + // Dispatcher interface. + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service); + + private: + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtOpenThread() in the target. + bool NtOpenThread(IPCInfo* ipc, DWORD desired_access, DWORD thread_id); + + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtOpenProcess() in the target. + bool NtOpenProcess(IPCInfo* ipc, DWORD desired_access, DWORD process_id); + + // Processes IPC requests from calls to NtOpenProcessToken() in the target. + bool NtOpenProcessToken(IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE process, DWORD desired_access); + + // Processes IPC requests from calls to NtOpenProcessTokenEx() in the target. + bool NtOpenProcessTokenEx(IPCInfo* ipc, HANDLE process, DWORD desired_access, + DWORD attributes); + + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to CreateProcessW() in the target. + bool CreateProcessW(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, std::wstring* cmd_line, + std::wstring* cur_dir, CountedBuffer* info); + + PolicyBase* policy_base_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ThreadProcessDispatcher); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_DISPATCHER_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_interception.cc b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_interception.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e847908 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_interception.cc @@ -0,0 +1,447 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_interception.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_target.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt; + +// Hooks NtOpenThread and proxy the call to the broker if it's trying to +// open a thread in the same process. +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThread(NtOpenThreadFunction orig_OpenThread, + PHANDLE thread, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PCLIENT_ID client_id) { + NTSTATUS status = orig_OpenThread(thread, desired_access, object_attributes, + client_id); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + do { + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + break; + if (!client_id) + break; + + uint32 thread_id = 0; + bool should_break = false; + __try { + // We support only the calls for the current process + if (NULL != client_id->UniqueProcess) + should_break = true; + + // Object attributes should be NULL or empty. + if (!should_break && NULL != object_attributes) { + if (0 != object_attributes->Attributes || + NULL != object_attributes->ObjectName || + NULL != object_attributes->RootDirectory || + NULL != object_attributes->SecurityDescriptor || + NULL != object_attributes->SecurityQualityOfService) { + should_break = true; + } + } + + thread_id = static_cast<uint32>( + reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(client_id->UniqueThread)); + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + + if (should_break) + break; + + if (!ValidParameter(thread, sizeof(HANDLE), WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTOPENTHREAD_TAG, desired_access, + thread_id, &answer); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(answer.nt_status)) + // The nt_status here is most likely STATUS_INVALID_CID because + // in the broker we set the process id in the CID (client ID) param + // to be the current process. If you try to open a thread from another + // process you will get this INVALID_CID error. On the other hand, if you + // try to open a thread in your own process, it should return success. + // We don't want to return STATUS_INVALID_CID here, so we return the + // return of the original open thread status, which is most likely + // STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. + break; + + __try { + // Write the output parameters. + *thread = answer.handle; + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + + return answer.nt_status; + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +// Hooks NtOpenProcess and proxy the call to the broker if it's trying to +// open the current process. +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcess(NtOpenProcessFunction orig_OpenProcess, + PHANDLE process, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PCLIENT_ID client_id) { + NTSTATUS status = orig_OpenProcess(process, desired_access, object_attributes, + client_id); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + do { + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + break; + if (!client_id) + break; + + uint32 process_id = 0; + bool should_break = false; + __try { + // Object attributes should be NULL or empty. + if (!should_break && NULL != object_attributes) { + if (0 != object_attributes->Attributes || + NULL != object_attributes->ObjectName || + NULL != object_attributes->RootDirectory || + NULL != object_attributes->SecurityDescriptor || + NULL != object_attributes->SecurityQualityOfService) { + should_break = true; + } + } + + process_id = static_cast<uint32>( + reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(client_id->UniqueProcess)); + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + + if (should_break) + break; + + if (!ValidParameter(process, sizeof(HANDLE), WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTOPENPROCESS_TAG, desired_access, + process_id, &answer); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(answer.nt_status)) + return answer.nt_status; + + __try { + // Write the output parameters. + *process = answer.handle; + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + + return answer.nt_status; + } while (false); + + return status; +} + + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcessToken( + NtOpenProcessTokenFunction orig_OpenProcessToken, HANDLE process, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, PHANDLE token) { + NTSTATUS status = orig_OpenProcessToken(process, desired_access, token); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + do { + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + break; + + if (CURRENT_PROCESS != process) + break; + + if (!ValidParameter(token, sizeof(HANDLE), WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKEN_TAG, process, + desired_access, &answer); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(answer.nt_status)) + return answer.nt_status; + + __try { + // Write the output parameters. + *token = answer.handle; + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + + return answer.nt_status; + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcessTokenEx( + NtOpenProcessTokenExFunction orig_OpenProcessTokenEx, HANDLE process, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, ULONG handle_attributes, PHANDLE token) { + NTSTATUS status = orig_OpenProcessTokenEx(process, desired_access, + handle_attributes, token); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + do { + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + break; + + if (CURRENT_PROCESS != process) + break; + + if (!ValidParameter(token, sizeof(HANDLE), WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKENEX_TAG, process, + desired_access, handle_attributes, &answer); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(answer.nt_status)) + return answer.nt_status; + + __try { + // Write the output parameters. + *token = answer.handle; + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + + return answer.nt_status; + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +BOOL WINAPI TargetCreateProcessW(CreateProcessWFunction orig_CreateProcessW, + LPCWSTR application_name, LPWSTR command_line, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, + BOOL inherit_handles, DWORD flags, + LPVOID environment, LPCWSTR current_directory, + LPSTARTUPINFOW startup_info, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION process_information) { + if (orig_CreateProcessW(application_name, command_line, process_attributes, + thread_attributes, inherit_handles, flags, + environment, current_directory, startup_info, + process_information)) { + return TRUE; + } + DWORD original_error = ::GetLastError(); + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return FALSE; + + do { + if (!ValidParameter(process_information, sizeof(PROCESS_INFORMATION), + WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + const wchar_t* cur_dir = NULL; + + wchar_t current_directory[MAX_PATH]; + DWORD result = ::GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, current_directory); + if (0 != result && result < MAX_PATH) + cur_dir = current_directory; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + + InOutCountedBuffer proc_info(process_information, + sizeof(PROCESS_INFORMATION)); + + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_CREATEPROCESSW_TAG, application_name, + command_line, cur_dir, proc_info, &answer); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + ::SetLastError(answer.win32_result); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != answer.win32_result) + return FALSE; + + return TRUE; + } while (false); + + ::SetLastError(original_error); + return FALSE; +} + +BOOL WINAPI TargetCreateProcessA(CreateProcessAFunction orig_CreateProcessA, + LPCSTR application_name, LPSTR command_line, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, + BOOL inherit_handles, DWORD flags, + LPVOID environment, LPCSTR current_directory, + LPSTARTUPINFOA startup_info, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION process_information) { + if (orig_CreateProcessA(application_name, command_line, process_attributes, + thread_attributes, inherit_handles, flags, + environment, current_directory, startup_info, + process_information)) { + return TRUE; + } + DWORD original_error = ::GetLastError(); + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return FALSE; + + do { + if (!ValidParameter(process_information, sizeof(PROCESS_INFORMATION), + WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + // Convert the input params to unicode. + UNICODE_STRING *cmd_unicode = NULL; + UNICODE_STRING *app_unicode = NULL; + if (command_line) { + cmd_unicode = AnsiToUnicode(command_line); + if (!cmd_unicode) + break; + } + + if (application_name) { + app_unicode = AnsiToUnicode(application_name); + if (!app_unicode) { + operator delete(cmd_unicode, NT_ALLOC); + break; + } + } + + const wchar_t* cmd_line = cmd_unicode ? cmd_unicode->Buffer : NULL; + const wchar_t* app_name = app_unicode ? app_unicode->Buffer : NULL; + const wchar_t* cur_dir = NULL; + + wchar_t current_directory[MAX_PATH]; + DWORD result = ::GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, current_directory); + if (0 != result && result < MAX_PATH) + cur_dir = current_directory; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + + InOutCountedBuffer proc_info(process_information, + sizeof(PROCESS_INFORMATION)); + + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_CREATEPROCESSW_TAG, app_name, + cmd_line, cur_dir, proc_info, &answer); + + operator delete(cmd_unicode, NT_ALLOC); + operator delete(app_unicode, NT_ALLOC); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + ::SetLastError(answer.win32_result); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != answer.win32_result) + return FALSE; + + return TRUE; + } while (false); + + ::SetLastError(original_error); + return FALSE; +} + +// Creates a thread without registering with CSRSS. This is required if we +// closed the CSRSS ALPC port after lockdown. +HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateThread(CreateThreadFunction orig_CreateThread, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, + SIZE_T stack_size, + LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE start_address, + PVOID parameter, + DWORD creation_flags, + LPDWORD thread_id) { +// Try the normal CreateThread; switch to RtlCreateUserThread if needed. + static bool use_create_thread = true; + HANDLE thread; + if (use_create_thread) { + thread = orig_CreateThread(thread_attributes, stack_size, start_address, + parameter, creation_flags, thread_id); + if (thread) + return thread; + } + + PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd = + thread_attributes ? thread_attributes->lpSecurityDescriptor : NULL; + CLIENT_ID client_id; + + NTSTATUS result = g_nt.RtlCreateUserThread(NtCurrentProcess, sd, + creation_flags & CREATE_SUSPENDED, + 0, stack_size, 0, start_address, + parameter, &thread, &client_id); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(result)) + return 0; + + // CSRSS is closed if we got here, so use RtlCreateUserThread from here on. + use_create_thread = false; + if (thread_id) + *thread_id = HandleToUlong(client_id.UniqueThread); + return thread; +} + +// Cache the default LCID to avoid pinging CSRSS after lockdown. +// TODO(jschuh): This approach will miss a default locale changes after +// lockdown. In the future we may want to have the broker check instead. +LCID WINAPI TargetGetUserDefaultLCID( + GetUserDefaultLCIDFunction orig_GetUserDefaultLCID) { + static LCID default_lcid = orig_GetUserDefaultLCID(); + return default_lcid; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_interception.h b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_interception.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37c2c14 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_interception.h @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_INTERCEPTION_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_INTERCEPTION_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +extern "C" { + +typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CreateProcessWFunction)( + LPCWSTR lpApplicationName, + LPWSTR lpCommandLine, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes, + BOOL bInheritHandles, + DWORD dwCreationFlags, + LPVOID lpEnvironment, + LPCWSTR lpCurrentDirectory, + LPSTARTUPINFOW lpStartupInfo, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation); + +typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CreateProcessAFunction)( + LPCSTR lpApplicationName, + LPSTR lpCommandLine, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes, + BOOL bInheritHandles, + DWORD dwCreationFlags, + LPVOID lpEnvironment, + LPCSTR lpCurrentDirectory, + LPSTARTUPINFOA lpStartupInfo, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation); + +typedef HANDLE (WINAPI *CreateThreadFunction)( + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes, + SIZE_T dwStackSize, + LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress, + PVOID lpParameter, + DWORD dwCreationFlags, + LPDWORD lpThreadId); + +typedef LCID (WINAPI *GetUserDefaultLCIDFunction)(); + +// Interception of NtOpenThread on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenThread( + NtOpenThreadFunction orig_OpenThread, PHANDLE thread, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PCLIENT_ID client_id); + +// Interception of NtOpenProcess on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcess( + NtOpenProcessFunction orig_OpenProcess, PHANDLE process, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + PCLIENT_ID client_id); + +// Interception of NtOpenProcessToken on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcessToken( + NtOpenProcessTokenFunction orig_OpenProcessToken, HANDLE process, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, PHANDLE token); + +// Interception of NtOpenProcessTokenEx on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenProcessTokenEx( + NtOpenProcessTokenExFunction orig_OpenProcessTokenEx, HANDLE process, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, ULONG handle_attributes, PHANDLE token); + +// Interception of CreateProcessW and A in kernel32.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT BOOL WINAPI TargetCreateProcessW( + CreateProcessWFunction orig_CreateProcessW, LPCWSTR application_name, + LPWSTR command_line, LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, BOOL inherit_handles, DWORD flags, + LPVOID environment, LPCWSTR current_directory, LPSTARTUPINFOW startup_info, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION process_information); + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT BOOL WINAPI TargetCreateProcessA( + CreateProcessAFunction orig_CreateProcessA, LPCSTR application_name, + LPSTR command_line, LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, BOOL inherit_handles, DWORD flags, + LPVOID environment, LPCSTR current_directory, LPSTARTUPINFOA startup_info, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION process_information); + +// Interception of CreateThread in kernel32.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateThread( + CreateThreadFunction orig_CreateThread, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes, SIZE_T stack_size, + LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE start_address, PVOID parameter, + DWORD creation_flags, LPDWORD thread_id); + +// Interception of GetUserDefaultLCID in kernel32.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT LCID WINAPI TargetGetUserDefaultLCID( + GetUserDefaultLCIDFunction orig_GetUserDefaultLCID); + +} // extern "C" + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_INTERCEPTION_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_policy.cc b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_policy.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca00916 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_policy.cc @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_policy.h" + +#include <string> + +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { + +// These are the only safe rights that can be given to a sandboxed +// process for the process created by the broker. All others are potential +// vectors of privilege elevation. +const DWORD kProcessRights = SYNCHRONIZE | + PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | + PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | + PROCESS_TERMINATE | + PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME; + +const DWORD kThreadRights = SYNCHRONIZE | + THREAD_TERMINATE | + THREAD_SUSPEND_RESUME | + THREAD_QUERY_INFORMATION | + THREAD_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | + THREAD_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION; + +// Creates a child process and duplicates the handles to 'target_process'. The +// remaining parameters are the same as CreateProcess(). +BOOL CreateProcessExWHelper(HANDLE target_process, BOOL give_full_access, + LPCWSTR lpApplicationName, LPWSTR lpCommandLine, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes, + BOOL bInheritHandles, DWORD dwCreationFlags, + LPVOID lpEnvironment, LPCWSTR lpCurrentDirectory, + LPSTARTUPINFOW lpStartupInfo, + LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation) { + if (!::CreateProcessW(lpApplicationName, lpCommandLine, lpProcessAttributes, + lpThreadAttributes, bInheritHandles, dwCreationFlags, + lpEnvironment, lpCurrentDirectory, lpStartupInfo, + lpProcessInformation)) { + return FALSE; + } + + DWORD process_access = kProcessRights; + DWORD thread_access = kThreadRights; + if (give_full_access) { + process_access = PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS; + thread_access = THREAD_ALL_ACCESS; + } + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), lpProcessInformation->hProcess, + target_process, &lpProcessInformation->hProcess, + process_access, FALSE, DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE)) { + ::CloseHandle(lpProcessInformation->hThread); + return FALSE; + } + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), lpProcessInformation->hThread, + target_process, &lpProcessInformation->hThread, + thread_access, FALSE, DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE)) { + return FALSE; + } + return TRUE; +} + +} + +namespace sandbox { + +bool ProcessPolicy::GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy) { + scoped_ptr<PolicyRule> process; + switch (semantics) { + case TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC: { + process.reset(new PolicyRule(GIVE_READONLY)); + break; + }; + case TargetPolicy::PROCESS_ALL_EXEC: { + process.reset(new PolicyRule(GIVE_ALLACCESS)); + break; + }; + default: { + return false; + }; + } + + if (!process->AddStringMatch(IF, NameBased::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE)) { + return false; + } + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_CREATEPROCESSW_TAG, process.get())) { + return false; + } + return true; +} + +NTSTATUS ProcessPolicy::OpenThreadAction(const ClientInfo& client_info, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 thread_id, + HANDLE* handle) { + *handle = NULL; + + NtOpenThreadFunction NtOpenThread = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtOpenThread", &NtOpenThread); + + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attributes = {0}; + attributes.Length = sizeof(attributes); + CLIENT_ID client_id = {0}; + client_id.UniqueProcess = reinterpret_cast<PVOID>( + static_cast<ULONG_PTR>(client_info.process_id)); + client_id.UniqueThread = + reinterpret_cast<PVOID>(static_cast<ULONG_PTR>(thread_id)); + + HANDLE local_handle; + NTSTATUS status = NtOpenThread(&local_handle, desired_access, &attributes, + &client_id); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + client_info.process, handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + } + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS ProcessPolicy::OpenProcessAction(const ClientInfo& client_info, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 process_id, + HANDLE* handle) { + *handle = NULL; + + NtOpenProcessFunction NtOpenProcess = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtOpenProcess", &NtOpenProcess); + + if (client_info.process_id != process_id) + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attributes = {0}; + attributes.Length = sizeof(attributes); + CLIENT_ID client_id = {0}; + client_id.UniqueProcess = reinterpret_cast<PVOID>( + static_cast<ULONG_PTR>(client_info.process_id)); + HANDLE local_handle; + NTSTATUS status = NtOpenProcess(&local_handle, desired_access, &attributes, + &client_id); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + client_info.process, handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + } + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS ProcessPolicy::OpenProcessTokenAction(const ClientInfo& client_info, + HANDLE process, + uint32 desired_access, + HANDLE* handle) { + *handle = NULL; + NtOpenProcessTokenFunction NtOpenProcessToken = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtOpenProcessToken", &NtOpenProcessToken); + + if (CURRENT_PROCESS != process) + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + + HANDLE local_handle; + NTSTATUS status = NtOpenProcessToken(client_info.process, desired_access, + &local_handle); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + client_info.process, handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + } + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS ProcessPolicy::OpenProcessTokenExAction(const ClientInfo& client_info, + HANDLE process, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 attributes, + HANDLE* handle) { + *handle = NULL; + NtOpenProcessTokenExFunction NtOpenProcessTokenEx = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtOpenProcessTokenEx", &NtOpenProcessTokenEx); + + if (CURRENT_PROCESS != process) + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + + HANDLE local_handle; + NTSTATUS status = NtOpenProcessTokenEx(client_info.process, desired_access, + attributes, &local_handle); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + client_info.process, handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + } + return status; +} + +DWORD ProcessPolicy::CreateProcessWAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &app_name, + const std::wstring &command_line, + PROCESS_INFORMATION* process_info) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means create the process. + if (GIVE_ALLACCESS != eval_result && GIVE_READONLY != eval_result) { + return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + STARTUPINFO startup_info = {0}; + startup_info.cb = sizeof(startup_info); + scoped_ptr_malloc<wchar_t> cmd_line(_wcsdup(command_line.c_str())); + + BOOL should_give_full_access = (GIVE_ALLACCESS == eval_result); + if (!CreateProcessExWHelper(client_info.process, should_give_full_access, + app_name.c_str(), cmd_line.get(), NULL, NULL, + FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &startup_info, + process_info)) { + return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_policy.h b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_policy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78323cc --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/process_thread_policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_POLICY_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_POLICY_H_ + +#include <string> + +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +enum EvalResult; + +// This class centralizes most of the knowledge related to process execution. +class ProcessPolicy { + public: + // Creates the required low-level policy rules to evaluate a high-level. + // policy rule for process creation + // 'name' is the executable to be spawn. + // 'semantics' is the desired semantics. + // 'policy' is the policy generator to which the rules are going to be added. + static bool GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy); + + // Opens a thread from the child process and returns the handle. + // client_info contains the information about the child process, + // desired_access is the access requested by the child and thread_id + // is the thread_id to be opened. + // The function returns the return value of NtOpenThread. + static NTSTATUS OpenThreadAction(const ClientInfo& client_info, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 thread_id, + HANDLE* handle); + + // Opens the process id passed in and returns the duplicated handle to + // the child. We only allow the child processes to open themselves. Any other + // pid open is denied. + static NTSTATUS OpenProcessAction(const ClientInfo& client_info, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 process_id, + HANDLE* handle); + + // Opens the token associated with the process and returns the duplicated + // handle to the child. We only allow the child processes to open his own + // token (using ::GetCurrentProcess()). + static NTSTATUS OpenProcessTokenAction(const ClientInfo& client_info, + HANDLE process, + uint32 desired_access, + HANDLE* handle); + + // Opens the token associated with the process and returns the duplicated + // handle to the child. We only allow the child processes to open his own + // token (using ::GetCurrentProcess()). + static NTSTATUS OpenProcessTokenExAction(const ClientInfo& client_info, + HANDLE process, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 attributes, + HANDLE* handle); + + // Processes a 'CreateProcessW()' request from the target. + // 'client_info' : the target process that is making the request. + // 'eval_result' : The desired policy action to accomplish. + // 'app_name' : The full path of the process to be created. + // 'command_line' : The command line passed to the created process. + static DWORD CreateProcessWAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &app_name, + const std::wstring &command_line, + PROCESS_INFORMATION* process_info); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_PROCESS_THREAD_POLICY_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/registry_dispatcher.cc b/sandbox/win/src/registry_dispatcher.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f86c76a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/registry_dispatcher.cc @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/registry_dispatcher.h" + +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_broker.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/registry_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/registry_policy.h" + +namespace { + +// Builds a path using the root directory and the name. +bool GetCompletePath(HANDLE root, const std::wstring& name, + std::wstring* complete_name) { + if (root) { + if (!sandbox::GetPathFromHandle(root, complete_name)) + return false; + + *complete_name += L"\\"; + *complete_name += name; + } else { + *complete_name = name; + } + + return true; +} + +} + +namespace sandbox { + +RegistryDispatcher::RegistryDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base) + : policy_base_(policy_base) { + static const IPCCall create_params = { + {IPC_NTCREATEKEY_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, VOIDPTR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, + ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>(&RegistryDispatcher::NtCreateKey) + }; + + static const IPCCall open_params = { + {IPC_NTOPENKEY_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, VOIDPTR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>(&RegistryDispatcher::NtOpenKey) + }; + + ipc_calls_.push_back(create_params); + ipc_calls_.push_back(open_params); +} + +bool RegistryDispatcher::SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, + int service) { + if (IPC_NTCREATEKEY_TAG == service) + return INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtCreateKey, CREATE_KEY_ID, 32); + + if (IPC_NTOPENKEY_TAG == service) { + bool result = INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenKey, OPEN_KEY_ID, 16); + if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN7) + result &= INTERCEPT_NT(manager, NtOpenKeyEx, OPEN_KEY_EX_ID, 20); + return result; + } + + return false; +} + +bool RegistryDispatcher::NtCreateKey( + IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, HANDLE root, + DWORD desired_access, DWORD title_index, DWORD create_options) { + base::win::ScopedHandle root_handle; + std::wstring real_path = *name; + + // If there is a root directory, we need to duplicate the handle to make + // it valid in this process. + if (root) { + if (!::DuplicateHandle(ipc->client_info->process, root, + ::GetCurrentProcess(), &root, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) + return false; + + root_handle.Set(root); + } + + if (!GetCompletePath(root, *name, &real_path)) + return false; + + const wchar_t* regname = real_path.c_str(); + CountedParameterSet<OpenKey> params; + params[OpenKey::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(regname); + params[OpenKey::ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(desired_access); + + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_NTCREATEKEY_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + + HANDLE handle; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + ULONG disposition = 0; + if (!RegistryPolicy::CreateKeyAction(result, *ipc->client_info, *name, + attributes, root, desired_access, + title_index, create_options, &handle, + &nt_status, &disposition)) { + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.extended[0].unsigned_int = disposition; + ipc->return_info.nt_status = nt_status; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +bool RegistryDispatcher::NtOpenKey(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, + DWORD attributes, HANDLE root, + DWORD desired_access) { + base::win::ScopedHandle root_handle; + std::wstring real_path = *name; + + // If there is a root directory, we need to duplicate the handle to make + // it valid in this process. + if (root) { + if (!::DuplicateHandle(ipc->client_info->process, root, + ::GetCurrentProcess(), &root, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) + return false; + root_handle.Set(root); + } + + if (!GetCompletePath(root, *name, &real_path)) + return false; + + const wchar_t* regname = real_path.c_str(); + CountedParameterSet<OpenKey> params; + params[OpenKey::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(regname); + params[OpenKey::ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(desired_access); + + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_NTOPENKEY_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + HANDLE handle; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + if (!RegistryPolicy::OpenKeyAction(result, *ipc->client_info, *name, + attributes, root, desired_access, &handle, + &nt_status)) { + ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.nt_status = nt_status; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/registry_dispatcher.h b/sandbox/win/src/registry_dispatcher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d1390d --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/registry_dispatcher.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_DISPATCHER_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_DISPATCHER_H_ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This class handles registry-related IPC calls. +class RegistryDispatcher : public Dispatcher { + public: + explicit RegistryDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base); + ~RegistryDispatcher() {} + + // Dispatcher interface. + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service); + + private: + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtCreateKey in the target. + bool NtCreateKey(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, + HANDLE root, DWORD desired_access, + DWORD title_index, DWORD create_options); + + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to NtOpenKey in the target. + bool NtOpenKey(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD attributes, + HANDLE root, DWORD desired_access); + + PolicyBase* policy_base_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(RegistryDispatcher); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_DISPATCHER_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/registry_interception.cc b/sandbox/win/src/registry_interception.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3cabf47 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/registry_interception.cc @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/registry_interception.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtCreateKey(NtCreateKeyFunction orig_CreateKey, + PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + ULONG title_index, PUNICODE_STRING class_name, + ULONG create_options, PULONG disposition) { + // Check if the process can create it first. + NTSTATUS status = orig_CreateKey(key, desired_access, object_attributes, + title_index, class_name, create_options, + disposition); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return status; + + do { + if (!ValidParameter(key, sizeof(HANDLE), WRITE)) + break; + + if (disposition && !ValidParameter(disposition, sizeof(ULONG), WRITE)) + break; + + // At this point we don't support class_name. + if (class_name && class_name->Buffer && class_name->Length) + break; + + // We don't support creating link keys, volatile keys and backup/restore. + if (create_options) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + wchar_t* name; + uint32 attributes = 0; + HANDLE root_directory = 0; + NTSTATUS ret = AllocAndCopyName(object_attributes, &name, &attributes, + &root_directory); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || NULL == name) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTCREATEKEY_TAG, name, attributes, + root_directory, desired_access, title_index, + create_options, &answer); + + operator delete(name, NT_ALLOC); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(answer.nt_status)) + // TODO(nsylvain): We should return answer.nt_status here instead + // of status. We can do this only after we checked the policy. + // otherwise we will returns ACCESS_DENIED for all paths + // that are not specified by a policy, even though your token allows + // access to that path, and the original call had a more meaningful + // error. Bug 4369 + break; + + __try { + *key = answer.handle; + + if (disposition) + *disposition = answer.extended[0].unsigned_int; + + status = answer.nt_status; + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI CommonNtOpenKey(NTSTATUS status, PHANDLE key, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes) { + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return status; + + do { + if (!ValidParameter(key, sizeof(HANDLE), WRITE)) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + wchar_t* name; + uint32 attributes; + HANDLE root_directory; + NTSTATUS ret = AllocAndCopyName(object_attributes, &name, &attributes, + &root_directory); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || NULL == name) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_NTOPENKEY_TAG, name, attributes, + root_directory, desired_access, &answer); + + operator delete(name, NT_ALLOC); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(answer.nt_status)) + // TODO(nsylvain): We should return answer.nt_status here instead + // of status. We can do this only after we checked the policy. + // otherwise we will returns ACCESS_DENIED for all paths + // that are not specified by a policy, even though your token allows + // access to that path, and the original call had a more meaningful + // error. Bug 4369 + break; + + __try { + *key = answer.handle; + status = answer.nt_status; + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + break; + } + } while (false); + + return status; +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenKey(NtOpenKeyFunction orig_OpenKey, PHANDLE key, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes) { + // Check if the process can open it first. + NTSTATUS status = orig_OpenKey(key, desired_access, object_attributes); + if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + return CommonNtOpenKey(status, key, desired_access, object_attributes); +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenKeyEx(NtOpenKeyExFunction orig_OpenKeyEx, + PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, + ULONG open_options) { + // Check if the process can open it first. + NTSTATUS status = orig_OpenKeyEx(key, desired_access, object_attributes, + open_options); + + // We do not support open_options at this time. The 2 current known values + // are REG_OPTION_CREATE_LINK, to open a symbolic link, and + // REG_OPTION_BACKUP_RESTORE to open the key with special privileges. + if (NT_SUCCESS(status) || open_options != 0) + return status; + + return CommonNtOpenKey(status, key, desired_access, object_attributes); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/registry_interception.h b/sandbox/win/src/registry_interception.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7036c49 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/registry_interception.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_INTERCEPTION_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_INTERCEPTION_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +extern "C" { + +// Interception of NtCreateKey on the child process. +// It should never be called directly +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtCreateKey( + NtCreateKeyFunction orig_CreateKey, PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, ULONG title_index, + PUNICODE_STRING class_name, ULONG create_options, PULONG disposition); + +// Interception of NtOpenKey on the child process. +// It should never be called directly +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenKey( + NtOpenKeyFunction orig_OpenKey, PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes); + +// Interception of NtOpenKeyEx on the child process. +// It should never be called directly +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtOpenKeyEx( + NtOpenKeyExFunction orig_OpenKeyEx, PHANDLE key, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES object_attributes, ULONG open_options); + +} // extern "C" + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_INTERCEPTION_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy.cc b/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..497636f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy.cc @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <string> + +#include "sandbox/src/registry_policy.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { + +static const DWORD kAllowedRegFlags = KEY_QUERY_VALUE | KEY_ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS | + KEY_NOTIFY | KEY_READ | GENERIC_READ | + GENERIC_EXECUTE | READ_CONTROL; + +// Opens the key referenced by |obj_attributes| with |access| and +// checks what permission was given. Remove the WRITE flags and update +// |access| with the new value. +NTSTATUS TranslateMaximumAllowed(OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* obj_attributes, + DWORD* access) { + NtOpenKeyFunction NtOpenKey = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtOpenKey", &NtOpenKey); + + NtCloseFunction NtClose = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtClose", &NtClose); + + NtQueryObjectFunction NtQueryObject = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &NtQueryObject); + + // Open the key. + HANDLE handle; + NTSTATUS status = NtOpenKey(&handle, *access, obj_attributes); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION info = {0}; + status = NtQueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &info, sizeof(info), + NULL); + NtClose(handle); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + *access = info.GrantedAccess & kAllowedRegFlags; + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +NTSTATUS NtCreateKeyInTarget(HANDLE* target_key_handle, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* obj_attributes, + ULONG title_index, + UNICODE_STRING* class_name, + ULONG create_options, + ULONG* disposition, + HANDLE target_process) { + NtCreateKeyFunction NtCreateKey = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtCreateKey", &NtCreateKey); + + if (MAXIMUM_ALLOWED & desired_access) { + NTSTATUS status = TranslateMaximumAllowed(obj_attributes, &desired_access); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + HANDLE local_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + NTSTATUS status = NtCreateKey(&local_handle, desired_access, obj_attributes, + title_index, class_name, create_options, + disposition); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + target_process, target_key_handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +NTSTATUS NtOpenKeyInTarget(HANDLE* target_key_handle, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* obj_attributes, + HANDLE target_process) { + NtOpenKeyFunction NtOpenKey = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtOpenKey", &NtOpenKey); + + if (MAXIMUM_ALLOWED & desired_access) { + NTSTATUS status = TranslateMaximumAllowed(obj_attributes, &desired_access); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + HANDLE local_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + NTSTATUS status = NtOpenKey(&local_handle, desired_access, obj_attributes); + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return status; + + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + target_process, target_key_handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +} + +namespace sandbox { + +bool RegistryPolicy::GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy) { + std::wstring resovled_name(name); + if (resovled_name.empty()) { + return false; + } + + if (!ResolveRegistryName(resovled_name, &resovled_name)) + return false; + + name = resovled_name.c_str(); + + EvalResult result = ASK_BROKER; + + PolicyRule open(result); + PolicyRule create(result); + + switch (semantics) { + case TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY: { + // We consider all flags that are not known to be readonly as potentially + // used for write. Here we also support MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, but we are going + // to expand it to read-only before the call. + DWORD restricted_flags = ~(kAllowedRegFlags | MAXIMUM_ALLOWED); + open.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenKey::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND); + create.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenKey::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND); + break; + } + case TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY: { + break; + } + default: { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + } + + if (!create.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenKey::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) || + !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTCREATEKEY_TAG, &create)) { + return false; + } + + if (!open.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenKey::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE) || + !policy->AddRule(IPC_NTOPENKEY_TAG, &open)) { + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +bool RegistryPolicy::CreateKeyAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &key, + uint32 attributes, + HANDLE root_directory, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 title_index, + uint32 create_options, + HANDLE* handle, + NTSTATUS* nt_status, + ULONG* disposition) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means create the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return false; + } + + // We don't support creating link keys, volatile keys or backup/restore. + if (create_options) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return false; + } + + UNICODE_STRING uni_name = {0}; + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitObjectAttribs(key, attributes, root_directory, &obj_attributes, + &uni_name); + *nt_status = NtCreateKeyInTarget(handle, desired_access, &obj_attributes, + title_index, NULL, create_options, + disposition, client_info.process); + return true; +} + +bool RegistryPolicy::OpenKeyAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &key, + uint32 attributes, + HANDLE root_directory, + uint32 desired_access, + HANDLE* handle, + NTSTATUS* nt_status) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means open the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) { + *nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + return true; + } + + UNICODE_STRING uni_name = {0}; + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attributes = {0}; + InitObjectAttribs(key, attributes, root_directory, &obj_attributes, + &uni_name); + *nt_status = NtOpenKeyInTarget(handle, desired_access, &obj_attributes, + client_info.process); + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy.h b/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da41d1c --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_POLICY_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_POLICY_H__ + +#include <string> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +enum EvalResult; + +// This class centralizes most of the knowledge related to registry policy +class RegistryPolicy { + public: + // Creates the required low-level policy rules to evaluate a high-level + // policy rule for registry IO, in particular open or create actions. + static bool GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy); + + // Performs the desired policy action on a create request with an + // API that is compatible with the IPC-received parameters. + static bool CreateKeyAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &key, + uint32 attributes, + HANDLE root_directory, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 title_index, + uint32 create_options, + HANDLE* handle, + NTSTATUS* nt_status, + ULONG* disposition); + + // Performs the desired policy action on an open request with an + // API that is compatible with the IPC-received parameters. + static bool OpenKeyAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &key, + uint32 attributes, + HANDLE root_directory, + uint32 desired_access, + HANDLE* handle, + NTSTATUS* nt_status); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_REGISTRY_POLICY_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cdc1577 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/registry_policy_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <shlobj.h> + +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" +#include "sandbox/src/registry_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" + +namespace { + +static const DWORD kAllowedRegFlags = KEY_QUERY_VALUE | KEY_ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS | + KEY_NOTIFY | KEY_READ | GENERIC_READ | + GENERIC_EXECUTE | READ_CONTROL; + +#define BINDNTDLL(name) \ + name ## Function name = reinterpret_cast<name ## Function>( \ + ::GetProcAddress(::GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"), #name)) + +bool IsKeyOpenForRead(HKEY handle) { + BINDNTDLL(NtQueryObject); + + OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION info = {0}; + NTSTATUS status = NtQueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &info, + sizeof(info), NULL); + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + return false; + + if ((info.GrantedAccess & (~kAllowedRegFlags)) != 0) + return false; + return true; +} + +} + +namespace sandbox { + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int Reg_OpenKey(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 4) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + REGSAM desired_access = 0; + ULONG options = 0; + if (wcscmp(argv[1], L"read") == 0) { + desired_access = KEY_READ; + } else if (wcscmp(argv[1], L"write") == 0) { + desired_access = KEY_ALL_ACCESS; + } else if (wcscmp(argv[1], L"link") == 0) { + options = REG_OPTION_CREATE_LINK; + desired_access = KEY_ALL_ACCESS; + } else { + desired_access = MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; + } + + HKEY root = GetReservedKeyFromName(argv[2]); + HKEY key; + LRESULT result = 0; + + if (wcscmp(argv[0], L"create") == 0) + result = ::RegCreateKeyEx(root, argv[3], 0, NULL, options, desired_access, + NULL, &key, NULL); + else + result = ::RegOpenKeyEx(root, argv[3], 0, desired_access, &key); + + if (ERROR_SUCCESS == result) { + if (MAXIMUM_ALLOWED == desired_access) { + if (!IsKeyOpenForRead(key)) { + ::RegCloseKey(key); + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + } + ::RegCloseKey(key); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } else if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == result) { + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + } + + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +TEST(RegistryPolicyTest, TestKeyAnyAccess) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft")); + + // Tests read access on key allowed for read-write. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey create read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\microsoft")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey open read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\microsoft")); + + if (::IsUserAnAdmin()) { + // Tests write access on key allowed for read-write. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey create write HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\microsoft")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey open write HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\microsoft")); + } + + // Tests subdirectory access on keys where we don't have subdirectory acess. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Reg_OpenKey create read " + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\microsoft\\Windows")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Reg_OpenKey open read " + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\microsoft\\windows")); + + // Tests to see if we can create keys where we dont have subdirectory access. + // This is denied. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Reg_OpenKey create write " + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\Microsoft\\google_unit_tests")); + + RegDeleteKey(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, L"software\\Microsoft\\google_unit_tests"); + + // Tests if we need to handle differently the "\\" at the end. + // This is denied. We need to add both rules. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey create read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\microsoft\\")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey open read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\microsoft\\")); +} + +TEST(RegistryPolicyTest, TestKeyNoAccess) { + TestRunner runner; + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE")); + + // Tests read access where we don't have access at all. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey create read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey open read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software")); +} + +TEST(RegistryPolicyTest, TestKeyReadOnlyAccess) { + TestRunner runner; + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\*")); + + // Tests subdirectory acess on keys where we have subdirectory acess. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Reg_OpenKey create read " + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\Policies\\microsoft")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Reg_OpenKey open read " + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\Policies\\microsoft")); + + // Tests to see if we can create keys where we have subdirectory access. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Reg_OpenKey create write " + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\Policies\\google_unit_tests")); + + RegDeleteKey(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, L"software\\Policies\\google_unit_tests"); +} + +TEST(RegistryPolicyTest, TestKeyAllAccessSubDir) { + TestRunner runner; + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\*")); + + if (::IsUserAnAdmin()) { + // Tests to see if we can create keys where we have subdirectory access. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Reg_OpenKey create write " + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\Policies\\google_unit_tests")); + + RegDeleteKey(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, L"software\\Policies\\google_unit_tests"); + } +} + +TEST(RegistryPolicyTest, TestKeyCreateLink) { + TestRunner runner; + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\*")); + + // Tests to see if we can create a registry link key. + // NOTE: In theory here we should make sure to check for SBOX_TEST_DENIED + // instead of !SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, but unfortunately the result is not + // access denied. Internally RegCreateKeyEx (At least on Vista 64) tries to + // create the link, and we return successfully access denied, then, it + // decides to try to break the path in multiple chunks, and create the links + // one by one. In this scenario, it tries to create "HKLM\Software" as a + // link key, which obviously fail with STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION, and + // this is what is returned to the user. + EXPECT_NE(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Reg_OpenKey create link " + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE software\\Policies\\google_unit_tests")); + + // In case our code fails, and the call works, we need to delete the new + // link. There is no api for this, so we need to use the NT call. + HKEY key = NULL; + LRESULT result = ::RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, + L"software\\Policies\\google_unit_tests", + REG_OPTION_OPEN_LINK, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, + &key); + + if (!result) { + HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"); + NtDeleteKeyFunction NtDeleteKey = + reinterpret_cast<NtDeleteKeyFunction>(GetProcAddress(ntdll, + "NtDeleteKey")); + NtDeleteKey(key); + } +} + +TEST(RegistryPolicyTest, TestKeyReadOnlyHKCU) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_USERS\\.default")); + + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"HKEY_USERS\\.default\\software")); + + // Tests read access where we only have read-only access. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey create read HKEY_CURRENT_USER software")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey open read HKEY_CURRENT_USER software")); + + // Tests write access where we only have read-only acess. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey create write HKEY_CURRENT_USER software")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey open write HKEY_CURRENT_USER software")); + + // Tests maximum allowed access where we only have read-only access. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey create maximum_allowed HKEY_CURRENT_USER software")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest( + L"Reg_OpenKey open maximum_allowed HKEY_CURRENT_USER software")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/resolver.cc b/sandbox/win/src/resolver.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..295bfb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/resolver.cc @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/resolver.h" + +#include "base/win/pe_image.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +NTSTATUS ResolverThunk::Init(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes) { + if (NULL == thunk_storage || 0 == storage_bytes || + NULL == target_module || NULL == target_name) + return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + if (storage_bytes < GetThunkSize()) + return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + NTSTATUS ret = STATUS_SUCCESS; + if (NULL == interceptor_entry_point) { + ret = ResolveInterceptor(interceptor_module, interceptor_name, + &interceptor_entry_point); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + } + + ret = ResolveTarget(target_module, target_name, &target_); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + + interceptor_ = interceptor_entry_point; + + return ret; +} + +NTSTATUS ResolverThunk::ResolveInterceptor(const void* interceptor_module, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void** address) { + DCHECK_NT(address); + if (!interceptor_module) + return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + base::win::PEImage pe(interceptor_module); + if (!pe.VerifyMagic()) + return STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_FORMAT; + + *address = pe.GetProcAddress(interceptor_name); + + if (!(*address)) + return STATUS_PROCEDURE_NOT_FOUND; + + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/resolver.h b/sandbox/win/src/resolver.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ec0bf5 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/resolver.h @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Defines ResolverThunk, the interface for classes that perform interceptions. +// For more details see +// http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox . + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_RESOLVER_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_RESOLVER_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +// A resolver is the object in charge of performing the actual interception of +// a function. There should be a concrete implementation of a resolver roughly +// per type of interception. +class ResolverThunk { + public: + ResolverThunk() {} + virtual ~ResolverThunk() {} + + // Performs the actual interception of a function. + // target_name is an exported function from the module loaded at + // target_module, and must be replaced by interceptor_name, exported from + // interceptor_module. interceptor_entry_point can be provided instead of + // interceptor_name / interceptor_module. + // thunk_storage must point to a buffer on the child's address space, to hold + // the patch thunk, and related data. If provided, storage_used will receive + // the number of bytes used from thunk_storage. + // + // Example: (without error checking) + // + // size_t size = resolver.GetThunkSize(); + // char* buffer = ::VirtualAllocEx(child_process, NULL, size, + // MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE); + // resolver.Setup(ntdll_module, NULL, L"NtCreateFile", NULL, + // &MyReplacementFunction, buffer, size, NULL); + // + // In general, the idea is to allocate a single big buffer for all + // interceptions on the same dll, and call Setup n times. + // WARNING: This means that any data member that is specific to a single + // interception must be reset within this method. + virtual NTSTATUS Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used) = 0; + + // Gets the address of function_name inside module (main exe). + virtual NTSTATUS ResolveInterceptor(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + const void** address); + + // Gets the address of an exported function_name inside module. + virtual NTSTATUS ResolveTarget(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + void** address); + + // Gets the required buffer size for this type of thunk. + virtual size_t GetThunkSize() const = 0; + + protected: + // Performs basic initialization on behalf of a concrete instance of a + // resolver. That is, parameter validation and resolution of the target + // and the interceptor into the member variables. + // + // target_name is an exported function from the module loaded at + // target_module, and must be replaced by interceptor_name, exported from + // interceptor_module. interceptor_entry_point can be provided instead of + // interceptor_name / interceptor_module. + // thunk_storage must point to a buffer on the child's address space, to hold + // the patch thunk, and related data. + virtual NTSTATUS Init(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes); + + // Gets the required buffer size for the internal part of the thunk. + size_t GetInternalThunkSize() const; + + // Initializes the internal part of the thunk. + // interceptor is the function to be called instead of original_function. + bool SetInternalThunk(void* storage, size_t storage_bytes, + const void* original_function, const void* interceptor); + + // Holds the resolved interception target. + void* target_; + // Holds the resolved interception interceptor. + const void* interceptor_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ResolverThunk); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_RESOLVER_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/resolver_32.cc b/sandbox/win/src/resolver_32.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae5c168 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/resolver_32.cc @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/resolver.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +namespace { + +#pragma pack(push, 1) +struct InternalThunk { + // This struct contains roughly the following code: + // sub esp, 8 // Create working space + // push edx // Save register + // mov edx, [esp + 0xc] // Get return adddress + // mov [esp + 8], edx // Store return address + // mov dword ptr [esp + 0xc], 0x7c401200 // Store extra argument + // mov dword ptr [esp + 4], 0x40010203 // Store address to jump to + // pop edx // Restore register + // ret // Jump to interceptor + // + // This code only modifies esp and eip so it must work with to normal calling + // convention. It is assembled as: + // + // 00 83ec08 sub esp,8 + // 03 52 push edx + // 04 8b54240c mov edx,dword ptr [esp + 0Ch] + // 08 89542408 mov dword ptr [esp + 8], edx + // 0c c744240c0012407c mov dword ptr [esp + 0Ch], 7C401200h + // 14 c744240403020140 mov dword ptr [esp + 4], 40010203h + // 1c 5a pop edx + // 1d c3 ret + InternalThunk() { + opcodes_1 = 0x5208ec83; + opcodes_2 = 0x0c24548b; + opcodes_3 = 0x08245489; + opcodes_4 = 0x0c2444c7; + opcodes_5 = 0x042444c7; + opcodes_6 = 0xc35a; + extra_argument = 0; + interceptor_function = 0; + }; + ULONG opcodes_1; // = 0x5208ec83 + ULONG opcodes_2; // = 0x0c24548b + ULONG opcodes_3; // = 0x08245489 + ULONG opcodes_4; // = 0x0c2444c7 + ULONG extra_argument; + ULONG opcodes_5; // = 0x042444c7 + ULONG interceptor_function; + USHORT opcodes_6; // = 0xc35a +}; +#pragma pack(pop) + +}; // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +bool ResolverThunk::SetInternalThunk(void* storage, size_t storage_bytes, + const void* original_function, + const void* interceptor) { + if (storage_bytes < sizeof(InternalThunk)) + return false; + + InternalThunk* thunk = new(storage, NT_PLACE) InternalThunk; + +#pragma warning(push) +#pragma warning(disable: 4311) + // These casts generate warnings because they are 32 bit specific. + thunk->interceptor_function = reinterpret_cast<ULONG>(interceptor); + thunk->extra_argument = reinterpret_cast<ULONG>(original_function); +#pragma warning(pop) + + return true; +} + +size_t ResolverThunk::GetInternalThunkSize() const { + return sizeof(InternalThunk); +} + +NTSTATUS ResolverThunk::ResolveTarget(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + void** address) { + const void** casted = const_cast<const void**>(address); + return ResolverThunk::ResolveInterceptor(module, function_name, casted); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/resolver_64.cc b/sandbox/win/src/resolver_64.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96d039b --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/resolver_64.cc @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/resolver.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +namespace { + +const BYTE kPushRax = 0x50; +const USHORT kMovRax = 0xB848; +const ULONG kMovRspRax = 0x24048948; +const BYTE kRetNp = 0xC3; + +#pragma pack(push, 1) +struct InternalThunk { + // This struct contains roughly the following code: + // 00 50 push rax + // 01 48b8f0debc9a78563412 mov rax,123456789ABCDEF0h + // 0b 48890424 mov qword ptr [rsp],rax + // 0f c3 ret + // + // The code modifies rax, but that should not be an issue for the common + // calling conventions. + + InternalThunk() { + push_rax = kPushRax; + mov_rax = kMovRax; + interceptor_function = 0; + mov_rsp_rax = kMovRspRax; + ret = kRetNp; + }; + BYTE push_rax; // = 50 + USHORT mov_rax; // = 48 B8 + ULONG_PTR interceptor_function; + ULONG mov_rsp_rax; // = 48 89 04 24 + BYTE ret; // = C3 +}; +#pragma pack(pop) + +} // namespace. + +namespace sandbox { + +size_t ResolverThunk::GetInternalThunkSize() const { + return sizeof(InternalThunk); +} + +bool ResolverThunk::SetInternalThunk(void* storage, size_t storage_bytes, + const void* original_function, + const void* interceptor) { + if (storage_bytes < sizeof(InternalThunk)) + return false; + + InternalThunk* thunk = new(storage, NT_PLACE) InternalThunk; + thunk->interceptor_function = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(interceptor); + + return true; +} + +NTSTATUS ResolverThunk::ResolveTarget(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + void** address) { + // We don't support sidestep & co. + return STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token.cc b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bac8816 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token.cc @@ -0,0 +1,466 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token.h" + +#include <vector> + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "sandbox/src/acl.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + + +namespace sandbox { + +unsigned RestrictedToken::Init(const HANDLE effective_token) { + DCHECK(!init_); + if (init_) + return ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED; + + if (effective_token) { + // We duplicate the handle to be able to use it even if the original handle + // is closed. + HANDLE effective_token_dup; + if (::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), + effective_token, + ::GetCurrentProcess(), + &effective_token_dup, + DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS, + FALSE, + 0)) { // no special options + effective_token_ = effective_token_dup; + } else { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + } else { + if (!::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), + TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, + &effective_token_)) + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + init_ = true; + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::GetRestrictedTokenHandle(HANDLE *token_handle) const { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + size_t deny_size = sids_for_deny_only_.size(); + size_t restrict_size = sids_to_restrict_.size(); + size_t privileges_size = privileges_to_disable_.size(); + + SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES *deny_only_array = NULL; + if (deny_size) { + deny_only_array = new SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES[deny_size]; + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sids_for_deny_only_.size() ; ++i) { + deny_only_array[i].Attributes = SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY; + deny_only_array[i].Sid = + const_cast<SID*>(sids_for_deny_only_[i].GetPSID()); + } + } + + SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES *sids_to_restrict_array = NULL; + if (restrict_size) { + sids_to_restrict_array = new SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES[restrict_size]; + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < restrict_size; ++i) { + sids_to_restrict_array[i].Attributes = 0; + sids_to_restrict_array[i].Sid = + const_cast<SID*>(sids_to_restrict_[i].GetPSID()); + } + } + + LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES *privileges_to_disable_array = NULL; + if (privileges_size) { + privileges_to_disable_array = new LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES[privileges_size]; + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < privileges_size; ++i) { + privileges_to_disable_array[i].Attributes = 0; + privileges_to_disable_array[i].Luid = privileges_to_disable_[i]; + } + } + + BOOL result = TRUE; + HANDLE new_token = NULL; + // The SANDBOX_INERT flag did nothing in XP and it was just a way to tell + // if a token has ben restricted given the limiations of IsTokenRestricted() + // but it appears that in Windows 7 it hints the AppLocker subsystem to + // leave us alone. + if (deny_size || restrict_size || privileges_size) { + result = ::CreateRestrictedToken(effective_token_, + SANDBOX_INERT, + static_cast<DWORD>(deny_size), + deny_only_array, + static_cast<DWORD>(privileges_size), + privileges_to_disable_array, + static_cast<DWORD>(restrict_size), + sids_to_restrict_array, + &new_token); + } else { + // Duplicate the token even if it's not modified at this point + // because any subsequent changes to this token would also affect the + // current process. + result = ::DuplicateTokenEx(effective_token_, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, + SecurityIdentification, TokenPrimary, + &new_token); + } + + if (deny_only_array) + delete[] deny_only_array; + + if (sids_to_restrict_array) + delete[] sids_to_restrict_array; + + if (privileges_to_disable_array) + delete[] privileges_to_disable_array; + + if (!result) + return ::GetLastError(); + + // Modify the default dacl on the token to contain Restricted and the user. + if (!AddSidToDefaultDacl(new_token, WinRestrictedCodeSid, GENERIC_ALL)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + if (!AddUserSidToDefaultDacl(new_token, GENERIC_ALL)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + DWORD error = SetTokenIntegrityLevel(new_token, integrity_level_); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != error) + return error; + + BOOL status = ::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), + new_token, + ::GetCurrentProcess(), + token_handle, + TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, + FALSE, // Don't inherit. + 0); + + if (new_token != effective_token_) + ::CloseHandle(new_token); + + if (!status) + return ::GetLastError(); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::GetRestrictedTokenHandleForImpersonation( + HANDLE *token_handle) const { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + HANDLE restricted_token_handle; + unsigned err_code = GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&restricted_token_handle); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) + return err_code; + + HANDLE impersonation_token; + if (!::DuplicateToken(restricted_token_handle, + SecurityImpersonation, + &impersonation_token)) { + ::CloseHandle(restricted_token_handle); + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + ::CloseHandle(restricted_token_handle); + + BOOL status = ::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), + impersonation_token, + ::GetCurrentProcess(), + token_handle, + TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, + FALSE, // Don't inherit. + 0); + + ::CloseHandle(impersonation_token); + + if (!status) + return ::GetLastError(); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::AddAllSidsForDenyOnly(std::vector<Sid> *exceptions) { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + TOKEN_GROUPS *token_groups = NULL; + DWORD size = 0; + + BOOL result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenGroups, + NULL, // No buffer. + 0, // Size is 0. + &size); + if (!size) + return ::GetLastError(); + + token_groups = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_GROUPS*>(new BYTE[size]); + result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenGroups, + token_groups, + size, + &size); + if (!result) { + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(token_groups); + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + // Build the list of the deny only group SIDs + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < token_groups->GroupCount ; ++i) { + if ((token_groups->Groups[i].Attributes & SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY) == 0 && + (token_groups->Groups[i].Attributes & SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID) == 0) { + bool should_ignore = false; + if (exceptions) { + for (unsigned int j = 0; j < exceptions->size(); ++j) { + if (::EqualSid(const_cast<SID*>((*exceptions)[j].GetPSID()), + token_groups->Groups[i].Sid)) { + should_ignore = true; + break; + } + } + } + if (!should_ignore) { + sids_for_deny_only_.push_back( + reinterpret_cast<SID*>(token_groups->Groups[i].Sid)); + } + } + } + + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(token_groups); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::AddSidForDenyOnly(const Sid &sid) { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + sids_for_deny_only_.push_back(sid); + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::AddUserSidForDenyOnly() { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + DWORD size = sizeof(TOKEN_USER) + SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE; + TOKEN_USER* token_user = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_USER*>(new BYTE[size]); + + BOOL result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenUser, + token_user, + size, + &size); + + Sid user = reinterpret_cast<SID*>(token_user->User.Sid); + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(token_user); + + if (!result) + return ::GetLastError(); + + sids_for_deny_only_.push_back(user); + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::DeleteAllPrivileges( + const std::vector<std::wstring> *exceptions) { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + // Get the list of privileges in the token + TOKEN_PRIVILEGES *token_privileges = NULL; + DWORD size = 0; + + BOOL result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenPrivileges, + NULL, // No buffer. + 0, // Size is 0. + &size); + if (!size) + return ::GetLastError(); + + token_privileges = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_PRIVILEGES*>(new BYTE[size]); + result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenPrivileges, + token_privileges, + size, + &size); + if (!result) { + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE *>(token_privileges); + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + + // Build the list of privileges to disable + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < token_privileges->PrivilegeCount; ++i) { + bool should_ignore = false; + if (exceptions) { + for (unsigned int j = 0; j < exceptions->size(); ++j) { + LUID luid = {0}; + ::LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, (*exceptions)[j].c_str(), &luid); + if (token_privileges->Privileges[i].Luid.HighPart == luid.HighPart && + token_privileges->Privileges[i].Luid.LowPart == luid.LowPart) { + should_ignore = true; + break; + } + } + } + if (!should_ignore) { + privileges_to_disable_.push_back(token_privileges->Privileges[i].Luid); + } + } + + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE *>(token_privileges); + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::DeletePrivilege(const wchar_t *privilege) { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + LUID luid = {0}; + if (LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, privilege, &luid)) + privileges_to_disable_.push_back(luid); + else + return ::GetLastError(); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::AddRestrictingSid(const Sid &sid) { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + sids_to_restrict_.push_back(sid); // No attributes + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::AddRestrictingSidLogonSession() { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + TOKEN_GROUPS *token_groups = NULL; + DWORD size = 0; + + BOOL result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenGroups, + NULL, // No buffer. + 0, // Size is 0. + &size); + if (!size) + return ::GetLastError(); + + token_groups = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_GROUPS*>(new BYTE[size]); + result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenGroups, + token_groups, + size, + &size); + if (!result) { + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(token_groups); + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + SID *logon_sid = NULL; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < token_groups->GroupCount ; ++i) { + if ((token_groups->Groups[i].Attributes & SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID) != 0) { + logon_sid = static_cast<SID*>(token_groups->Groups[i].Sid); + break; + } + } + + if (logon_sid) + sids_to_restrict_.push_back(logon_sid); + + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(token_groups); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::AddRestrictingSidCurrentUser() { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + DWORD size = sizeof(TOKEN_USER) + SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE; + TOKEN_USER* token_user = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_USER*>(new BYTE[size]); + + BOOL result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenUser, + token_user, + size, + &size); + + Sid user = reinterpret_cast<SID*>(token_user->User.Sid); + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(token_user); + + + if (!result) + return ::GetLastError(); + + sids_to_restrict_.push_back(user); + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::AddRestrictingSidAllSids() { + DCHECK(init_); + if (!init_) + return ERROR_NO_TOKEN; + + // Add the current user to the list. + unsigned error = AddRestrictingSidCurrentUser(); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != error) + return error; + + TOKEN_GROUPS *token_groups = NULL; + DWORD size = 0; + + // Get the buffer size required. + BOOL result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, TokenGroups, NULL, 0, + &size); + if (!size) + return ::GetLastError(); + + token_groups = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_GROUPS*>(new BYTE[size]); + result = ::GetTokenInformation(effective_token_, + TokenGroups, + token_groups, + size, + &size); + if (!result) { + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(token_groups); + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + // Build the list of restricting sids from all groups. + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < token_groups->GroupCount ; ++i) { + if ((token_groups->Groups[i].Attributes & SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY) == 0) + AddRestrictingSid(reinterpret_cast<SID*>(token_groups->Groups[i].Sid)); + } + + delete[] reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(token_groups); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +unsigned RestrictedToken::SetIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) { + integrity_level_ = integrity_level; + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token.h b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88bd70f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token.h @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_RESTRICTED_TOKEN_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_RESTRICTED_TOKEN_H_ + +#include <windows.h> +#include <vector> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/security_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sid.h" + +// Flags present in the Group SID list. These 2 flags are new in Windows Vista +#ifndef SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY +#define SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY (0x00000020L) +#endif +#ifndef SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY_ENABLED +#define SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY_ENABLED (0x00000040L) +#endif + +namespace sandbox { + +// Handles the creation of a restricted token using the effective token or +// any token handle. +// Sample usage: +// RestrictedToken restricted_token; +// unsigned err_code = restricted_token.Init(NULL); // Use the current +// // effective token +// if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) { +// // handle error. +// } +// +// restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(ATL::Sids::Users().GetPSID()); +// HANDLE token_handle; +// err_code = restricted_token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle); +// if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) { +// // handle error. +// } +// [...] +// CloseHandle(token_handle); +class RestrictedToken { + public: + // Init() has to be called before calling any other method in the class. + RestrictedToken() + : init_(false), effective_token_(NULL), + integrity_level_(INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST) { } + + ~RestrictedToken() { + if (effective_token_) + CloseHandle(effective_token_); + } + + // Initializes the RestrictedToken object with effective_token. + // If effective_token is NULL, it initializes the RestrictedToken object with + // the effective token of the current process. + unsigned Init(HANDLE effective_token); + + // Creates a restricted token and returns its handle using the token_handle + // output parameter. This handle has to be closed by the caller. + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + unsigned GetRestrictedTokenHandle(HANDLE *token_handle) const; + + // Creates a restricted token and uses this new token to create a new token + // for impersonation. Returns the handle of this impersonation token using + // the token_handle output parameter. This handle has to be closed by + // the caller. + // + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + // + // The sample usage is the same as the GetRestrictedTokenHandle function. + unsigned GetRestrictedTokenHandleForImpersonation(HANDLE *token_handle) const; + + // Lists all sids in the token and mark them as Deny Only except for those + // present in the exceptions parameter. If there is no exception needed, + // the caller can pass an empty list or NULL for the exceptions + // parameter. + // + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + // + // Sample usage: + // std::vector<Sid> sid_exceptions; + // sid_exceptions.push_back(ATL::Sids::Users().GetPSID()); + // sid_exceptions.push_back(ATL::Sids::World().GetPSID()); + // restricted_token.AddAllSidsForDenyOnly(&sid_exceptions); + // Note: A Sid marked for Deny Only in a token cannot be used to grant + // access to any resource. It can only be used to deny access. + unsigned AddAllSidsForDenyOnly(std::vector<Sid> *exceptions); + + // Adds a user or group SID for Deny Only in the restricted token. + // Parameter: sid is the SID to add in the Deny Only list. + // The return value is always ERROR_SUCCESS. + // + // Sample Usage: + // restricted_token.AddSidForDenyOnly(ATL::Sids::Admins().GetPSID()); + unsigned AddSidForDenyOnly(const Sid &sid); + + // Adds the user sid of the token for Deny Only in the restricted token. + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + unsigned AddUserSidForDenyOnly(); + + // Lists all privileges in the token and add them to the list of privileges + // to remove except for those present in the exceptions parameter. If + // there is no exception needed, the caller can pass an empty list or NULL + // for the exceptions parameter. + // + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + // + // Sample usage: + // std::vector<std::wstring> privilege_exceptions; + // privilege_exceptions.push_back(SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME); + // restricted_token.DeleteAllPrivileges(&privilege_exceptions); + unsigned DeleteAllPrivileges( + const std::vector<std::wstring> *exceptions); + + // Adds a privilege to the list of privileges to remove in the restricted + // token. + // Parameter: privilege is the privilege name to remove. This is the string + // representing the privilege. (e.g. "SeChangeNotifyPrivilege"). + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + // + // Sample usage: + // restricted_token.DeletePrivilege(SE_LOAD_DRIVER_NAME); + unsigned DeletePrivilege(const wchar_t *privilege); + + // Adds a SID to the list of restricting sids in the restricted token. + // Parameter: sid is the sid to add to the list restricting sids. + // The return value is always ERROR_SUCCESS. + // + // Sample usage: + // restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(ATL::Sids::Users().GetPSID()); + // Note: The list of restricting is used to force Windows to perform all + // access checks twice. The first time using your user SID and your groups, + // and the second time using your list of restricting sids. The access has + // to be granted in both places to get access to the resource requested. + unsigned AddRestrictingSid(const Sid &sid); + + // Adds the logon sid of the token in the list of restricting sids for the + // restricted token. + // + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + unsigned AddRestrictingSidLogonSession(); + + // Adds the owner sid of the token in the list of restricting sids for the + // restricted token. + // + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + unsigned AddRestrictingSidCurrentUser(); + + // Adds all group sids and the user sid to the restricting sids list. + // + // If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the + // function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to + // the error. + unsigned AddRestrictingSidAllSids(); + + // Sets the token integrity level. This is only valid on Vista. The integrity + // level cannot be higher than your current integrity level. + unsigned SetIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level); + + private: + // The list of restricting sids in the restricted token. + std::vector<Sid> sids_to_restrict_; + // The list of privileges to remove in the restricted token. + std::vector<LUID> privileges_to_disable_; + // The list of sids to mark as Deny Only in the restricted token. + std::vector<Sid> sids_for_deny_only_; + // The token to restrict. Can only be set in a constructor. + HANDLE effective_token_; + // The token integrity level. Only valid on Vista. + IntegrityLevel integrity_level_; + // Tells if the object is initialized or not (if Init() has been called) + bool init_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(RestrictedToken); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_RESTRICTED_TOKEN_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..310b73f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,530 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file contains unit tests for the RestrictedToken. + +#define _ATL_NO_EXCEPTIONS +#include <atlbase.h> +#include <atlsecurity.h> +#include <vector> +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sid.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Tests the initializatioin with an invalid token handle. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, InvalidHandle) { + RestrictedToken token; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE, token.Init(reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(0x5555))); +} + +// Tests the initialization with NULL as parameter. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DefaultInit) { + // Get the current process token. + HANDLE token_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + ASSERT_TRUE(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, + &token_handle)); + + ASSERT_NE(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, token_handle); + + ATL::CAccessToken access_token; + access_token.Attach(token_handle); + + // Create the token using the current token. + RestrictedToken token_default; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token_default.Init(NULL)); + + // Get the handle to the restricted token. + + HANDLE restricted_token_handle = NULL; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, + token_default.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&restricted_token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(restricted_token_handle); + + ATL::CSid sid_user_restricted; + ATL::CSid sid_user_default; + ATL::CSid sid_owner_restricted; + ATL::CSid sid_owner_default; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetUser(&sid_user_restricted)); + ASSERT_TRUE(access_token.GetUser(&sid_user_default)); + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetOwner(&sid_owner_restricted)); + ASSERT_TRUE(access_token.GetOwner(&sid_owner_default)); + + // Check if both token have the same owner and user. + ASSERT_EQ(sid_user_restricted, sid_user_default); + ASSERT_EQ(sid_owner_restricted, sid_owner_default); +} + +// Tests the initialization with a custom token as parameter. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, CustomInit) { + // Get the current process token. + HANDLE token_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + ASSERT_TRUE(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, + &token_handle)); + + ASSERT_NE(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, token_handle); + + ATL::CAccessToken access_token; + access_token.Attach(token_handle); + + // Change the primary group. + access_token.SetPrimaryGroup(ATL::Sids::World()); + + // Create the token using the current token. + RestrictedToken token; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(access_token.GetHandle())); + + // Get the handle to the restricted token. + + HANDLE restricted_token_handle = NULL; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, + token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&restricted_token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(restricted_token_handle); + + ATL::CSid sid_restricted; + ATL::CSid sid_default; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetPrimaryGroup(&sid_restricted)); + ASSERT_TRUE(access_token.GetPrimaryGroup(&sid_default)); + + // Check if both token have the same owner. + ASSERT_EQ(sid_restricted, sid_default); +} + +// Verifies that the token created by the object are valid. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, ResultToken) { + RestrictedToken token; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, + token.AddRestrictingSid(ATL::Sids::World().GetPSID())); + + HANDLE restricted_token; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&restricted_token)); + + ASSERT_TRUE(::IsTokenRestricted(restricted_token)); + + DWORD length = 0; + TOKEN_TYPE type; + ASSERT_TRUE(::GetTokenInformation(restricted_token, + ::TokenType, + &type, + sizeof(type), + &length)); + + ASSERT_EQ(type, TokenPrimary); + + HANDLE impersonation_token; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, + token.GetRestrictedTokenHandleForImpersonation(&impersonation_token)); + + ASSERT_TRUE(::IsTokenRestricted(impersonation_token)); + + ASSERT_TRUE(::GetTokenInformation(impersonation_token, + ::TokenType, + &type, + sizeof(type), + &length)); + + ASSERT_EQ(type, TokenImpersonation); + + ::CloseHandle(impersonation_token); + ::CloseHandle(restricted_token); +} + +// Verifies that the token created has "Restricted" in its default dacl. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DefaultDacl) { + RestrictedToken token; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, + token.AddRestrictingSid(ATL::Sids::World().GetPSID())); + + HANDLE handle; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(handle); + + ATL::CDacl dacl; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetDefaultDacl(&dacl)); + + bool restricted_found = false; + + unsigned int ace_count = dacl.GetAceCount(); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ace_count ; ++i) { + ATL::CSid sid; + ACCESS_MASK mask = 0; + dacl.GetAclEntry(i, &sid, &mask); + if (sid == ATL::Sids::RestrictedCode() && mask == GENERIC_ALL) { + restricted_found = true; + break; + } + } + + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_found); +} + +// Tests the method "AddSidForDenyOnly". +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DenySid) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddSidForDenyOnly(Sid(WinWorldSid))); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + ATL::CTokenGroups groups; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetGroups(&groups)); + + ATL::CSid::CSidArray sids; + ATL::CAtlArray<DWORD> attributes; + groups.GetSidsAndAttributes(&sids, &attributes); + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sids.GetCount(); i++) { + if (ATL::Sids::World() == sids[i]) { + ASSERT_EQ(SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY, + attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY); + } + } +} + +// Tests the method "AddAllSidsForDenyOnly". +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DenySids) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddAllSidsForDenyOnly(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + ATL::CTokenGroups groups; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetGroups(&groups)); + + ATL::CSid::CSidArray sids; + ATL::CAtlArray<DWORD> attributes; + groups.GetSidsAndAttributes(&sids, &attributes); + + // Verify that all sids are really gone. + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sids.GetCount(); i++) { + if ((attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID) == 0 && + (attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY) == 0) { + ASSERT_EQ(SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY, + attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY); + } + } +} + +// Tests the method "AddAllSidsForDenyOnly" using an exception list. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DenySidsException) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + std::vector<Sid> sids_exception; + sids_exception.push_back(Sid(WinWorldSid)); + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddAllSidsForDenyOnly(&sids_exception)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + ATL::CTokenGroups groups; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetGroups(&groups)); + + ATL::CSid::CSidArray sids; + ATL::CAtlArray<DWORD> attributes; + groups.GetSidsAndAttributes(&sids, &attributes); + + // Verify that all sids are really gone. + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sids.GetCount(); i++) { + if ((attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID) == 0 && + (attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY) == 0) { + if (ATL::Sids::World() == sids[i]) { + ASSERT_EQ(NULL, attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY); + } else { + ASSERT_EQ(SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY, + attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY); + } + } + } +} + +// Tests test method AddOwnerSidForDenyOnly. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DenyOwnerSid) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddUserSidForDenyOnly()); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + ATL::CTokenGroups groups; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetGroups(&groups)); + + ATL::CSid::CSidArray sids; + ATL::CAtlArray<DWORD> attributes; + groups.GetSidsAndAttributes(&sids, &attributes); + + ATL::CSid user_sid; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetUser(&user_sid)); + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sids.GetCount(); ++i) { + if (user_sid == sids[i]) { + ASSERT_EQ(SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY, + attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY); + } + } +} + +// Tests the method DeleteAllPrivileges. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DeleteAllPrivileges) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.DeleteAllPrivileges(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + ATL::CTokenPrivileges privileges; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetPrivileges(&privileges)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, privileges.GetCount()); +} + +// Tests the method DeleteAllPrivileges with an exception list. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DeleteAllPrivilegesException) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + std::vector<std::wstring> exceptions; + exceptions.push_back(SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME); + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.DeleteAllPrivileges(&exceptions)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + ATL::CTokenPrivileges privileges; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetPrivileges(&privileges)); + + ATL::CTokenPrivileges::CNames privilege_names; + ATL::CTokenPrivileges::CAttributes privilege_name_attributes; + privileges.GetNamesAndAttributes(&privilege_names, + &privilege_name_attributes); + + ASSERT_EQ(1, privileges.GetCount()); + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < privileges.GetCount(); ++i) { + ASSERT_EQ(privilege_names[i], SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME); + } +} + +// Tests the method DeletePrivilege. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DeletePrivilege) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.DeletePrivilege(SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + ATL::CTokenPrivileges privileges; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetPrivileges(&privileges)); + + ATL::CTokenPrivileges::CNames privilege_names; + ATL::CTokenPrivileges::CAttributes privilege_name_attributes; + privileges.GetNamesAndAttributes(&privilege_names, + &privilege_name_attributes); + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < privileges.GetCount(); ++i) { + ASSERT_NE(privilege_names[i], SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME); + } +} + +// Checks if a sid is in the restricting list of the restricted token. +// Asserts if it's not the case. If count is a positive number, the number of +// elements in the restricting sids list has to be equal. +void CheckRestrictingSid(const ATL::CAccessToken &restricted_token, + ATL::CSid sid, int count) { + DWORD length = 1000; + BYTE *memory = new BYTE[1000]; + TOKEN_GROUPS *groups = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_GROUPS*>(memory); + ASSERT_TRUE(::GetTokenInformation(restricted_token.GetHandle(), + TokenRestrictedSids, + groups, + length, + &length)); + + ATL::CTokenGroups atl_groups(*groups); + delete[] memory; + + if (count >= 0) + ASSERT_EQ(count, atl_groups.GetCount()); + + ATL::CSid::CSidArray sids; + ATL::CAtlArray<DWORD> attributes; + atl_groups.GetSidsAndAttributes(&sids, &attributes); + + bool present = false; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sids.GetCount(); ++i) { + if (sids[i] == sid) { + present = true; + break; + } + } + + ASSERT_TRUE(present); +} + +// Tests the method AddRestrictingSid. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, AddRestrictingSid) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, + token.AddRestrictingSid(ATL::Sids::World().GetPSID())); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + CheckRestrictingSid(restricted_token, ATL::Sids::World(), 1); +} + +// Tests the method AddRestrictingSidCurrentUser. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, AddRestrictingSidCurrentUser) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddRestrictingSidCurrentUser()); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + ATL::CSid user; + restricted_token.GetUser(&user); + + CheckRestrictingSid(restricted_token, user, 1); +} + +// Tests the method AddRestrictingSidLogonSession. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, AddRestrictingSidLogonSession) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddRestrictingSidLogonSession()); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + ATL::CSid session; + restricted_token.GetLogonSid(&session); + + CheckRestrictingSid(restricted_token, session, 1); +} + +// Tests adding a lot of restricting sids. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, AddMultipleRestrictingSids) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddRestrictingSidCurrentUser()); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddRestrictingSidLogonSession()); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, + token.AddRestrictingSid(ATL::Sids::World().GetPSID())); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + ATL::CSid session; + restricted_token.GetLogonSid(&session); + + DWORD length = 1000; + BYTE *memory = new BYTE[1000]; + TOKEN_GROUPS *groups = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_GROUPS*>(memory); + ASSERT_TRUE(::GetTokenInformation(restricted_token.GetHandle(), + TokenRestrictedSids, + groups, + length, + &length)); + + ATL::CTokenGroups atl_groups(*groups); + delete[] memory; + + ASSERT_EQ(3, atl_groups.GetCount()); +} + +// Tests the method "AddRestrictingSidAllSids". +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, AddAllSidToRestrictingSids) { + RestrictedToken token; + HANDLE token_handle = NULL; + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.AddRestrictingSidAllSids()); + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(&token_handle)); + + ATL::CAccessToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Attach(token_handle); + + ATL::CTokenGroups groups; + ASSERT_TRUE(restricted_token.GetGroups(&groups)); + + ATL::CSid::CSidArray sids; + ATL::CAtlArray<DWORD> attributes; + groups.GetSidsAndAttributes(&sids, &attributes); + + // Verify that all group sids are in the restricting sid list. + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sids.GetCount(); i++) { + if ((attributes[i] & SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY) == 0) { + CheckRestrictingSid(restricted_token, sids[i], -1); + } + } + + // Verify that the user is in the restricting sid list. + ATL::CSid user; + restricted_token.GetUser(&user); + CheckRestrictingSid(restricted_token, user, -1); +} + +// Test to be executed only in release because they are triggering DCHECKs. +#ifndef _DEBUG + +// Checks the error code when the object is initialized twice. +TEST(RestrictedTokenTest, DoubleInit) { + RestrictedToken token; + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, token.Init(NULL)); + + ASSERT_EQ(ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED, token.Init(NULL)); +} + +#endif + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_utils.cc b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_utils.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df30b40 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_utils.cc @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <aclapi.h> +#include <sddl.h> +#include <vector> + +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token_utils.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/job.h" +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token.h" +#include "sandbox/src/security_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sid.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +DWORD CreateRestrictedToken(HANDLE *token_handle, + TokenLevel security_level, + IntegrityLevel integrity_level, + TokenType token_type) { + if (!token_handle) + return ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; + + RestrictedToken restricted_token; + restricted_token.Init(NULL); // Initialized with the current process token + + std::vector<std::wstring> privilege_exceptions; + std::vector<Sid> sid_exceptions; + + bool deny_sids = true; + bool remove_privileges = true; + + switch (security_level) { + case USER_UNPROTECTED: { + deny_sids = false; + remove_privileges = false; + break; + } + case USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS: { + deny_sids = false; + remove_privileges = false; + + unsigned err_code = restricted_token.AddRestrictingSidAllSids(); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) + return err_code; + + break; + } + case USER_NON_ADMIN: { + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinBuiltinUsersSid); + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinWorldSid); + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinInteractiveSid); + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinAuthenticatedUserSid); + privilege_exceptions.push_back(SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME); + break; + } + case USER_INTERACTIVE: { + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinBuiltinUsersSid); + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinWorldSid); + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinInteractiveSid); + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinAuthenticatedUserSid); + privilege_exceptions.push_back(SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(WinBuiltinUsersSid); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(WinWorldSid); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(WinRestrictedCodeSid); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSidCurrentUser(); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSidLogonSession(); + break; + } + case USER_LIMITED: { + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinBuiltinUsersSid); + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinWorldSid); + sid_exceptions.push_back(WinInteractiveSid); + privilege_exceptions.push_back(SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(WinBuiltinUsersSid); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(WinWorldSid); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(WinRestrictedCodeSid); + + // This token has to be able to create objects in BNO. + // Unfortunately, on vista, it needs the current logon sid + // in the token to achieve this. You should also set the process to be + // low integrity level so it can't access object created by other + // processes. + if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_VISTA) + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSidLogonSession(); + break; + } + case USER_RESTRICTED: { + privilege_exceptions.push_back(SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME); + restricted_token.AddUserSidForDenyOnly(); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(WinRestrictedCodeSid); + break; + } + case USER_LOCKDOWN: { + restricted_token.AddUserSidForDenyOnly(); + restricted_token.AddRestrictingSid(WinNullSid); + break; + } + default: { + return ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; + } + } + + DWORD err_code = ERROR_SUCCESS; + if (deny_sids) { + err_code = restricted_token.AddAllSidsForDenyOnly(&sid_exceptions); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) + return err_code; + } + + if (remove_privileges) { + err_code = restricted_token.DeleteAllPrivileges(&privilege_exceptions); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) + return err_code; + } + + restricted_token.SetIntegrityLevel(integrity_level); + + switch (token_type) { + case PRIMARY: { + err_code = restricted_token.GetRestrictedTokenHandle(token_handle); + break; + } + case IMPERSONATION: { + err_code = restricted_token.GetRestrictedTokenHandleForImpersonation( + token_handle); + break; + } + default: { + err_code = ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; + break; + } + } + + return err_code; +} + +DWORD StartRestrictedProcessInJob(wchar_t *command_line, + TokenLevel primary_level, + TokenLevel impersonation_level, + JobLevel job_level, + HANDLE *const job_handle_ret) { + Job job; + DWORD err_code = job.Init(job_level, NULL, 0); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) + return err_code; + + if (JOB_UNPROTECTED != job_level) { + // Share the Desktop handle to be able to use MessageBox() in the sandboxed + // application. + err_code = job.UserHandleGrantAccess(GetDesktopWindow()); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) + return err_code; + } + + // Create the primary (restricted) token for the process + HANDLE primary_token_handle = NULL; + err_code = CreateRestrictedToken(&primary_token_handle, + primary_level, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST, + PRIMARY); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) { + return err_code; + } + base::win::ScopedHandle primary_token(primary_token_handle); + + // Create the impersonation token (restricted) to be able to start the + // process. + HANDLE impersonation_token_handle; + err_code = CreateRestrictedToken(&impersonation_token_handle, + impersonation_level, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST, + IMPERSONATION); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) { + return err_code; + } + base::win::ScopedHandle impersonation_token(impersonation_token_handle); + + // Start the process + STARTUPINFO startup_info = {0}; + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation process_info; + DWORD flags = CREATE_SUSPENDED; + + if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN8) { + // Windows 8 implements nested jobs, but for older systems we need to + // break out of any job we're in to enforce our restrictions. + flags |= CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB; + } + + if (!::CreateProcessAsUser(primary_token.Get(), + NULL, // No application name. + command_line, + NULL, // No security attribute. + NULL, // No thread attribute. + FALSE, // Do not inherit handles. + flags, + NULL, // Use the environment of the caller. + NULL, // Use current directory of the caller. + &startup_info, + process_info.Receive())) { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + // Change the token of the main thread of the new process for the + // impersonation token with more rights. + { + HANDLE temp_thread = process_info.thread_handle(); + if (!::SetThreadToken(&temp_thread, impersonation_token.Get())) { + ::TerminateProcess(process_info.process_handle(), + 0); // exit code + return ::GetLastError(); + } + } + + err_code = job.AssignProcessToJob(process_info.process_handle()); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != err_code) { + ::TerminateProcess(process_info.process_handle(), + 0); // exit code + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + // Start the application + ::ResumeThread(process_info.thread_handle()); + + (*job_handle_ret) = job.Detach(); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +DWORD SetObjectIntegrityLabel(HANDLE handle, SE_OBJECT_TYPE type, + const wchar_t* ace_access, + const wchar_t* integrity_level_sid) { + // Build the SDDL string for the label. + std::wstring sddl = L"S:("; // SDDL for a SACL. + sddl += SDDL_MANDATORY_LABEL; // Ace Type is "Mandatory Label". + sddl += L";;"; // No Ace Flags. + sddl += ace_access; // Add the ACE access. + sddl += L";;;"; // No ObjectType and Inherited Object Type. + sddl += integrity_level_sid; // Trustee Sid. + sddl += L")"; + + DWORD error = ERROR_SUCCESS; + PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sec_desc = NULL; + + PACL sacl = NULL; + BOOL sacl_present = FALSE; + BOOL sacl_defaulted = FALSE; + + if (::ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(sddl.c_str(), + SDDL_REVISION, + &sec_desc, NULL)) { + if (::GetSecurityDescriptorSacl(sec_desc, &sacl_present, &sacl, + &sacl_defaulted)) { + error = ::SetSecurityInfo(handle, type, + LABEL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, NULL, NULL, NULL, + sacl); + } else { + error = ::GetLastError(); + } + + ::LocalFree(sec_desc); + } else { + return::GetLastError(); + } + + return error; +} + +const wchar_t* GetIntegrityLevelString(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) { + switch (integrity_level) { + case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_SYSTEM: + return L"S-1-16-16384"; + case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_HIGH: + return L"S-1-16-12288"; + case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM: + return L"S-1-16-8192"; + case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM_LOW: + return L"S-1-16-6144"; + case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW: + return L"S-1-16-4096"; + case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_BELOW_LOW: + return L"S-1-16-2048"; + case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED: + return L"S-1-16-0"; + case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST: + return NULL; + } + + NOTREACHED(); + return NULL; +} +DWORD SetTokenIntegrityLevel(HANDLE token, IntegrityLevel integrity_level) { + if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA) + return ERROR_SUCCESS; + + const wchar_t* integrity_level_str = GetIntegrityLevelString(integrity_level); + if (!integrity_level_str) { + // No mandatory level specified, we don't change it. + return ERROR_SUCCESS; + } + + PSID integrity_sid = NULL; + if (!::ConvertStringSidToSid(integrity_level_str, &integrity_sid)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + TOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL label = {0}; + label.Label.Attributes = SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY; + label.Label.Sid = integrity_sid; + + DWORD size = sizeof(TOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL) + ::GetLengthSid(integrity_sid); + BOOL result = ::SetTokenInformation(token, TokenIntegrityLevel, &label, + size); + ::LocalFree(integrity_sid); + + return result ? ERROR_SUCCESS : ::GetLastError(); +} + +DWORD SetProcessIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) { + if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA) + return ERROR_SUCCESS; + + // We don't check for an invalid level here because we'll just let it + // fail on the SetTokenIntegrityLevel call later on. + if (integrity_level == INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST) { + // No mandatory level specified, we don't change it. + return ERROR_SUCCESS; + } + + HANDLE token_handle; + if (!::OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_DEFAULT, + &token_handle)) + return ::GetLastError(); + + base::win::ScopedHandle token(token_handle); + + return SetTokenIntegrityLevel(token.Get(), integrity_level); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_utils.h b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_utils.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0aade8b --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/restricted_token_utils.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_RESTRICTED_TOKEN_UTILS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_RESTRICTED_TOKEN_UTILS_H__ + +#include <accctrl.h> +#include <windows.h> + +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token.h" +#include "sandbox/src/security_level.h" + +// Contains the utility functions to be able to create restricted tokens based +// on a security profiles. + +namespace sandbox { + +// The type of the token returned by the CreateNakedToken. +enum TokenType { + IMPERSONATION = 0, + PRIMARY +}; + +// Creates a restricted token based on the effective token of the current +// process. The parameter security_level determines how much the token is +// restricted. The token_type determines if the token will be used as a primary +// token or impersonation token. The integrity level of the token is set to +// |integrity level| on Vista only. +// token_handle is the output value containing the handle of the +// newly created restricted token. +// If the function succeeds, the return value is ERROR_SUCCESS. If the +// function fails, the return value is the win32 error code corresponding to +// the error. +DWORD CreateRestrictedToken(HANDLE *token_handle, + TokenLevel security_level, + IntegrityLevel integrity_level, + TokenType token_type); + +// Starts the process described by the input parameter command_line in a job +// with a restricted token. Also set the main thread of this newly created +// process to impersonate a user with more rights so it can initialize +// correctly. +// +// Parameters: primary_level is the security level of the primary token. +// impersonation_level is the security level of the impersonation token used +// to initialize the process. job_level is the security level of the job +// object used to encapsulate the process. +// +// The output parameter job_handle is the handle to the job object. It has +// to be closed with CloseHandle() when not needed. Closing this handle will +// kill the process started. +// +// Note: The process started with this function has to call RevertToSelf() as +// soon as possible to stop using the impersonation token and start being +// secure. +// +// Note: The Unicode version of this function will fail if the command_line +// parameter is a const string. +DWORD StartRestrictedProcessInJob(wchar_t *command_line, + TokenLevel primary_level, + TokenLevel impersonation_level, + JobLevel job_level, + HANDLE *job_handle); + +// Sets the integrity label on a object handle. +DWORD SetObjectIntegrityLabel(HANDLE handle, SE_OBJECT_TYPE type, + const wchar_t* ace_access, + const wchar_t* integrity_level_sid); + +// Sets the integrity level on a token. This is only valid on Vista. It returns +// without failing on XP. If the integrity level that you specify is greater +// than the current integrity level, the function will fail. +DWORD SetTokenIntegrityLevel(HANDLE token, IntegrityLevel integrity_level); + +// Sets the integrity level on the current process on Vista. It returns without +// failing on XP. If the integrity level that you specify is greater than the +// current integrity level, the function will fail. +DWORD SetProcessIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level); + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_RESTRICTED_TOKEN_UTILS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f70c702 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.cc @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <windows.h> +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/broker_services.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +#if defined(_WIN64) && !defined(NACL_WIN64) +// We allow building this code for Win64 as part of NaCl to enable development +#error Sandbox code was not tested on 64-bit Windows. See \ + http://crbug.com/27218 for details and progress log. +#endif + + +namespace sandbox { +// The section for IPC and policy. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE g_shared_section = NULL; + +static bool s_is_broker = false; + +// GetBrokerServices: the current implementation relies on a shared section +// that is created by the broker and opened by the target. +BrokerServices* SandboxFactory::GetBrokerServices() { + // Can't be the broker if the shared section is open. + if (NULL != g_shared_section) { + return NULL; + } + // If the shared section does not exist we are the broker, then create + // the broker object. + s_is_broker = true; + return BrokerServicesBase::GetInstance(); +} + +// GetTargetServices implementation must follow the same technique as the +// GetBrokerServices, but in this case the logic is the opposite. +TargetServices* SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices() { + // Can't be the target if the section handle is not valid. + if (NULL == g_shared_section) { + return NULL; + } + // We are the target + s_is_broker = false; + // Creates and returns the target services implementation. + return TargetServicesBase::GetInstance(); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18c05ce --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Sandbox is a sandbox library for windows processes. Use when you want a +// 'privileged' process and a 'locked down process' to interact with. +// The privileged process is called the broker and it is started by external +// means (such as the user starting it). The 'sandboxed' process is called the +// target and it is started by the broker. There can be many target processes +// started by a single broker process. This library provides facilities +// for both the broker and the target. +// +// The design rationale and relevant documents can be found at http://go/sbox. +// +// Note: this header does not include the SandboxFactory definitions because +// there are cases where the Sandbox library is linked against the main .exe +// while its API needs to be used in a DLL. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_H__ + +#include <windows.h> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +// sandbox: Google User-Land Application Sandbox +namespace sandbox { + +class BrokerServices; +class ProcessState; +class TargetPolicy; +class TargetServices; + +// BrokerServices exposes all the broker API. +// The basic use is to start the target(s) and wait for them to end. +// +// This API is intended to be called in the following order +// (error checking omitted): +// BrokerServices* broker = SandboxFactory::GetBrokerServices(); +// broker->Init(); +// PROCESS_INFORMATION target; +// broker->SpawnTarget(target_exe_path, target_args, &target); +// ::ResumeThread(target->hThread); +// // -- later you can call: +// broker->WaitForAllTargets(option); +// +class BrokerServices { + public: + // Initializes the broker. Must be called before any other on this class. + // returns ALL_OK if successful. All other return values imply failure. + // If the return is ERROR_GENERIC, you can call ::GetLastError() to get + // more information. + virtual ResultCode Init() = 0; + + // Returns the interface pointer to a new, empty policy object. Use this + // interface to specify the sandbox policy for new processes created by + // SpawnTarget() + virtual TargetPolicy* CreatePolicy() = 0; + + // Creates a new target (child process) in a suspended state. + // Parameters: + // exe_path: This is the full path to the target binary. This parameter + // can be null and in this case the exe path must be the first argument + // of the command_line. + // command_line: The arguments to be passed as command line to the new + // process. This can be null if the exe_path parameter is not null. + // policy: This is the pointer to the policy object for the sandbox to + // be created. + // target: returns the resulting target process information such as process + // handle and PID just as if CreateProcess() had been called. The caller is + // responsible for closing the handles returned in this structure. + // Returns: + // ALL_OK if successful. All other return values imply failure. + virtual ResultCode SpawnTarget(const wchar_t* exe_path, + const wchar_t* command_line, + TargetPolicy* policy, + PROCESS_INFORMATION* target) = 0; + + // This call blocks (waits) for all the targets to terminate. + // Returns: + // ALL_OK if successful. All other return values imply failure. + // If the return is ERROR_GENERIC, you can call ::GetLastError() to get + // more information. + virtual ResultCode WaitForAllTargets() = 0; + + // Adds an unsandboxed process as a peer for policy decisions (e.g. + // HANDLES_DUP_ANY policy). + // Returns: + // ALL_OK if successful. All other return values imply failure. + // If the return is ERROR_GENERIC, you can call ::GetLastError() to get + // more information. + virtual ResultCode AddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) = 0; +}; + +// TargetServices models the current process from the perspective +// of a target process. To obtain a pointer to it use +// Sandbox::GetTargetServices(). Note that this call returns a non-null +// pointer only if this process is in fact a target. A process is a target +// only if the process was spawned by a call to BrokerServices::SpawnTarget(). +// +// This API allows the target to gain access to resources with a high +// privilege token and then when it is ready to perform dangerous activities +// (such as download content from the web) it can lower its token and +// enter into locked-down (sandbox) mode. +// The typical usage is as follows: +// +// TargetServices* target_services = Sandbox::GetTargetServices(); +// if (NULL != target_services) { +// // We are the target. +// target_services->Init(); +// // Do work that requires high privileges here. +// // .... +// // When ready to enter lock-down mode call LowerToken: +// target_services->LowerToken(); +// } +// +// For more information see the BrokerServices API documentation. +class TargetServices { + public: + // Initializes the target. Must call this function before any other. + // returns ALL_OK if successful. All other return values imply failure. + // If the return is ERROR_GENERIC, you can call ::GetLastError() to get + // more information. + virtual ResultCode Init() = 0; + + // Discards the impersonation token and uses the lower token, call before + // processing any untrusted data or running third-party code. If this call + // fails the current process could be terminated immediately. + virtual void LowerToken() = 0; + + // Returns the ProcessState object. Through that object it's possible to have + // information about the current state of the process, such as whether + // LowerToken has been called or not. + virtual ProcessState* GetState() = 0; + + // Requests the broker to duplicate the supplied handle into the target + // process. The target process must be an active sandbox child process + // and the source process must have a corresponding policy allowing + // handle duplication for this object type. + // Returns: + // ALL_OK if successful. All other return values imply failure. + // If the return is ERROR_GENERIC, you can call ::GetLastError() to get + // more information. + virtual ResultCode DuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE* target_handle, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options) = 0; +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.vcproj b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.vcproj new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f206e01 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox.vcproj @@ -0,0 +1,658 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="Windows-1252"?> +<VisualStudioProject + ProjectType="Visual C++" + Version="8.00" + Name="sandbox" + ProjectGUID="{881F6A97-D539-4C48-B401-DF04385B2343}" + RootNamespace="sandbox" + Keyword="Win32Proj" + > + <Platforms> + <Platform + Name="Win32" + /> + </Platforms> + <ToolFiles> + </ToolFiles> + <Configurations> + <Configuration + Name="Debug|Win32" + ConfigurationType="4" + InheritedPropertySheets="$(SolutionDir)..\build\debug.vsprops;$(SolutionDir)..\build\common.vsprops;$(SolutionDir)..\testing\using_gtest.vsprops" + > + <Tool + Name="VCPreBuildEventTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCCustomBuildTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCXMLDataGeneratorTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCWebServiceProxyGeneratorTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCMIDLTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCCLCompilerTool" + UsePrecompiledHeader="2" + ForcedIncludeFiles="stdafx.h" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCManagedResourceCompilerTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCResourceCompilerTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCPreLinkEventTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCLibrarianTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCALinkTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCXDCMakeTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCBscMakeTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCFxCopTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCPostBuildEventTool" + Description="Copy wow_helper to output directory" + CommandLine="copy $(ProjectDir)\..\wow_helper\wow_helper.exe $(OutDir) && copy $(ProjectDir)\..\wow_helper\wow_helper.pdb $(OutDir)" + /> + </Configuration> + <Configuration + Name="Release|Win32" + ConfigurationType="4" + InheritedPropertySheets="$(SolutionDir)..\build\release.vsprops;$(SolutionDir)..\build\common.vsprops;$(SolutionDir)..\testing\using_gtest.vsprops" + > + <Tool + Name="VCPreBuildEventTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCCustomBuildTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCXMLDataGeneratorTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCWebServiceProxyGeneratorTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCMIDLTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCCLCompilerTool" + UsePrecompiledHeader="0" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCManagedResourceCompilerTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCResourceCompilerTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCPreLinkEventTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCLibrarianTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCALinkTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCXDCMakeTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCBscMakeTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCFxCopTool" + /> + <Tool + Name="VCPostBuildEventTool" + Description="Copy wow_helper to output directory" + CommandLine="copy $(ProjectDir)\..\wow_helper\wow_helper.exe $(OutDir) && copy $(ProjectDir)\..\wow_helper\wow_helper.pdb $(OutDir)" + /> + </Configuration> + </Configurations> + <References> + </References> + <Files> + <Filter + Name="security" + > + <File + RelativePath=".\acl.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\acl.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\dep.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\dep.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\job.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\job.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\restricted_token.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\restricted_token.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\restricted_token_utils.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\restricted_token_utils.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\security_level.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sid.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sid.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\window.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\window.h" + > + </File> + </Filter> + <Filter + Name="Interception" + > + <File + RelativePath=".\eat_resolver.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\eat_resolver.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\interception.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\interception.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\interception_agent.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\interception_agent.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\interception_internal.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\pe_image.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\pe_image.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\resolver.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\resolver.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\service_resolver.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\service_resolver.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep_resolver.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep_resolver.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\target_interceptions.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\target_interceptions.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\Wow64.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\Wow64.h" + > + </File> + <Filter + Name="sidestep" + > + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep\ia32_modrm_map.cpp" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep\ia32_opcode_map.cpp" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep\mini_disassembler.cpp" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep\mini_disassembler.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep\mini_disassembler_types.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep\preamble_patcher.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sidestep\preamble_patcher_with_stub.cpp" + > + </File> + </Filter> + </Filter> + <Filter + Name="nt_level" + > + <File + RelativePath=".\nt_internals.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_target.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_target.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_nt_types.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_nt_util.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_nt_util.h" + > + </File> + </Filter> + <Filter + Name="Policy_handlers" + > + <File + RelativePath=".\filesystem_dispatcher.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\filesystem_dispatcher.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\filesystem_interception.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\filesystem_interception.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\filesystem_policy.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\filesystem_policy.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\named_pipe_dispatcher.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\named_pipe_dispatcher.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\named_pipe_interception.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\named_pipe_interception.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\named_pipe_policy.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\named_pipe_policy.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_params.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\process_thread_dispatcher.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\process_thread_dispatcher.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\process_thread_interception.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\process_thread_interception.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\process_thread_policy.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\process_thread_policy.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\registry_dispatcher.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\registry_dispatcher.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\registry_interception.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\registry_interception.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\registry_policy.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\registry_policy.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sync_dispatcher.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sync_dispatcher.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sync_interception.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sync_interception.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sync_policy.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sync_policy.h" + > + </File> + </Filter> + <Filter + Name="IPC" + > + <File + RelativePath=".\crosscall_client.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\crosscall_params.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\crosscall_server.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\crosscall_server.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\ipc_tags.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sharedmem_ipc_client.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sharedmem_ipc_client.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sharedmem_ipc_server.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sharedmem_ipc_server.h" + > + </File> + </Filter> + <Filter + Name="Policy_base" + > + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_engine_opcodes.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_engine_opcodes.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_engine_params.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_engine_processor.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_engine_processor.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_low_level.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_low_level.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_policy_base.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_policy_base.h" + > + </File> + </Filter> + <File + RelativePath=".\broker_services.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\broker_services.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\internal_types.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_broker.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\policy_broker.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_factory.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_policy.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_types.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_utils.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\sandbox_utils.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\shared_handles.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\shared_handles.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\stdafx.cc" + > + <FileConfiguration + Name="Debug|Win32" + > + <Tool + Name="VCCLCompilerTool" + UsePrecompiledHeader="1" + /> + </FileConfiguration> + <FileConfiguration + Name="Release|Win32" + > + <Tool + Name="VCCLCompilerTool" + UsePrecompiledHeader="0" + /> + </FileConfiguration> + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\stdafx.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\target_process.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\target_process.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\target_services.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\target_services.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\win2k_threadpool.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\win2k_threadpool.h" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\win_utils.cc" + > + </File> + <File + RelativePath=".\win_utils.h" + > + </File> + </Files> + <Globals> + </Globals> +</VisualStudioProject> diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_factory.h b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_factory.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b52bcb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_factory.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_FACTORY_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_FACTORY_H__ + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" + +// SandboxFactory is a set of static methods to get access to the broker +// or target services object. Only one of the two methods (GetBrokerServices, +// GetTargetServices) will return a non-null pointer and that should be used +// as the indication that the process is the broker or the target: +// +// BrokerServices* broker_services = SandboxFactory::GetBrokerServices(); +// if (NULL != broker_services) { +// //we are the broker, call broker api here +// broker_services->Init(); +// } else { +// TargetServices* target_services = SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices(); +// if (NULL != target_services) { +// //we are the target, call target api here +// target_services->Init(); +// } +// +// The methods in this class are expected to be called from a single thread +// +// The Sandbox library needs to be linked against the main executable, but +// sometimes the API calls are issued from a DLL that loads into the exe +// process. These factory methods then need to be called from the main +// exe and the interface pointers then can be safely passed to the DLL where +// the Sandbox API calls are made. +namespace sandbox { + +class SandboxFactory { + public: + // Returns the Broker API interface, returns NULL if this process is the + // target. + static BrokerServices* GetBrokerServices(); + + // Returns the Target API interface, returns NULL if this process is the + // broker. + static TargetServices* GetTargetServices(); + private: + DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(SandboxFactory); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_FACTORY_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_types.h b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_types.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0d24f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_NT_TYPES_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_NT_TYPES_H__ + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +struct NtExports { + NtAllocateVirtualMemoryFunction AllocateVirtualMemory; + NtCloseFunction Close; + NtDuplicateObjectFunction DuplicateObject; + NtFreeVirtualMemoryFunction FreeVirtualMemory; + NtMapViewOfSectionFunction MapViewOfSection; + NtProtectVirtualMemoryFunction ProtectVirtualMemory; + NtQueryInformationProcessFunction QueryInformationProcess; + NtQueryObjectFunction QueryObject; + NtQuerySectionFunction QuerySection; + NtQueryVirtualMemoryFunction QueryVirtualMemory; + NtUnmapViewOfSectionFunction UnmapViewOfSection; + RtlAllocateHeapFunction RtlAllocateHeap; + RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeStringFunction RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString; + RtlCompareUnicodeStringFunction RtlCompareUnicodeString; + RtlCreateHeapFunction RtlCreateHeap; + RtlCreateUserThreadFunction RtlCreateUserThread; + RtlDestroyHeapFunction RtlDestroyHeap; + RtlFreeHeapFunction RtlFreeHeap; + _strnicmpFunction _strnicmp; + strlenFunction strlen; + wcslenFunction wcslen; +}; + +// This is the value used for the ntdll level allocator. +enum AllocationType { + NT_ALLOC, + NT_PLACE, + NT_PAGE +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_NT_TYPES_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..daa361a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.cc @@ -0,0 +1,599 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +#include "base/win/pe_image.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This is the list of all imported symbols from ntdll.dll. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt = { NULL }; + +} + +namespace { + +#if defined(_WIN64) +void* AllocateNearTo(void* source, size_t size) { + using sandbox::g_nt; + + // Start with 1 GB above the source. + const unsigned int kOneGB = 0x40000000; + void* base = reinterpret_cast<char*>(source) + kOneGB; + SIZE_T actual_size = size; + ULONG_PTR zero_bits = 0; // Not the correct type if used. + ULONG type = MEM_RESERVE; + + if (reinterpret_cast<SIZE_T>(source) > 0x7ff80000000) { + // We are at the top of the address space. Let's try the highest available + // address. + base = NULL; + type |= MEM_TOP_DOWN; + } + + NTSTATUS ret; + int attempts = 0; + for (; attempts < 20; attempts++) { + ret = g_nt.AllocateVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &base, zero_bits, + &actual_size, type, PAGE_READWRITE); + if (NT_SUCCESS(ret)) { + if (base < source) { + // We won't be able to patch this dll. + VERIFY_SUCCESS(g_nt.FreeVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &base, &size, + MEM_RELEASE)); + return NULL; + } + break; + } + + // Try 100 MB higher. + base = reinterpret_cast<char*>(base) + 100 * 0x100000; + }; + + if (attempts == 20) + return NULL; + + ret = g_nt.AllocateVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &base, zero_bits, + &actual_size, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE); + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) { + VERIFY_SUCCESS(g_nt.FreeVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &base, &size, + MEM_RELEASE)); + base = NULL; + } + + return base; +} +#else // defined(_WIN64). +void* AllocateNearTo(void* source, size_t size) { + using sandbox::g_nt; + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(source); + + // In 32-bit processes allocations below 512k are predictable, so mark + // anything in that range as reserved and retry until we get a good address. + const void* const kMinAddress = reinterpret_cast<void*>(512 * 1024); + NTSTATUS ret; + SIZE_T actual_size; + void* base; + do { + base = NULL; + actual_size = 64 * 1024; + ret = g_nt.AllocateVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &base, 0, &actual_size, + MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_NOACCESS); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return NULL; + } while (base < kMinAddress); + + actual_size = size; + ret = g_nt.AllocateVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &base, 0, &actual_size, + MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return NULL; + return base; +} +#endif // defined(_WIN64). + +} // namespace. + +namespace sandbox { + +// Handle for our private heap. +void* g_heap = NULL; + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE g_shared_section; +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT size_t g_shared_IPC_size = 0; +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT size_t g_shared_policy_size = 0; + +void* volatile g_shared_policy_memory = NULL; +void* volatile g_shared_IPC_memory = NULL; + +// Both the IPC and the policy share a single region of memory in which the IPC +// memory is first and the policy memory is last. +bool MapGlobalMemory() { + if (NULL == g_shared_IPC_memory) { + void* memory = NULL; + SIZE_T size = 0; + // Map the entire shared section from the start. + NTSTATUS ret = g_nt.MapViewOfSection(g_shared_section, NtCurrentProcess, + &memory, 0, 0, NULL, &size, ViewUnmap, + 0, PAGE_READWRITE); + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || NULL == memory) { + NOTREACHED_NT(); + return false; + } + + if (NULL != _InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&g_shared_IPC_memory, + memory, NULL)) { + // Somebody beat us to the memory setup. + ret = g_nt.UnmapViewOfSection(NtCurrentProcess, memory); + VERIFY_SUCCESS(ret); + } + DCHECK_NT(g_shared_IPC_size > 0); + g_shared_policy_memory = reinterpret_cast<char*>(g_shared_IPC_memory) + + g_shared_IPC_size; + } + DCHECK_NT(g_shared_policy_memory); + DCHECK_NT(g_shared_policy_size > 0); + return true; +} + +void* GetGlobalIPCMemory() { + if (!MapGlobalMemory()) + return NULL; + return g_shared_IPC_memory; +} + +void* GetGlobalPolicyMemory() { + if (!MapGlobalMemory()) + return NULL; + return g_shared_policy_memory; +} + +bool InitHeap() { + if (!g_heap) { + // Create a new heap using default values for everything. + void* heap = g_nt.RtlCreateHeap(HEAP_GROWABLE, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (!heap) + return false; + + if (NULL != _InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&g_heap, heap, NULL)) { + // Somebody beat us to the memory setup. + g_nt.RtlDestroyHeap(heap); + } + } + return (g_heap) ? true : false; +} + +// Physically reads or writes from memory to verify that (at this time), it is +// valid. Returns a dummy value. +int TouchMemory(void* buffer, size_t size_bytes, RequiredAccess intent) { + const int kPageSize = 4096; + int dummy = 0; + char* start = reinterpret_cast<char*>(buffer); + char* end = start + size_bytes - 1; + + if (WRITE == intent) { + for (; start < end; start += kPageSize) { + *start = 0; + } + *end = 0; + } else { + for (; start < end; start += kPageSize) { + dummy += *start; + } + dummy += *end; + } + + return dummy; +} + +bool ValidParameter(void* buffer, size_t size, RequiredAccess intent) { + DCHECK_NT(size); + __try { + TouchMemory(buffer, size, intent); + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + return false; + } + return true; +} + +NTSTATUS CopyData(void* destination, const void* source, size_t bytes) { + NTSTATUS ret = STATUS_SUCCESS; + __try { + if (SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) { + memcpy(destination, source, bytes); + } else { + const char* from = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(source); + char* to = reinterpret_cast<char*>(destination); + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { + to[i] = from[i]; + } + } + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + ret = GetExceptionCode(); + } + return ret; +} + +// Hacky code... replace with AllocAndCopyObjectAttributes. +NTSTATUS AllocAndCopyName(const OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* in_object, + wchar_t** out_name, uint32* attributes, + HANDLE* root) { + if (!InitHeap()) + return STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + + DCHECK_NT(out_name); + *out_name = NULL; + NTSTATUS ret = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + __try { + do { + if (in_object->RootDirectory != static_cast<HANDLE>(0) && !root) + break; + if (NULL == in_object->ObjectName) + break; + if (NULL == in_object->ObjectName->Buffer) + break; + + size_t size = in_object->ObjectName->Length + sizeof(wchar_t); + *out_name = new(NT_ALLOC) wchar_t[size/sizeof(wchar_t)]; + if (NULL == *out_name) + break; + + ret = CopyData(*out_name, in_object->ObjectName->Buffer, + size - sizeof(wchar_t)); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + break; + + (*out_name)[size / sizeof(wchar_t) - 1] = L'\0'; + + if (attributes) + *attributes = in_object->Attributes; + + if (root) + *root = in_object->RootDirectory; + ret = STATUS_SUCCESS; + } while (false); + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + ret = GetExceptionCode(); + } + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) && *out_name) { + operator delete(*out_name, NT_ALLOC); + *out_name = NULL; + } + + return ret; +} + +NTSTATUS GetProcessId(HANDLE process, ULONG *process_id) { + PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION proc_info; + ULONG bytes_returned; + + NTSTATUS ret = g_nt.QueryInformationProcess(process, ProcessBasicInformation, + &proc_info, sizeof(proc_info), + &bytes_returned); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || sizeof(proc_info) != bytes_returned) + return ret; + + *process_id = proc_info.UniqueProcessId; + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +bool IsSameProcess(HANDLE process) { + if (NtCurrentProcess == process) + return true; + + static ULONG s_process_id = 0; + + if (!s_process_id) { + NTSTATUS ret = GetProcessId(NtCurrentProcess, &s_process_id); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return false; + } + + ULONG process_id; + NTSTATUS ret = GetProcessId(process, &process_id); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return false; + + return (process_id == s_process_id); +} + +bool IsValidImageSection(HANDLE section, PVOID *base, PLARGE_INTEGER offset, + PSIZE_T view_size) { + if (!section || !base || !view_size || offset) + return false; + + HANDLE query_section; + + NTSTATUS ret = g_nt.DuplicateObject(NtCurrentProcess, section, + NtCurrentProcess, &query_section, + SECTION_QUERY, 0, 0); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return false; + + SECTION_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info; + SIZE_T bytes_returned; + ret = g_nt.QuerySection(query_section, SectionBasicInformation, &basic_info, + sizeof(basic_info), &bytes_returned); + + VERIFY_SUCCESS(g_nt.Close(query_section)); + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret) || sizeof(basic_info) != bytes_returned) + return false; + + if (!(basic_info.Attributes & SEC_IMAGE)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +UNICODE_STRING* AnsiToUnicode(const char* string) { + ANSI_STRING ansi_string; + ansi_string.Length = static_cast<USHORT>(g_nt.strlen(string)); + ansi_string.MaximumLength = ansi_string.Length + 1; + ansi_string.Buffer = const_cast<char*>(string); + + if (ansi_string.Length > ansi_string.MaximumLength) + return NULL; + + size_t name_bytes = ansi_string.MaximumLength * sizeof(wchar_t) + + sizeof(UNICODE_STRING); + + UNICODE_STRING* out_string = reinterpret_cast<UNICODE_STRING*>( + new(NT_ALLOC) char[name_bytes]); + if (!out_string) + return NULL; + + out_string->MaximumLength = ansi_string.MaximumLength * sizeof(wchar_t); + out_string->Buffer = reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(&out_string[1]); + + BOOLEAN alloc_destination = FALSE; + NTSTATUS ret = g_nt.RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString(out_string, &ansi_string, + alloc_destination); + DCHECK_NT(STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW != ret); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) { + operator delete(out_string, NT_ALLOC); + return NULL; + } + + return out_string; +} + +UNICODE_STRING* GetImageInfoFromModule(HMODULE module, uint32* flags) { + UNICODE_STRING* out_name = NULL; + __try { + do { + *flags = 0; + base::win::PEImage pe(module); + + if (!pe.VerifyMagic()) + break; + *flags |= MODULE_IS_PE_IMAGE; + + PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY exports = pe.GetExportDirectory(); + if (exports) { + char* name = reinterpret_cast<char*>(pe.RVAToAddr(exports->Name)); + out_name = AnsiToUnicode(name); + } + + PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS headers = pe.GetNTHeaders(); + if (headers) { + if (headers->OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint) + *flags |= MODULE_HAS_ENTRY_POINT; + if (headers->OptionalHeader.SizeOfCode) + *flags |= MODULE_HAS_CODE; + } + } while (false); + } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { + } + + return out_name; +} + +UNICODE_STRING* GetBackingFilePath(PVOID address) { + // We'll start with something close to max_path charactes for the name. + ULONG buffer_bytes = MAX_PATH * 2; + + for (;;) { + MEMORY_SECTION_NAME* section_name = reinterpret_cast<MEMORY_SECTION_NAME*>( + new(NT_ALLOC) char[buffer_bytes]); + + if (!section_name) + return NULL; + + ULONG returned_bytes; + NTSTATUS ret = g_nt.QueryVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, address, + MemorySectionName, section_name, + buffer_bytes, &returned_bytes); + + if (STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW == ret) { + // Retry the call with the given buffer size. + operator delete(section_name, NT_ALLOC); + section_name = NULL; + buffer_bytes = returned_bytes; + continue; + } + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) { + operator delete(section_name, NT_ALLOC); + return NULL; + } + + return reinterpret_cast<UNICODE_STRING*>(section_name); + } +} + +UNICODE_STRING* ExtractModuleName(const UNICODE_STRING* module_path) { + if ((!module_path) || (!module_path->Buffer)) + return NULL; + + wchar_t* sep = NULL; + int start_pos = module_path->Length / sizeof(wchar_t) - 1; + int ix = start_pos; + + for (; ix >= 0; --ix) { + if (module_path->Buffer[ix] == L'\\') { + sep = &module_path->Buffer[ix]; + break; + } + } + + // Ends with path separator. Not a valid module name. + if ((ix == start_pos) && sep) + return NULL; + + // No path separator found. Use the entire name. + if (!sep) { + sep = &module_path->Buffer[-1]; + } + + // Add one to the size so we can null terminate the string. + size_t size_bytes = (start_pos - ix + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t); + + // Based on the code above, size_bytes should always be small enough + // to make the static_cast below safe. + DCHECK_NT(kuint16max > size_bytes); + char* str_buffer = new(NT_ALLOC) char[size_bytes + sizeof(UNICODE_STRING)]; + if (!str_buffer) + return NULL; + + UNICODE_STRING* out_string = reinterpret_cast<UNICODE_STRING*>(str_buffer); + out_string->Buffer = reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(&out_string[1]); + out_string->Length = static_cast<USHORT>(size_bytes - sizeof(wchar_t)); + out_string->MaximumLength = static_cast<USHORT>(size_bytes); + + NTSTATUS ret = CopyData(out_string->Buffer, &sep[1], out_string->Length); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) { + operator delete(out_string, NT_ALLOC); + return NULL; + } + + out_string->Buffer[out_string->Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0'; + return out_string; +} + +NTSTATUS AutoProtectMemory::ChangeProtection(void* address, size_t bytes, + ULONG protect) { + DCHECK_NT(!changed_); + SIZE_T new_bytes = bytes; + NTSTATUS ret = g_nt.ProtectVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &address, + &new_bytes, protect, &old_protect_); + if (NT_SUCCESS(ret)) { + changed_ = true; + address_ = address; + bytes_ = new_bytes; + } + + return ret; +} + +NTSTATUS AutoProtectMemory::RevertProtection() { + if (!changed_) + return STATUS_SUCCESS; + + DCHECK_NT(address_); + DCHECK_NT(bytes_); + + SIZE_T new_bytes = bytes_; + NTSTATUS ret = g_nt.ProtectVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &address_, + &new_bytes, old_protect_, + &old_protect_); + DCHECK_NT(NT_SUCCESS(ret)); + + changed_ = false; + address_ = NULL; + bytes_ = 0; + old_protect_ = 0; + + return ret; +} + +bool IsSupportedRenameCall(FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION* file_info, DWORD length, + uint32 file_info_class) { + if (FileRenameInformation != file_info_class) + return false; + + if (length < sizeof(FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION)) + return false; + + // Make sure file name length doesn't exceed the message length + if (length - offsetof(FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION, FileName) < + file_info->FileNameLength) + return false; + + // We don't support a root directory. + if (file_info->RootDirectory) + return false; + + // Check if it starts with \\??\\. We don't support relative paths. + if (file_info->FileNameLength < 4 || file_info->FileNameLength > kuint16max) + return false; + + if (file_info->FileName[0] != L'\\' || + file_info->FileName[1] != L'?' || + file_info->FileName[2] != L'?' || + file_info->FileName[3] != L'\\') + return false; + + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox + +void* operator new(size_t size, sandbox::AllocationType type, + void* near_to) { + using namespace sandbox; + + if (NT_ALLOC == type) { + if (!InitHeap()) + return NULL; + + // Use default flags for the allocation. + return g_nt.RtlAllocateHeap(sandbox::g_heap, 0, size); + } else if (NT_PAGE == type) { + return AllocateNearTo(near_to, size); + } + NOTREACHED_NT(); + return NULL; +} + +void operator delete(void* memory, sandbox::AllocationType type) { + using namespace sandbox; + + if (NT_ALLOC == type) { + // Use default flags. + VERIFY(g_nt.RtlFreeHeap(sandbox::g_heap, 0, memory)); + } else if (NT_PAGE == type) { + void* base = memory; + SIZE_T size = 0; + VERIFY_SUCCESS(g_nt.FreeVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess, &base, &size, + MEM_RELEASE)); + } else { + NOTREACHED_NT(); + } +} + +void operator delete(void* memory, sandbox::AllocationType type, + void* near_to) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(near_to); + operator delete(memory, type); +} + +void* __cdecl operator new(size_t size, void* buffer, + sandbox::AllocationType type) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(size); + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(type); + return buffer; +} + +void __cdecl operator delete(void* memory, void* buffer, + sandbox::AllocationType type) { + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(memory); + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(buffer); + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(type); +} diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a82302 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_NT_UTIL_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_NT_UTIL_H_ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_types.h" + +// Placement new and delete to be used from ntdll interception code. +void* __cdecl operator new(size_t size, sandbox::AllocationType type, + void* near_to = NULL); +void __cdecl operator delete(void* memory, sandbox::AllocationType type); +// Add operator delete that matches the placement form of the operator new +// above. This is required by compiler to generate code to call operator delete +// in case the object's constructor throws an exception. +// See http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cxdxz3x6.aspx +void __cdecl operator delete(void* memory, sandbox::AllocationType type, + void* near_to); + +// Regular placement new and delete +void* __cdecl operator new(size_t size, void* buffer, + sandbox::AllocationType type); +void __cdecl operator delete(void* memory, void* buffer, + sandbox::AllocationType type); + +// DCHECK_NT is defined to be pretty much an assert at this time because we +// don't have logging from the ntdll layer on the child. +// +// VERIFY_NT and VERIFY_SUCCESS_NT are the standard asserts on debug, but +// execute the actual argument on release builds. VERIFY_NT expects an action +// returning a bool, while VERIFY_SUCCESS_NT expects an action returning +// NTSTATUS. +#ifndef NDEBUG +#define DCHECK_NT(condition) { (condition) ? 0 : __debugbreak(); } +#define VERIFY(action) DCHECK_NT(action) +#define VERIFY_SUCCESS(action) DCHECK_NT(NT_SUCCESS(action)) +#else +#define DCHECK_NT(condition) +#define VERIFY(action) (action) +#define VERIFY_SUCCESS(action) (action) +#endif + +#define NOTREACHED_NT() DCHECK_NT(false) + +namespace sandbox { + +extern "C" long _InterlockedCompareExchange(long volatile* destination, + long exchange, long comperand); + +#pragma intrinsic(_InterlockedCompareExchange) + +// We want to make sure that we use an intrinsic version of the function, not +// the one provided by kernel32. +__forceinline void* _InterlockedCompareExchangePointer( + void* volatile* destination, void* exchange, void* comperand) { + size_t ret = _InterlockedCompareExchange( + reinterpret_cast<long volatile*>(destination), + static_cast<long>(reinterpret_cast<size_t>(exchange)), + static_cast<long>(reinterpret_cast<size_t>(comperand))); + + return reinterpret_cast<void*>(static_cast<size_t>(ret)); +} + +// Returns a pointer to the IPC shared memory. +void* GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + +// Returns a pointer to the Policy shared memory. +void* GetGlobalPolicyMemory(); + +enum RequiredAccess { + READ, + WRITE +}; + +// Performs basic user mode buffer validation. In any case, buffers access must +// be protected by SEH. intent specifies if the buffer should be tested for read +// or write. +// Note that write intent implies destruction of the buffer content (we actually +// write) +bool ValidParameter(void* buffer, size_t size, RequiredAccess intent); + + +// Copies data from a user buffer to our buffer. Returns the operation status. +NTSTATUS CopyData(void* destination, const void* source, size_t bytes); + +// Copies the name from an object attributes. +NTSTATUS AllocAndCopyName(const OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* in_object, + wchar_t** out_name, uint32* attributes, HANDLE* root); + +// Initializes our ntdll level heap +bool InitHeap(); + +// Returns true if the provided handle refers to the current process. +bool IsSameProcess(HANDLE process); + +enum MappedModuleFlags { + MODULE_IS_PE_IMAGE = 1, // Module is an executable. + MODULE_HAS_ENTRY_POINT = 2, // Execution entry point found. + MODULE_HAS_CODE = 4 // Non zero size of executable sections. +}; + +// Returns the name and characteristics for a given PE module. The return +// value is the name as defined by the export table and the flags is any +// combination of the MappedModuleFlags enumeration. +// +// The returned buffer must be freed with a placement delete from the ntdll +// level allocator: +// +// UNICODE_STRING* name = GetPEImageInfoFromModule(HMODULE module, &flags); +// if (!name) { +// // probably not a valid dll +// return; +// } +// InsertYourLogicHere(name); +// operator delete(name, NT_ALLOC); +UNICODE_STRING* GetImageInfoFromModule(HMODULE module, uint32* flags); + +// Returns the full path and filename for a given dll. +// May return NULL if the provided address is not backed by a named section, or +// if the current OS version doesn't support the call. The returned buffer must +// be freed with a placement delete (see GetImageNameFromModule example). +UNICODE_STRING* GetBackingFilePath(PVOID address); + +// Returns the last component of a path that contains the module name. +// It will return NULL if the path ends with the path separator. The returned +// buffer must be freed with a placement delete (see GetImageNameFromModule +// example). +UNICODE_STRING* ExtractModuleName(const UNICODE_STRING* module_path); + +// Returns true if the parameters correspond to a dll mapped as code. +bool IsValidImageSection(HANDLE section, PVOID *base, PLARGE_INTEGER offset, + PSIZE_T view_size); + +// Converts an ansi string to an UNICODE_STRING. +UNICODE_STRING* AnsiToUnicode(const char* string); + +// Provides a simple way to temporarily change the protection of a memory page. +class AutoProtectMemory { + public: + AutoProtectMemory() + : changed_(false), address_(NULL), bytes_(0), old_protect_(0) {} + + ~AutoProtectMemory() { + RevertProtection(); + } + + // Sets the desired protection of a given memory range. + NTSTATUS ChangeProtection(void* address, size_t bytes, ULONG protect); + + // Restores the original page protection. + NTSTATUS RevertProtection(); + + private: + bool changed_; + void* address_; + size_t bytes_; + ULONG old_protect_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(AutoProtectMemory); +}; + +// Returns true if the file_rename_information structure is supported by our +// rename handler. +bool IsSupportedRenameCall(FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION* file_info, DWORD length, + uint32 file_info_class); + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_NT_UTIL_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..288adc45 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_ + +#include <string> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/security_level.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +class TargetPolicy { + public: + // Windows subsystems that can have specific rules. + // Note: The process subsystem(SUBSY_PROCESS) does not evaluate the request + // exactly like the CreateProcess API does. See the comment at the top of + // process_thread_dispatcher.cc for more details. + enum SubSystem { + SUBSYS_FILES, // Creation and opening of files and pipes. + SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, // Creation of named pipes. + SUBSYS_PROCESS, // Creation of child processes. + SUBSYS_REGISTRY, // Creation and opening of registry keys. + SUBSYS_SYNC, // Creation of named sync objects. + SUBSYS_HANDLES // Duplication of handles to other processes. + }; + + // Allowable semantics when a rule is matched. + enum Semantics { + FILES_ALLOW_ANY, // Allows open or create for any kind of access that + // the file system supports. + FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, // Allows open or create with read access only. + FILES_ALLOW_QUERY, // Allows access to query the attributes of a file. + FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY, // Allows open or create with directory semantics + // only. + HANDLES_DUP_ANY, // Allows duplicating handles opened with any + // access permissions. + HANDLES_DUP_BROKER, // Allows duplicating handles to the broker process. + NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, // Allows creation of a named pipe. + PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, // Allows to create a process with minimal rights + // over the resulting process and thread handles. + // No other parameters besides the command line are + // passed to the child process. + PROCESS_ALL_EXEC, // Allows the creation of a process and return fill + // access on the returned handles. + // This flag can be used only when the main token of + // the sandboxed application is at least INTERACTIVE. + EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY, // Allows the creation of an event with full access. + EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, // Allows opening an even with synchronize access. + REG_ALLOW_READONLY, // Allows readonly access to a registry key. + REG_ALLOW_ANY // Allows read and write access to a registry key. + }; + + // Increments the reference count of this object. The reference count must + // be incremented if this interface is given to another component. + virtual void AddRef() = 0; + + // Decrements the reference count of this object. When the reference count + // is zero the object is automatically destroyed. + // Indicates that the caller is done with this interface. After calling + // release no other method should be called. + virtual void Release() = 0; + + // Sets the security level for the target process' two tokens. + // This setting is permanent and cannot be changed once the target process is + // spawned. + // initial: the security level for the initial token. This is the token that + // is used by the process from the creation of the process until the moment + // the process calls TargetServices::LowerToken() or the process calls + // win32's ReverToSelf(). Once this happens the initial token is no longer + // available and the lockdown token is in effect. + // lockdown: the security level for the token that comes into force after the + // process calls TargetServices::LowerToken() or the process calls + // ReverToSelf(). See the explanation of each level in the TokenLevel + // definition. + // Return value: SBOX_ALL_OK if the setting succeeds and false otherwise. + // Returns false if the lockdown value is more permissive than the initial + // value. + // + // Important: most of the sandbox-provided security relies on this single + // setting. The caller should strive to set the lockdown level as restricted + // as possible. + virtual ResultCode SetTokenLevel(TokenLevel initial, TokenLevel lockdown) = 0; + + // Sets the security level of the Job Object to which the target process will + // belong. This setting is permanent and cannot be changed once the target + // process is spawned. The job controls the global security settings which + // can not be specified in the token security profile. + // job_level: the security level for the job. See the explanation of each + // level in the JobLevel definition. + // ui_exceptions: specify what specific rights that are disabled in the + // chosen job_level that need to be granted. Use this parameter to avoid + // selecting the next permissive job level unless you need all the rights + // that are granted in such level. + // The exceptions can be specified as a combination of the following + // constants: + // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES : grant access to all user-mode handles. These + // include windows, icons, menus and various GDI objects. In addition the + // target process can set hooks, and broadcast messages to other processes + // that belong to the same desktop. + // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD : grant read-only access to the clipboard. + // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_WRITECLIPBOARD : grant write access to the clipboard. + // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS : allow changes to the system-wide + // parameters as defined by the Win32 call SystemParametersInfo(). + // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS : allow programmatic changes to the + // display settings. + // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_GLOBALATOMS : allow access to the global atoms table. + // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP : allow the creation of new desktops. + // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS : allow the call to ExitWindows(). + // + // Return value: SBOX_ALL_OK if the setting succeeds and false otherwise. + // + // Note: JOB_OBJECT_XXXX constants are defined in winnt.h and documented at + // length in: + // http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684152.aspx + // + // Note: the recommended level is JOB_RESTRICTED or JOB_LOCKDOWN. + virtual ResultCode SetJobLevel(JobLevel job_level, uint32 ui_exceptions) = 0; + + // Specifies the desktop on which the application is going to run. If the + // desktop does not exist, it will be created. If alternate_winstation is + // set to true, the desktop will be created on an alternate window station. + virtual ResultCode SetAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) = 0; + + // Returns the name of the alternate desktop used. If an alternate window + // station is specified, the name is prepended by the window station name, + // followed by a backslash. + virtual std::wstring GetAlternateDesktop() const = 0; + + // Precreates the desktop and window station, if any. + virtual ResultCode CreateAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) = 0; + + // Destroys the desktop and windows station. + virtual void DestroyAlternateDesktop() = 0; + + // Sets the integrity level of the process in the sandbox. Both the initial + // token and the main token will be affected by this. This is valid only + // on Vista. It is silently ignored on other OSes. If you set the integrity + // level to a level higher than your current level, the sandbox will fail + // to start. + virtual ResultCode SetIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel level) = 0; + + // Sets the integrity level of the process in the sandbox. The integrity level + // will not take effect before you call LowerToken. User Interface Privilege + // Isolation is not affected by this setting and will remain off for the + // process in the sandbox. This flag is valid on Vista only, it is silently + // ignored on other OSes. If you set the integrity level to a level higher + // than your current level, the sandbox will fail to start. + virtual ResultCode SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel level) = 0; + + // Sets the interceptions to operate in strict mode. By default, interceptions + // are performed in "relaxed" mode, where if something inside NTDLL.DLL is + // already patched we attempt to intercept it anyway. Setting interceptions + // to strict mode means that when we detect that the function is patched we'll + // refuse to perform the interception. + virtual void SetStrictInterceptions() = 0; + + // Adds a policy rule effective for processes spawned using this policy. + // subsystem: One of the above enumerated windows subsystems. + // semantics: One of the above enumerated FileSemantics. + // pattern: A specific full path or a full path with wildcard patterns. + // The valid wildcards are: + // '*' : Matches zero or more character. Only one in series allowed. + // '?' : Matches a single character. One or more in series are allowed. + // Examples: + // "c:\\documents and settings\\vince\\*.dmp" + // "c:\\documents and settings\\*\\crashdumps\\*.dmp" + // "c:\\temp\\app_log_?????_chrome.txt" + virtual ResultCode AddRule(SubSystem subsystem, Semantics semantics, + const wchar_t* pattern) = 0; + + // Adds a dll that will be unloaded in the target process before it gets + // a chance to initialize itself. Typically, dlls that cause the target + // to crash go here. + virtual ResultCode AddDllToUnload(const wchar_t* dll_name) = 0; + + // Adds a handle that will be closed in the target process after lockdown. + // A NULL value for handle_name indicates all handles of the specified type. + // An empty string for handle_name indicates the handle is unnamed. + virtual ResultCode AddKernelObjectToClose(const wchar_t* handle_type, + const wchar_t* handle_name) = 0; +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4438641 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.cc @@ -0,0 +1,542 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/callback.h" +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "sandbox/src/filesystem_dispatcher.h" +#include "sandbox/src/filesystem_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_dispatcher.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/job.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/named_pipe_dispatcher.h" +#include "sandbox/src/named_pipe_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_broker.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_processor.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_dispatcher.h" +#include "sandbox/src/process_thread_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/registry_dispatcher.h" +#include "sandbox/src/registry_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sync_dispatcher.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sync_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_process.h" +#include "sandbox/src/window.h" + +namespace { +// The standard windows size for one memory page. +const size_t kOneMemPage = 4096; +// The IPC and Policy shared memory sizes. +const size_t kIPCMemSize = kOneMemPage * 2; +const size_t kPolMemSize = kOneMemPage * 14; + +// Helper function to allocate space (on the heap) for policy. +sandbox::PolicyGlobal* MakeBrokerPolicyMemory() { + const size_t kTotalPolicySz = kPolMemSize; + char* mem = new char[kTotalPolicySz]; + DCHECK(mem); + memset(mem, 0, kTotalPolicySz); + sandbox::PolicyGlobal* policy = reinterpret_cast<sandbox::PolicyGlobal*>(mem); + policy->data_size = kTotalPolicySz - sizeof(sandbox::PolicyGlobal); + return policy; +} +} + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT IntegrityLevel g_shared_delayed_integrity_level; + +// Initializes static members. +HWINSTA PolicyBase::alternate_winstation_handle_ = NULL; +HDESK PolicyBase::alternate_desktop_handle_ = NULL; + +PolicyBase::PolicyBase() + : ref_count(1), + lockdown_level_(USER_LOCKDOWN), + initial_level_(USER_LOCKDOWN), + job_level_(JOB_LOCKDOWN), + ui_exceptions_(0), + use_alternate_desktop_(false), + use_alternate_winstation_(false), + file_system_init_(false), + relaxed_interceptions_(true), + integrity_level_(INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST), + delayed_integrity_level_(INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST), + policy_maker_(NULL), + policy_(NULL) { + ::InitializeCriticalSection(&lock_); + // Initialize the IPC dispatcher array. + memset(&ipc_targets_, NULL, sizeof(ipc_targets_)); + Dispatcher* dispatcher = NULL; + + dispatcher = new FilesystemDispatcher(this); + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTOPENFILE_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTSETINFO_RENAME_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTQUERYATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTQUERYFULLATTRIBUTESFILE_TAG] = dispatcher; + + dispatcher = new NamedPipeDispatcher(this); + ipc_targets_[IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG] = dispatcher; + + dispatcher = new ThreadProcessDispatcher(this); + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTOPENTHREAD_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTOPENPROCESS_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_CREATEPROCESSW_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKEN_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTOPENPROCESSTOKENEX_TAG] = dispatcher; + + dispatcher = new SyncDispatcher(this); + ipc_targets_[IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_OPENEVENT_TAG] = dispatcher; + + dispatcher = new RegistryDispatcher(this); + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTCREATEKEY_TAG] = dispatcher; + ipc_targets_[IPC_NTOPENKEY_TAG] = dispatcher; + + dispatcher = new HandleDispatcher(this); + ipc_targets_[IPC_DUPLICATEHANDLEPROXY_TAG] = dispatcher; +} + +PolicyBase::~PolicyBase() { + TargetSet::iterator it; + for (it = targets_.begin(); it != targets_.end(); ++it) { + TargetProcess* target = (*it); + delete target; + } + delete ipc_targets_[IPC_NTCREATEFILE_TAG]; + delete ipc_targets_[IPC_CREATENAMEDPIPEW_TAG]; + delete ipc_targets_[IPC_NTOPENTHREAD_TAG]; + delete ipc_targets_[IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG]; + delete ipc_targets_[IPC_NTCREATEKEY_TAG]; + delete ipc_targets_[IPC_DUPLICATEHANDLEPROXY_TAG]; + delete policy_maker_; + delete policy_; + ::DeleteCriticalSection(&lock_); +} + +void PolicyBase::AddRef() { + ::InterlockedIncrement(&ref_count); +} + +void PolicyBase::Release() { + if (0 == ::InterlockedDecrement(&ref_count)) + delete this; +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::SetTokenLevel(TokenLevel initial, TokenLevel lockdown) { + if (initial < lockdown) { + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + } + initial_level_ = initial; + lockdown_level_ = lockdown; + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::SetJobLevel(JobLevel job_level, uint32 ui_exceptions) { + job_level_ = job_level; + ui_exceptions_ = ui_exceptions; + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::SetAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) { + use_alternate_desktop_ = true; + use_alternate_winstation_ = alternate_winstation; + return CreateAlternateDesktop(alternate_winstation); +} + +std::wstring PolicyBase::GetAlternateDesktop() const { + // No alternate desktop or winstation. Return an empty string. + if (!use_alternate_desktop_ && !use_alternate_winstation_) { + return std::wstring(); + } + + // The desktop and winstation should have been created by now. + // If we hit this scenario, it means that the user ignored the failure + // during SetAlternateDesktop, so we ignore it here too. + if (use_alternate_desktop_ && !alternate_desktop_handle_) { + return std::wstring(); + } + if (use_alternate_winstation_ && (!alternate_desktop_handle_ || + !alternate_winstation_handle_)) { + return std::wstring(); + } + + return GetFullDesktopName(alternate_winstation_handle_, + alternate_desktop_handle_); +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::CreateAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) { + if (alternate_winstation) { + // Previously called with alternate_winstation = false? + if (!alternate_winstation_handle_ && alternate_desktop_handle_) + return SBOX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED; + + // Check if it's already created. + if (alternate_winstation_handle_ && alternate_desktop_handle_) + return SBOX_ALL_OK; + + DCHECK(!alternate_winstation_handle_); + // Create the window station. + ResultCode result = CreateAltWindowStation(&alternate_winstation_handle_); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != result) + return result; + + // Verify that everything is fine. + if (!alternate_winstation_handle_ || + GetWindowObjectName(alternate_winstation_handle_).empty()) + return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_DESKTOP; + + // Create the destkop. + result = CreateAltDesktop(alternate_winstation_handle_, + &alternate_desktop_handle_); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != result) + return result; + + // Verify that everything is fine. + if (!alternate_desktop_handle_ || + GetWindowObjectName(alternate_desktop_handle_).empty()) + return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_DESKTOP; + } else { + // Previously called with alternate_winstation = true? + if (alternate_winstation_handle_) + return SBOX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED; + + // Check if it already exists. + if (alternate_desktop_handle_) + return SBOX_ALL_OK; + + // Create the destkop. + ResultCode result = CreateAltDesktop(NULL, &alternate_desktop_handle_); + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != result) + return result; + + // Verify that everything is fine. + if (!alternate_desktop_handle_ || + GetWindowObjectName(alternate_desktop_handle_).empty()) + return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_DESKTOP; + } + + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +void PolicyBase::DestroyAlternateDesktop() { + if (alternate_desktop_handle_) { + ::CloseDesktop(alternate_desktop_handle_); + alternate_desktop_handle_ = NULL; + } + + if (alternate_winstation_handle_) { + ::CloseWindowStation(alternate_winstation_handle_); + alternate_winstation_handle_ = NULL; + } +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::SetIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) { + integrity_level_ = integrity_level; + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::SetDelayedIntegrityLevel( + IntegrityLevel integrity_level) { + delayed_integrity_level_ = integrity_level; + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +void PolicyBase::SetStrictInterceptions() { + relaxed_interceptions_ = false; +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::AddRule(SubSystem subsystem, Semantics semantics, + const wchar_t* pattern) { + if (NULL == policy_) { + policy_ = MakeBrokerPolicyMemory(); + DCHECK(policy_); + policy_maker_ = new LowLevelPolicy(policy_); + DCHECK(policy_maker_); + } + + switch (subsystem) { + case SUBSYS_FILES: { + if (!file_system_init_) { + if (!FileSystemPolicy::SetInitialRules(policy_maker_)) + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + file_system_init_ = true; + } + if (!FileSystemPolicy::GenerateRules(pattern, semantics, policy_maker_)) { + NOTREACHED(); + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + } + break; + } + case SUBSYS_SYNC: { + if (!SyncPolicy::GenerateRules(pattern, semantics, policy_maker_)) { + NOTREACHED(); + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + } + break; + } + case SUBSYS_PROCESS: { + if (lockdown_level_ < USER_INTERACTIVE && + TargetPolicy::PROCESS_ALL_EXEC == semantics) { + // This is unsupported. This is a huge security risk to give full access + // to a process handle. + return SBOX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED; + } + if (!ProcessPolicy::GenerateRules(pattern, semantics, policy_maker_)) { + NOTREACHED(); + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + } + break; + } + case SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES: { + if (!NamedPipePolicy::GenerateRules(pattern, semantics, policy_maker_)) { + NOTREACHED(); + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + } + break; + } + case SUBSYS_REGISTRY: { + if (!RegistryPolicy::GenerateRules(pattern, semantics, policy_maker_)) { + NOTREACHED(); + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + } + break; + } + case SUBSYS_HANDLES: { + if (!HandlePolicy::GenerateRules(pattern, semantics, policy_maker_)) { + NOTREACHED(); + return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS; + } + break; + } + default: { + return SBOX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED; + } + } + + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::AddDllToUnload(const wchar_t* dll_name) { + blacklisted_dlls_.push_back(std::wstring(dll_name)); + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +ResultCode PolicyBase::AddKernelObjectToClose(const char16* handle_type, + const char16* handle_name) { + return handle_closer_.AddHandle(handle_type, handle_name); +} + +// When an IPC is ready in any of the targets we get called. We manage an array +// of IPC dispatchers which are keyed on the IPC tag so we normally delegate +// to the appropriate dispatcher unless we can handle the IPC call ourselves. +Dispatcher* PolicyBase::OnMessageReady(IPCParams* ipc, + CallbackGeneric* callback) { + DCHECK(callback); + static const IPCParams ping1 = {IPC_PING1_TAG, ULONG_TYPE}; + static const IPCParams ping2 = {IPC_PING2_TAG, INOUTPTR_TYPE}; + + if (ping1.Matches(ipc) || ping2.Matches(ipc)) { + *callback = reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>( + static_cast<Callback1>(&PolicyBase::Ping)); + return this; + } + + Dispatcher* dispatch = GetDispatcher(ipc->ipc_tag); + if (!dispatch) { + NOTREACHED(); + return NULL; + } + return dispatch->OnMessageReady(ipc, callback); +} + +// Delegate to the appropriate dispatcher. +bool PolicyBase::SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service) { + if (IPC_PING1_TAG == service || IPC_PING2_TAG == service) + return true; + + Dispatcher* dispatch = GetDispatcher(service); + if (!dispatch) { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + return dispatch->SetupService(manager, service); +} + +DWORD PolicyBase::MakeJobObject(HANDLE* job) { + // Create the windows job object. + Job job_obj; + DWORD result = job_obj.Init(job_level_, NULL, ui_exceptions_); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != result) { + return result; + } + *job = job_obj.Detach(); + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +DWORD PolicyBase::MakeTokens(HANDLE* initial, HANDLE* lockdown) { + // Create the 'naked' token. This will be the permanent token associated + // with the process and therefore with any thread that is not impersonating. + DWORD result = CreateRestrictedToken(lockdown, lockdown_level_, + integrity_level_, PRIMARY); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != result) { + return result; + } + // Create the 'better' token. We use this token as the one that the main + // thread uses when booting up the process. It should contain most of + // what we need (before reaching main( )) + result = CreateRestrictedToken(initial, initial_level_, + integrity_level_, IMPERSONATION); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != result) { + ::CloseHandle(*lockdown); + return result; + } + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +bool PolicyBase::AddTarget(TargetProcess* target) { + if (NULL != policy_) + policy_maker_->Done(); + + if (!SetupAllInterceptions(target)) + return false; + + if (!SetupHandleCloser(target)) + return false; + + // Initialize the sandbox infrastructure for the target. + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != target->Init(this, policy_, kIPCMemSize, kPolMemSize)) + return false; + + g_shared_delayed_integrity_level = delayed_integrity_level_; + ResultCode ret = target->TransferVariable( + "g_shared_delayed_integrity_level", + &g_shared_delayed_integrity_level, + sizeof(g_shared_delayed_integrity_level)); + g_shared_delayed_integrity_level = INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST; + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != ret) + return false; + + AutoLock lock(&lock_); + targets_.push_back(target); + return true; +} + +bool PolicyBase::OnJobEmpty(HANDLE job) { + AutoLock lock(&lock_); + TargetSet::iterator it; + for (it = targets_.begin(); it != targets_.end(); ++it) { + if ((*it)->Job() == job) + break; + } + if (it == targets_.end()) { + return false; + } + TargetProcess* target = *it; + targets_.erase(it); + delete target; + return true; +} + +EvalResult PolicyBase::EvalPolicy(int service, + CountedParameterSetBase* params) { + if (NULL != policy_) { + if (NULL == policy_->entry[service]) { + // There is no policy for this particular service. This is not a big + // deal. + return DENY_ACCESS; + } + for (int i = 0; i < params->count; i++) { + if (!params->parameters[i].IsValid()) { + NOTREACHED(); + return SIGNAL_ALARM; + } + } + PolicyProcessor pol_evaluator(policy_->entry[service]); + PolicyResult result = pol_evaluator.Evaluate(kShortEval, + params->parameters, + params->count); + if (POLICY_MATCH == result) { + return pol_evaluator.GetAction(); + } + DCHECK(POLICY_ERROR != result); + } + + return DENY_ACCESS; +} + +// We service IPC_PING_TAG message which is a way to test a round trip of the +// IPC subsystem. We receive a integer cookie and we are expected to return the +// cookie times two (or three) and the current tick count. +bool PolicyBase::Ping(IPCInfo* ipc, void* arg1) { + switch (ipc->ipc_tag) { + case IPC_PING1_TAG: { + IPCInt ipc_int(arg1); + uint32 cookie = ipc_int.As32Bit(); + ipc->return_info.extended_count = 2; + ipc->return_info.extended[0].unsigned_int = ::GetTickCount(); + ipc->return_info.extended[1].unsigned_int = 2 * cookie; + return true; + } + case IPC_PING2_TAG: { + CountedBuffer* io_buffer = reinterpret_cast<CountedBuffer*>(arg1); + if (sizeof(uint32) != io_buffer->Size()) + return false; + + uint32* cookie = reinterpret_cast<uint32*>(io_buffer->Buffer()); + *cookie = (*cookie) * 3; + return true; + } + default: return false; + } +} + +Dispatcher* PolicyBase::GetDispatcher(int ipc_tag) { + if (ipc_tag >= IPC_LAST_TAG || ipc_tag <= IPC_UNUSED_TAG) + return NULL; + + return ipc_targets_[ipc_tag]; +} + +bool PolicyBase::SetupAllInterceptions(TargetProcess* target) { + InterceptionManager manager(target, relaxed_interceptions_); + + if (policy_) { + for (int i = 0; i < IPC_LAST_TAG; i++) { + if (policy_->entry[i] && !ipc_targets_[i]->SetupService(&manager, i)) + return false; + } + } + + if (!blacklisted_dlls_.empty()) { + std::vector<std::wstring>::iterator it = blacklisted_dlls_.begin(); + for (; it != blacklisted_dlls_.end(); ++it) { + manager.AddToUnloadModules(it->c_str()); + } + } + + if (!handle_closer_.SetupHandleInterceptions(&manager)) + return false; + + if (!SetupBasicInterceptions(&manager)) + return false; + + if (!manager.InitializeInterceptions()) + return false; + + // Finally, setup imports on the target so the interceptions can work. + return SetupNtdllImports(target); +} + +bool PolicyBase::SetupHandleCloser(TargetProcess* target) { + return handle_closer_.InitializeTargetHandles(target); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3ea805 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_BASE_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_BASE_H_ + +#include <windows.h> + +#include <list> +#include <vector> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/compiler_specific.h" +#include "base/string16.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_closer.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +class LowLevelPolicy; +class TargetProcess; +struct PolicyGlobal; + +// We act as a policy dispatcher, implementing the handler for the "ping" IPC, +// so we have to provide the appropriate handler on the OnMessageReady method. +// There is a static_cast for the handler, and the compiler only performs the +// cast if the first base class is Dispatcher. +class PolicyBase : public Dispatcher, public TargetPolicy { + public: + PolicyBase(); + + // TargetPolicy: + virtual void AddRef() OVERRIDE; + virtual void Release() OVERRIDE; + virtual ResultCode SetTokenLevel(TokenLevel initial, + TokenLevel lockdown) OVERRIDE; + virtual ResultCode SetJobLevel(JobLevel job_level, + uint32 ui_exceptions) OVERRIDE; + virtual ResultCode SetAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) OVERRIDE; + virtual std::wstring GetAlternateDesktop() const OVERRIDE; + virtual ResultCode CreateAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) OVERRIDE; + virtual void DestroyAlternateDesktop() OVERRIDE; + virtual ResultCode SetIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) OVERRIDE; + virtual ResultCode SetDelayedIntegrityLevel( + IntegrityLevel integrity_level) OVERRIDE; + virtual void SetStrictInterceptions() OVERRIDE; + virtual ResultCode AddRule(SubSystem subsystem, Semantics semantics, + const wchar_t* pattern) OVERRIDE; + virtual ResultCode AddDllToUnload(const wchar_t* dll_name); + virtual ResultCode AddKernelObjectToClose(const char16* handle_type, + const char16* handle_name) OVERRIDE; + + // Dispatcher: + virtual Dispatcher* OnMessageReady(IPCParams* ipc, + CallbackGeneric* callback) OVERRIDE; + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service) OVERRIDE; + + // Creates a Job object with the level specified in a previous call to + // SetJobLevel(). Returns the standard windows of ::GetLastError(). + DWORD MakeJobObject(HANDLE* job); + + // Creates the two tokens with the levels specified in a previous call to + // SetTokenLevel(). Returns the standard windows of ::GetLastError(). + DWORD MakeTokens(HANDLE* initial, HANDLE* lockdown); + + // Adds a target process to the internal list of targets. Internally a + // call to TargetProcess::Init() is issued. + bool AddTarget(TargetProcess* target); + + // Called when there are no more active processes in a Job. + // Removes a Job object associated with this policy and the target associated + // with the job. + bool OnJobEmpty(HANDLE job); + + EvalResult EvalPolicy(int service, CountedParameterSetBase* params); + + private: + ~PolicyBase(); + + // Test IPC providers. + bool Ping(IPCInfo* ipc, void* cookie); + + // Returns a dispatcher from ipc_targets_. + Dispatcher* GetDispatcher(int ipc_tag); + + // Sets up interceptions for a new target. + bool SetupAllInterceptions(TargetProcess* target); + + // Sets up the handle closer for a new target. + bool SetupHandleCloser(TargetProcess* target); + + // This lock synchronizes operations on the targets_ collection. + CRITICAL_SECTION lock_; + // Maintains the list of target process associated with this policy. + // The policy takes ownership of them. + typedef std::list<TargetProcess*> TargetSet; + TargetSet targets_; + // Standard object-lifetime reference counter. + volatile LONG ref_count; + // The user-defined global policy settings. + TokenLevel lockdown_level_; + TokenLevel initial_level_; + JobLevel job_level_; + uint32 ui_exceptions_; + bool use_alternate_desktop_; + bool use_alternate_winstation_; + // Helps the file system policy initialization. + bool file_system_init_; + bool relaxed_interceptions_; + IntegrityLevel integrity_level_; + IntegrityLevel delayed_integrity_level_; + // The array of objects that will answer IPC calls. + Dispatcher* ipc_targets_[IPC_LAST_TAG]; + // Object in charge of generating the low level policy. + LowLevelPolicy* policy_maker_; + // Memory structure that stores the low level policy. + PolicyGlobal* policy_; + // The list of dlls to unload in the target process. + std::vector<std::wstring> blacklisted_dlls_; + // This is a map of handle-types to names that we need to close in the + // target process. A null set means we need to close all handles of the + // given type. + HandleCloser handle_closer_; + + static HDESK alternate_desktop_handle_; + static HWINSTA alternate_winstation_handle_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(PolicyBase); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_BASE_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_types.h b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_types.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce9b767 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_TYPES_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_TYPES_H_ + +namespace sandbox { + +// Operation result codes returned by the sandbox API. +enum ResultCode { + SBOX_ALL_OK = 0, + // Error is originating on the win32 layer. Call GetlastError() for more + // information. + SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC = 1, + // An invalid combination of parameters was given to the API. + SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS = 2, + // The desired operation is not supported at this time. + SBOX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED = 3, + // The request requires more memory that allocated or available. + SBOX_ERROR_NO_SPACE = 4, + // The ipc service requested does not exist. + SBOX_ERROR_INVALID_IPC = 5, + // The ipc service did not complete. + SBOX_ERROR_FAILED_IPC = 6, + // The requested handle was not found. + SBOX_ERROR_NO_HANDLE = 7, + // This function was not expected to be called at this time. + SBOX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_CALL = 8, + // WaitForAllTargets is already called. + SBOX_ERROR_WAIT_ALREADY_CALLED = 9, + // A channel error prevented DoCall from executing. + SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR = 10, + // Failed to create the alternate desktop. + SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_DESKTOP = 11, + // Failed to create the alternate window station. + SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_WINSTATION = 12, + // Failed to switch back to the interactive window station. + SBOX_ERROR_FAILED_TO_SWITCH_BACK_WINSTATION = 13, + // Placeholder for last item of the enum. + SBOX_ERROR_LAST +}; + +// If the sandbox cannot create a secure environment for the target, the +// target will be forcibly terminated. These are the process exit codes. +enum TerminationCodes { + SBOX_FATAL_INTEGRITY = 7006, // Could not set the integrity level. + SBOX_FATAL_DROPTOKEN = 7007, // Could not lower the token. + SBOX_FATAL_FLUSHANDLES = 7008, // Failed to flush registry handles. + SBOX_FATAL_CACHEDISABLE = 7009, // Failed to forbid HCKU caching. + SBOX_FATAL_CLOSEHANDLES = 7010 // Failed to close pending handles. +}; + +class BrokerServices; +class TargetServices; + +// Contains the pointer to a target or broker service. +struct SandboxInterfaceInfo { + BrokerServices* broker_services; + TargetServices* target_services; +}; + +#if SANDBOX_EXPORTS +#define SANDBOX_INTERCEPT extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) +#else +#define SANDBOX_INTERCEPT extern "C" +#endif + +enum InterceptionType { + INTERCEPTION_INVALID = 0, + INTERCEPTION_SERVICE_CALL, // Trampoline of an NT native call + INTERCEPTION_EAT, + INTERCEPTION_SIDESTEP, // Preamble patch + INTERCEPTION_SMART_SIDESTEP, // Preamble patch but bypass internal calls + INTERCEPTION_UNLOAD_MODULE, // Unload the module (don't patch) + INTERCEPTION_LAST // Placeholder for last item in the enumeration +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_TYPES_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_utils.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_utils.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3bfa696 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_utils.cc @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" + +#include <windows.h> + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/internal_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +bool GetModuleHandleHelper(DWORD flags, const wchar_t* module_name, + HMODULE* module) { + DCHECK(module); + + HMODULE kernel32_base = ::GetModuleHandle(kKerneldllName); + if (!kernel32_base) { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + + GetModuleHandleExFunction get_module_handle_ex = reinterpret_cast< + GetModuleHandleExFunction>(::GetProcAddress(kernel32_base, + "GetModuleHandleExW")); + if (get_module_handle_ex) { + BOOL ret = get_module_handle_ex(flags, module_name, module); + return (ret ? true : false); + } + + if (!flags) { + *module = ::LoadLibrary(module_name); + } else if (flags & GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN) { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } else if (!(flags & GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS)) { + DCHECK((flags & GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT) == + GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT); + + *module = ::GetModuleHandle(module_name); + } else { + DCHECK((flags & (GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT | + GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS)) == + (GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT | + GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS)); + + MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION info = {0}; + size_t returned = VirtualQuery(module_name, &info, sizeof(info)); + if (sizeof(info) != returned) + return false; + *module = reinterpret_cast<HMODULE>(info.AllocationBase); + } + return true; +} + +bool IsXPSP2OrLater() { + base::win::Version version = base::win::GetVersion(); + return (version > base::win::VERSION_XP) || + ((version == base::win::VERSION_XP) && + (base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance()->service_pack().major >= 2)); +} + +void InitObjectAttribs(const std::wstring& name, ULONG attributes, HANDLE root, + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* obj_attr, UNICODE_STRING* uni_name) { + static RtlInitUnicodeStringFunction RtlInitUnicodeString; + if (!RtlInitUnicodeString) { + HMODULE ntdll = ::GetModuleHandle(kNtdllName); + RtlInitUnicodeString = reinterpret_cast<RtlInitUnicodeStringFunction>( + GetProcAddress(ntdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString")); + DCHECK(RtlInitUnicodeString); + } + RtlInitUnicodeString(uni_name, name.c_str()); + InitializeObjectAttributes(obj_attr, uni_name, attributes, root, NULL); +} + +}; // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_utils.h b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_utils.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..314330f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_utils.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_UTILS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_UTILS_H__ + +#include <windows.h> +#include <string> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +typedef BOOL (WINAPI* GetModuleHandleExFunction)(DWORD flags, + LPCWSTR module_name, + HMODULE* module); + +// Windows XP provides a nice function in kernel32.dll called GetModuleHandleEx +// This function allows us to verify if a function exported by the module +// lies in the module itself. +// As we need compatibility with windows 2000, we cannot use this function +// by calling it by name. This helper function checks if the GetModuleHandleEx +// function is exported by kernel32 and uses it, otherwise, implemets part of +// the functionality exposed by GetModuleHandleEx. +bool GetModuleHandleHelper(DWORD flags, const wchar_t* module_name, + HMODULE* module); + +// Returns true if the current OS is Windows XP SP2 or later. +bool IsXPSP2OrLater(); + +void InitObjectAttribs(const std::wstring& name, ULONG attributes, HANDLE root, + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* obj_attr, UNICODE_STRING* uni_name); + +}; // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SANDBOX_UTILS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/security_level.h b/sandbox/win/src/security_level.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..467f96f --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/security_level.h @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SECURITY_LEVEL_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SECURITY_LEVEL_H_ + +namespace sandbox { + +// List of all the integrity levels supported in the sandbox. This is used +// only on Windows Vista. You can't set the integrity level of the process +// in the sandbox to a level higher than yours. +enum IntegrityLevel { + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_SYSTEM, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_HIGH, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM_LOW, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_BELOW_LOW, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED, + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST +}; + +// The Token level specifies a set of security profiles designed to +// provide the bulk of the security of sandbox. +// +// TokenLevel |Restricting |Deny Only |Privileges| +// |Sids |Sids | | +// ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------| +// USER_LOCKDOWN | Null Sid | All | None | +// ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------| +// USER_RESTRICTED | RESTRICTED | All | Traverse | +// ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------| +// USER_LIMITED | Users | All except: | Traverse | +// | Everyone | Users | | +// | RESTRICTED | Everyone | | +// | | Interactive | | +// ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------| +// USER_INTERACTIVE | Users | All except: | Traverse | +// | Everyone | Users | | +// | RESTRICTED | Everyone | | +// | Owner | Interactive | | +// | | Local | | +// | | Authent-users | | +// | | User | | +// ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------| +// USER_NON_ADMIN | None | All except: | Traverse | +// | | Users | | +// | | Everyone | | +// | | Interactive | | +// | | Local | | +// | | Authent-users | | +// | | User | | +// ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------| +// USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS | All | None | All | +// ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------| +// USER_UNPROTECTED | None | None | All | +// ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------| +// +// The above restrictions are actually a transformation that is applied to +// the existing broker process token. The resulting token that will be +// applied to the target process depends both on the token level selected +// and on the broker token itself. +// +// The LOCKDOWN and RESTRICTED are designed to allow access to almost +// nothing that has security associated with and they are the recommended +// levels to run sandboxed code specially if there is a chance that the +// broker is process might be started by a user that belongs to the Admins +// or power users groups. +enum TokenLevel { + USER_LOCKDOWN = 0, + USER_RESTRICTED, + USER_LIMITED, + USER_INTERACTIVE, + USER_NON_ADMIN, + USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, + USER_UNPROTECTED +}; + +// The Job level specifies a set of decreasing security profiles for the +// Job object that the target process will be placed into. +// This table summarizes the security associated with each level: +// +// JobLevel |General |Quota | +// |restrictions |restrictions | +// -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------| +// JOB_UNPROTECTED | None | *Kill on Job close.| +// -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------| +// JOB_INTERACTIVE | *Forbid system-wide changes using | | +// | SystemParametersInfo(). | *Kill on Job close.| +// | *Forbid the creation/switch of | | +// | Desktops. | | +// | *Forbids calls to ExitWindows(). | | +// -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------| +// JOB_LIMITED_USER | Same as INTERACTIVE_USER plus: | *One active process| +// | *Forbid changes to the display | limit. | +// | settings. | *Kill on Job close.| +// -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------| +// JOB_RESTRICTED | Same as LIMITED_USER plus: | *One active process| +// | * No read/write to the clipboard. | limit. | +// | * No access to User Handles that | *Kill on Job close.| +// | belong to other processes. | | +// | * Forbid message broadcasts. | | +// | * Forbid setting global hooks. | | +// | * No access to the global atoms | | +// | table. | | +// -----------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------| +// JOB_LOCKDOWN | Same as RESTRICTED | *One active process| +// | | limit. | +// | | *Kill on Job close.| +// | | *Kill on unhandled | +// | | exception. | +// | | | +// In the context of the above table, 'user handles' refers to the handles of +// windows, bitmaps, menus, etc. Files, treads and registry handles are kernel +// handles and are not affected by the job level settings. +enum JobLevel { + JOB_LOCKDOWN = 0, + JOB_RESTRICTED, + JOB_LIMITED_USER, + JOB_INTERACTIVE, + JOB_UNPROTECTED +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SECURITY_LEVEL_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver.cc b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79579a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver.cc @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/service_resolver.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/win/pe_image.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +NTSTATUS ServiceResolverThunk::ResolveInterceptor( + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void** address) { + // After all, we are using a locally mapped version of the exe, so the + // action is the same as for a target function. + return ResolveTarget(interceptor_module, interceptor_name, + const_cast<void**>(address)); +} + +// In this case all the work is done from the parent, so resolve is +// just a simple GetProcAddress. +NTSTATUS ServiceResolverThunk::ResolveTarget(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + void** address) { + DCHECK(address); + if (NULL == module) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + base::win::PEImage module_image(module); + *address = module_image.GetProcAddress(function_name); + + if (NULL == *address) { + NOTREACHED(); + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver.h b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99eadb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver.h @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SERVICE_RESOLVER_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SERVICE_RESOLVER_H__ + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/resolver.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform service-call type functions +// inside ntdll.dll. +class ServiceResolverThunk : public ResolverThunk { + public: + // The service resolver needs a child process to write to. + ServiceResolverThunk(HANDLE process, bool relaxed) + : process_(process), ntdll_base_(NULL), win2k_(false), + relaxed_(relaxed), relative_jump_(0) {} + virtual ~ServiceResolverThunk() {} + + // Implementation of Resolver::Setup. + virtual NTSTATUS Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used); + + // Implementation of Resolver::ResolveInterceptor. + virtual NTSTATUS ResolveInterceptor(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + const void** address); + + // Implementation of Resolver::ResolveTarget. + virtual NTSTATUS ResolveTarget(const void* module, + const char* function_name, + void** address); + + // Implementation of Resolver::GetThunkSize. + virtual size_t GetThunkSize() const; + + protected: + // The unit test will use this member to allow local patch on a buffer. + HMODULE ntdll_base_; + + // Handle of the child process. + HANDLE process_; + + protected: + // Keeps track of a Windows 2000 resolver. + bool win2k_; + + private: + // Returns true if the code pointer by target_ corresponds to the expected + // type of function. Saves that code on the first part of the thunk pointed + // by local_thunk (should be directly accessible from the parent). + virtual bool IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const; + + // Performs the actual patch of target_. + // local_thunk must be already fully initialized, and the first part must + // contain the original code. The real type of this buffer is ServiceFullThunk + // (yes, private). remote_thunk (real type ServiceFullThunk), must be + // allocated on the child, and will contain the thunk data, after this call. + // Returns the apropriate status code. + virtual NTSTATUS PerformPatch(void* local_thunk, void* remote_thunk); + + // Provides basically the same functionality as IsFunctionAService but it + // continues even if it does not recognize the function code. remote_thunk + // is the address of our memory on the child. + bool SaveOriginalFunction(void* local_thunk, void* remote_thunk); + + // true if we are allowed to patch already-patched functions. + bool relaxed_; + ULONG relative_jump_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ServiceResolverThunk); +}; + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform service-call type functions +// inside ntdll.dll on WOW64 (32 bit ntdll on 64 bit Vista). +class Wow64ResolverThunk : public ServiceResolverThunk { + public: + // The service resolver needs a child process to write to. + Wow64ResolverThunk(HANDLE process, bool relaxed) + : ServiceResolverThunk(process, relaxed) {} + virtual ~Wow64ResolverThunk() {} + + private: + virtual bool IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Wow64ResolverThunk); +}; + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform service-call type functions +// inside ntdll.dll on WOW64 for Windows 8. +class Wow64W8ResolverThunk : public ServiceResolverThunk { + public: + // The service resolver needs a child process to write to. + Wow64W8ResolverThunk(HANDLE process, bool relaxed) + : ServiceResolverThunk(process, relaxed) {} + virtual ~Wow64W8ResolverThunk() {} + + private: + virtual bool IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Wow64W8ResolverThunk); +}; + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform service-call type functions +// inside ntdll.dll on Windows 2000 and XP pre SP2. +class Win2kResolverThunk : public ServiceResolverThunk { + public: + // The service resolver needs a child process to write to. + Win2kResolverThunk(HANDLE process, bool relaxed) + : ServiceResolverThunk(process, relaxed) { + win2k_ = true; + } + virtual ~Win2kResolverThunk() {} + + private: + virtual bool IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Win2kResolverThunk); +}; + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform service-call type functions +// inside ntdll.dll on Windows 8. +class Win8ResolverThunk : public ServiceResolverThunk { + public: + // The service resolver needs a child process to write to. + Win8ResolverThunk(HANDLE process, bool relaxed) + : ServiceResolverThunk(process, relaxed) {} + virtual ~Win8ResolverThunk() {} + + private: + virtual bool IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Win8ResolverThunk); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SERVICE_RESOLVER_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_32.cc b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_32.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f5597b --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_32.cc @@ -0,0 +1,424 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/service_resolver.h" + +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { +#pragma pack(push, 1) + +const BYTE kMovEax = 0xB8; +const BYTE kMovEdx = 0xBA; +const USHORT kMovEdxEsp = 0xD48B; +const USHORT kCallPtrEdx = 0x12FF; +const USHORT kCallEdx = 0xD2FF; +const BYTE kCallEip = 0xE8; +const BYTE kRet = 0xC2; +const BYTE kRet2 = 0xC3; +const BYTE kNop = 0x90; +const USHORT kJmpEdx = 0xE2FF; +const USHORT kXorEcx = 0xC933; +const ULONG kLeaEdx = 0x0424548D; +const ULONG kCallFs1 = 0xC015FF64; +const USHORT kCallFs2 = 0; +const BYTE kCallFs3 = 0; +const BYTE kAddEsp1 = 0x83; +const USHORT kAddEsp2 = 0x4C4; +const BYTE kJmp32 = 0xE9; +const USHORT kSysenter = 0x340F; + +const int kMaxService = 1000; + +// Service code for 32 bit systems. +// NOTE: on win2003 "call dword ptr [edx]" is "call edx". +struct ServiceEntry { + // This struct contains roughly the following code: + // 00 mov eax,25h + // 05 mov edx,offset SharedUserData!SystemCallStub (7ffe0300) + // 0a call dword ptr [edx] + // 0c ret 2Ch + // 0f nop + BYTE mov_eax; // = B8 + ULONG service_id; + BYTE mov_edx; // = BA + ULONG stub; + USHORT call_ptr_edx; // = FF 12 + BYTE ret; // = C2 + USHORT num_params; + BYTE nop; +}; + +// Service code for 32 bit Windows 8. +struct ServiceEntryW8 { + // This struct contains the following code: + // 00 b825000000 mov eax,25h + // 05 e803000000 call eip+3 + // 0a c22c00 ret 2Ch + // 0d 8bd4 mov edx,esp + // 0f 0f34 sysenter + // 11 c3 ret + // 12 8bff mov edi,edi + BYTE mov_eax; // = B8 + ULONG service_id; + BYTE call_eip; // = E8 + ULONG call_offset; + BYTE ret_p; // = C2 + USHORT num_params; + USHORT mov_edx_esp; // = BD D4 + USHORT sysenter; // = 0F 34 + BYTE ret; // = C3 + USHORT nop; +}; + +// Service code for a 32 bit process running on a 64 bit os. +struct Wow64Entry { + // This struct may contain one of two versions of code: + // 1. For XP, Vista and 2K3: + // 00 b825000000 mov eax, 25h + // 05 33c9 xor ecx, ecx + // 07 8d542404 lea edx, [esp + 4] + // 0b 64ff15c0000000 call dword ptr fs:[0C0h] + // 12 c22c00 ret 2Ch + // + // 2. For Windows 7: + // 00 b825000000 mov eax, 25h + // 05 33c9 xor ecx, ecx + // 07 8d542404 lea edx, [esp + 4] + // 0b 64ff15c0000000 call dword ptr fs:[0C0h] + // 12 83c404 add esp, 4 + // 15 c22c00 ret 2Ch + // + // So we base the structure on the bigger one: + BYTE mov_eax; // = B8 + ULONG service_id; + USHORT xor_ecx; // = 33 C9 + ULONG lea_edx; // = 8D 54 24 04 + ULONG call_fs1; // = 64 FF 15 C0 + USHORT call_fs2; // = 00 00 + BYTE call_fs3; // = 00 + BYTE add_esp1; // = 83 or ret + USHORT add_esp2; // = C4 04 or num_params + BYTE ret; // = C2 + USHORT num_params; +}; + +// Service code for a 32 bit process running on 64 bit Windows 8. +struct Wow64EntryW8 { + // 00 b825000000 mov eax, 25h + // 05 64ff15c0000000 call dword ptr fs:[0C0h] + // 0b c22c00 ret 2Ch + // 0f 90 nop + BYTE mov_eax; // = B8 + ULONG service_id; + ULONG call_fs1; // = 64 FF 15 C0 + USHORT call_fs2; // = 00 00 + BYTE call_fs3; // = 00 + BYTE ret; // = C2 + USHORT num_params; + BYTE nop; +}; + +// Make sure that relaxed patching works as expected. +const size_t kMinServiceSize = offsetof(ServiceEntry, ret); +COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(ServiceEntryW8) >= kMinServiceSize, wrong_service_len); +COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(Wow64Entry) >= kMinServiceSize, wrong_service_len); +COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(Wow64EntryW8) >= kMinServiceSize, wrong_service_len); + +struct ServiceFullThunk { + union { + ServiceEntry original; + ServiceEntryW8 original_w8; + Wow64Entry wow_64; + Wow64EntryW8 wow_64_w8; + }; + int internal_thunk; // Dummy member to the beginning of the internal thunk. +}; + +#pragma pack(pop) + +}; // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +NTSTATUS ServiceResolverThunk::Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used) { + NTSTATUS ret = Init(target_module, interceptor_module, target_name, + interceptor_name, interceptor_entry_point, + thunk_storage, storage_bytes); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + + relative_jump_ = 0; + size_t thunk_bytes = GetThunkSize(); + scoped_array<char> thunk_buffer(new char[thunk_bytes]); + ServiceFullThunk* thunk = reinterpret_cast<ServiceFullThunk*>( + thunk_buffer.get()); + + if (!IsFunctionAService(&thunk->original) && + (!relaxed_ || !SaveOriginalFunction(&thunk->original, thunk_storage))) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + ret = PerformPatch(thunk, thunk_storage); + + if (NULL != storage_used) + *storage_used = thunk_bytes; + + return ret; +} + +size_t ServiceResolverThunk::GetThunkSize() const { + return offsetof(ServiceFullThunk, internal_thunk) + GetInternalThunkSize(); +} + +bool ServiceResolverThunk::IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const { + ServiceEntry function_code; + SIZE_T read; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(process_, target_, &function_code, + sizeof(function_code), &read)) + return false; + + if (sizeof(function_code) != read) + return false; + + if (kMovEax != function_code.mov_eax || + kMovEdx != function_code.mov_edx || + (kCallPtrEdx != function_code.call_ptr_edx && + kCallEdx != function_code.call_ptr_edx) || + kRet != function_code.ret) + return false; + + // Find the system call pointer if we don't already have it. + if (kCallEdx != function_code.call_ptr_edx) { + DWORD ki_system_call; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(process_, + bit_cast<const void*>(function_code.stub), + &ki_system_call, sizeof(ki_system_call), &read)) + return false; + + if (sizeof(ki_system_call) != read) + return false; + + HMODULE module_1, module_2; + // last check, call_stub should point to a KiXXSystemCall function on ntdll + if (!GetModuleHandleHelper(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS | + GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT, + bit_cast<const wchar_t*>(ki_system_call), + &module_1)) + return false; + + if (NULL != ntdll_base_) { + // This path is only taken when running the unit tests. We want to be + // able to patch a buffer in memory, so target_ is not inside ntdll. + module_2 = ntdll_base_; + } else { + if (!GetModuleHandleHelper( + GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS | + GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT, + reinterpret_cast<const wchar_t*>(target_), + &module_2)) { + return false; + } + } + + if (module_1 != module_2) + return false; + } + + // Save the verified code + memcpy(local_thunk, &function_code, sizeof(function_code)); + + return true; +} + +NTSTATUS ServiceResolverThunk::PerformPatch(void* local_thunk, + void* remote_thunk) { + ServiceEntry intercepted_code; + size_t bytes_to_write = sizeof(intercepted_code); + ServiceFullThunk *full_local_thunk = reinterpret_cast<ServiceFullThunk*>( + local_thunk); + ServiceFullThunk *full_remote_thunk = reinterpret_cast<ServiceFullThunk*>( + remote_thunk); + + // patch the original code + memcpy(&intercepted_code, &full_local_thunk->original, + sizeof(intercepted_code)); + intercepted_code.mov_eax = kMovEax; + intercepted_code.service_id = full_local_thunk->original.service_id; + intercepted_code.mov_edx = kMovEdx; + intercepted_code.stub = bit_cast<ULONG>(&full_remote_thunk->internal_thunk); + intercepted_code.call_ptr_edx = kJmpEdx; + bytes_to_write = kMinServiceSize; + + if (relative_jump_) { + intercepted_code.mov_eax = kJmp32; + intercepted_code.service_id = relative_jump_; + bytes_to_write = offsetof(ServiceEntry, mov_edx); + } + + // setup the thunk + SetInternalThunk(&full_local_thunk->internal_thunk, GetInternalThunkSize(), + remote_thunk, interceptor_); + + size_t thunk_size = GetThunkSize(); + + // copy the local thunk buffer to the child + SIZE_T written; + if (!::WriteProcessMemory(process_, remote_thunk, local_thunk, + thunk_size, &written)) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + if (thunk_size != written) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + // and now change the function to intercept, on the child + if (NULL != ntdll_base_) { + // running a unit test + if (!::WriteProcessMemory(process_, target_, &intercepted_code, + bytes_to_write, &written)) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } else { + if (!WriteProtectedChildMemory(process_, target_, &intercepted_code, + bytes_to_write)) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +bool ServiceResolverThunk::SaveOriginalFunction(void* local_thunk, + void* remote_thunk) { + ServiceEntry function_code; + SIZE_T read; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(process_, target_, &function_code, + sizeof(function_code), &read)) + return false; + + if (sizeof(function_code) != read) + return false; + + if (kJmp32 == function_code.mov_eax) { + // Plain old entry point patch. The relative jump address follows it. + ULONG relative = function_code.service_id; + + // First, fix our copy of their patch. + relative += bit_cast<ULONG>(target_) - bit_cast<ULONG>(remote_thunk); + + function_code.service_id = relative; + + // And now, remember how to re-patch it. + ServiceFullThunk *full_thunk = + reinterpret_cast<ServiceFullThunk*>(remote_thunk); + + const ULONG kJmp32Size = 5; + + relative_jump_ = bit_cast<ULONG>(&full_thunk->internal_thunk) - + bit_cast<ULONG>(target_) - kJmp32Size; + } + + // Save the verified code + memcpy(local_thunk, &function_code, sizeof(function_code)); + + return true; +} + +bool Wow64ResolverThunk::IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const { + Wow64Entry function_code; + SIZE_T read; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(process_, target_, &function_code, + sizeof(function_code), &read)) + return false; + + if (sizeof(function_code) != read) + return false; + + if (kMovEax != function_code.mov_eax || kXorEcx != function_code.xor_ecx || + kLeaEdx != function_code.lea_edx || kCallFs1 != function_code.call_fs1 || + kCallFs2 != function_code.call_fs2 || kCallFs3 != function_code.call_fs3) + return false; + + if ((kAddEsp1 == function_code.add_esp1 && + kAddEsp2 == function_code.add_esp2 && + kRet == function_code.ret) || kRet == function_code.add_esp1) { + // Save the verified code + memcpy(local_thunk, &function_code, sizeof(function_code)); + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +bool Wow64W8ResolverThunk::IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const { + Wow64EntryW8 function_code; + SIZE_T read; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(process_, target_, &function_code, + sizeof(function_code), &read)) + return false; + + if (sizeof(function_code) != read) + return false; + + if (kMovEax != function_code.mov_eax || kCallFs1 != function_code.call_fs1 || + kCallFs2 != function_code.call_fs2 || + kCallFs3 != function_code.call_fs3 || kRet != function_code.ret) { + return false; + } + + // Save the verified code + memcpy(local_thunk, &function_code, sizeof(function_code)); + return true; +} + +bool Win2kResolverThunk::IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const { + ServiceEntry function_code; + SIZE_T read; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(process_, target_, &function_code, + sizeof(function_code), &read)) + return false; + + if (sizeof(function_code) != read) + return false; + + if (kMovEax != function_code.mov_eax || + function_code.service_id > kMaxService) + return false; + + // Save the verified code + memcpy(local_thunk, &function_code, sizeof(function_code)); + + return true; +} + +bool Win8ResolverThunk::IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const { + ServiceEntryW8 function_code; + SIZE_T read; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(process_, target_, &function_code, + sizeof(function_code), &read)) + return false; + + if (sizeof(function_code) != read) + return false; + + if (kMovEax != function_code.mov_eax || kCallEip != function_code.call_eip || + function_code.call_offset != 3 || kRet != function_code.ret_p || + kMovEdxEsp != function_code.mov_edx_esp || + kSysenter != function_code.sysenter || kRet2 != function_code.ret) { + return false; + } + + // Save the verified code + memcpy(local_thunk, &function_code, sizeof(function_code)); + + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_64.cc b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_64.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01e3b1a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_64.cc @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/service_resolver.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace { +#pragma pack(push, 1) + +const ULONG kMmovR10EcxMovEax = 0xB8D18B4C; +const USHORT kSyscall = 0x050F; +const BYTE kRetNp = 0xC3; +const ULONG64 kMov1 = 0x54894808244C8948; +const ULONG64 kMov2 = 0x4C182444894C1024; +const ULONG kMov3 = 0x20244C89; + +// Service code for 64 bit systems. +struct ServiceEntry { + // This struct contains roughly the following code: + // 00 mov r10,rcx + // 03 mov eax,52h + // 08 syscall + // 0a ret + // 0b xchg ax,ax + // 0e xchg ax,ax + + ULONG mov_r10_rcx_mov_eax; // = 4C 8B D1 B8 + ULONG service_id; + USHORT syscall; // = 0F 05 + BYTE ret; // = C3 + BYTE pad; // = 66 + USHORT xchg_ax_ax1; // = 66 90 + USHORT xchg_ax_ax2; // = 66 90 +}; + +// Service code for 64 bit Windows 8. +struct ServiceEntryW8 { + // This struct contains the following code: + // 00 48894c2408 mov [rsp+8], rcx + // 05 4889542410 mov [rsp+10], rdx + // 0a 4c89442418 mov [rsp+18], r8 + // 0f 4c894c2420 mov [rsp+20], r9 + // 14 4c8bd1 mov r10,rcx + // 17 b825000000 mov eax,25h + // 1c 0f05 syscall + // 1e c3 ret + // 1f 90 nop + + ULONG64 mov_1; // = 48 89 4C 24 08 48 89 54 + ULONG64 mov_2; // = 24 10 4C 89 44 24 18 4C + ULONG mov_3; // = 89 4C 24 20 + ULONG mov_r10_rcx_mov_eax; // = 4C 8B D1 B8 + ULONG service_id; + USHORT syscall; // = 0F 05 + BYTE ret; // = C2 + BYTE nop; // = 90 +}; + +// We don't have an internal thunk for x64. +struct ServiceFullThunk { + union { + ServiceEntry original; + ServiceEntryW8 original_w8; + }; +}; + +#pragma pack(pop) + +bool IsService(const void* source) { + const ServiceEntry* service = + reinterpret_cast<const ServiceEntry*>(source); + + return (kMmovR10EcxMovEax == service->mov_r10_rcx_mov_eax && + kSyscall == service->syscall && kRetNp == service->ret); +} + +}; // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +NTSTATUS ServiceResolverThunk::Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used) { + NTSTATUS ret = Init(target_module, interceptor_module, target_name, + interceptor_name, interceptor_entry_point, + thunk_storage, storage_bytes); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + + size_t thunk_bytes = GetThunkSize(); + scoped_array<char> thunk_buffer(new char[thunk_bytes]); + ServiceFullThunk* thunk = reinterpret_cast<ServiceFullThunk*>( + thunk_buffer.get()); + + if (!IsFunctionAService(&thunk->original)) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + ret = PerformPatch(thunk, thunk_storage); + + if (NULL != storage_used) + *storage_used = thunk_bytes; + + return ret; +} + +size_t ServiceResolverThunk::GetThunkSize() const { + return sizeof(ServiceFullThunk); +} + +bool ServiceResolverThunk::IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const { + ServiceFullThunk function_code; + SIZE_T read; + if (!::ReadProcessMemory(process_, target_, &function_code, + sizeof(function_code), &read)) + return false; + + if (sizeof(function_code) != read) + return false; + + if (!IsService(&function_code)) { + // See if it's the Win8 signature. + ServiceEntryW8* w8_service = &function_code.original_w8; + if (!IsService(&w8_service->mov_r10_rcx_mov_eax) || + w8_service->mov_1 != kMov1 || w8_service->mov_1 != kMov1 || + w8_service->mov_1 != kMov1) { + return false; + } + } + + // Save the verified code. + memcpy(local_thunk, &function_code, sizeof(function_code)); + + return true; +} + +NTSTATUS ServiceResolverThunk::PerformPatch(void* local_thunk, + void* remote_thunk) { + ServiceFullThunk* full_local_thunk = reinterpret_cast<ServiceFullThunk*>( + local_thunk); + ServiceFullThunk* full_remote_thunk = reinterpret_cast<ServiceFullThunk*>( + remote_thunk); + + // Patch the original code. + ServiceEntry local_service; + DCHECK_GE(GetInternalThunkSize(), sizeof(local_service)); + if (!SetInternalThunk(&local_service, sizeof(local_service), NULL, + interceptor_)) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + // Copy the local thunk buffer to the child. + SIZE_T actual; + if (!::WriteProcessMemory(process_, remote_thunk, local_thunk, + sizeof(ServiceFullThunk), &actual)) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + if (sizeof(ServiceFullThunk) != actual) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + // And now change the function to intercept, on the child. + if (NULL != ntdll_base_) { + // Running a unit test. + if (!::WriteProcessMemory(process_, target_, &local_service, + sizeof(local_service), &actual)) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } else { + if (!WriteProtectedChildMemory(process_, target_, &local_service, + sizeof(local_service))) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +} + +bool Wow64ResolverThunk::IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; +} + +bool Win2kResolverThunk::IsFunctionAService(void* local_thunk) const { + NOTREACHED(); + return false; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc85c86 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/service_resolver_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file contains unit tests for ServiceResolverThunk. + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/resolver.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/service_resolver.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace { + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform service-call type functions +// inside ntdll.dll. +template<typename T> +class ResolverThunkTest : public T { + public: + // The service resolver needs a child process to write to. + explicit ResolverThunkTest(bool relaxed) + : T(::GetCurrentProcess(), relaxed) {} + + // Sets the interception target to the desired address. + void set_target(void* target) { + fake_target_ = target; + } + + protected: + // Overrides Resolver::Init + virtual NTSTATUS Init(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes) { + NTSTATUS ret = STATUS_SUCCESS; + ret = ResolverThunk::Init(target_module, interceptor_module, target_name, + interceptor_name, interceptor_entry_point, + thunk_storage, storage_bytes); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret); + + target_ = fake_target_; + ntdll_base_ = ::GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"); + return ret; + }; + + private: + // Holds the address of the fake target. + void* fake_target_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ResolverThunkTest); +}; + +typedef ResolverThunkTest<sandbox::ServiceResolverThunk> WinXpResolverTest; + +#if !defined(_WIN64) +typedef ResolverThunkTest<sandbox::Win2kResolverThunk> Win2kResolverTest; +typedef ResolverThunkTest<sandbox::Win8ResolverThunk> Win8ResolverTest; +typedef ResolverThunkTest<sandbox::Wow64ResolverThunk> Wow64ResolverTest; +typedef ResolverThunkTest<sandbox::Wow64W8ResolverThunk> Wow64W8ResolverTest; +#endif + +const BYTE kJump32 = 0xE9; + +void CheckJump(void* source, void* target) { +#pragma pack(push) +#pragma pack(1) + struct Code { + BYTE jump; + ULONG delta; + }; +#pragma pack(pop) + +#if defined(_WIN64) + FAIL() << "Running 32-bit codepath"; +#else + Code* patched = reinterpret_cast<Code*>(source); + EXPECT_EQ(kJump32, patched->jump); + + ULONG source_addr = bit_cast<ULONG>(source); + ULONG target_addr = bit_cast<ULONG>(target); + EXPECT_EQ(target_addr + 19 - source_addr, patched->delta); +#endif +} + +NTSTATUS PatchNtdllWithResolver(const char* function, bool relaxed, + sandbox::ServiceResolverThunk* resolver) { + HMODULE ntdll_base = ::GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != ntdll_base); + + void* target = ::GetProcAddress(ntdll_base, function); + EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != target); + if (NULL == target) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + BYTE service[50]; + memcpy(service, target, sizeof(service)); + + static_cast<WinXpResolverTest*>(resolver)->set_target(service); + + // Any pointer will do as an interception_entry_point + void* function_entry = resolver; + size_t thunk_size = resolver->GetThunkSize(); + scoped_array<char> thunk(new char[thunk_size]); + size_t used; + + NTSTATUS ret = resolver->Setup(ntdll_base, NULL, function, NULL, + function_entry, thunk.get(), thunk_size, + &used); + if (NT_SUCCESS(ret)) { + EXPECT_EQ(thunk_size, used); + EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(service, target, sizeof(service))); + EXPECT_NE(kJump32, service[0]); + + if (relaxed) { + // It's already patched, let's patch again, and simulate a direct patch. + service[0] = kJump32; + ret = resolver->Setup(ntdll_base, NULL, function, NULL, function_entry, + thunk.get(), thunk_size, &used); + CheckJump(service, thunk.get()); + } + } + + return ret; +} + +sandbox::ServiceResolverThunk* GetTestResolver(bool relaxed) { +#if defined(_WIN64) + return new WinXpResolverTest(relaxed); +#else + base::win::OSInfo* os_info = base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance(); + if (os_info->wow64_status() == base::win::OSInfo::WOW64_ENABLED) { + if (os_info->version() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8) + return new Wow64W8ResolverTest(relaxed); + return new Wow64ResolverTest(relaxed); + } + + if (!sandbox::IsXPSP2OrLater()) + return new Win2kResolverTest(relaxed); + + if (os_info->version() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8) + return new Win8ResolverTest(relaxed); + + return new WinXpResolverTest(relaxed); +#endif +} + +NTSTATUS PatchNtdll(const char* function, bool relaxed) { + sandbox::ServiceResolverThunk* resolver = GetTestResolver(relaxed); + + NTSTATUS ret = PatchNtdllWithResolver(function, relaxed, resolver); + delete resolver; + return ret; +} + +TEST(ServiceResolverTest, PatchesServices) { + NTSTATUS ret = PatchNtdll("NtClose", false); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtClose, last error: " << ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdll("NtCreateFile", false); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtCreateFile, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdll("NtCreateMutant", false); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtCreateMutant, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdll("NtMapViewOfSection", false); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtMapViewOfSection, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); +} + +TEST(ServiceResolverTest, FailsIfNotService) { +#if !defined(_WIN64) + EXPECT_NE(STATUS_SUCCESS, PatchNtdll("RtlUlongByteSwap", false)); +#endif + + EXPECT_NE(STATUS_SUCCESS, PatchNtdll("LdrLoadDll", false)); +} + +TEST(ServiceResolverTest, PatchesPatchedServices) { +// We don't support "relaxed mode" for Win64 apps. +#if !defined(_WIN64) + NTSTATUS ret = PatchNtdll("NtClose", true); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtClose, last error: " << ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdll("NtCreateFile", true); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtCreateFile, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdll("NtCreateMutant", true); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtCreateMutant, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdll("NtMapViewOfSection", true); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtMapViewOfSection, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); +#endif +} + +TEST(ServiceResolverTest, MultiplePatchedServices) { +// We don't support "relaxed mode" for Win64 apps. +#if !defined(_WIN64) + sandbox::ServiceResolverThunk* resolver = GetTestResolver(true); + NTSTATUS ret = PatchNtdllWithResolver("NtClose", true, resolver); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtClose, last error: " << ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdllWithResolver("NtCreateFile", true, resolver); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtCreateFile, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdllWithResolver("NtCreateMutant", true, resolver); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtCreateMutant, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); + + ret = PatchNtdllWithResolver("NtMapViewOfSection", true, resolver); + EXPECT_EQ(STATUS_SUCCESS, ret) << "NtMapViewOfSection, last error: " << + ::GetLastError(); + delete resolver; +#endif +} + +} // namespace diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/shared_handles.cc b/sandbox/win/src/shared_handles.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d07f057 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/shared_handles.cc @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/shared_handles.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Note once again the the assumption here is that the shared memory is +// initialized with zeros in the process that calls SetHandle and that +// the process that calls GetHandle 'sees' this memory. + +SharedHandles::SharedHandles() { + shared_.items = NULL; + shared_.max_items = 0; +} + +bool SharedHandles::Init(void* raw_mem, size_t size_bytes) { + if (size_bytes < sizeof(shared_.items[0])) { + // The shared memory is too small! + return false; + } + shared_.items = static_cast<SharedItem*>(raw_mem); + shared_.max_items = size_bytes / sizeof(shared_.items[0]); + return true; +} + +// Note that an empty slot is marked with a tag == 0 that is why is +// not a valid imput tag +bool SharedHandles::SetHandle(uint32 tag, HANDLE handle) { + if (0 == tag) { + // Invalid tag + return false; + } + // Find empty slot and put the tag and the handle there + SharedItem* empty_slot = FindByTag(0); + if (NULL == empty_slot) { + return false; + } + empty_slot->tag = tag; + empty_slot->item = handle; + return true; +} + +bool SharedHandles::GetHandle(uint32 tag, HANDLE* handle) { + if (0 == tag) { + // Invalid tag + return false; + } + SharedItem* found = FindByTag(tag); + if (NULL == found) { + return false; + } + *handle = found->item; + return true; +} + +SharedHandles::SharedItem* SharedHandles::FindByTag(uint32 tag) { + for (size_t ix = 0; ix != shared_.max_items; ++ix) { + if (tag == shared_.items[ix].tag) { + return &shared_.items[ix]; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/shared_handles.h b/sandbox/win/src/shared_handles.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c76bfb --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/shared_handles.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SHARED_HANDLES_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SHARED_HANDLES_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" + +#ifndef HANDLE +// We can provide our own windows compatilble handle definition, but +// in general we want to rely on the client of this api to include +// the proper windows headers. Note that we don't want to bring the +// whole <windows.h> into scope if we don't have to. +typedef void* HANDLE; +#endif + +namespace sandbox { + +// SharedHandles is a simple class to stash and find windows object handles +// given a raw block of memory which is shared between two processes. +// It addresses the need to communicate a handle value between two windows +// processes given that they are already sharing some memory. +// +// This class is not exposed directly to users of the sanbox API, instead +// we expose the wrapper methods TargetProcess::TransferHandle( ) and +// TargetServices::GetTransferHandle() +// +// Use it for a small number of items, since internaly uses linear seach +// +// The use is very simple. Given a shared memory between proces A and B: +// process A: +// HANDLE handle = SomeFunction(..); +// SharedHandles shared_handes; +// shared_handles.Init(memory) +// shared_handles.SetHandle(3, handle); +// +// process B: +// SharedHandles shared_handes; +// shared_handles.Init(memory) +// HANDLE handle = shared_handles.GetHandle(3); +// +// Note that '3' in this example is a unique id, that must be agreed before +// transfer +// +// Note2: While this class can be used in a single process, there are +// better alternatives such as STL +// +// Note3: Under windows a kernel object handle in one process does not +// make sense for another process unless there is a DuplicateHandle( ) +// call involved which this class DOES NOT do that for you. +// +// Note4: Under windows, shared memory when created is initialized to +// zeros always. If you are not using shared memory it is your responsability +// to zero it for the setter process and to copy it to the getter process. +class SharedHandles { + public: + SharedHandles(); + + // Initializes the shared memory for use. + // Pass the shared memory base and size. It will internally compute + // how many handles can it store. If initialization fails the return value + // is false. + bool Init(void* raw_mem, size_t size_bytes); + + // Sets a handle in the shared memory for transfer. + // Parameters: + // tag : an integer, different from zero that uniquely identfies the + // handle to transfer. + // handle: the handle value associated with 'tag' to tranfer + // Returns false if there is not enough space in the shared memory for + // this handle. + bool SetHandle(uint32 tag, HANDLE handle); + + // Gets a handle previously stored by SetHandle. + // Parameters: + // tag: an integer different from zero that uniquely identfies the handle + // to retrieve. + // *handle: output handle value if the call was succesful. + // If a handle with the provided tag is not found the return value is false. + // If the tag is found the return value is true. + bool GetHandle(uint32 tag, HANDLE* handle); + + private: + // A single item is the tuple handle/tag + struct SharedItem { + uint32 tag; + void* item; + }; + + // SharedMem is used to layout the memory as an array of SharedItems + struct SharedMem { + size_t max_items; + SharedItem* items; + }; + + // Finds an Item tuple provided the handle tag. + // Uses linear search because we expect the number of handles to be + // small (say less than ~100). + SharedItem* FindByTag(uint32 tag); + + SharedMem shared_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SharedHandles); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SHARED_HANDLES_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30c03b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.cc @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <string.h> +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_params.h" +#include "base/logging.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Get the base of the data buffer of the channel; this is where the input +// parameters get serialized. Since they get serialized directly into the +// channel we avoid one copy. +void* SharedMemIPCClient::GetBuffer() { + bool failure = false; + size_t ix = LockFreeChannel(&failure); + if (failure) { + return NULL; + } + return reinterpret_cast<char*>(control_) + + control_->channels[ix].channel_base; +} + +// If we need to cancel an IPC before issuing DoCall +// our client should call FreeBuffer with the same pointer +// returned by GetBuffer. +void SharedMemIPCClient::FreeBuffer(void* buffer) { + size_t num = ChannelIndexFromBuffer(buffer); + ChannelControl* channel = control_->channels; + LONG result = ::InterlockedExchange(&channel[num].state, kFreeChannel); + DCHECK(kFreeChannel != result); + result; +} + +// The constructor simply casts the shared memory to the internal +// structures. This is a cheap step that is why this IPC object can +// and should be constructed per call. +SharedMemIPCClient::SharedMemIPCClient(void* shared_mem) + : control_(reinterpret_cast<IPCControl*>(shared_mem)) { + first_base_ = reinterpret_cast<char*>(shared_mem) + + control_->channels[0].channel_base; + // There must be at least one channel. + DCHECK(0 != control_->channels_count); +} + +// Do the IPC. At this point the channel should have already been +// filled with the serialized input parameters. +// We follow the pattern explained in the header file. +ResultCode SharedMemIPCClient::DoCall(CrossCallParams* params, + CrossCallReturn* answer) { + if (!control_->server_alive) + return SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR; + + size_t num = ChannelIndexFromBuffer(params->GetBuffer()); + ChannelControl* channel = control_->channels; + // Note that the IPC tag goes outside the buffer as well inside + // the buffer. This should enable the server to prioritize based on + // IPC tags without having to de-serialize the entire message. + channel[num].ipc_tag = params->GetTag(); + + // Wait for the server to service this IPC call. After kIPCWaitTimeOut1 + // we check if the server_alive mutex was abandoned which will indicate + // that the server has died. + + // While the atomic signaling and waiting is not a requirement, it + // is nice because we save a trip to kernel. + DWORD wait = ::SignalObjectAndWait(channel[num].ping_event, + channel[num].pong_event, + kIPCWaitTimeOut1, FALSE); + if (WAIT_TIMEOUT == wait) { + // The server is taking too long. Enter a loop were we check if the + // server_alive mutex has been abandoned which would signal a server crash + // or else we keep waiting for a response. + while (true) { + wait = ::WaitForSingleObject(control_->server_alive, 0); + if (WAIT_TIMEOUT == wait) { + // Server seems still alive. We already signaled so here we just wait. + wait = ::WaitForSingleObject(channel[num].pong_event, kIPCWaitTimeOut1); + if (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == wait) { + // The server took a long time but responded. + break; + } else if (WAIT_TIMEOUT == wait) { + continue; + } else { + return SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR; + } + } else { + // The server has crashed and windows has signaled the mutex as + // abandoned. + ::InterlockedExchange(&channel[num].state, kAbandonnedChannel); + control_->server_alive = 0; + return SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR; + } + } + } else if (WAIT_OBJECT_0 != wait) { + // Probably the server crashed before the kIPCWaitTimeOut1 occurred. + return SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR; + } + + // The server has returned an answer, copy it and free the channel. + memcpy(answer, params->GetCallReturn(), sizeof(CrossCallReturn)); + + // Return the IPC state It can indicate that while the IPC has + // completed some error in the Broker has caused to not return valid + // results. + return answer->call_outcome; +} + +// Locking a channel is a simple as looping over all the channels +// looking for one that is has state = kFreeChannel and atomically +// swapping it to kBusyChannel. +// If there is no free channel, then we must back off so some other +// thread makes progress and frees a channel. To back off we sleep. +size_t SharedMemIPCClient::LockFreeChannel(bool* severe_failure) { + if (0 == control_->channels_count) { + *severe_failure = true; + return 0; + } + ChannelControl* channel = control_->channels; + do { + for (size_t ix = 0; ix != control_->channels_count; ++ix) { + if (kFreeChannel == ::InterlockedCompareExchange(&channel[ix].state, + kBusyChannel, + kFreeChannel)) { + *severe_failure = false; + return ix; + } + } + // We did not find any available channel, maybe the server is dead. + DWORD wait = ::WaitForSingleObject(control_->server_alive, + kIPCWaitTimeOut2); + if (WAIT_TIMEOUT != wait) { + // The server is dead and we outlive it enough to get in trouble. + *severe_failure = true; + return 0; + } + } + while (true); +} + +// Find out which channel we are from the pointer returned by GetBuffer. +size_t SharedMemIPCClient::ChannelIndexFromBuffer(const void* buffer) { + ptrdiff_t d = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(buffer) - first_base_; + size_t num = d/kIPCChannelSize; + DCHECK(num < control_->channels_count); + return (num); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h b/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90d0022 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SHAREDMEM_IPC_CLIENT_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SHAREDMEM_IPC_CLIENT_H__ + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" + +// IPC transport implementation that uses shared memory. +// This is the client side +// +// The shared memory is divided on blocks called channels, and potentially +// it can perform as many concurrent IPC calls as channels. The IPC over +// each channel is strictly synchronous for the client. +// +// Each channel as a channel control section associated with. Each control +// section has two kernel events (known as ping and pong) and a integer +// variable that maintains a state +// +// this is the state diagram of a channel: +// +// locked in service +// kFreeChannel---------->BusyChannel-------------->kAckChannel +// ^ | +// |_________________________________________________| +// answer ready +// +// The protocol is as follows: +// 1) client finds a free channel: state = kFreeChannel +// 2) does an atomic compare-and-swap, now state = BusyChannel +// 3) client writes the data into the channel buffer +// 4) client signals the ping event and waits (blocks) on the pong event +// 5) eventually the server signals the pong event +// 6) the client awakes and reads the answer from the same channel +// 7) the client updates its InOut parameters with the new data from the +// shared memory section. +// 8) the client atomically sets the state = kFreeChannel +// +// In the shared memory the layout is as follows: +// +// [ channel count ] +// [ channel control 0] +// [ channel control 1] +// [ channel control N] +// [ channel buffer 0 ] 1024 bytes +// [ channel buffer 1 ] 1024 bytes +// [ channel buffer N ] 1024 bytes +// +// By default each channel buffer is 1024 bytes +namespace sandbox { + +// the possible channel states as described above +enum ChannelState { + // channel is free + kFreeChannel = 1, + // IPC in progress client side + kBusyChannel, + // IPC in progress server side + kAckChannel, + // not used right now + kReadyChannel, + // IPC abandoned by client side + kAbandonnedChannel +}; + +// The next two constants control the time outs for the IPC. +const DWORD kIPCWaitTimeOut1 = 1000; // Milliseconds. +const DWORD kIPCWaitTimeOut2 = 50; // Milliseconds. + +// the channel control structure +struct ChannelControl { + // points to be beginning of the channel buffer, where data goes + size_t channel_base; + // maintains the state from the ChannelState enumeration + volatile LONG state; + // the ping event is signaled by the client when the IPC data is ready on + // the buffer + HANDLE ping_event; + // the client waits on the pong event for the IPC answer back + HANDLE pong_event; + // the IPC unique identifier + uint32 ipc_tag; +}; + +struct IPCControl { + // total number of channels available, some might be busy at a given time + size_t channels_count; + // handle to a shared mutex to detect when the server is dead + HANDLE server_alive; + // array of channel control structures + ChannelControl channels[1]; +}; + +// the actual shared memory IPC implementation class. This object is designed +// to be lightweight so it can be constructed on-site (at the calling place) +// wherever an IPC call is needed. +class SharedMemIPCClient { + public: + // Creates the IPC client. + // as parameter it takes the base address of the shared memory + explicit SharedMemIPCClient(void* shared_mem); + + // locks a free channel and returns the channel buffer memory base. This call + // blocks until there is a free channel + void* GetBuffer(); + + // releases the lock on the channel, for other to use. call this if you have + // called GetBuffer and you want to abort but have not called yet DoCall() + void FreeBuffer(void* buffer); + + // Performs the actual IPC call. + // params: The blob of packed input parameters. + // answer: upon IPC completion, it contains the server answer to the IPC. + // If the return value is not SBOX_ERROR_CHANNEL_ERROR, the caller has to free + // the channel. + // returns ALL_OK if the IPC mechanism successfully delivered. You still need + // to check on the answer structure to see the actual IPC result. + ResultCode DoCall(CrossCallParams* params, CrossCallReturn* answer); + + private: + // Returns the index of the first free channel. It sets 'severe_failure' + // to true if there is an unrecoverable error that does not allow to + // find a channel. + size_t LockFreeChannel(bool* severe_failure); + // Return the channel index given the address of the buffer. + size_t ChannelIndexFromBuffer(const void* buffer); + IPCControl* control_; + // point to the first channel base + char* first_base_; +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SHAREDMEM_IPC_CLIENT_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba90d1b --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.cc @@ -0,0 +1,410 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "base/callback.h" +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +SharedMemIPCServer::SharedMemIPCServer(HANDLE target_process, + DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE target_job, + ThreadProvider* thread_provider, + Dispatcher* dispatcher) + : client_control_(NULL), + thread_provider_(thread_provider), + target_process_(target_process), + target_process_id_(target_process_id), + target_job_object_(target_job), + call_dispatcher_(dispatcher) { +} + +SharedMemIPCServer::~SharedMemIPCServer() { + // Free the wait handles associated with the thread pool. + if (!thread_provider_->UnRegisterWaits(this)) { + // Better to leak than to crash. + return; + } + // Free the IPC signal events. + ServerContexts::iterator it; + for (it = server_contexts_.begin(); it != server_contexts_.end(); ++it) { + ServerControl* context = (*it); + ::CloseHandle(context->ping_event); + ::CloseHandle(context->pong_event); + delete context; + } +} + +bool SharedMemIPCServer::Init(void* shared_mem, uint32 shared_size, + uint32 channel_size) { + // The shared memory needs to be at least as big as a channel. + if (shared_size < channel_size) { + return false; + } + // The channel size should be aligned. + if (0 != (channel_size % 32)) { + return false; + } + + // Calculate how many channels we can fit in the shared memory. + shared_size -= offsetof(IPCControl, channels); + size_t channel_count = shared_size / (sizeof(ChannelControl) + channel_size); + + // If we cannot fit even one channel we bail out. + if (0 == channel_count) { + return false; + } + // Calculate the start of the first channel. + size_t base_start = (sizeof(ChannelControl)* channel_count) + + offsetof(IPCControl, channels); + + client_control_ = reinterpret_cast<IPCControl*>(shared_mem); + client_control_->channels_count = 0; + + // This is the initialization that we do per-channel. Basically: + // 1) make two events (ping & pong) + // 2) create handles to the events for the client and the server. + // 3) initialize the channel (client_context) with the state. + // 4) initialize the server side of the channel (service_context). + // 5) call the thread provider RegisterWait to register the ping events. + for (size_t ix = 0; ix != channel_count; ++ix) { + ChannelControl* client_context = &client_control_->channels[ix]; + ServerControl* service_context = new ServerControl; + server_contexts_.push_back(service_context); + + if (!MakeEvents(&service_context->ping_event, + &service_context->pong_event, + &client_context->ping_event, + &client_context->pong_event)) { + return false; + } + + client_context->channel_base = base_start; + client_context->state = kFreeChannel; + + // Note that some of these values are available as members of this + // object but we put them again into the service_context because we + // will be called on a static method (ThreadPingEventReady) + service_context->shared_base = reinterpret_cast<char*>(shared_mem); + service_context->channel_size = channel_size; + service_context->channel = client_context; + service_context->channel_buffer = service_context->shared_base + + client_context->channel_base; + service_context->dispatcher = call_dispatcher_; + service_context->target_info.process = target_process_; + service_context->target_info.process_id = target_process_id_; + service_context->target_info.job_object = target_job_object_; + // Advance to the next channel. + base_start += channel_size; + // Register the ping event with the threadpool. + thread_provider_->RegisterWait(this, service_context->ping_event, + ThreadPingEventReady, service_context); + } + + // We create a mutex that the server locks. If the server dies unexpectedly, + // the thread that owns it will fail to release the lock and windows will + // report to the target (when it tries to acquire it) that the wait was + // abandoned. Note: We purposely leak the local handle because we want it to + // be closed by Windows itself so it is properly marked as abandoned if the + // server dies. + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), + ::CreateMutexW(NULL, TRUE, NULL), + target_process_, &client_control_->server_alive, + SYNCHRONIZE | EVENT_MODIFY_STATE, FALSE, 0)) { + return false; + } + // This last setting indicates to the client all is setup. + client_control_->channels_count = channel_count; + return true; +} + +// Releases memory allocated for IPC arguments, if needed. +void ReleaseArgs(const IPCParams* ipc_params, void* args[kMaxIpcParams]) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < kMaxIpcParams; i++) { + switch (ipc_params->args[i]) { + case WCHAR_TYPE: { + delete reinterpret_cast<std::wstring*>(args[i]); + args[i] = NULL; + break; + } + case INOUTPTR_TYPE: { + delete reinterpret_cast<CountedBuffer*>(args[i]); + args[i] = NULL; + break; + } + default: break; + } + } +} + +// Fills up the list of arguments (args and ipc_params) for an IPC call. +bool GetArgs(CrossCallParamsEx* params, IPCParams* ipc_params, + void* args[kMaxIpcParams]) { + if (kMaxIpcParams < params->GetParamsCount()) + return false; + + for (uint32 i = 0; i < params->GetParamsCount(); i++) { + uint32 size; + ArgType type; + args[i] = params->GetRawParameter(i, &size, &type); + if (args[i]) { + ipc_params->args[i] = type; + switch (type) { + case WCHAR_TYPE: { + scoped_ptr<std::wstring> data(new std::wstring); + if (!params->GetParameterStr(i, data.get())) { + args[i] = 0; + ReleaseArgs(ipc_params, args); + return false; + } + args[i] = data.release(); + break; + } + case ULONG_TYPE: { + uint32 data; + if (!params->GetParameter32(i, &data)) { + ReleaseArgs(ipc_params, args); + return false; + } + IPCInt ipc_int(data); + args[i] = ipc_int.AsVoidPtr(); + break; + } + case VOIDPTR_TYPE : { + void* data; + if (!params->GetParameterVoidPtr(i, &data)) { + ReleaseArgs(ipc_params, args); + return false; + } + args[i] = data; + break; + } + case INOUTPTR_TYPE: { + if (!args[i]) { + ReleaseArgs(ipc_params, args); + return false; + } + CountedBuffer* buffer = new CountedBuffer(args[i] , size); + args[i] = buffer; + break; + } + default: break; + } + } + } + return true; +} + +bool SharedMemIPCServer::InvokeCallback(const ServerControl* service_context, + void* ipc_buffer, + CrossCallReturn* call_result) { + // Set the default error code; + SetCallError(SBOX_ERROR_INVALID_IPC, call_result); + uint32 output_size = 0; + // Parse, verify and copy the message. The handler operates on a copy + // of the message so the client cannot play dirty tricks by changing the + // data in the channel while the IPC is being processed. + scoped_ptr<CrossCallParamsEx> params( + CrossCallParamsEx::CreateFromBuffer(ipc_buffer, + service_context->channel_size, + &output_size)); + if (!params.get()) + return false; + + uint32 tag = params->GetTag(); + COMPILE_ASSERT(0 == INVALID_TYPE, Incorrect_type_enum); + IPCParams ipc_params = {0}; + ipc_params.ipc_tag = tag; + + void* args[kMaxIpcParams]; + if (!GetArgs(params.get(), &ipc_params, args)) + return false; + + IPCInfo ipc_info = {0}; + ipc_info.ipc_tag = tag; + ipc_info.client_info = &service_context->target_info; + Dispatcher* dispatcher = service_context->dispatcher; + DCHECK(dispatcher); + bool error = true; + Dispatcher* handler = NULL; + + Dispatcher::CallbackGeneric callback_generic; + handler = dispatcher->OnMessageReady(&ipc_params, &callback_generic); + if (handler) { + switch (params->GetParamsCount()) { + case 0: { + // Ask the IPC dispatcher if she can service this IPC. + Dispatcher::Callback0 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback0>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info)) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 1: { + Dispatcher::Callback1 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback1>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 2: { + Dispatcher::Callback2 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback2>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0], args[1])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 3: { + Dispatcher::Callback3 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback3>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0], args[1], args[2])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 4: { + Dispatcher::Callback4 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback4>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0], args[1], args[2], + args[3])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 5: { + Dispatcher::Callback5 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback5>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], + args[4])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 6: { + Dispatcher::Callback6 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback6>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], + args[4], args[5])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 7: { + Dispatcher::Callback7 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback7>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], + args[4], args[5], args[6])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 8: { + Dispatcher::Callback8 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback8>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], + args[4], args[5], args[6], args[7])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + case 9: { + Dispatcher::Callback9 callback = + reinterpret_cast<Dispatcher::Callback9>(callback_generic); + if (!(handler->*callback)(&ipc_info, args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], + args[4], args[5], args[6], args[7], args[8])) + break; + error = false; + break; + } + default: { + NOTREACHED(); + break; + } + } + } + + if (error) { + if (handler) + SetCallError(SBOX_ERROR_FAILED_IPC, call_result); + } else { + memcpy(call_result, &ipc_info.return_info, sizeof(*call_result)); + SetCallSuccess(call_result); + if (params->IsInOut()) { + // Maybe the params got changed by the broker. We need to upadte the + // memory section. + memcpy(ipc_buffer, params.get(), output_size); + } + } + + ReleaseArgs(&ipc_params, args); + + return !error; +} + +// This function gets called by a thread from the thread pool when a +// ping event fires. The context is the same as passed in the RegisterWait() +// call above. +void __stdcall SharedMemIPCServer::ThreadPingEventReady(void* context, + unsigned char) { + if (NULL == context) { + DCHECK(false); + return; + } + ServerControl* service_context = reinterpret_cast<ServerControl*>(context); + // Since the event fired, the channel *must* be busy. Change to kAckChannel + // while we service it. + LONG last_state = + ::InterlockedCompareExchange(&service_context->channel->state, + kAckChannel, kBusyChannel); + if (kBusyChannel != last_state) { + DCHECK(false); + return; + } + + // Prepare the result structure. At this point we will return some result + // even if the IPC is invalid, malformed or has no handler. + CrossCallReturn call_result = {0}; + void* buffer = service_context->channel_buffer; + + InvokeCallback(service_context, buffer, &call_result); + + // Copy the answer back into the channel and signal the pong event. This + // should wake up the client so he can finish the the ipc cycle. + CrossCallParams* call_params = reinterpret_cast<CrossCallParams*>(buffer); + memcpy(call_params->GetCallReturn(), &call_result, sizeof(call_result)); + ::InterlockedExchange(&service_context->channel->state, kAckChannel); + ::SetEvent(service_context->pong_event); +} + +bool SharedMemIPCServer::MakeEvents(HANDLE* server_ping, HANDLE* server_pong, + HANDLE* client_ping, HANDLE* client_pong) { + // Note that the IPC client has no right to delete the events. That would + // cause problems. The server *owns* the events. + const DWORD kDesiredAccess = SYNCHRONIZE | EVENT_MODIFY_STATE; + + // The events are auto reset, and start not signaled. + *server_ping = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), *server_ping, target_process_, + client_ping, kDesiredAccess, FALSE, 0)) { + return false; + } + *server_pong = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), *server_pong, target_process_, + client_pong, kDesiredAccess, FALSE, 0)) { + return false; + } + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.h b/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e10174 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.h @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SHAREDMEM_IPC_SERVER_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SHAREDMEM_IPC_SERVER_H_ + +#include <list> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/gtest_prod_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" + +// IPC transport implementation that uses shared memory. +// This is the server side +// +// The server side has knowledge about the layout of the shared memory +// and the state transitions. Both are explained in sharedmem_ipc_client.h +// +// As opposed to SharedMemIPClient, the Server object should be one for the +// entire lifetime of the target process. The server is in charge of creating +// the events (ping, pong) both for the client and for the target that are used +// to signal the IPC and also in charge of setting the initial state of the +// channels. +// +// When an IPC is ready, the server relies on being called by on the +// ThreadPingEventReady callback. The IPC server then retrieves the buffer, +// marshals it into a CrossCallParam object and calls the Dispatcher, who is in +// charge of fulfilling the IPC request. +namespace sandbox { + +// the shared memory implementation of the IPC server. There should be one +// of these objects per target (IPC client) process +class SharedMemIPCServer { + public: + // Creates the IPC server. + // target_process: handle to the target process. It must be suspended. + // target_process_id: process id of the target process. + // target_job: the job object handle associated with the target process. + // thread_provider: a thread provider object. + // dispatcher: an object that can service IPC calls. + SharedMemIPCServer(HANDLE target_process, DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE target_job, ThreadProvider* thread_provider, + Dispatcher* dispatcher); + + ~SharedMemIPCServer(); + + // Initializes the server structures, shared memory structures and + // creates the kernels events used to signal the IPC. + bool Init(void* shared_mem, uint32 shared_size, uint32 channel_size); + + private: + // Allow tests to be marked DISABLED_. Note that FLAKY_ and FAILS_ prefixes + // do not work with sandbox tests. + FRIEND_TEST_ALL_PREFIXES(IPCTest, SharedMemServerTests); + // When an event fires (IPC request). A thread from the ThreadProvider + // will call this function. The context parameter should be the same as + // provided when ThreadProvider::RegisterWait was called. + static void __stdcall ThreadPingEventReady(void* context, + unsigned char); + + // Makes the client and server events. This function is called once + // per channel. + bool MakeEvents(HANDLE* server_ping, HANDLE* server_pong, + HANDLE* client_ping, HANDLE* client_pong); + + // A copy this structure is maintained per channel. + // Note that a lot of the fields are just the same of what we have in the IPC + // object itself. It is better to have the copies since we can dispatch in the + // static method without worrying about converting back to a member function + // call or about threading issues. + struct ServerControl { + // This channel server ping event. + HANDLE ping_event; + // This channel server pong event. + HANDLE pong_event; + // The size of this channel. + uint32 channel_size; + // The pointer to the actual channel data. + char* channel_buffer; + // The pointer to the base of the shared memory. + char* shared_base; + // A pointer to this channel's client-side control structure this structure + // lives in the shared memory. + ChannelControl* channel; + // the IPC dispatcher associated with this channel. + Dispatcher* dispatcher; + // The target process information associated with this channel. + ClientInfo target_info; + }; + + // Looks for the appropriate handler for this IPC and invokes it. + static bool InvokeCallback(const ServerControl* service_context, + void* ipc_buffer, CrossCallReturn* call_result); + + // Points to the shared memory channel control which lives at + // the start of the shared section. + IPCControl* client_control_; + + // Keeps track of the server side objects that are used to answer an IPC. + typedef std::list<ServerControl*> ServerContexts; + ServerContexts server_contexts_; + + // The thread provider provides the threads that call back into this object + // when the IPC events fire. + ThreadProvider* thread_provider_; + + // The IPC object is associated with a target process. + HANDLE target_process_; + + // The target process id associated with the IPC object. + DWORD target_process_id_; + + // The target object is inside a job too. + HANDLE target_job_object_; + + // The dispatcher handles 'ready' IPC calls. + Dispatcher* call_dispatcher_; + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SharedMemIPCServer); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SHAREDMEM_IPC_SERVER_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sid.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sid.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ed9963 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sid.cc @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/sid.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +Sid::Sid(const SID *sid) { + ::CopySid(SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE, sid_, const_cast<SID*>(sid)); +}; + +Sid::Sid(WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE type) { + DWORD size_sid = SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE; + BOOL result = ::CreateWellKnownSid(type, NULL, sid_, &size_sid); + DCHECK(result); + DBG_UNREFERENCED_LOCAL_VARIABLE(result); +} + +const SID *Sid::GetPSID() const { + return reinterpret_cast<SID*>(const_cast<BYTE*>(sid_)); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sid.h b/sandbox/win/src/sid.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4656859 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sid.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SID_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SID_H_ + +#include <windows.h> + +namespace sandbox { + +// This class is used to hold and generate SIDS. +class Sid { + public: + // Constructors initializing the object with the SID passed. + // This is a converting constructor. It is not explicit. + Sid(const SID *sid); + Sid(WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE type); + + // Returns sid_. + const SID *GetPSID() const; + + private: + BYTE sid_[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE]; +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SID_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sid_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sid_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1ac60a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sid_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file contains unit tests for the sid class. + +#define _ATL_NO_EXCEPTIONS +#include <atlbase.h> +#include <atlsecurity.h> + +#include "sandbox/src/sid.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Calls ::EqualSid. This function exists only to simplify the calls to +// ::EqualSid by removing the need to cast the input params. +BOOL EqualSid(const SID *sid1, const SID *sid2) { + return ::EqualSid(const_cast<SID*>(sid1), const_cast<SID*>(sid2)); +} + +// Tests the creation if a Sid +TEST(SidTest, Constructors) { + ATL::CSid sid_world = ATL::Sids::World(); + SID *sid_world_pointer = const_cast<SID*>(sid_world.GetPSID()); + + // Check the SID* constructor + Sid sid_sid_star(sid_world_pointer); + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(sid_world_pointer, sid_sid_star.GetPSID())); + + // Check the copy constructor + Sid sid_copy(sid_sid_star); + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(sid_world_pointer, sid_copy.GetPSID())); + + // Note that the WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE constructor is tested in the GetPSID + // test. +} + +// Tests the method GetPSID +TEST(SidTest, GetPSID) { + // Check for non-null result; + ASSERT_NE(static_cast<SID*>(NULL), Sid(::WinLocalSid).GetPSID()); + ASSERT_NE(static_cast<SID*>(NULL), Sid(::WinCreatorOwnerSid).GetPSID()); + ASSERT_NE(static_cast<SID*>(NULL), Sid(::WinBatchSid).GetPSID()); + + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(Sid(::WinNullSid).GetPSID(), + ATL::Sids::Null().GetPSID())); + + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(Sid(::WinWorldSid).GetPSID(), + ATL::Sids::World().GetPSID())); + + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(Sid(::WinDialupSid).GetPSID(), + ATL::Sids::Dialup().GetPSID())); + + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(Sid(::WinNetworkSid).GetPSID(), + ATL::Sids::Network().GetPSID())); + + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(Sid(::WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid).GetPSID(), + ATL::Sids::Admins().GetPSID())); + + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(Sid(::WinBuiltinUsersSid).GetPSID(), + ATL::Sids::Users().GetPSID())); + + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(Sid(::WinBuiltinGuestsSid).GetPSID(), + ATL::Sids::Guests().GetPSID())); + + ASSERT_TRUE(EqualSid(Sid(::WinProxySid).GetPSID(), + ATL::Sids::Proxy().GetPSID())); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/ia32_modrm_map.cpp b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/ia32_modrm_map.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b22ab1d --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/ia32_modrm_map.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Table of relevant information about how to decode the ModR/M byte. +// Based on information in the IA-32 Intel Architecture +// Software Developer's Manual Volume 2: Instruction Set Reference. + +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler_types.h" + +namespace sidestep { + +const ModrmEntry MiniDisassembler::s_ia16_modrm_map_[] = { +// mod == 00 + /* r/m == 000 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 001 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 010 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 011 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 100 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 101 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 110 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, + /* r/m == 111 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, +// mod == 01 + /* r/m == 000 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 001 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 010 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 011 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 100 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 101 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 110 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 111 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, +// mod == 10 + /* r/m == 000 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, + /* r/m == 001 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, + /* r/m == 010 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, + /* r/m == 011 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, + /* r/m == 100 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, + /* r/m == 101 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, + /* r/m == 110 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, + /* r/m == 111 */ { true, false, OS_WORD }, +// mod == 11 + /* r/m == 000 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 001 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 010 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 011 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 100 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 101 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 110 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 111 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO } +}; + +const ModrmEntry MiniDisassembler::s_ia32_modrm_map_[] = { +// mod == 00 + /* r/m == 000 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 001 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 010 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 011 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 100 */ { false, true, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 101 */ { true, false, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, + /* r/m == 110 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 111 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, +// mod == 01 + /* r/m == 000 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 001 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 010 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 011 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 100 */ { true, true, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 101 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 110 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, + /* r/m == 111 */ { true, false, OS_BYTE }, +// mod == 10 + /* r/m == 000 */ { true, false, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, + /* r/m == 001 */ { true, false, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, + /* r/m == 010 */ { true, false, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, + /* r/m == 011 */ { true, false, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, + /* r/m == 100 */ { true, true, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, + /* r/m == 101 */ { true, false, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, + /* r/m == 110 */ { true, false, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, + /* r/m == 111 */ { true, false, OS_DOUBLE_WORD }, +// mod == 11 + /* r/m == 000 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 001 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 010 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 011 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 100 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 101 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 110 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, + /* r/m == 111 */ { false, false, OS_ZERO }, +}; + +}; // namespace sidestep diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/ia32_opcode_map.cpp b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/ia32_opcode_map.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f37cef --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/ia32_opcode_map.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,1159 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Opcode decoding maps. Based on the IA-32 Intel Architecture +// Software Developer's Manual Volume 2: Instruction Set Reference. Idea +// for how to lay out the tables in memory taken from the implementation +// in the Bastard disassembly environment. + +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.h" + +namespace sidestep { + +/* +* This is the first table to be searched; the first field of each +* Opcode in the table is either 0 to indicate you're in the +* right table, or an index to the correct table, in the global +* map g_pentiumOpcodeMap +*/ +const Opcode s_first_opcode_byte[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF */ { 1, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x10 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x11 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x12 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x13 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x14 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x15 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x16 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x17 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x18 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x19 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x20 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x21 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x22 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x23 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x24 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x25 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x26 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x27 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "daa", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x28 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x29 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2E */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "das", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x30 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x31 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x32 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x33 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x34 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x35 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x36 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x37 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "aaa", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x38 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x39 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3E */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "aas", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x40 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x41 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x42 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x43 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x44 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x45 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x46 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x47 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x48 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x49 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x50 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x51 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x52 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x53 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x54 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x55 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x56 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x57 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x58 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x59 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x60 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pushad", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x61 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "popad", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x62 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_M | OT_A, AM_NOT_USED, "bound", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x63 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_G | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "arpl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x64 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x65 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x66 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX_OPERAND, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x67 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX_ADDRESS, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x68 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x69 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, "imul", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, "imul", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Y | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "insb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Y | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "insd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_X | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "outsb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_X | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "outsb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x70 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jo", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x71 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jno", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x72 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x73 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jnc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x74 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x75 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jnz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x76 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jbe", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x77 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "ja", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x78 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "js", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x79 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jns", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7A */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jpe", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7B */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jpo", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7C */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7D */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jge", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7E */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jle", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7F */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x80 */ { 2, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x81 */ { 3, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x82 */ { 4, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x83 */ { 5, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x84 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "test", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x85 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "test", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x86 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x87 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x88 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x89 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_S | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_M | OT_ADDRESS_MODE_M, AM_NOT_USED, "lea", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_S | OT_W, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x90 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "nop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x91 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x92 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x93 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x94 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x95 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x96 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x97 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x98 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "cwde", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x99 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "cdq", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9A */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_A | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "callf", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "wait", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pushfd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "popfd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "sahf", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lahf", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_O | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_O | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_O | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_O | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_X | OT_B, AM_Y | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "movsb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_X | OT_V, AM_Y | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "movsd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_X | OT_B, AM_Y | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "cmpsb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_X | OT_V, AM_Y | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmpsd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "test", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "test", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Y | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "stosb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Y | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "stosd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_X| OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "lodsb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_X| OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "lodsd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_Y | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "scasb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_Y | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "scasd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC0 */ { 6, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC1 */ { 7, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC2 */ { 0, IT_RETURN, AM_I | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "ret", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC3 */ { 0, IT_RETURN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "ret", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_M | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, "les", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_M | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, "lds", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_I | OT_W, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "enter", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "leave", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCA */ { 0, IT_RETURN, AM_I | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "retf", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCB */ { 0, IT_RETURN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "retf", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "int3", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "int", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "into", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "iret", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD0 */ { 8, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD1 */ { 9, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD2 */ { 10, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD3 */ { 11, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "aam", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "aad", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD6 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "xlat", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + + // The following 8 lines would be references to the FPU tables, but we currently + // do not support the FPU instructions in this disassembler. + + /* 0xD8 */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD9 */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xDA */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xDB */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xDC */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xDD */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xDE */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xDF */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + + + /* 0xE0 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "loopnz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE1 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "loopz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE2 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "loop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE3 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jcxz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "in", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "in", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_I | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "out", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_I | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "out", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE8 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "call", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE9 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xEA */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_A | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xEB */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xEC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "in", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xED */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "in", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xEE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "out", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xEF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "out", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF0 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lock:", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF1 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF2 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "repne:", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF3 */ { 0, IT_PREFIX, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "rep:", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "hlt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "cmc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF6 */ { 12, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF7 */ { 13, IT_REFERENCE, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "clc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "stc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xFA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "cli", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xFB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "sti", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xFC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "cld", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xFD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "std", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xFE */ { 14, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xFF */ { 15, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0f[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 16, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 17, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "lar", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "lsl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "clts", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "invd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "wbinvd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "ud2", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xE */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x10 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "movups", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "movsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "movss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "movupd" } }, + /* 0x11 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "movups", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "movsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "movss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "movupd" } }, + /* 0x12 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movlps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movhlps" }, // only one of ... + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movhlps" }, // ...these two is correct, Intel doesn't specify which + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_S, AM_NOT_USED, "movlpd" } }, + /* 0x13 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movlps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movlpd" } }, + /* 0x14 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "unpcklps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "unpcklpd" } }, + /* 0x15 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "unpckhps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "unpckhpd" } }, + /* 0x16 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movhps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movlhps" }, // only one of... + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movlhps" }, // ...these two is correct, Intel doesn't specify which + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movhpd" } }, + /* 0x17 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movhps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movhpd" } }, + /* 0x18 */ { 18, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x19 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1A */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1B */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1C */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1D */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1E */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1F */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x20 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_R | OT_D, AM_C | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x21 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_R | OT_D, AM_D | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x22 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_C | OT_D, AM_R | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x23 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_D | OT_D, AM_R | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "mov", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x24 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x25 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x26 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x27 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x28 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "movaps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "movapd" } }, + /* 0x29 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "movaps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "movapd" } }, + /* 0x2A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtpi2ps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_E | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtsi2sd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_E | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtsi2ss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_Q | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtpi2pd" } }, + /* 0x2B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "movntps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "movntpd" } }, + /* 0x2C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "cvttps2pi", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_D, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "cvttsd2si" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_D, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "cvttss2si" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Q | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "cvttpd2pi" } }, + /* 0x2D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtps2pi", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_D, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtsd2si" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_D, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtss2si" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Q | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtpd2pi" } }, + /* 0x2E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "ucomiss", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "ucomisd" } }, + /* 0x2F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "comiss", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "comisd" } }, + /* 0x30 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "wrmsr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x31 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "rdtsc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x32 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "rdmsr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x33 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "rdpmc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x34 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "sysenter", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x35 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "sysexit", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x36 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x37 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x38 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x39 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3A */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3B */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "movnti", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3D */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3E */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3F */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x40 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovo", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x41 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovno", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x42 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x43 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovnc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x44 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x45 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovnz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x46 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovbe", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x47 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmova", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x48 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovs", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x49 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovns", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovpe", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovpo", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovge", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovle", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmovg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x50 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_D, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "movmskps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_D, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "movmskpd" } }, + /* 0x51 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "sqrtps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "sqrtsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "sqrtss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "sqrtpd" } }, + /* 0x52 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "rsqrtps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "rsqrtss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x53 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "rcpps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "rcpss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x54 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "andps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "andpd" } }, + /* 0x55 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "andnps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "andnpd" } }, + /* 0x56 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "orps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "orpd" } }, + /* 0x57 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "xorps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "xorpd" } }, + /* 0x58 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "addps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "addsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "addss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "addpd" } }, + /* 0x59 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "mulps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "mulsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "mulss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "mulpd" } }, + /* 0x5A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtps2pd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtsd2ss" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtss2sd" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtpd2ps" } }, + /* 0x5B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtdq2ps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "cvttps2dq" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtps2dq" } }, + /* 0x5C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "subps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "subsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "subss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "subpd" } }, + /* 0x5D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "minps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "minsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "minss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "minpd" } }, + /* 0x5E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "divps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "divsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "divss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "divpd" } }, + /* 0x5F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_NOT_USED, "maxps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_NOT_USED, "maxsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_NOT_USED, "maxss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "maxpd" } }, + /* 0x60 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "punpcklbw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "punpcklbw" } }, + /* 0x61 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "punpcklwd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "punpcklwd" } }, + /* 0x62 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "punpckldq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "punpckldq" } }, + /* 0x63 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "packsswb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "packsswb" } }, + /* 0x64 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpgtb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpgtb" } }, + /* 0x65 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpgtw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpgtw" } }, + /* 0x66 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpgtd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpgtd" } }, + /* 0x67 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "packuswb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "packuswb" } }, + /* 0x68 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "punpckhbw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_DQ, AM_Q | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "punpckhbw" } }, + /* 0x69 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "punpckhwd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_DQ, AM_Q | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "punpckhwd" } }, + /* 0x6A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "punpckhdq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_DQ, AM_Q | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "punpckhdq" } }, + /* 0x6B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "packssdw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_DQ, AM_Q | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "packssdw" } }, + /* 0x6C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "not used without prefix", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "punpcklqdq" } }, + /* 0x6D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "not used without prefix", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "punpcklqdq" } }, + /* 0x6E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_D, AM_E | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "movd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_E | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "movd" } }, + /* 0x6F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "movq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "movdqu" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "movdqa" } }, + /* 0x70 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, "pshuf", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, "pshuflw" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, "pshufhw" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, "pshufd" } }, + /* 0x71 */ { 19, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x72 */ { 20, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x73 */ { 21, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x74 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpeqb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpeqb" } }, + /* 0x75 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpeqw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpeqw" } }, + /* 0x76 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpeqd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pcmpeqd" } }, + /* 0x77 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "emms", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + + // The following six opcodes are escapes into the MMX stuff, which this disassembler does not support. + /* 0x78 */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x79 */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7A */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7B */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7C */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7D */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + + /* 0x7E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_D, AM_P | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "movd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movq" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_D, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "movd" } }, + /* 0x7F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "movdqu" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "movdqa" } }, + /* 0x80 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jo", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x81 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jno", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x82 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x83 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jnc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x84 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x85 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jnz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x86 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jbe", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x87 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "ja", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x88 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "js", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x89 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jns", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8A */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jpe", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8B */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jpo", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8C */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8D */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jge", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8E */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jle", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x8F */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_J | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x90 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "seto", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x91 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setno", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x92 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x93 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setnc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x94 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x95 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setnz", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x96 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setbe", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x97 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "seta", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x98 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "sets", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x99 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setns", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9A */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setpe", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9B */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setpo", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9C */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9D */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setge", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9E */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setle", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x9F */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "setg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "cpuid", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "bt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, "shld", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B | AM_REGISTER, "shld", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA6 */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA7 */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xA9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "pop", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "rsm", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "bts", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, "shrd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B | AM_REGISTER, "shrd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAE */ { 22, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xAF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "imul", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "cmpxchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmpxchg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lss", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "btr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lfs", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lgs", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "movzx", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "movzx", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB8 */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xB9 */ { 0, IT_UNKNOWN, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "ud1", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBA */ { 23, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_G | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "btc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "bsf", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "bsr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "movsx", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xBF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_V, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, "movsx", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_G | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "xadd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "xadd", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_I | OT_B, "cmpps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SD, AM_W | OT_SD, AM_I | OT_B, "cmpsd" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_SS, AM_W | OT_SS, AM_I | OT_B, "cmpss" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_I | OT_B, "cmppd" } }, + /* 0xC3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_D, AM_G | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, "movnti", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_E | OT_D, AM_I | OT_B, "pinsrw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_E | OT_D, AM_I | OT_B, "pinsrw" } }, + /* 0xC5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_D, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, "pextrw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_D, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, "pextrw" } }, + /* 0xC6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PS, AM_W | OT_PS, AM_I | OT_B, "shufps", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_I | OT_B, "shufpd" } }, + /* 0xC7 */ { 24, IT_REFERENCE, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "bswap", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xC9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "bswap", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "bswap", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "bswap", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "bswap", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "bswap", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "bswap", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xCF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "bswap", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD0 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xD1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psrlw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psrlw" } }, + /* 0xD2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psrld", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psrld" } }, + /* 0xD3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psrlq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psrlq" } }, + /* 0xD4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "paddq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "paddq" } }, + /* 0xD5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pmullw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pmullw" } }, + /* 0xD6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "unused without prefix", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movdq2q" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movq2dq" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movq" } }, + /* 0xD7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_D, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pmovmskb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_G | OT_D, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pmovmskb" } }, + /* 0xD8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psubusb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psubusb" } }, + /* 0xD9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psubusw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psubusw" } }, + /* 0xDA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pminub", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pminub" } }, + /* 0xDB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pand", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pand" } }, + /* 0xDC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "paddusb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "paddusb" } }, + /* 0xDD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "paddusw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "paddusw" } }, + /* 0xDE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pmaxub", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pmaxub" } }, + /* 0xDF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pandn", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pandn" } }, + /* 0xE0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pavgb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pavgb" } }, + /* 0xE1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psraw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psrqw" } }, + /* 0xE2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psrad", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psrad" } }, + /* 0xE3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pavgw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pavgw" } }, + /* 0xE4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pmulhuw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pmulhuw" } }, + /* 0xE5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pmulhuw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pmulhw" } }, + /* 0xE6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "not used without prefix", true, + /* F2h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtpd2dq" }, + /* F3h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_PD, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "cvtdq2pd" }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_PD, AM_NOT_USED, "cvttpd2dq" } }, + /* 0xE7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_Q, AM_V | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "movntq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "movntdq" } }, + /* 0xE8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psubsb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psubsb" } }, + /* 0xE9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psubsw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psubsw" } }, + /* 0xEA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pminsw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pminsw" } }, + /* 0xEB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "por", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "por" } }, + /* 0xEC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "paddsb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "paddsb" } }, + /* 0xED */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "paddsw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "paddsw" } }, + /* 0xEE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pmaxsw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pmaxsw" } }, + /* 0xEF */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pxor", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pxor" } }, + /* 0xF0 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0xF1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psllw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psllw" } }, + /* 0xF2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pslld", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pslld" } }, + /* 0xF3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psllq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psllq" } }, + /* 0xF4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pmuludq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pmuludq" } }, + /* 0xF5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "pmaddwd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "pmaddwd" } }, + /* 0xF6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psadbw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psadbw" } }, + /* 0xF7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_PI, AM_Q | OT_PI, AM_NOT_USED, "maskmovq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "maskmovdqu" } }, + /* 0xF8 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psubb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psubb" } }, + /* 0xF9 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psubw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psubw" } }, + /* 0xFA */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psubd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psubd" } }, + /* 0xFB */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "psubq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "psubq" } }, + /* 0xFC */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "paddb", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "paddb" } }, + /* 0xFD */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "paddw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "paddw" } }, + /* 0xFE */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_Q | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, "paddd", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_V | OT_DQ, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_NOT_USED, "paddd" } }, + /* 0xFF */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0f00[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "sldt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "str", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lldt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "ltr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "verr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "verw", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0f01[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_S, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "sgdt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_S, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "sidt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_S, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lgdt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_S, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lidt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "smsw", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_W, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lmsw", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "invlpg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0f18[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_ADDRESS_MODE_M, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "prefetch", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "prefetch", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "prefetch", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_D, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "prefetch", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0f71[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psrlw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psrlw" } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psraw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psraw" } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psllw", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psllw" } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0f72[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psrld", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psrld" } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psrad", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psrad" } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "pslld", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "pslld" } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0f73[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psrlq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psrlq" } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_P | OT_Q, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psllq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "psllq" } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "pslldq", true, + /* F2h */ { 0 }, + /* F3h */ { 0 }, + /* 66h */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_W | OT_DQ, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "pslldq" } }, +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0fae[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "fxsave", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "fxrstor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "ldmxcsr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "stmxcsr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "lfence", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "mfence", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "clflush/sfence", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0fba[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "bt", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "bts", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "btr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "btc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_0fc7[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_M | OT_Q, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "cmpxch8b", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_80[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_81[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_82[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_83[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "add", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "or", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "adc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sbb", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "and", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sub", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "xor", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "cmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_c0[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rol", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "ror", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rcl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rcr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "shl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "shr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sal", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sar", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_c1[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rol", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "ror", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rcl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rcr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "shl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "shr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sal", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sar", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_d0[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "rol", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "ror", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "rcl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "rcr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "shl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "shr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "sal", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "sar", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_d1[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "rol", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "ror", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "rcl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "rcr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "shl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "shr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "sal", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_IMPLICIT, AM_NOT_USED, "sar", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_d2[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rol", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "ror", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rcl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rcr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "shl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "shr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sal", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sar", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_d3[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rol", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "ror", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rcl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "rcr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "shl", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "shr", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sal", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "sar", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_f6[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "test", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_I | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "test", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "not", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "neg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, OT_B | AM_REGISTER, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "mul", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, OT_B | AM_REGISTER, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "imul", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "div", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_B, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, "idiv", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_f7[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "test", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_I | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "test", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "not", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "neg", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "mul", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "imul", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "div", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_REGISTER | OT_V, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, "idiv", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_fe[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_B, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +const Opcode s_opcode_byte_after_ff[] = { + /* 0x0 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "inc", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x1 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "dec", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x2 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "call", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x3 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_E | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "call", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x4 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x5 */ { 0, IT_JUMP, AM_E | OT_P, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "jmp", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x6 */ { 0, IT_GENERIC, AM_E | OT_V, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, "push", false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } }, + /* 0x7 */ { 0, IT_UNUSED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, AM_NOT_USED, 0, false, /* F2h */ { 0 }, /* F3h */ { 0 }, /* 66h */ { 0 } } +}; + +/* +* A table of all the other tables, containing some extra information, e.g. +* how to mask out the byte we're looking at. +*/ +const OpcodeTable MiniDisassembler::s_ia32_opcode_map_[]={ + // One-byte opcodes and jumps to larger + /* 0 */ {s_first_opcode_byte, 0, 0xff, 0, 0xff}, + // Two-byte opcodes (second byte) + /* 1 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0f, 0, 0xff, 0, 0xff}, + // Start of tables for opcodes using ModR/M bits as extension + /* 2 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_80, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 3 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_81, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 4 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_82, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 5 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_83, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 6 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_c0, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 7 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_c1, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 8 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_d0, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 9 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_d1, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 10 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_d2, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 11 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_d3, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 12 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_f6, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 13 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_f7, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 14 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_fe, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x01}, + /* 15 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_ff, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 16 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0f00, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 17 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0f01, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 18 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0f18, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 19 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0f71, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 20 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0f72, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 21 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0f73, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 22 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0fae, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 23 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0fba, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x07}, + /* 24 */ {s_opcode_byte_after_0fc7, 3, 0x07, 0, 0x01} +}; + +}; // namespace sidestep diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.cpp b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..514522a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Implementation of MiniDisassembler. + +#ifdef _WIN64 +#error The code in this file should not be used on 64-bit Windows. +#endif + +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.h" + +namespace sidestep { + +MiniDisassembler::MiniDisassembler(bool operand_default_is_32_bits, + bool address_default_is_32_bits) + : operand_default_is_32_bits_(operand_default_is_32_bits), + address_default_is_32_bits_(address_default_is_32_bits) { + Initialize(); +} + +MiniDisassembler::MiniDisassembler() + : operand_default_is_32_bits_(true), + address_default_is_32_bits_(true) { + Initialize(); +} + +InstructionType MiniDisassembler::Disassemble( + unsigned char* start_byte, + unsigned int* instruction_bytes) { + // Clean up any state from previous invocations. + Initialize(); + + // Start by processing any prefixes. + unsigned char* current_byte = start_byte; + unsigned int size = 0; + InstructionType instruction_type = ProcessPrefixes(current_byte, &size); + + if (IT_UNKNOWN == instruction_type) + return instruction_type; + + current_byte += size; + size = 0; + + // Invariant: We have stripped all prefixes, and the operand_is_32_bits_ + // and address_is_32_bits_ flags are correctly set. + + instruction_type = ProcessOpcode(current_byte, 0, &size); + + // Check for error processing instruction + if ((IT_UNKNOWN == instruction_type_) || (IT_UNUSED == instruction_type_)) { + return IT_UNKNOWN; + } + + current_byte += size; + + // Invariant: operand_bytes_ indicates the total size of operands + // specified by the opcode and/or ModR/M byte and/or SIB byte. + // pCurrentByte points to the first byte after the ModR/M byte, or after + // the SIB byte if it is present (i.e. the first byte of any operands + // encoded in the instruction). + + // We get the total length of any prefixes, the opcode, and the ModR/M and + // SIB bytes if present, by taking the difference of the original starting + // address and the current byte (which points to the first byte of the + // operands if present, or to the first byte of the next instruction if + // they are not). Adding the count of bytes in the operands encoded in + // the instruction gives us the full length of the instruction in bytes. + *instruction_bytes += operand_bytes_ + (current_byte - start_byte); + + // Return the instruction type, which was set by ProcessOpcode(). + return instruction_type_; +} + +void MiniDisassembler::Initialize() { + operand_is_32_bits_ = operand_default_is_32_bits_; + address_is_32_bits_ = address_default_is_32_bits_; + operand_bytes_ = 0; + have_modrm_ = false; + should_decode_modrm_ = false; + instruction_type_ = IT_UNKNOWN; + got_f2_prefix_ = false; + got_f3_prefix_ = false; + got_66_prefix_ = false; +} + +InstructionType MiniDisassembler::ProcessPrefixes(unsigned char* start_byte, + unsigned int* size) { + InstructionType instruction_type = IT_GENERIC; + const Opcode& opcode = s_ia32_opcode_map_[0].table_[*start_byte]; + + switch (opcode.type_) { + case IT_PREFIX_ADDRESS: + address_is_32_bits_ = !address_default_is_32_bits_; + goto nochangeoperand; + case IT_PREFIX_OPERAND: + operand_is_32_bits_ = !operand_default_is_32_bits_; + nochangeoperand: + case IT_PREFIX: + + if (0xF2 == (*start_byte)) + got_f2_prefix_ = true; + else if (0xF3 == (*start_byte)) + got_f3_prefix_ = true; + else if (0x66 == (*start_byte)) + got_66_prefix_ = true; + + instruction_type = opcode.type_; + (*size)++; + // we got a prefix, so add one and check next byte + ProcessPrefixes(start_byte + 1, size); + default: + break; // not a prefix byte + } + + return instruction_type; +} + +InstructionType MiniDisassembler::ProcessOpcode(unsigned char* start_byte, + unsigned int table_index, + unsigned int* size) { + const OpcodeTable& table = s_ia32_opcode_map_[table_index]; // Get our table + unsigned char current_byte = (*start_byte) >> table.shift_; + current_byte = current_byte & table.mask_; // Mask out the bits we will use + + // Check whether the byte we have is inside the table we have. + if (current_byte < table.min_lim_ || current_byte > table.max_lim_) { + instruction_type_ = IT_UNKNOWN; + return instruction_type_; + } + + const Opcode& opcode = table.table_[current_byte]; + if (IT_UNUSED == opcode.type_) { + // This instruction is not used by the IA-32 ISA, so we indicate + // this to the user. Probably means that we were pointed to + // a byte in memory that was not the start of an instruction. + instruction_type_ = IT_UNUSED; + return instruction_type_; + } else if (IT_REFERENCE == opcode.type_) { + // We are looking at an opcode that has more bytes (or is continued + // in the ModR/M byte). Recursively find the opcode definition in + // the table for the opcode's next byte. + (*size)++; + ProcessOpcode(start_byte + 1, opcode.table_index_, size); + return instruction_type_; + } + + const SpecificOpcode* specific_opcode = reinterpret_cast< + const SpecificOpcode*>(&opcode); + if (opcode.is_prefix_dependent_) { + if (got_f2_prefix_ && opcode.opcode_if_f2_prefix_.mnemonic_ != 0) { + specific_opcode = &opcode.opcode_if_f2_prefix_; + } else if (got_f3_prefix_ && opcode.opcode_if_f3_prefix_.mnemonic_ != 0) { + specific_opcode = &opcode.opcode_if_f3_prefix_; + } else if (got_66_prefix_ && opcode.opcode_if_66_prefix_.mnemonic_ != 0) { + specific_opcode = &opcode.opcode_if_66_prefix_; + } + } + + // Inv: The opcode type is known. + instruction_type_ = specific_opcode->type_; + + // Let's process the operand types to see if we have any immediate + // operands, and/or a ModR/M byte. + + ProcessOperand(specific_opcode->flag_dest_); + ProcessOperand(specific_opcode->flag_source_); + ProcessOperand(specific_opcode->flag_aux_); + + // Inv: We have processed the opcode and incremented operand_bytes_ + // by the number of bytes of any operands specified by the opcode + // that are stored in the instruction (not registers etc.). Now + // we need to return the total number of bytes for the opcode and + // for the ModR/M or SIB bytes if they are present. + + if (table.mask_ != 0xff) { + if (have_modrm_) { + // we're looking at a ModR/M byte so we're not going to + // count that into the opcode size + ProcessModrm(start_byte, size); + return IT_GENERIC; + } else { + // need to count the ModR/M byte even if it's just being + // used for opcode extension + (*size)++; + return IT_GENERIC; + } + } else { + if (have_modrm_) { + // The ModR/M byte is the next byte. + (*size)++; + ProcessModrm(start_byte + 1, size); + return IT_GENERIC; + } else { + (*size)++; + return IT_GENERIC; + } + } +} + +bool MiniDisassembler::ProcessOperand(int flag_operand) { + bool succeeded = true; + if (AM_NOT_USED == flag_operand) + return succeeded; + + // Decide what to do based on the addressing mode. + switch (flag_operand & AM_MASK) { + // No ModR/M byte indicated by these addressing modes, and no + // additional (e.g. immediate) parameters. + case AM_A: // Direct address + case AM_F: // EFLAGS register + case AM_X: // Memory addressed by the DS:SI register pair + case AM_Y: // Memory addressed by the ES:DI register pair + case AM_IMPLICIT: // Parameter is implicit, occupies no space in + // instruction + break; + + // There is a ModR/M byte but it does not necessarily need + // to be decoded. + case AM_C: // reg field of ModR/M selects a control register + case AM_D: // reg field of ModR/M selects a debug register + case AM_G: // reg field of ModR/M selects a general register + case AM_P: // reg field of ModR/M selects an MMX register + case AM_R: // mod field of ModR/M may refer only to a general register + case AM_S: // reg field of ModR/M selects a segment register + case AM_T: // reg field of ModR/M selects a test register + case AM_V: // reg field of ModR/M selects a 128-bit XMM register + have_modrm_ = true; + break; + + // In these addressing modes, there is a ModR/M byte and it needs to be + // decoded. No other (e.g. immediate) params than indicated in ModR/M. + case AM_E: // Operand is either a general-purpose register or memory, + // specified by ModR/M byte + case AM_M: // ModR/M byte will refer only to memory + case AM_Q: // Operand is either an MMX register or memory (complex + // evaluation), specified by ModR/M byte + case AM_W: // Operand is either a 128-bit XMM register or memory (complex + // eval), specified by ModR/M byte + have_modrm_ = true; + should_decode_modrm_ = true; + break; + + // These addressing modes specify an immediate or an offset value + // directly, so we need to look at the operand type to see how many + // bytes. + case AM_I: // Immediate data. + case AM_J: // Jump to offset. + case AM_O: // Operand is at offset. + switch (flag_operand & OT_MASK) { + case OT_B: // Byte regardless of operand-size attribute. + operand_bytes_ += OS_BYTE; + break; + case OT_C: // Byte or word, depending on operand-size attribute. + if (operand_is_32_bits_) + operand_bytes_ += OS_WORD; + else + operand_bytes_ += OS_BYTE; + break; + case OT_D: // Doubleword, regardless of operand-size attribute. + operand_bytes_ += OS_DOUBLE_WORD; + break; + case OT_DQ: // Double-quadword, regardless of operand-size attribute. + operand_bytes_ += OS_DOUBLE_QUAD_WORD; + break; + case OT_P: // 32-bit or 48-bit pointer, depending on operand-size + // attribute. + if (operand_is_32_bits_) + operand_bytes_ += OS_48_BIT_POINTER; + else + operand_bytes_ += OS_32_BIT_POINTER; + break; + case OT_PS: // 128-bit packed single-precision floating-point data. + operand_bytes_ += OS_128_BIT_PACKED_SINGLE_PRECISION_FLOATING; + break; + case OT_Q: // Quadword, regardless of operand-size attribute. + operand_bytes_ += OS_QUAD_WORD; + break; + case OT_S: // 6-byte pseudo-descriptor. + operand_bytes_ += OS_PSEUDO_DESCRIPTOR; + break; + case OT_SD: // Scalar Double-Precision Floating-Point Value + case OT_PD: // Unaligned packed double-precision floating point value + operand_bytes_ += OS_DOUBLE_PRECISION_FLOATING; + break; + case OT_SS: + // Scalar element of a 128-bit packed single-precision + // floating data. + // We simply return enItUnknown since we don't have to support + // floating point + succeeded = false; + break; + case OT_V: // Word or doubleword, depending on operand-size attribute. + if (operand_is_32_bits_) + operand_bytes_ += OS_DOUBLE_WORD; + else + operand_bytes_ += OS_WORD; + break; + case OT_W: // Word, regardless of operand-size attribute. + operand_bytes_ += OS_WORD; + break; + + // Can safely ignore these. + case OT_A: // Two one-word operands in memory or two double-word + // operands in memory + case OT_PI: // Quadword MMX technology register (e.g. mm0) + case OT_SI: // Doubleword integer register (e.g., eax) + break; + + default: + break; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + + return succeeded; +} + +bool MiniDisassembler::ProcessModrm(unsigned char* start_byte, + unsigned int* size) { + // If we don't need to decode, we just return the size of the ModR/M + // byte (there is never a SIB byte in this case). + if (!should_decode_modrm_) { + (*size)++; + return true; + } + + // We never care about the reg field, only the combination of the mod + // and r/m fields, so let's start by packing those fields together into + // 5 bits. + unsigned char modrm = (*start_byte); + unsigned char mod = modrm & 0xC0; // mask out top two bits to get mod field + modrm = modrm & 0x07; // mask out bottom 3 bits to get r/m field + mod = mod >> 3; // shift the mod field to the right place + modrm = mod | modrm; // combine the r/m and mod fields as discussed + mod = mod >> 3; // shift the mod field to bits 2..0 + + // Invariant: modrm contains the mod field in bits 4..3 and the r/m field + // in bits 2..0, and mod contains the mod field in bits 2..0 + + const ModrmEntry* modrm_entry = 0; + if (address_is_32_bits_) + modrm_entry = &s_ia32_modrm_map_[modrm]; + else + modrm_entry = &s_ia16_modrm_map_[modrm]; + + // Invariant: modrm_entry points to information that we need to decode + // the ModR/M byte. + + // Add to the count of operand bytes, if the ModR/M byte indicates + // that some operands are encoded in the instruction. + if (modrm_entry->is_encoded_in_instruction_) + operand_bytes_ += modrm_entry->operand_size_; + + // Process the SIB byte if necessary, and return the count + // of ModR/M and SIB bytes. + if (modrm_entry->use_sib_byte_) { + (*size)++; + return ProcessSib(start_byte + 1, mod, size); + } else { + (*size)++; + return true; + } +} + +bool MiniDisassembler::ProcessSib(unsigned char* start_byte, + unsigned char mod, + unsigned int* size) { + // get the mod field from the 2..0 bits of the SIB byte + unsigned char sib_base = (*start_byte) & 0x07; + if (0x05 == sib_base) { + switch (mod) { + case 0x00: // mod == 00 + case 0x02: // mod == 10 + operand_bytes_ += OS_DOUBLE_WORD; + break; + case 0x01: // mod == 01 + operand_bytes_ += OS_BYTE; + break; + case 0x03: // mod == 11 + // According to the IA-32 docs, there does not seem to be a disp + // value for this value of mod + default: + break; + } + } + + (*size)++; + return true; +} + +}; // namespace sidestep diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.h b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..444df36 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.h @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Definition of MiniDisassembler. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_MINI_DISASSEMBLER_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_MINI_DISASSEMBLER_H__ + +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler_types.h" + +namespace sidestep { + +// This small disassembler is very limited +// in its functionality, and in fact does only the bare minimum required by the +// preamble patching utility. It may be useful for other purposes, however. +// +// The limitations include at least the following: +// -# No support for coprocessor opcodes, MMX, etc. +// -# No machine-readable identification of opcodes or decoding of +// assembly parameters. The name of the opcode (as a string) is given, +// however, to aid debugging. +// +// You may ask what this little disassembler actually does, then? The answer is +// that it does the following, which is exactly what the patching utility needs: +// -# Indicates if opcode is a jump (any kind) or a return (any kind) +// because this is important for the patching utility to determine if +// a function is too short or there are jumps too early in it for it +// to be preamble patched. +// -# The opcode length is always calculated, so that the patching utility +// can figure out where the next instruction starts, and whether it +// already has enough instructions to replace with the absolute jump +// to the patching code. +// +// The usage is quite simple; just create a MiniDisassembler and use its +// Disassemble() method. +// +// If you would like to extend this disassembler, please refer to the +// IA-32 Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual Volume 2: +// Instruction Set Reference for information about operand decoding +// etc. +class MiniDisassembler { + public: + + // Creates a new instance and sets defaults. + // + // operand_default_32_bits: If true, the default operand size is + // set to 32 bits, which is the default under Win32. Otherwise it is 16 bits. + // address_default_32_bits: If true, the default address size is + // set to 32 bits, which is the default under Win32. Otherwise it is 16 bits. + MiniDisassembler(bool operand_default_32_bits, + bool address_default_32_bits); + + // Equivalent to MiniDisassembler(true, true); + MiniDisassembler(); + + // Attempts to disassemble a single instruction starting from the + // address in memory it is pointed to. + // + // start: Address where disassembly should start. + // instruction_bytes: Variable that will be incremented by + // the length in bytes of the instruction. + // Returns enItJump, enItReturn or enItGeneric on success. enItUnknown + // if unable to disassemble, enItUnused if this seems to be an unused + // opcode. In the last two (error) cases, cbInstruction will be set + // to 0xffffffff. + // + // Postcondition: This instance of the disassembler is ready to be used again, + // with unchanged defaults from creation time. + InstructionType Disassemble(unsigned char* start, + unsigned int* instruction_bytes); + + private: + + // Makes the disassembler ready for reuse. + void Initialize(); + + // Sets the flags for address and operand sizes. + // Returns Number of prefix bytes. + InstructionType ProcessPrefixes(unsigned char* start, unsigned int* size); + + // Sets the flag for whether we have ModR/M, and increments + // operand_bytes_ if any are specifies by the opcode directly. + // Returns Number of opcode bytes. + InstructionType ProcessOpcode(unsigned char* start, + unsigned int table, + unsigned int* size); + + // Checks the type of the supplied operand. Increments + // operand_bytes_ if it directly indicates an immediate etc. + // operand. Asserts have_modrm_ if the operand specifies + // a ModR/M byte. + bool ProcessOperand(int flag_operand); + + // Increments operand_bytes_ by size specified by ModR/M and + // by SIB if present. + // Returns 0 in case of error, 1 if there is just a ModR/M byte, + // 2 if there is a ModR/M byte and a SIB byte. + bool ProcessModrm(unsigned char* start, unsigned int* size); + + // Processes the SIB byte that it is pointed to. + // start: Pointer to the SIB byte. + // mod: The mod field from the ModR/M byte. + // Returns 1 to indicate success (indicates 1 SIB byte) + bool ProcessSib(unsigned char* start, unsigned char mod, unsigned int* size); + + // The instruction type we have decoded from the opcode. + InstructionType instruction_type_; + + // Counts the number of bytes that is occupied by operands in + // the current instruction (note: we don't care about how large + // operands stored in registers etc. are). + unsigned int operand_bytes_; + + // True iff there is a ModR/M byte in this instruction. + bool have_modrm_; + + // True iff we need to decode the ModR/M byte (sometimes it just + // points to a register, we can tell by the addressing mode). + bool should_decode_modrm_; + + // Current operand size is 32 bits if true, 16 bits if false. + bool operand_is_32_bits_; + + // Default operand size is 32 bits if true, 16 bits if false. + bool operand_default_is_32_bits_; + + // Current address size is 32 bits if true, 16 bits if false. + bool address_is_32_bits_; + + // Default address size is 32 bits if true, 16 bits if false. + bool address_default_is_32_bits_; + + // Huge big opcode table based on the IA-32 manual, defined + // in Ia32OpcodeMap.cpp + static const OpcodeTable s_ia32_opcode_map_[]; + + // Somewhat smaller table to help with decoding ModR/M bytes + // when 16-bit addressing mode is being used. Defined in + // Ia32ModrmMap.cpp + static const ModrmEntry s_ia16_modrm_map_[]; + + // Somewhat smaller table to help with decoding ModR/M bytes + // when 32-bit addressing mode is being used. Defined in + // Ia32ModrmMap.cpp + static const ModrmEntry s_ia32_modrm_map_[]; + + // Indicators of whether we got certain prefixes that certain + // silly Intel instructions depend on in nonstandard ways for + // their behaviors. + bool got_f2_prefix_, got_f3_prefix_, got_66_prefix_; +}; + +}; // namespace sidestep + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_MINI_DISASSEMBLER_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler_types.h b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler_types.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c10626 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. +// +// Several simple types used by the disassembler and some of the patching +// mechanisms. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_MINI_DISASSEMBLER_TYPES_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_MINI_DISASSEMBLER_TYPES_H__ + +namespace sidestep { + +// Categories of instructions that we care about +enum InstructionType { + // This opcode is not used + IT_UNUSED, + // This disassembler does not recognize this opcode (error) + IT_UNKNOWN, + // This is not an instruction but a reference to another table + IT_REFERENCE, + // This byte is a prefix byte that we can ignore + IT_PREFIX, + // This is a prefix byte that switches to the nondefault address size + IT_PREFIX_ADDRESS, + // This is a prefix byte that switches to the nondefault operand size + IT_PREFIX_OPERAND, + // A jump or call instruction + IT_JUMP, + // A return instruction + IT_RETURN, + // Any other type of instruction (in this case we don't care what it is) + IT_GENERIC, +}; + +// Lists IA-32 operand sizes in multiples of 8 bits +enum OperandSize { + OS_ZERO = 0, + OS_BYTE = 1, + OS_WORD = 2, + OS_DOUBLE_WORD = 4, + OS_QUAD_WORD = 8, + OS_DOUBLE_QUAD_WORD = 16, + OS_32_BIT_POINTER = 32/8, + OS_48_BIT_POINTER = 48/8, + OS_SINGLE_PRECISION_FLOATING = 32/8, + OS_DOUBLE_PRECISION_FLOATING = 64/8, + OS_DOUBLE_EXTENDED_PRECISION_FLOATING = 80/8, + OS_128_BIT_PACKED_SINGLE_PRECISION_FLOATING = 128/8, + OS_PSEUDO_DESCRIPTOR = 6 +}; + +// Operand addressing methods from the IA-32 manual. The enAmMask value +// is a mask for the rest. The other enumeration values are named for the +// names given to the addressing methods in the manual, e.g. enAm_D is for +// the D addressing method. +// +// The reason we use a full 4 bytes and a mask, is that we need to combine +// these flags with the enOperandType to store the details +// on the operand in a single integer. +enum AddressingMethod { + AM_NOT_USED = 0, // This operand is not used for this instruction + AM_MASK = 0x00FF0000, // Mask for the rest of the values in this enumeration + AM_A = 0x00010000, // A addressing type + AM_C = 0x00020000, // C addressing type + AM_D = 0x00030000, // D addressing type + AM_E = 0x00040000, // E addressing type + AM_F = 0x00050000, // F addressing type + AM_G = 0x00060000, // G addressing type + AM_I = 0x00070000, // I addressing type + AM_J = 0x00080000, // J addressing type + AM_M = 0x00090000, // M addressing type + AM_O = 0x000A0000, // O addressing type + AM_P = 0x000B0000, // P addressing type + AM_Q = 0x000C0000, // Q addressing type + AM_R = 0x000D0000, // R addressing type + AM_S = 0x000E0000, // S addressing type + AM_T = 0x000F0000, // T addressing type + AM_V = 0x00100000, // V addressing type + AM_W = 0x00110000, // W addressing type + AM_X = 0x00120000, // X addressing type + AM_Y = 0x00130000, // Y addressing type + AM_REGISTER = 0x00140000, // Specific register is always used as this op + AM_IMPLICIT = 0x00150000, // An implicit, fixed value is used +}; + +// Operand types from the IA-32 manual. The enOtMask value is +// a mask for the rest. The rest of the values are named for the +// names given to these operand types in the manual, e.g. enOt_ps +// is for the ps operand type in the manual. +// +// The reason we use a full 4 bytes and a mask, is that we need +// to combine these flags with the enAddressingMethod to store the details +// on the operand in a single integer. +enum OperandType { + OT_MASK = 0xFF000000, + OT_A = 0x01000000, + OT_B = 0x02000000, + OT_C = 0x03000000, + OT_D = 0x04000000, + OT_DQ = 0x05000000, + OT_P = 0x06000000, + OT_PI = 0x07000000, + OT_PS = 0x08000000, // actually unsupported for (we don't know its size) + OT_Q = 0x09000000, + OT_S = 0x0A000000, + OT_SS = 0x0B000000, + OT_SI = 0x0C000000, + OT_V = 0x0D000000, + OT_W = 0x0E000000, + OT_SD = 0x0F000000, // scalar double-precision floating-point value + OT_PD = 0x10000000, // double-precision floating point + // dummy "operand type" for address mode M - which doesn't specify + // operand type + OT_ADDRESS_MODE_M = 0x80000000 +}; + +// Everything that's in an Opcode (see below) except the three +// alternative opcode structs for different prefixes. +struct SpecificOpcode { + // Index to continuation table, or 0 if this is the last + // byte in the opcode. + int table_index_; + + // The opcode type + InstructionType type_; + + // Description of the type of the dest, src and aux operands, + // put together from an enOperandType flag and an enAddressingMethod + // flag. + int flag_dest_; + int flag_source_; + int flag_aux_; + + // We indicate the mnemonic for debugging purposes + const char* mnemonic_; +}; + +// The information we keep in our tables about each of the different +// valid instructions recognized by the IA-32 architecture. +struct Opcode { + // Index to continuation table, or 0 if this is the last + // byte in the opcode. + int table_index_; + + // The opcode type + InstructionType type_; + + // Description of the type of the dest, src and aux operands, + // put together from an enOperandType flag and an enAddressingMethod + // flag. + int flag_dest_; + int flag_source_; + int flag_aux_; + + // We indicate the mnemonic for debugging purposes + const char* mnemonic_; + + // Alternative opcode info if certain prefixes are specified. + // In most cases, all of these are zeroed-out. Only used if + // bPrefixDependent is true. + bool is_prefix_dependent_; + SpecificOpcode opcode_if_f2_prefix_; + SpecificOpcode opcode_if_f3_prefix_; + SpecificOpcode opcode_if_66_prefix_; +}; + +// Information about each table entry. +struct OpcodeTable { + // Table of instruction entries + const Opcode* table_; + // How many bytes left to shift ModR/M byte <b>before</b> applying mask + unsigned char shift_; + // Mask to apply to byte being looked at before comparing to table + unsigned char mask_; + // Minimum/maximum indexes in table. + unsigned char min_lim_; + unsigned char max_lim_; +}; + +// Information about each entry in table used to decode ModR/M byte. +struct ModrmEntry { + // Is the operand encoded as bytes in the instruction (rather than + // if it's e.g. a register in which case it's just encoded in the + // ModR/M byte) + bool is_encoded_in_instruction_; + + // Is there a SIB byte? In this case we always need to decode it. + bool use_sib_byte_; + + // What is the size of the operand (only important if it's encoded + // in the instruction)? + OperandSize operand_size_; +}; + +}; // namespace sidestep + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_MINI_DISASSEMBLER_TYPES_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/preamble_patcher.h b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/preamble_patcher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18cf7f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/preamble_patcher.h @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Definition of PreamblePatcher + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_PREAMBLE_PATCHER_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_PREAMBLE_PATCHER_H__ + +namespace sidestep { + +// Maximum size of the preamble stub. We overwrite at least the first 5 +// bytes of the function. Considering the worst case scenario, we need 4 +// bytes + the max instruction size + 5 more bytes for our jump back to +// the original code. With that in mind, 32 is a good number :) +const size_t kMaxPreambleStubSize = 32; + +// Possible results of patching/unpatching +enum SideStepError { + SIDESTEP_SUCCESS = 0, + SIDESTEP_INVALID_PARAMETER, + SIDESTEP_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER, + SIDESTEP_JUMP_INSTRUCTION, + SIDESTEP_FUNCTION_TOO_SMALL, + SIDESTEP_UNSUPPORTED_INSTRUCTION, + SIDESTEP_NO_SUCH_MODULE, + SIDESTEP_NO_SUCH_FUNCTION, + SIDESTEP_ACCESS_DENIED, + SIDESTEP_UNEXPECTED, +}; + +// Implements a patching mechanism that overwrites the first few bytes of +// a function preamble with a jump to our hook function, which is then +// able to call the original function via a specially-made preamble-stub +// that imitates the action of the original preamble. +// +// Note that there are a number of ways that this method of patching can +// fail. The most common are: +// - If there is a jump (jxx) instruction in the first 5 bytes of +// the function being patched, we cannot patch it because in the +// current implementation we do not know how to rewrite relative +// jumps after relocating them to the preamble-stub. Note that +// if you really really need to patch a function like this, it +// would be possible to add this functionality (but at some cost). +// - If there is a return (ret) instruction in the first 5 bytes +// we cannot patch the function because it may not be long enough +// for the jmp instruction we use to inject our patch. +// - If there is another thread currently executing within the bytes +// that are copied to the preamble stub, it will crash in an undefined +// way. +// +// If you get any other error than the above, you're either pointing the +// patcher at an invalid instruction (e.g. into the middle of a multi- +// byte instruction, or not at memory containing executable instructions) +// or, there may be a bug in the disassembler we use to find +// instruction boundaries. +class PreamblePatcher { + public: + // Patches target_function to point to replacement_function using a provided + // preamble_stub of stub_size bytes. + // Returns An error code indicating the result of patching. + template <class T> + static SideStepError Patch(T target_function, T replacement_function, + void* preamble_stub, size_t stub_size) { + return RawPatchWithStub(target_function, replacement_function, + reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(preamble_stub), + stub_size, NULL); + } + + private: + + // Patches a function by overwriting its first few bytes with + // a jump to a different function. This is similar to the RawPatch + // function except that it uses the stub allocated by the caller + // instead of allocating it. + // + // To use this function, you first have to call VirtualProtect to make the + // target function writable at least for the duration of the call. + // + // target_function: A pointer to the function that should be + // patched. + // + // replacement_function: A pointer to the function that should + // replace the target function. The replacement function must have + // exactly the same calling convention and parameters as the original + // function. + // + // preamble_stub: A pointer to a buffer where the preamble stub + // should be copied. The size of the buffer should be sufficient to + // hold the preamble bytes. + // + // stub_size: Size in bytes of the buffer allocated for the + // preamble_stub + // + // bytes_needed: Pointer to a variable that receives the minimum + // number of bytes required for the stub. Can be set to NULL if you're + // not interested. + // + // Returns An error code indicating the result of patching. + static SideStepError RawPatchWithStub(void* target_function, + void *replacement_function, + unsigned char* preamble_stub, + size_t stub_size, + size_t* bytes_needed); +}; + +}; // namespace sidestep + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_PREAMBLE_PATCHER_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/preamble_patcher_with_stub.cpp b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/preamble_patcher_with_stub.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bdd79c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep/preamble_patcher_with_stub.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +// Implementation of PreamblePatcher + +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep/preamble_patcher.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep/mini_disassembler.h" + +// Definitions of assembly statements we need +#define ASM_JMP32REL 0xE9 +#define ASM_INT3 0xCC + +namespace { + +// Very basic memcpy. We are copying 4 to 12 bytes most of the time, so there +// is no attempt to optimize this code or have a general purpose function. +// We don't want to call the crt from this code. +inline void* RawMemcpy(void* destination, const void* source, size_t bytes) { + const char* from = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(source); + char* to = reinterpret_cast<char*>(destination); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes ; i++) + to[i] = from[i]; + + return destination; +} + +// Very basic memset. We are filling 1 to 7 bytes most of the time, so there +// is no attempt to optimize this code or have a general purpose function. +// We don't want to call the crt from this code. +inline void* RawMemset(void* destination, int value, size_t bytes) { + char* to = reinterpret_cast<char*>(destination); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes ; i++) + to[i] = static_cast<char>(value); + + return destination; +} + +} // namespace + +#define ASSERT(a, b) DCHECK_NT(a) + +namespace sidestep { + +SideStepError PreamblePatcher::RawPatchWithStub( + void* target_function, + void* replacement_function, + unsigned char* preamble_stub, + size_t stub_size, + size_t* bytes_needed) { + if ((NULL == target_function) || + (NULL == replacement_function) || + (NULL == preamble_stub)) { + ASSERT(false, (L"Invalid parameters - either pTargetFunction or " + L"pReplacementFunction or pPreambleStub were NULL.")); + return SIDESTEP_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + // TODO(V7:joi) Siggi and I just had a discussion and decided that both + // patching and unpatching are actually unsafe. We also discussed a + // method of making it safe, which is to freeze all other threads in the + // process, check their thread context to see if their eip is currently + // inside the block of instructions we need to copy to the stub, and if so + // wait a bit and try again, then unfreeze all threads once we've patched. + // Not implementing this for now since we're only using SideStep for unit + // testing, but if we ever use it for production code this is what we + // should do. + // + // NOTE: Stoyan suggests we can write 8 or even 10 bytes atomically using + // FPU instructions, and on newer processors we could use cmpxchg8b or + // cmpxchg16b. So it might be possible to do the patching/unpatching + // atomically and avoid having to freeze other threads. Note though, that + // doing it atomically does not help if one of the other threads happens + // to have its eip in the middle of the bytes you change while you change + // them. + unsigned char* target = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(target_function); + + // Let's disassemble the preamble of the target function to see if we can + // patch, and to see how much of the preamble we need to take. We need 5 + // bytes for our jmp instruction, so let's find the minimum number of + // instructions to get 5 bytes. + MiniDisassembler disassembler; + unsigned int preamble_bytes = 0; + while (preamble_bytes < 5) { + InstructionType instruction_type = + disassembler.Disassemble(target + preamble_bytes, &preamble_bytes); + if (IT_JUMP == instruction_type) { + ASSERT(false, (L"Unable to patch because there is a jump instruction " + L"in the first 5 bytes.")); + return SIDESTEP_JUMP_INSTRUCTION; + } else if (IT_RETURN == instruction_type) { + ASSERT(false, (L"Unable to patch because function is too short")); + return SIDESTEP_FUNCTION_TOO_SMALL; + } else if (IT_GENERIC != instruction_type) { + ASSERT(false, (L"Disassembler encountered unsupported instruction " + L"(either unused or unknown")); + return SIDESTEP_UNSUPPORTED_INSTRUCTION; + } + } + + if (NULL != bytes_needed) + *bytes_needed = preamble_bytes + 5; + + // Inv: preamble_bytes is the number of bytes (at least 5) that we need to + // take from the preamble to have whole instructions that are 5 bytes or more + // in size total. The size of the stub required is cbPreamble + size of + // jmp (5) + if (preamble_bytes + 5 > stub_size) { + NOTREACHED_NT(); + return SIDESTEP_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER; + } + + // First, copy the preamble that we will overwrite. + RawMemcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(preamble_stub), + reinterpret_cast<void*>(target), preamble_bytes); + + // Now, make a jmp instruction to the rest of the target function (minus the + // preamble bytes we moved into the stub) and copy it into our preamble-stub. + // find address to jump to, relative to next address after jmp instruction +#pragma warning(push) +#pragma warning(disable:4244) + // This assignment generates a warning because it is 32 bit specific. + int relative_offset_to_target_rest + = ((reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(target) + preamble_bytes) - + (preamble_stub + preamble_bytes + 5)); +#pragma warning(pop) + // jmp (Jump near, relative, displacement relative to next instruction) + preamble_stub[preamble_bytes] = ASM_JMP32REL; + // copy the address + RawMemcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(preamble_stub + preamble_bytes + 1), + reinterpret_cast<void*>(&relative_offset_to_target_rest), 4); + + // Inv: preamble_stub points to assembly code that will execute the + // original function by first executing the first cbPreamble bytes of the + // preamble, then jumping to the rest of the function. + + // Overwrite the first 5 bytes of the target function with a jump to our + // replacement function. + // (Jump near, relative, displacement relative to next instruction) + target[0] = ASM_JMP32REL; + + // Find offset from instruction after jmp, to the replacement function. +#pragma warning(push) +#pragma warning(disable:4244) + int offset_to_replacement_function = + reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(replacement_function) - + reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(target) - 5; +#pragma warning(pop) + // complete the jmp instruction + RawMemcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(target + 1), + reinterpret_cast<void*>(&offset_to_replacement_function), 4); + // Set any remaining bytes that were moved to the preamble-stub to INT3 so + // as not to cause confusion (otherwise you might see some strange + // instructions if you look at the disassembly, or even invalid + // instructions). Also, by doing this, we will break into the debugger if + // some code calls into this portion of the code. If this happens, it + // means that this function cannot be patched using this patcher without + // further thought. + if (preamble_bytes > 5) { + RawMemset(reinterpret_cast<void*>(target + 5), ASM_INT3, + preamble_bytes - 5); + } + + // Inv: The memory pointed to by target_function now points to a relative + // jump instruction that jumps over to the preamble_stub. The preamble + // stub contains the first stub_size bytes of the original target + // function's preamble code, followed by a relative jump back to the next + // instruction after the first cbPreamble bytes. + + return SIDESTEP_SUCCESS; +} + +}; // namespace sidestep + +#undef ASSERT diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep_resolver.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep_resolver.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e22ca6b --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep_resolver.cc @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep_resolver.h" + +#include "base/win/pe_image.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sidestep/preamble_patcher.h" + +namespace { + +const size_t kSizeOfSidestepStub = sidestep::kMaxPreambleStubSize; + +struct SidestepThunk { + char sidestep[kSizeOfSidestepStub]; // Storage for the sidestep stub. + int internal_thunk; // Dummy member to the beginning of the internal thunk. +}; + +struct SmartThunk { + const void* module_base; // Target module's base. + const void* interceptor; // Real interceptor. + SidestepThunk sidestep; // Standard sidestep thunk. +}; + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +NTSTATUS SidestepResolverThunk::Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used) { + NTSTATUS ret = Init(target_module, interceptor_module, target_name, + interceptor_name, interceptor_entry_point, + thunk_storage, storage_bytes); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + + SidestepThunk* thunk = reinterpret_cast<SidestepThunk*>(thunk_storage); + + size_t internal_bytes = storage_bytes - kSizeOfSidestepStub; + if (!SetInternalThunk(&thunk->internal_thunk, internal_bytes, thunk_storage, + interceptor_)) + return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + AutoProtectMemory memory; + memory.ChangeProtection(target_, kSizeOfSidestepStub, PAGE_READWRITE); + + sidestep::SideStepError rv = sidestep::PreamblePatcher::Patch( + target_, reinterpret_cast<void*>(&thunk->internal_thunk), thunk_storage, + kSizeOfSidestepStub); + + if (sidestep::SIDESTEP_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER == rv) + return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + if (sidestep::SIDESTEP_SUCCESS != rv) + return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + + if (storage_used) + *storage_used = GetThunkSize(); + + return ret; +} + +size_t SidestepResolverThunk::GetThunkSize() const { + return GetInternalThunkSize() + kSizeOfSidestepStub; +} + +// This is basically a wrapper around the normal sidestep patch that extends +// the thunk to use a chained interceptor. It uses the fact that +// SetInternalThunk generates the code to pass as the first parameter whatever +// it receives as original_function; we let SidestepResolverThunk set this value +// to its saved code, and then we change it to our thunk data. +NTSTATUS SmartSidestepResolverThunk::Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used) { + if (storage_bytes < GetThunkSize()) + return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + SmartThunk* thunk = reinterpret_cast<SmartThunk*>(thunk_storage); + thunk->module_base = target_module; + + NTSTATUS ret; + if (interceptor_entry_point) { + thunk->interceptor = interceptor_entry_point; + } else { + ret = ResolveInterceptor(interceptor_module, interceptor_name, + &thunk->interceptor); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + } + + // Perform a standard sidestep patch on the last part of the thunk, but point + // to our internal smart interceptor. + size_t standard_bytes = storage_bytes - offsetof(SmartThunk, sidestep); + ret = SidestepResolverThunk::Setup(target_module, interceptor_module, + target_name, NULL, &SmartStub, + &thunk->sidestep, standard_bytes, NULL); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + + // Fix the internal thunk to pass the whole buffer to the interceptor. + SetInternalThunk(&thunk->sidestep.internal_thunk, GetInternalThunkSize(), + thunk_storage, &SmartStub); + + if (storage_used) + *storage_used = GetThunkSize(); + + return ret; +} + +size_t SmartSidestepResolverThunk::GetThunkSize() const { + return GetInternalThunkSize() + kSizeOfSidestepStub + + offsetof(SmartThunk, sidestep); +} + +// This code must basically either call the intended interceptor or skip the +// call and invoke instead the original function. In any case, we are saving +// the registers that may be trashed by our c++ code. +// +// This function is called with a first parameter inserted by us, that points +// to our SmartThunk. When we call the interceptor we have to replace this +// parameter with the one expected by that function (stored inside our +// structure); on the other hand, when we skip the interceptor we have to remove +// that extra argument before calling the original function. +// +// When we skip the interceptor, the transformation of the stack looks like: +// On Entry: On Use: On Exit: +// [param 2] = first real argument [param 2] (esp+1c) [param 2] +// [param 1] = our SmartThunk [param 1] (esp+18) [ret address] +// [ret address] = real caller [ret address] (esp+14) [xxx] +// [xxx] [addr to jump to] (esp+10) [xxx] +// [xxx] [saved eax] [xxx] +// [xxx] [saved ebx] [xxx] +// [xxx] [saved ecx] [xxx] +// [xxx] [saved edx] [xxx] +__declspec(naked) +void SmartSidestepResolverThunk::SmartStub() { + __asm { + push eax // Space for the jump. + push eax // Save registers. + push ebx + push ecx + push edx + mov ebx, [esp + 0x18] // First parameter = SmartThunk. + mov edx, [esp + 0x14] // Get the return address. + mov eax, [ebx]SmartThunk.module_base + push edx + push eax + call SmartSidestepResolverThunk::IsInternalCall + add esp, 8 + + test eax, eax + lea edx, [ebx]SmartThunk.sidestep // The original function. + jz call_interceptor + + // Skip this call + mov ecx, [esp + 0x14] // Return address. + mov [esp + 0x18], ecx // Remove first parameter. + mov [esp + 0x10], edx + pop edx // Restore registers. + pop ecx + pop ebx + pop eax + ret 4 // Jump to original function. + + call_interceptor: + mov ecx, [ebx]SmartThunk.interceptor + mov [esp + 0x18], edx // Replace first parameter. + mov [esp + 0x10], ecx + pop edx // Restore registers. + pop ecx + pop ebx + pop eax + ret // Jump to original function. + } +} + +bool SmartSidestepResolverThunk::IsInternalCall(const void* base, + void* return_address) { + DCHECK_NT(base); + DCHECK_NT(return_address); + + base::win::PEImage pe(base); + if (pe.GetImageSectionFromAddr(return_address)) + return true; + return false; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sidestep_resolver.h b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep_resolver.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e7fdac --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sidestep_resolver.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_RESOLVER_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_RESOLVER_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/resolver.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform sidestep interceptions. +class SidestepResolverThunk : public ResolverThunk { + public: + SidestepResolverThunk() {} + virtual ~SidestepResolverThunk() {} + + // Implementation of Resolver::Setup. + virtual NTSTATUS Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used); + + // Implementation of Resolver::GetThunkSize. + virtual size_t GetThunkSize() const; + + private: + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SidestepResolverThunk); +}; + +// This is the concrete resolver used to perform smart sidestep interceptions. +// This means basically a sidestep interception that skips the interceptor when +// the caller resides on the same dll being intercepted. It is intended as +// a helper only, because that determination is not infallible. +class SmartSidestepResolverThunk : public SidestepResolverThunk { + public: + SmartSidestepResolverThunk() {} + virtual ~SmartSidestepResolverThunk() {} + + // Implementation of Resolver::Setup. + virtual NTSTATUS Setup(const void* target_module, + const void* interceptor_module, + const char* target_name, + const char* interceptor_name, + const void* interceptor_entry_point, + void* thunk_storage, + size_t storage_bytes, + size_t* storage_used); + + // Implementation of Resolver::GetThunkSize. + virtual size_t GetThunkSize() const; + + private: + // Performs the actual call to the interceptor if the conditions are correct + // (as determined by IsInternalCall). + static void SmartStub(); + + // Returns true if return_address is inside the module loaded at base. + static bool IsInternalCall(const void* base, void* return_address); + + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SmartSidestepResolverThunk); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SIDESTEP_RESOLVER_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sync_dispatcher.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sync_dispatcher.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..025fd96 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sync_dispatcher.cc @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/sync_dispatcher.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/interceptors.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_broker.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sync_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sync_policy.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +SyncDispatcher::SyncDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base) + : policy_base_(policy_base) { + static const IPCCall create_params = { + {IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>(&SyncDispatcher::CreateEvent) + }; + + static const IPCCall open_params = { + {IPC_OPENEVENT_TAG, WCHAR_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE, ULONG_TYPE}, + reinterpret_cast<CallbackGeneric>(&SyncDispatcher::OpenEvent) + }; + + ipc_calls_.push_back(create_params); + ipc_calls_.push_back(open_params); +} + +bool SyncDispatcher::SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, + int service) { + if (IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG == service) + return INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, L"kernel32.dll", CreateEventW, + CREATE_EVENT_ID, 20); + + if (IPC_OPENEVENT_TAG == service) + return INTERCEPT_EAT(manager, L"kernel32.dll", OpenEventW, + OPEN_EVENT_ID, 16); + + return false; +} + +bool SyncDispatcher::CreateEvent(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, + DWORD manual_reset, DWORD initial_state) { + const wchar_t* event_name = name->c_str(); + CountedParameterSet<NameBased> params; + params[NameBased::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(event_name); + + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + HANDLE handle = NULL; + DWORD ret = SyncPolicy::CreateEventAction(result, *ipc->client_info, *name, + manual_reset, initial_state, + &handle); + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.win32_result = ret; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +bool SyncDispatcher::OpenEvent(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, + DWORD desired_access, DWORD inherit_handle) { + const wchar_t* event_name = name->c_str(); + + CountedParameterSet<OpenEventParams> params; + params[OpenEventParams::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(event_name); + params[OpenEventParams::ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(desired_access); + + EvalResult result = policy_base_->EvalPolicy(IPC_OPENEVENT_TAG, + params.GetBase()); + HANDLE handle = NULL; + DWORD ret = SyncPolicy::OpenEventAction(result, *ipc->client_info, *name, + desired_access, inherit_handle, + &handle); + // Return operation status on the IPC. + ipc->return_info.win32_result = ret; + ipc->return_info.handle = handle; + return true; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sync_dispatcher.h b/sandbox/win/src/sync_dispatcher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be9b9a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sync_dispatcher.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_DISPATCHER_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_DISPATCHER_H_ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// This class handles sync-related IPC calls. +class SyncDispatcher : public Dispatcher { + public: + explicit SyncDispatcher(PolicyBase* policy_base); + ~SyncDispatcher() {} + + // Dispatcher interface. + virtual bool SetupService(InterceptionManager* manager, int service); + +private: + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to CreateEvent in the target. + bool CreateEvent(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD manual_reset, + DWORD initial_state); + + // Processes IPC requests coming from calls to OpenEvent in the target. + bool OpenEvent(IPCInfo* ipc, std::wstring* name, DWORD desired_access, + DWORD inherit_handle); + + PolicyBase* policy_base_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SyncDispatcher); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_DISPATCHER_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sync_interception.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sync_interception.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4832c79 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sync_interception.cc @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/sync_interception.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_target.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateEventW(CreateEventWFunction orig_CreateEvent, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes, + BOOL manual_reset, BOOL initial_state, + LPCWSTR name) { + // Check if the process can create it first. + HANDLE handle = orig_CreateEvent(security_attributes, manual_reset, + initial_state, name); + DWORD original_error = ::GetLastError(); + if (NULL != handle) + return handle; + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return NULL; + + do { + if (security_attributes) + break; + + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + CountedParameterSet<NameBased> params; + params[NameBased::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(name); + + if (!QueryBroker(IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG, params.GetBase())) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG, name, manual_reset, + initial_state, &answer); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + ::SetLastError(answer.win32_result); + return answer.handle; + } while (false); + + ::SetLastError(original_error); + return NULL; +} + +// Interception of OpenEventW on the child process. +// It should never be called directly +HANDLE WINAPI TargetOpenEventW(OpenEventWFunction orig_OpenEvent, + ACCESS_MASK desired_access, BOOL inherit_handle, + LPCWSTR name) { + // Check if the process can open it first. + HANDLE handle = orig_OpenEvent(desired_access, inherit_handle, name); + DWORD original_error = ::GetLastError(); + if (NULL != handle) + return handle; + + // We don't trust that the IPC can work this early. + if (!SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->InitCalled()) + return NULL; + + do { + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) + break; + + uint32 inherit_handle_ipc = inherit_handle; + CountedParameterSet<OpenEventParams> params; + params[OpenEventParams::NAME] = ParamPickerMake(name); + params[OpenEventParams::ACCESS] = ParamPickerMake(desired_access); + + if (!QueryBroker(IPC_OPENEVENT_TAG, params.GetBase())) + break; + + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_OPENEVENT_TAG, name, desired_access, + inherit_handle_ipc, &answer); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) + break; + + ::SetLastError(answer.win32_result); + return answer.handle; + } while (false); + + ::SetLastError(original_error); + return NULL; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sync_interception.h b/sandbox/win/src/sync_interception.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ac23e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sync_interception.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_INTERCEPTION_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_INTERCEPTION_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +extern "C" { + +typedef HANDLE (WINAPI *CreateEventWFunction) ( + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpEventAttributes, + DWORD dwDesiredAccess, + BOOL bInheritHandle, + LPCWSTR lpName); + +typedef HANDLE (WINAPI *OpenEventWFunction) ( + BOOL bManualReset, + BOOL bInitialState, + LPCWSTR lpName); + +// Interception of CreateEvent on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetCreateEventW( + CreateEventWFunction orig_CreateEvent, + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes, BOOL manual_reset, + BOOL initial_state, LPCWSTR name); + +// Interception of OpenEvent on the child process. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE WINAPI TargetOpenEventW( + OpenEventWFunction orig_OpenEvent, ACCESS_MASK desired_access, + BOOL inherit_handle, LPCWSTR name); + +} // extern "C" + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_INTERCEPTION_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..364cf73 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy.cc @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <string> + +#include "sandbox/src/sync_policy.h" + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_engine_opcodes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_params.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_utils.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +bool SyncPolicy::GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy) { + std::wstring mod_name(name); + if (mod_name.empty()) { + return false; + } + + if (TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY != semantics && + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY != semantics) { + // Other flags are not valid for sync policy yet. + NOTREACHED(); + return false; + } + + // Add the open rule. + EvalResult result = ASK_BROKER; + PolicyRule open(result); + + if (!open.AddStringMatch(IF, OpenEventParams::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE)) + return false; + + if (TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY == semantics) { + // We consider all flags that are not known to be readonly as potentially + // used for write. + DWORD allowed_flags = SYNCHRONIZE | GENERIC_READ | READ_CONTROL; + DWORD restricted_flags = ~allowed_flags; + open.AddNumberMatch(IF_NOT, OpenEventParams::ACCESS, restricted_flags, AND); + } + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_OPENEVENT_TAG, &open)) + return false; + + // If it's not a read only, add the create rule. + if (TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY != semantics) { + PolicyRule create(result); + if (!create.AddStringMatch(IF, NameBased::NAME, name, CASE_INSENSITIVE)) + return false; + + if (!policy->AddRule(IPC_CREATEEVENT_TAG, &create)) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +DWORD SyncPolicy::CreateEventAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &event_name, + uint32 manual_reset, + uint32 initial_state, + HANDLE *handle) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means create the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) + return false; + + HANDLE local_handle = ::CreateEvent(NULL, manual_reset, initial_state, + event_name.c_str()); + if (NULL == local_handle) + return ::GetLastError(); + + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + client_info.process, handle, 0, FALSE, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +DWORD SyncPolicy::OpenEventAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &event_name, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 inherit_handle, + HANDLE *handle) { + // The only action supported is ASK_BROKER which means create the requested + // file as specified. + if (ASK_BROKER != eval_result) + return false; + + HANDLE local_handle = ::OpenEvent(desired_access, FALSE, + event_name.c_str()); + if (NULL == local_handle) + return ::GetLastError(); + + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, + client_info.process, handle, 0, inherit_handle, + DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) { + ::CloseHandle(local_handle); + return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy.h b/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6404f79 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_POLICY_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_POLICY_H__ + +#include <string> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +enum EvalResult; + +// This class centralizes most of the knowledge related to sync policy +class SyncPolicy { + public: + // Creates the required low-level policy rules to evaluate a high-level + // policy rule for sync calls, in particular open or create actions. + // name is the sync object name, semantics is the desired semantics for the + // open or create and policy is the policy generator to which the rules are + // going to be added. + static bool GenerateRules(const wchar_t* name, + TargetPolicy::Semantics semantics, + LowLevelPolicy* policy); + + // Performs the desired policy action on a request. + // client_info is the target process that is making the request and + // eval_result is the desired policy action to accomplish. + static DWORD CreateEventAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &event_name, + uint32 manual_reset, + uint32 initial_state, + HANDLE *handle); + static DWORD OpenEventAction(EvalResult eval_result, + const ClientInfo& client_info, + const std::wstring &event_name, + uint32 desired_access, + uint32 inherit_handle, + HANDLE *handle); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_SYNC_POLICY_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c87243 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/sync_policy_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int Event_Open(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 2) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + DWORD desired_access = SYNCHRONIZE; + if (L'f' == argv[0][0]) + desired_access = EVENT_ALL_ACCESS; + + base::win::ScopedHandle event_open(::OpenEvent( + desired_access, FALSE, argv[1])); + DWORD error_open = ::GetLastError(); + + if (event_open.Get()) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + + if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == error_open || + ERROR_BAD_PATHNAME == error_open) + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int Event_CreateOpen(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc < 2 || argc > 3) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + wchar_t *event_name = NULL; + if (3 == argc) + event_name = argv[2]; + + BOOL manual_reset = FALSE; + BOOL initial_state = FALSE; + if (L't' == argv[0][0]) + manual_reset = TRUE; + if (L't' == argv[1][0]) + initial_state = TRUE; + + base::win::ScopedHandle event_create(::CreateEvent( + NULL, manual_reset, initial_state, event_name)); + DWORD error_create = ::GetLastError(); + base::win::ScopedHandle event_open; + if (event_name) + event_open.Set(::OpenEvent(EVENT_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, event_name)); + + if (event_create.Get()) { + DWORD wait = ::WaitForSingleObject(event_create.Get(), 0); + if (initial_state && WAIT_OBJECT_0 != wait) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + if (!initial_state && WAIT_TIMEOUT != wait) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + + if (event_name) { + // Both event_open and event_create have to be valid. + if (event_open.Get() && event_create) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + + if (event_open.Get() && !event_create || !event_open.Get() && event_create) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } else { + // Only event_create has to be valid. + if (event_create.Get()) + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + + if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == error_create || + ERROR_BAD_PATHNAME == error_create) + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +// Tests the creation of events using all the possible combinations. +TEST(SyncPolicyTest, TestEvent) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC, + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY, + L"test1")); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC, + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY, + L"test2")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f f")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t f")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f t")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t t")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f f test1")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t f test2")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f t test1")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t t test2")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f f test3")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t f test4")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f t test3")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t t test4")); +} + +// Tests opening events with read only access. +TEST(SyncPolicyTest, TestEventReadOnly) { + TestRunner runner; + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC, + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"test1")); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC, + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"test2")); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC, + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"test5")); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC, + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, + L"test6")); + + base::win::ScopedHandle handle1(::CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, L"test1")); + base::win::ScopedHandle handle2(::CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, L"test2")); + base::win::ScopedHandle handle3(::CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, L"test3")); + base::win::ScopedHandle handle4(::CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, L"test4")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f f")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t f")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_Open f test1")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_Open s test2")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_Open f test3")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_Open s test4")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f f test5")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t f test6")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen f t test5")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, runner.RunTest(L"Event_CreateOpen t t test6")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/target_interceptions.cc b/sandbox/win/src/target_interceptions.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1d463b --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/target_interceptions.cc @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/target_interceptions.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/interception_agent.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NtExports g_nt; + +// Hooks NtMapViewOfSection to detect the load of DLLs. If hot patching is +// required for this dll, this functions patches it. +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtMapViewOfSection( + NtMapViewOfSectionFunction orig_MapViewOfSection, HANDLE section, + HANDLE process, PVOID *base, ULONG_PTR zero_bits, SIZE_T commit_size, + PLARGE_INTEGER offset, PSIZE_T view_size, SECTION_INHERIT inherit, + ULONG allocation_type, ULONG protect) { + NTSTATUS ret = orig_MapViewOfSection(section, process, base, zero_bits, + commit_size, offset, view_size, inherit, + allocation_type, protect); + + static int s_load_count = 0; + if (1 == s_load_count) { + SandboxFactory::GetTargetServices()->GetState()->SetKernel32Loaded(); + s_load_count = 2; + } + + do { + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + break; + + if (!InitHeap()) + break; + + if (!IsSameProcess(process)) + break; + + if (!IsValidImageSection(section, base, offset, view_size)) + break; + + UINT image_flags; + UNICODE_STRING* module_name = + GetImageInfoFromModule(reinterpret_cast<HMODULE>(*base), &image_flags); + UNICODE_STRING* file_name = GetBackingFilePath(*base); + + if ((!module_name) && (image_flags & MODULE_HAS_CODE)) { + // If the module has no exports we retrieve the module name from the + // full path of the mapped section. + module_name = ExtractModuleName(file_name); + } + + InterceptionAgent* agent = InterceptionAgent::GetInterceptionAgent(); + + if (agent) { + if (!agent->OnDllLoad(file_name, module_name, *base)) { + // Interception agent is demanding to un-map the module. + g_nt.UnmapViewOfSection(process, *base); + ret = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + } + + if (module_name) + operator delete(module_name, NT_ALLOC); + + if (file_name) + operator delete(file_name, NT_ALLOC); + + } while (false); + + if (!s_load_count) + s_load_count = 1; + + return ret; +} + +NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtUnmapViewOfSection( + NtUnmapViewOfSectionFunction orig_UnmapViewOfSection, HANDLE process, + PVOID base) { + NTSTATUS ret = orig_UnmapViewOfSection(process, base); + + if (!NT_SUCCESS(ret)) + return ret; + + if (!IsSameProcess(process)) + return ret; + + InterceptionAgent* agent = InterceptionAgent::GetInterceptionAgent(); + + if (agent) + agent->OnDllUnload(base); + + return ret; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/target_interceptions.h b/sandbox/win/src/target_interceptions.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd6e12c --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/target_interceptions.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_INTERCEPTIONS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_INTERCEPTIONS_H__ + +namespace sandbox { + +extern "C" { + +// Interception of NtMapViewOfSection on the child process. +// It should never be called directly. This function provides the means to +// detect dlls being loaded, so we can patch them if needed. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtMapViewOfSection( + NtMapViewOfSectionFunction orig_MapViewOfSection, HANDLE section, + HANDLE process, PVOID *base, ULONG_PTR zero_bits, SIZE_T commit_size, + PLARGE_INTEGER offset, PSIZE_T view_size, SECTION_INHERIT inherit, + ULONG allocation_type, ULONG protect); + +// Interception of NtUnmapViewOfSection on the child process. +// It should never be called directly. This function provides the means to +// detect dlls being unloaded, so we can clean up our interceptions. +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT NTSTATUS WINAPI TargetNtUnmapViewOfSection( + NtUnmapViewOfSectionFunction orig_UnmapViewOfSection, HANDLE process, + PVOID base); + +} // extern "C" + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_INTERCEPTIONS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/target_process.cc b/sandbox/win/src/target_process.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88e2751 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/target_process.cc @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/target_process.h" + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "base/win/pe_image.h" +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/policy_low_level.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_server.h" + +namespace { + +void CopyPolicyToTarget(const void* source, size_t size, void* dest) { + if (!source || !size) + return; + memcpy(dest, source, size); + sandbox::PolicyGlobal* policy = + reinterpret_cast<sandbox::PolicyGlobal*>(dest); + + size_t offset = reinterpret_cast<size_t>(source); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < sandbox::kMaxServiceCount; i++) { + size_t buffer = reinterpret_cast<size_t>(policy->entry[i]); + if (buffer) { + buffer -= offset; + policy->entry[i] = reinterpret_cast<sandbox::PolicyBuffer*>(buffer); + } + } +} + +// Reserve a random range at the bottom of the address space in the target +// process to prevent predictable alocations at low addresses. +void PoisonLowerAddressRange(HANDLE process) { + unsigned int limit; + rand_s(&limit); + char* ptr = 0; + const size_t kMask64k = 0xFFFF; + // Random range (512k-16.5mb) in 64k steps. + const char* end = ptr + ((((limit % 16384) + 512) * 1024) & ~kMask64k); + while (ptr < end) { + MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION memory_info; + if (!::VirtualQueryEx(process, ptr, &memory_info, sizeof(memory_info))) + break; + size_t size = std::min((memory_info.RegionSize + kMask64k) & ~kMask64k, + static_cast<SIZE_T>(end - ptr)); + if (ptr && memory_info.State == MEM_FREE) + ::VirtualAllocEx(process, ptr, size, MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_NOACCESS); + ptr += size; + } +} + +} + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT HANDLE g_shared_section; +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT size_t g_shared_IPC_size; +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT size_t g_shared_policy_size; + +// Returns the address of the main exe module in memory taking in account +// address space layout randomization. +void* GetBaseAddress(const wchar_t* exe_name, void* entry_point) { + HMODULE exe = ::LoadLibrary(exe_name); + if (NULL == exe) + return exe; + + base::win::PEImage pe(exe); + if (!pe.VerifyMagic()) { + ::FreeLibrary(exe); + return exe; + } + PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS nt_header = pe.GetNTHeaders(); + char* base = reinterpret_cast<char*>(entry_point) - + nt_header->OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint; + + ::FreeLibrary(exe); + return base; +} + + +TargetProcess::TargetProcess(HANDLE initial_token, HANDLE lockdown_token, + HANDLE job, ThreadProvider* thread_pool) + // This object owns everything initialized here except thread_pool and + // the job_ handle. The Job handle is closed by BrokerServices and results + // eventually in a call to our dtor. + : lockdown_token_(lockdown_token), + initial_token_(initial_token), + job_(job), + thread_pool_(thread_pool), + base_address_(NULL) { +} + +TargetProcess::~TargetProcess() { + DWORD exit_code = 0; + // Give a chance to the process to die. In most cases the JOB_KILL_ON_CLOSE + // will take effect only when the context changes. As far as the testing went, + // this wait was enough to switch context and kill the processes in the job. + // If this process is already dead, the function will return without waiting. + // TODO(nsylvain): If the process is still alive at the end, we should kill + // it. http://b/893891 + // For now, this wait is there only to do a best effort to prevent some leaks + // from showing up in purify. + ::WaitForSingleObject(sandbox_process_info_.process_handle(), 50); + if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(sandbox_process_info_.process_handle(), + &exit_code) || (STILL_ACTIVE == exit_code)) { + // It is an error to destroy this object while the target process is still + // alive because we need to destroy the IPC subsystem and cannot risk to + // have an IPC reach us after this point. + shared_section_.Take(); + SharedMemIPCServer* server = ipc_server_.release(); + sandbox_process_info_.TakeProcessHandle(); + return; + } + + // ipc_server_ references our process handle, so make sure the former is shut + // down before the latter is closed (by ScopedProcessInformation). + ipc_server_.reset(); +} + +// Creates the target (child) process suspended and assigns it to the job +// object. +DWORD TargetProcess::Create(const wchar_t* exe_path, + const wchar_t* command_line, + const wchar_t* desktop, + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation* target_info) { + exe_name_.reset(_wcsdup(exe_path)); + + // the command line needs to be writable by CreateProcess(). + scoped_ptr_malloc<wchar_t> cmd_line(_wcsdup(command_line)); + scoped_ptr_malloc<wchar_t> desktop_name(desktop ? _wcsdup(desktop) : NULL); + + // Start the target process suspended. + DWORD flags = + CREATE_SUSPENDED | CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT | DETACHED_PROCESS; + + if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN8) { + // Windows 8 implements nested jobs, but for older systems we need to + // break out of any job we're in to enforce our restrictions. + flags |= CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB; + } + + STARTUPINFO startup_info = {sizeof(STARTUPINFO)}; + if (desktop) { + startup_info.lpDesktop = desktop_name.get(); + } + + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation process_info; + + if (!::CreateProcessAsUserW(lockdown_token_, + exe_path, + cmd_line.get(), + NULL, // No security attribute. + NULL, // No thread attribute. + FALSE, // Do not inherit handles. + flags, + NULL, // Use the environment of the caller. + NULL, // Use current directory of the caller. + &startup_info, + process_info.Receive())) { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + lockdown_token_.Close(); + + PoisonLowerAddressRange(process_info.process_handle()); + + DWORD win_result = ERROR_SUCCESS; + + // Assign the suspended target to the windows job object + if (!::AssignProcessToJobObject(job_, process_info.process_handle())) { + win_result = ::GetLastError(); + // It might be a security breach if we let the target run outside the job + // so kill it before it causes damage + ::TerminateProcess(process_info.process_handle(), 0); + return win_result; + } + + // Change the token of the main thread of the new process for the + // impersonation token with more rights. This allows the target to start; + // otherwise it will crash too early for us to help. + { + HANDLE temp_thread = process_info.thread_handle(); + if (!::SetThreadToken(&temp_thread, initial_token_)) { + win_result = ::GetLastError(); + ::TerminateProcess(process_info.process_handle(), 0); + return win_result; + } + initial_token_.Close(); + } + + CONTEXT context; + context.ContextFlags = CONTEXT_ALL; + if (!::GetThreadContext(process_info.thread_handle(), &context)) { + win_result = ::GetLastError(); + ::TerminateProcess(process_info.process_handle(), 0); + return win_result; + } + +#if defined(_WIN64) + void* entry_point = reinterpret_cast<void*>(context.Rcx); +#else +#pragma warning(push) +#pragma warning(disable: 4312) + // This cast generates a warning because it is 32 bit specific. + void* entry_point = reinterpret_cast<void*>(context.Eax); +#pragma warning(pop) +#endif // _WIN64 + + if (!target_info->DuplicateFrom(process_info)) { + win_result = ::GetLastError(); // This may or may not be correct. + ::TerminateProcess(process_info.process_handle(), 0); + return win_result; + } + + base_address_ = GetBaseAddress(exe_path, entry_point); + sandbox_process_info_.Swap(&process_info); + return win_result; +} + +ResultCode TargetProcess::TransferVariable(const char* name, void* address, + size_t size) { + if (!sandbox_process_info_.IsValid()) + return SBOX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_CALL; + + void* child_var = address; + +#if SANDBOX_EXPORTS + HMODULE module = ::LoadLibrary(exe_name_.get()); + if (NULL == module) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + child_var = ::GetProcAddress(module, name); + ::FreeLibrary(module); + + if (NULL == child_var) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + size_t offset = reinterpret_cast<char*>(child_var) - + reinterpret_cast<char*>(module); + child_var = reinterpret_cast<char*>(MainModule()) + offset; +#else + UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(name); +#endif + + SIZE_T written; + if (!::WriteProcessMemory(sandbox_process_info_.process_handle(), + child_var, address, size, &written)) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + if (written != size) + return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; + + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +// Construct the IPC server and the IPC dispatcher. When the target does +// an IPC it will eventually call the dispatcher. +DWORD TargetProcess::Init(Dispatcher* ipc_dispatcher, void* policy, + uint32 shared_IPC_size, uint32 shared_policy_size) { + // We need to map the shared memory on the target. This is necessary for + // any IPC that needs to take place, even if the target has not yet hit + // the main( ) function or even has initialized the CRT. So here we set + // the handle to the shared section. The target on the first IPC must do + // the rest, which boils down to calling MapViewofFile() + + // We use this single memory pool for IPC and for policy. + DWORD shared_mem_size = static_cast<DWORD>(shared_IPC_size + + shared_policy_size); + shared_section_.Set(::CreateFileMappingW(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL, + PAGE_READWRITE | SEC_COMMIT, + 0, shared_mem_size, NULL)); + if (!shared_section_.IsValid()) { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + DWORD access = FILE_MAP_READ | FILE_MAP_WRITE; + HANDLE target_shared_section; + if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), shared_section_, + sandbox_process_info_.process_handle(), + &target_shared_section, access, FALSE, 0)) { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + void* shared_memory = ::MapViewOfFile(shared_section_, + FILE_MAP_WRITE|FILE_MAP_READ, + 0, 0, 0); + if (NULL == shared_memory) { + return ::GetLastError(); + } + + CopyPolicyToTarget(policy, shared_policy_size, + reinterpret_cast<char*>(shared_memory) + shared_IPC_size); + + ResultCode ret; + // Set the global variables in the target. These are not used on the broker. + g_shared_section = target_shared_section; + ret = TransferVariable("g_shared_section", &g_shared_section, + sizeof(g_shared_section)); + g_shared_section = NULL; + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != ret) { + return (SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC == ret)? + ::GetLastError() : ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION; + } + g_shared_IPC_size = shared_IPC_size; + ret = TransferVariable("g_shared_IPC_size", &g_shared_IPC_size, + sizeof(g_shared_IPC_size)); + g_shared_IPC_size = 0; + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != ret) { + return (SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC == ret) ? + ::GetLastError() : ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION; + } + g_shared_policy_size = shared_policy_size; + ret = TransferVariable("g_shared_policy_size", &g_shared_policy_size, + sizeof(g_shared_policy_size)); + g_shared_policy_size = 0; + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != ret) { + return (SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC == ret) ? + ::GetLastError() : ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION; + } + + ipc_server_.reset( + new SharedMemIPCServer(sandbox_process_info_.process_handle(), + sandbox_process_info_.process_id(), + job_, thread_pool_, ipc_dispatcher)); + + if (!ipc_server_->Init(shared_memory, shared_IPC_size, kIPCChannelSize)) + return ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY; + + // After this point we cannot use this handle anymore. + ::CloseHandle(sandbox_process_info_.TakeThreadHandle()); + + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +void TargetProcess::Terminate() { + if (!sandbox_process_info_.IsValid()) + return; + + ::TerminateProcess(sandbox_process_info_.process_handle(), 0); +} + + +TargetProcess* MakeTestTargetProcess(HANDLE process, HMODULE base_address) { + TargetProcess* target = new TargetProcess(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + target->sandbox_process_info_.Receive()->hProcess = process; + target->base_address_ = base_address; + return target; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/target_process.h b/sandbox/win/src/target_process.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e462c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/target_process.h @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_PROCESS_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_PROCESS_H__ + +#include <windows.h> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +class SharedMemIPCServer; +class ThreadProvider; + +// TargetProcess models a target instance (child process). Objects of this +// class are owned by the Policy used to create them. +class TargetProcess { + public: + // The constructor takes ownership of |initial_token| and |lockdown_token|. + TargetProcess(HANDLE initial_token, HANDLE lockdown_token, HANDLE job, + ThreadProvider* thread_pool); + ~TargetProcess(); + + // TODO(cpu): Currently there does not seem to be a reason to implement + // reference counting for this class since is internal, but kept the + // the same interface so the interception framework does not need to be + // touched at this point. + void AddRef() {} + void Release() {} + + // Creates the new target process. The process is created suspended. + DWORD Create(const wchar_t* exe_path, + const wchar_t* command_line, + const wchar_t* desktop, + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation* target_info); + + // Destroys the target process. + void Terminate(); + + // Creates the IPC objects such as the BrokerDispatcher and the + // IPC server. The IPC server uses the services of the thread_pool. + DWORD Init(Dispatcher* ipc_dispatcher, void* policy, + uint32 shared_IPC_size, uint32 shared_policy_size); + + // Returns the handle to the target process. + HANDLE Process() const { + return sandbox_process_info_.process_handle(); + } + + // Returns the handle to the job object that the target process belongs to. + HANDLE Job() const { + return job_; + } + + // Returns the address of the target main exe. This is used by the + // interceptions framework. + HMODULE MainModule() const { + return reinterpret_cast<HMODULE>(base_address_); + } + + // Returns the name of the executable. + const wchar_t* Name() const { + return exe_name_.get(); + } + + // Returns the process id. + DWORD ProcessId() const { + return sandbox_process_info_.process_id(); + } + + // Returns the handle to the main thread. + HANDLE MainThread() const { + return sandbox_process_info_.thread_handle(); + } + + // Transfers a 32-bit variable between the broker and the target. + ResultCode TransferVariable(const char* name, void* address, size_t size); + + private: + // Details of the target process. + base::win::ScopedProcessInformation sandbox_process_info_; + // The token associated with the process. It provides the core of the + // sbox security. + base::win::ScopedHandle lockdown_token_; + // The token given to the initial thread so that the target process can + // start. It has more powers than the lockdown_token. + base::win::ScopedHandle initial_token_; + // Kernel handle to the shared memory used by the IPC server. + base::win::ScopedHandle shared_section_; + // Job object containing the target process. + HANDLE job_; + // Reference to the IPC subsystem. + scoped_ptr<SharedMemIPCServer> ipc_server_; + // Provides the threads used by the IPC. This class does not own this pointer. + ThreadProvider* thread_pool_; + // Base address of the main executable + void* base_address_; + // Full name of the target executable. + scoped_ptr_malloc<wchar_t> exe_name_; + + // Function used for testing. + friend TargetProcess* MakeTestTargetProcess(HANDLE process, + HMODULE base_address); + + DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(TargetProcess); +}; + +// Creates a mock TargetProcess used for testing interceptions. +// TODO(cpu): It seems that this method is not going to be used anymore. +TargetProcess* MakeTestTargetProcess(HANDLE process, HMODULE base_address); + + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_PROCESS_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/target_services.cc b/sandbox/win/src/target_services.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e13a3d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/target_services.cc @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" + +#include <process.h> + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_closer_agent.h" +#include "sandbox/src/handle_interception.h" +#include "sandbox/src/ipc_tags.h" +#include "sandbox/src/restricted_token_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sharedmem_ipc_client.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" + +namespace { + +// Flushing a cached key is triggered by just opening the key and closing the +// resulting handle. RegDisablePredefinedCache() is the documented way to flush +// HKCU so do not use it with this function. +bool FlushRegKey(HKEY root) { + HKEY key; + if (ERROR_SUCCESS == ::RegOpenKeyExW(root, NULL, 0, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, &key)) { + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != ::RegCloseKey(key)) + return false; + } + return true; +} + +// This function forces advapi32.dll to release some internally cached handles +// that were made during calls to RegOpenkey and RegOpenKeyEx if it is called +// with a more restrictive token. Returns true if the flushing is succesful +// although this behavior is undocumented and there is no guarantee that in +// fact this will happen in future versions of windows. +bool FlushCachedRegHandles() { + return (FlushRegKey(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE) && + FlushRegKey(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT) && + FlushRegKey(HKEY_USERS)); +} + +// Checks if we have handle entries pending and runs the closer. +bool CloseOpenHandles() { + if (sandbox::HandleCloserAgent::NeedsHandlesClosed()) { + sandbox::HandleCloserAgent handle_closer; + + handle_closer.InitializeHandlesToClose(); + if (!handle_closer.CloseHandles()) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +SANDBOX_INTERCEPT IntegrityLevel g_shared_delayed_integrity_level = + INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST; + +TargetServicesBase::TargetServicesBase() { +} + +ResultCode TargetServicesBase::Init() { + process_state_.SetInitCalled(); + return SBOX_ALL_OK; +} + +// Failure here is a breach of security so the process is terminated. +void TargetServicesBase::LowerToken() { + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != + SetProcessIntegrityLevel(g_shared_delayed_integrity_level)) + ::TerminateProcess(::GetCurrentProcess(), SBOX_FATAL_INTEGRITY); + process_state_.SetRevertedToSelf(); + // If the client code as called RegOpenKey, advapi32.dll has cached some + // handles. The following code gets rid of them. + if (!::RevertToSelf()) + ::TerminateProcess(::GetCurrentProcess(), SBOX_FATAL_DROPTOKEN); + if (!FlushCachedRegHandles()) + ::TerminateProcess(::GetCurrentProcess(), SBOX_FATAL_FLUSHANDLES); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != ::RegDisablePredefinedCache()) + ::TerminateProcess(::GetCurrentProcess(), SBOX_FATAL_CACHEDISABLE); + if (!CloseOpenHandles()) + ::TerminateProcess(::GetCurrentProcess(), SBOX_FATAL_CLOSEHANDLES); +} + +ProcessState* TargetServicesBase::GetState() { + return &process_state_; +} + +TargetServicesBase* TargetServicesBase::GetInstance() { + static TargetServicesBase instance; + return &instance; +} + +// The broker services a 'test' IPC service with the IPC_PING_TAG tag. +bool TargetServicesBase::TestIPCPing(int version) { + void* memory = GetGlobalIPCMemory(); + if (NULL == memory) { + return false; + } + SharedMemIPCClient ipc(memory); + CrossCallReturn answer = {0}; + + if (1 == version) { + uint32 tick1 = ::GetTickCount(); + uint32 cookie = 717115; + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_PING1_TAG, cookie, &answer); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) { + return false; + } + // We should get two extended returns values from the IPC, one is the + // tick count on the broker and the other is the cookie times two. + if ((answer.extended_count != 2)) { + return false; + } + // We test the first extended answer to be within the bounds of the tick + // count only if there was no tick count wraparound. + uint32 tick2 = ::GetTickCount(); + if (tick2 >= tick1) { + if ((answer.extended[0].unsigned_int < tick1) || + (answer.extended[0].unsigned_int > tick2)) { + return false; + } + } + + if (answer.extended[1].unsigned_int != cookie * 2) { + return false; + } + } else if (2 == version) { + uint32 cookie = 717111; + InOutCountedBuffer counted_buffer(&cookie, sizeof(cookie)); + ResultCode code = CrossCall(ipc, IPC_PING2_TAG, counted_buffer, &answer); + + if (SBOX_ALL_OK != code) { + return false; + } + if (cookie != 717111 * 3) { + return false; + } + } else { + return false; + } + return true; +} + +bool ProcessState::IsKernel32Loaded() { + return process_state_ != 0; +} + +bool ProcessState::InitCalled() { + return process_state_ > 1; +} + +bool ProcessState::RevertedToSelf() { + return process_state_ > 2; +} + +void ProcessState::SetKernel32Loaded() { + if (!process_state_) + process_state_ = 1; +} + +void ProcessState::SetInitCalled() { + if (process_state_ < 2) + process_state_ = 2; +} + +void ProcessState::SetRevertedToSelf() { + if (process_state_ < 3) + process_state_ = 3; +} + +ResultCode TargetServicesBase::DuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE* target_handle, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options) { + return sandbox::DuplicateHandleProxy(source_handle, target_process_id, + target_handle, desired_access, options); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/target_services.h b/sandbox/win/src/target_services.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4bf4f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/target_services.h @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_SERVICES_H__ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_SERVICES_H__ + +#include "base/basictypes.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +class ProcessState { + public: + ProcessState() : process_state_(0) {} + + // Returns true if kernel32.dll has been loaded. + bool IsKernel32Loaded(); + + // Returns true if main has been called. + bool InitCalled(); + + // Returns true if LowerToken has been called. + bool RevertedToSelf(); + + // Set the current state. + void SetKernel32Loaded(); + void SetInitCalled(); + void SetRevertedToSelf(); + + public: + int process_state_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ProcessState); +}; + +// This class is an implementation of the TargetServices. +// Look in the documentation of sandbox::TargetServices for more info. +// Do NOT add a destructor to this class without changing the implementation of +// the factory method. +class TargetServicesBase : public TargetServices { + public: + TargetServicesBase(); + + // Public interface of TargetServices. + virtual ResultCode Init(); + virtual void LowerToken(); + virtual ProcessState* GetState(); + virtual ResultCode DuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle, + DWORD target_process_id, + HANDLE* target_handle, + DWORD desired_access, + DWORD options); + + // Factory method. + static TargetServicesBase* GetInstance(); + + // Sends a simple IPC Message that has a well-known answer. Returns true + // if the IPC was successful and false otherwise. There are 2 versions of + // this test: 1 and 2. The first one send a simple message while the + // second one send a message with an in/out param. + bool TestIPCPing(int version); + + private: + ProcessState process_state_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(TargetServicesBase); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_TARGET_SERVICES_H__ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/threadpool_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/threadpool_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c85b57 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/threadpool_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/win2k_threadpool.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +void __stdcall EmptyCallBack(void*, unsigned char) { +} + +void __stdcall TestCallBack(void* context, unsigned char) { + HANDLE event = reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(context); + ::SetEvent(event); +} + +namespace sandbox { + +// Test that register and unregister work, part 1. +TEST(IPCTest, ThreadPoolRegisterTest1) { + Win2kThreadPool thread_pool; + + EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + + HANDLE event1 = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + HANDLE event2 = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + + uint32 context = 0; + EXPECT_FALSE(thread_pool.RegisterWait(0, event1, EmptyCallBack, &context)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.RegisterWait(this, event1, EmptyCallBack, &context)); + EXPECT_EQ(1, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.RegisterWait(this, event2, EmptyCallBack, &context)); + EXPECT_EQ(2, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.UnRegisterWaits(this)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + + EXPECT_EQ(TRUE, ::CloseHandle(event1)); + EXPECT_EQ(TRUE, ::CloseHandle(event2)); +} + +// Test that register and unregister work, part 2. +TEST(IPCTest, ThreadPoolRegisterTest2) { + Win2kThreadPool thread_pool; + + HANDLE event1 = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + HANDLE event2 = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + + uint32 context = 0; + uint32 c1 = 0; + uint32 c2 = 0; + + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.RegisterWait(&c1, event1, EmptyCallBack, &context)); + EXPECT_EQ(1, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.RegisterWait(&c2, event2, EmptyCallBack, &context)); + EXPECT_EQ(2, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.UnRegisterWaits(&c2)); + EXPECT_EQ(1, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.UnRegisterWaits(&c2)); + EXPECT_EQ(1, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.UnRegisterWaits(&c1)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + + EXPECT_EQ(TRUE, ::CloseHandle(event1)); + EXPECT_EQ(TRUE, ::CloseHandle(event2)); +} + +// Test that the thread pool has at least a thread that services an event. +// Test that when the event is un-registered is no longer serviced. +TEST(IPCTest, ThreadPoolSignalAndWaitTest) { + Win2kThreadPool thread_pool; + + // The events are auto reset and start not signaled. + HANDLE event1 = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + HANDLE event2 = ::CreateEventW(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL); + + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.RegisterWait(this, event1, TestCallBack, event2)); + + EXPECT_EQ(WAIT_OBJECT_0, ::SignalObjectAndWait(event1, event2, 5000, FALSE)); + EXPECT_EQ(WAIT_OBJECT_0, ::SignalObjectAndWait(event1, event2, 5000, FALSE)); + + EXPECT_TRUE(thread_pool.UnRegisterWaits(this)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_pool.OutstandingWaits()); + + EXPECT_EQ(WAIT_TIMEOUT, ::SignalObjectAndWait(event1, event2, 1000, FALSE)); + + EXPECT_EQ(TRUE, ::CloseHandle(event1)); + EXPECT_EQ(TRUE, ::CloseHandle(event2)); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/unload_dll_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/unload_dll_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bce1b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/unload_dll_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/src/target_services.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Loads and or unloads a DLL passed in the second parameter of argv. +// The first parameter of argv is 'L' = load, 'U' = unload or 'B' for both. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int UseOneDLL(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 2) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_RUN_TEST; + int rv = SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_RUN_TEST; + + wchar_t option = (argv[0])[0]; + if ((option == L'L') || (option == L'B')) { + HMODULE module1 = ::LoadLibraryW(argv[1]); + rv = (module1 == NULL) ? SBOX_TEST_FAILED : SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; + } + + if ((option == L'U') || (option == L'B')) { + HMODULE module2 = ::GetModuleHandleW(argv[1]); + rv = ::FreeLibrary(module2) ? SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED : SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + return rv; +} + +// Opens an event passed as the first parameter of argv. +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int SimpleOpenEvent(int argc, wchar_t **argv) { + if (argc != 1) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + base::win::ScopedHandle event_open(::OpenEvent(SYNCHRONIZE, FALSE, argv[0])); + return event_open.Get() ? SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED : SBOX_TEST_FAILED; +} + +// Flaky on windows, see http://crbug.com/80569. +TEST(UnloadDllTest, DISABLED_BaselineAvicapDll) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + runner.SetTimeout(2000); + // Add a sync rule, because that ensures that the interception agent has + // more than one item in its internal table. + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC, + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY, L"t0001")); + + // Note for the puzzled: avicap32.dll is a 64-bit dll in 64-bit versions of + // windows so this test and the others just work. + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"UseOneDLL L avicap32.dll")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"UseOneDLL B avicap32.dll")); +} + +// Flaky on windows, see http://crbug.com/80569. +TEST(UnloadDllTest, DISABLED_UnloadAviCapDllNoPatching) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + runner.SetTimeout(2000); + sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = runner.GetPolicy(); + policy->AddDllToUnload(L"avicap32.dll"); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_FAILED, runner.RunTest(L"UseOneDLL L avicap32.dll")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_FAILED, runner.RunTest(L"UseOneDLL B avicap32.dll")); +} + +// Flaky: http://crbug.com/38404 +TEST(UnloadDllTest, DISABLED_UnloadAviCapDllWithPatching) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.SetTimeout(2000); + runner.SetTestState(BEFORE_REVERT); + sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = runner.GetPolicy(); + policy->AddDllToUnload(L"avicap32.dll"); + + base::win::ScopedHandle handle1(::CreateEvent( + NULL, FALSE, FALSE, L"tst0001")); + + // Add a couple of rules that ensures that the interception agent add EAT + // patching on the client which makes sure that the unload dll record does + // not interact badly with them. + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, + TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, + L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft")); + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC, + TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY, L"tst0001")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_FAILED, runner.RunTest(L"UseOneDLL L avicap32.dll")); + + runner.SetTestState(AFTER_REVERT); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, runner.RunTest(L"SimpleOpenEvent tst0001")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/win2k_threadpool.cc b/sandbox/win/src/win2k_threadpool.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe2473e --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/win2k_threadpool.cc @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/win2k_threadpool.h" + +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +bool Win2kThreadPool::RegisterWait(const void* cookie, HANDLE waitable_object, + CrossCallIPCCallback callback, + void* context) { + if (0 == cookie) { + return false; + } + HANDLE pool_object = NULL; + // create a wait for a kernel object, with no timeout + if (!::RegisterWaitForSingleObject(&pool_object, waitable_object, callback, + context, INFINITE, WT_EXECUTEDEFAULT)) { + return false; + } + PoolObject pool_obj = {cookie, pool_object}; + AutoLock lock(&lock_); + pool_objects_.push_back(pool_obj); + return true; +} + +bool Win2kThreadPool::UnRegisterWaits(void* cookie) { + if (0 == cookie) { + return false; + } + AutoLock lock(&lock_); + bool success = true; + PoolObjects::iterator it = pool_objects_.begin(); + while (it != pool_objects_.end()) { + if (it->cookie == cookie) { + HANDLE wait = it->wait; + it = pool_objects_.erase(it); + success &= (::UnregisterWaitEx(wait, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) != 0); + } else { + ++it; + } + } + return success; +} + +size_t Win2kThreadPool::OutstandingWaits() { + AutoLock lock(&lock_); + return pool_objects_.size(); +} + +Win2kThreadPool::~Win2kThreadPool() { + // Here we used to unregister all the pool wait handles. Now, following the + // rest of the code we avoid lengthy or blocking calls given that the process + // is being torn down. + ::DeleteCriticalSection(&lock_); +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/win2k_threadpool.h b/sandbox/win/src/win2k_threadpool.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8593fa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/win2k_threadpool.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_WIN2K_THREADPOOL_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_WIN2K_THREADPOOL_H_ + +#include <list> +#include <algorithm> +#include "sandbox/src/crosscall_server.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Win2kThreadPool a simple implementation of a thread provider as required +// for the sandbox IPC subsystem. See sandbox\crosscall_server.h for the details +// and requirements of this interface. +// +// Implementing the thread provider as a thread pool is desirable in the case +// of shared memory IPC because it can generate a large number of waitable +// events: as many as channels. A thread pool does not create a thread per +// event, instead maintains a few idle threads but can create more if the need +// arises. +// +// This implementation simply thunks to the nice thread pool API of win2k. +class Win2kThreadPool : public ThreadProvider { + public: + Win2kThreadPool() { + ::InitializeCriticalSection(&lock_); + } + virtual ~Win2kThreadPool(); + + virtual bool RegisterWait(const void* cookie, HANDLE waitable_object, + CrossCallIPCCallback callback, + void* context); + + virtual bool UnRegisterWaits(void* cookie); + + // Returns the total number of wait objects associated with + // the thread pool. + size_t OutstandingWaits(); + + private: + // record to keep track of a wait and its associated cookie. + struct PoolObject { + const void* cookie; + HANDLE wait; + }; + // The list of pool wait objects. + typedef std::list<PoolObject> PoolObjects; + PoolObjects pool_objects_; + // This lock protects the list of pool wait objects. + CRITICAL_SECTION lock_; + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Win2kThreadPool); +}; + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_WIN2K_THREADPOOL_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/win_utils.cc b/sandbox/win/src/win_utils.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a43d97 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/win_utils.cc @@ -0,0 +1,323 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" + +#include <map> + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" +#include "sandbox/src/internal_types.h" +#include "sandbox/src/nt_internals.h" + +namespace { + +// Holds the information about a known registry key. +struct KnownReservedKey { + const wchar_t* name; + HKEY key; +}; + +// Contains all the known registry key by name and by handle. +const KnownReservedKey kKnownKey[] = { + { L"HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT", HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT }, + { L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER", HKEY_CURRENT_USER }, + { L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE", HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE}, + { L"HKEY_USERS", HKEY_USERS}, + { L"HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA", HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA}, + { L"HKEY_PERFORMANCE_TEXT", HKEY_PERFORMANCE_TEXT}, + { L"HKEY_PERFORMANCE_NLSTEXT", HKEY_PERFORMANCE_NLSTEXT}, + { L"HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG", HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG}, + { L"HKEY_DYN_DATA", HKEY_DYN_DATA} +}; + +// Returns true if the provided path points to a pipe. +bool IsPipe(const std::wstring& path) { + size_t start = 0; + if (0 == path.compare(0, sandbox::kNTPrefixLen, sandbox::kNTPrefix)) + start = sandbox::kNTPrefixLen; + + const wchar_t kPipe[] = L"pipe\\"; + return (0 == path.compare(start, arraysize(kPipe) - 1, kPipe)); +} + +} // namespace + +namespace sandbox { + +HKEY GetReservedKeyFromName(const std::wstring& name) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kKnownKey); ++i) { + if (name == kKnownKey[i].name) + return kKnownKey[i].key; + } + + return NULL; +} + +bool ResolveRegistryName(std::wstring name, std::wstring* resolved_name) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kKnownKey); ++i) { + if (name.find(kKnownKey[i].name) == 0) { + HKEY key; + DWORD disposition; + if (ERROR_SUCCESS != ::RegCreateKeyEx(kKnownKey[i].key, L"", 0, NULL, 0, + MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL, &key, + &disposition)) + return false; + + bool result = GetPathFromHandle(key, resolved_name); + ::RegCloseKey(key); + + if (!result) + return false; + + *resolved_name += name.substr(wcslen(kKnownKey[i].name)); + return true; + } + } + + return false; +} + +DWORD IsReparsePoint(const std::wstring& full_path, bool* result) { + std::wstring path = full_path; + + // Remove the nt prefix. + if (0 == path.compare(0, kNTPrefixLen, kNTPrefix)) + path = path.substr(kNTPrefixLen); + + // Check if it's a pipe. We can't query the attributes of a pipe. + if (IsPipe(path)) { + *result = FALSE; + return ERROR_SUCCESS; + } + + std::wstring::size_type last_pos = std::wstring::npos; + + do { + path = path.substr(0, last_pos); + + DWORD attributes = ::GetFileAttributes(path.c_str()); + if (INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES == attributes) { + DWORD error = ::GetLastError(); + if (error != ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND && + error != ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND && + error != ERROR_INVALID_NAME) { + // Unexpected error. + NOTREACHED(); + return error; + } + } else if (FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT & attributes) { + // This is a reparse point. + *result = true; + return ERROR_SUCCESS; + } + + last_pos = path.rfind(L'\\'); + } while (last_pos != std::wstring::npos); + + *result = false; + return ERROR_SUCCESS; +} + +// We get a |full_path| of the form \??\c:\some\foo\bar, and the name that +// we'll get from |handle| will be \device\harddiskvolume1\some\foo\bar. +bool SameObject(HANDLE handle, const wchar_t* full_path) { + std::wstring path(full_path); + DCHECK(!path.empty()); + + // Check if it's a pipe. + if (IsPipe(path)) + return true; + + std::wstring actual_path; + if (!GetPathFromHandle(handle, &actual_path)) + return false; + + // This may end with a backslash. + const wchar_t kBackslash = '\\'; + if (path[path.length() - 1] == kBackslash) + path = path.substr(0, path.length() - 1); + + // Perfect match (case-insesitive check). + if (0 == _wcsicmp(actual_path.c_str(), path.c_str())) + return true; + + // Look for the drive letter. + size_t colon_pos = path.find(L':'); + if (colon_pos == 0 || colon_pos == std::wstring::npos) + return false; + + // Only one character for the drive. + if (colon_pos > 1 && path[colon_pos - 2] != kBackslash) + return false; + + // We only need 3 chars, but let's alloc a buffer for four. + wchar_t drive[4] = {0}; + wchar_t vol_name[MAX_PATH]; + memcpy(drive, &path[colon_pos - 1], 2 * sizeof(*drive)); + + // We'll get a double null terminated string. + DWORD vol_length = ::QueryDosDeviceW(drive, vol_name, MAX_PATH); + if (vol_length < 2 || vol_length == MAX_PATH) + return false; + + // Ignore the nulls at the end. + vol_length = static_cast<DWORD>(wcslen(vol_name)); + + // The two paths should be the same length. + if (vol_length + path.size() - (colon_pos + 1) != actual_path.size()) + return false; + + // Check up to the drive letter. + if (0 != _wcsnicmp(actual_path.c_str(), vol_name, vol_length)) + return false; + + // Check the path after the drive letter. + if (0 != _wcsicmp(&actual_path[vol_length], &path[colon_pos + 1])) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool ConvertToLongPath(const std::wstring& short_path, + std::wstring* long_path) { + // Check if the path is a NT path. + bool is_nt_path = false; + std::wstring path = short_path; + if (0 == path.compare(0, kNTPrefixLen, kNTPrefix)) { + path = path.substr(kNTPrefixLen); + is_nt_path = true; + } + + DWORD size = MAX_PATH; + scoped_array<wchar_t> long_path_buf(new wchar_t[size]); + + DWORD return_value = ::GetLongPathName(path.c_str(), long_path_buf.get(), + size); + while (return_value >= size) { + size *= 2; + long_path_buf.reset(new wchar_t[size]); + return_value = ::GetLongPathName(path.c_str(), long_path_buf.get(), size); + } + + DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError(); + if (0 == return_value && (ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND == last_error || + ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND == last_error || + ERROR_INVALID_NAME == last_error)) { + // The file does not exist, but maybe a sub path needs to be expanded. + std::wstring::size_type last_slash = path.rfind(L'\\'); + if (std::wstring::npos == last_slash) + return false; + + std::wstring begin = path.substr(0, last_slash); + std::wstring end = path.substr(last_slash); + if (!ConvertToLongPath(begin, &begin)) + return false; + + // Ok, it worked. Let's reset the return value. + path = begin + end; + return_value = 1; + } else if (0 != return_value) { + path = long_path_buf.get(); + } + + if (return_value != 0) { + if (is_nt_path) { + *long_path = kNTPrefix; + *long_path += path; + } else { + *long_path = path; + } + + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +bool GetPathFromHandle(HANDLE handle, std::wstring* path) { + NtQueryObjectFunction NtQueryObject = NULL; + ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &NtQueryObject); + + OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION initial_buffer; + OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION* name = &initial_buffer; + ULONG size = sizeof(initial_buffer); + // Query the name information a first time to get the size of the name. + NTSTATUS status = NtQueryObject(handle, ObjectNameInformation, name, size, + &size); + + scoped_ptr<OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION> name_ptr; + if (size) { + name = reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION*>(new BYTE[size]); + name_ptr.reset(name); + + // Query the name information a second time to get the name of the + // object referenced by the handle. + status = NtQueryObject(handle, ObjectNameInformation, name, size, &size); + } + + if (STATUS_SUCCESS != status) + return false; + + path->assign(name->ObjectName.Buffer, name->ObjectName.Length / + sizeof(name->ObjectName.Buffer[0])); + return true; +} + +bool GetNtPathFromWin32Path(const std::wstring& path, std::wstring* nt_path) { + HANDLE file = ::CreateFileW(path.c_str(), 0, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, + OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, NULL); + if (file == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + return false; + bool rv = GetPathFromHandle(file, nt_path); + ::CloseHandle(file); + return rv; +} + +bool WriteProtectedChildMemory(HANDLE child_process, void* address, + const void* buffer, size_t length) { + // First, remove the protections. + DWORD old_protection; + if (!::VirtualProtectEx(child_process, address, length, + PAGE_WRITECOPY, &old_protection)) + return false; + + SIZE_T written; + bool ok = ::WriteProcessMemory(child_process, address, buffer, length, + &written) && (length == written); + + // Always attempt to restore the original protection. + if (!::VirtualProtectEx(child_process, address, length, + old_protection, &old_protection)) + return false; + + return ok; +} + +}; // namespace sandbox + +// TODO(jschuh): http://crbug.com/11789 +// I'm guessing we have a race where some "security" software is messing +// with ntdll/imports underneath us. So, we retry a few times, and in the +// worst case we sleep briefly before a few more attempts. (Normally sleeping +// would be very bad, but it's better than crashing in this case.) +void ResolveNTFunctionPtr(const char* name, void* ptr) { + const int max_tries = 5; + const int sleep_threshold = 2; + + static HMODULE ntdll = ::GetModuleHandle(sandbox::kNtdllName); + + FARPROC* function_ptr = reinterpret_cast<FARPROC*>(ptr); + *function_ptr = ::GetProcAddress(ntdll, name); + + for (int tries = 1; !(*function_ptr) && tries < max_tries; ++tries) { + if (tries >= sleep_threshold) + ::Sleep(1); + ntdll = ::GetModuleHandle(sandbox::kNtdllName); + *function_ptr = ::GetProcAddress(ntdll, name); + } + + CHECK(*function_ptr); +} diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h b/sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a80bb81 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2006-2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_WIN_UTILS_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_WIN_UTILS_H_ + +#include <windows.h> +#include <string> +#include "base/basictypes.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +// Prefix for path used by NT calls. +const wchar_t kNTPrefix[] = L"\\??\\"; +const size_t kNTPrefixLen = arraysize(kNTPrefix) - 1; + +const wchar_t kNTObjManPrefix[] = L"\\Device\\"; +const size_t kNTObjManPrefixLen = arraysize(kNTObjManPrefix) - 1; + +// Automatically acquires and releases a lock when the object is +// is destroyed. +class AutoLock { + public: + // Acquires the lock. + explicit AutoLock(CRITICAL_SECTION *lock) : lock_(lock) { + ::EnterCriticalSection(lock); + }; + + // Releases the lock; + ~AutoLock() { + ::LeaveCriticalSection(lock_); + }; + + private: + CRITICAL_SECTION *lock_; + DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(AutoLock); +}; + +// Basic implementation of a singleton which calls the destructor +// when the exe is shutting down or the DLL is being unloaded. +template <typename Derived> +class SingletonBase { + public: + static Derived* GetInstance() { + static Derived* instance = NULL; + if (NULL == instance) { + instance = new Derived(); + // Microsoft CRT extension. In an exe this this called after + // winmain returns, in a dll is called in DLL_PROCESS_DETACH + _onexit(OnExit); + } + return instance; + } + + private: + // this is the function that gets called by the CRT when the + // process is shutting down. + static int __cdecl OnExit() { + delete GetInstance(); + return 0; + } +}; + +// Convert a short path (C:\path~1 or \\??\\c:\path~1) to the long version of +// the path. If the path is not a valid filesystem path, the function returns +// false and the output parameter is not modified. +bool ConvertToLongPath(const std::wstring& short_path, std::wstring* long_path); + +// Sets result to true if the path contains a reparse point. The return value +// is ERROR_SUCCESS when the function succeeds or the appropriate error code +// when the function fails. +// This function is not smart. It looks for each element in the path and +// returns true if any of them is a reparse point. +DWORD IsReparsePoint(const std::wstring& full_path, bool* result); + +// Returns true if the handle corresponds to the object pointed by this path. +bool SameObject(HANDLE handle, const wchar_t* full_path); + +// Resolves a handle to an nt path. Returns true if the handle can be resolved. +bool GetPathFromHandle(HANDLE handle, std::wstring* path); + +// Resolves a win32 path to an nt path using GetPathFromHandle. The path must +// exist. Returs true if the translation was succesful. +bool GetNtPathFromWin32Path(const std::wstring& path, std::wstring* nt_path); + +// Translates a reserved key name to its handle. +// For example "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE" returns HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. +// Returns NULL if the name does not represent any reserved key name. +HKEY GetReservedKeyFromName(const std::wstring& name); + +// Resolves a user-readable registry path to a system-readable registry path. +// For example, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\microsoft is translated to +// \\registry\\machine\\software\\microsoft. Returns false if the path +// cannot be resolved. +bool ResolveRegistryName(std::wstring name, std::wstring* resolved_name); + +// Writes |length| bytes from the provided |buffer| into the address space of +// |child_process|, at the specified |address|, preserving the original write +// protection attributes. Returns true on success. +bool WriteProtectedChildMemory(HANDLE child_process, void* address, + const void* buffer, size_t length); + +} // namespace sandbox + +// Resolves a function name in NTDLL to a function pointer. The second parameter +// is a pointer to the function pointer. +void ResolveNTFunctionPtr(const char* name, void* ptr); + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_WIN_UTILS_H_ diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/win_utils_unittest.cc b/sandbox/win/src/win_utils_unittest.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f445ef --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/win_utils_unittest.cc @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include <windows.h> + +#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" +#include "sandbox/src/win_utils.h" +#include "sandbox/tests/common/test_utils.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +TEST(WinUtils, IsReparsePoint) { + using sandbox::IsReparsePoint; + + // Create a temp file because we need write access to it. + wchar_t temp_directory[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t my_folder[MAX_PATH]; + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempPath(MAX_PATH, temp_directory), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, my_folder), 0u); + + // Delete the file and create a directory instead. + ASSERT_TRUE(::DeleteFile(my_folder)); + ASSERT_TRUE(::CreateDirectory(my_folder, NULL)); + + bool result = true; + EXPECT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, IsReparsePoint(my_folder, &result)); + EXPECT_FALSE(result); + + // We have to fix Bug 32224 to pass this test. + std::wstring not_found = std::wstring(my_folder) + L"\\foo\\bar"; + // EXPECT_EQ(ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND, IsReparsePoint(not_found, &result)); + + std::wstring new_file = std::wstring(my_folder) + L"\\foo"; + EXPECT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, IsReparsePoint(new_file, &result)); + EXPECT_FALSE(result); + + // Replace the directory with a reparse point to %temp%. + HANDLE dir = ::CreateFile(my_folder, FILE_ALL_ACCESS, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, + OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, NULL); + EXPECT_NE(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, dir); + + std::wstring temp_dir_nt = std::wstring(L"\\??\\") + temp_directory; + EXPECT_TRUE(SetReparsePoint(dir, temp_dir_nt.c_str())); + + EXPECT_EQ(ERROR_SUCCESS, IsReparsePoint(new_file, &result)); + EXPECT_TRUE(result); + + EXPECT_TRUE(DeleteReparsePoint(dir)); + EXPECT_TRUE(::CloseHandle(dir)); + EXPECT_TRUE(::RemoveDirectory(my_folder)); +} + +TEST(WinUtils, SameObject) { + using sandbox::SameObject; + + // Create a temp file because we need write access to it. + wchar_t temp_directory[MAX_PATH]; + wchar_t my_folder[MAX_PATH]; + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempPath(MAX_PATH, temp_directory), 0u); + ASSERT_NE(::GetTempFileName(temp_directory, L"test", 0, my_folder), 0u); + + // Delete the file and create a directory instead. + ASSERT_TRUE(::DeleteFile(my_folder)); + ASSERT_TRUE(::CreateDirectory(my_folder, NULL)); + + std::wstring folder(my_folder); + std::wstring file_name = folder + L"\\foo.txt"; + const ULONG kSharing = FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_DELETE; + base::win::ScopedHandle file(CreateFile( + file_name.c_str(), GENERIC_WRITE, kSharing, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, + FILE_FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE, NULL)); + + EXPECT_TRUE(file.IsValid()); + std::wstring file_name_nt1 = std::wstring(L"\\??\\") + file_name; + std::wstring file_name_nt2 = std::wstring(L"\\??\\") + folder + L"\\FOO.txT"; + EXPECT_TRUE(SameObject(file.Get(), file_name_nt1.c_str())); + EXPECT_TRUE(SameObject(file.Get(), file_name_nt2.c_str())); + + file.Close(); + EXPECT_TRUE(::RemoveDirectory(my_folder)); +} diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/window.cc b/sandbox/win/src/window.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..507ae57 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/window.cc @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "sandbox/src/window.h" + +#include <aclapi.h> + +#include "base/logging.h" +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" + +namespace { + +// Gets the security attributes of a window object referenced by |handle|. The +// lpSecurityDescriptor member of the SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES parameter returned +// must be freed using LocalFree by the caller. +bool GetSecurityAttributes(HANDLE handle, SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES* attributes) { + attributes->bInheritHandle = FALSE; + attributes->nLength = sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES); + + PACL dacl = NULL; + DWORD result = ::GetSecurityInfo(handle, SE_WINDOW_OBJECT, + DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, NULL, NULL, &dacl, + NULL, &attributes->lpSecurityDescriptor); + if (ERROR_SUCCESS == result) + return true; + + return false; +} + +} + +namespace sandbox { + +ResultCode CreateAltWindowStation(HWINSTA* winsta) { + // Get the security attributes from the current window station; we will + // use this as the base security attributes for the new window station. + SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES attributes = {0}; + if (!GetSecurityAttributes(::GetProcessWindowStation(), &attributes)) { + return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_WINSTATION; + } + + // Create the window station using NULL for the name to ask the os to + // generate it. + // TODO(nsylvain): don't ask for WINSTA_ALL_ACCESS if we don't need to. + *winsta = ::CreateWindowStationW(NULL, 0, WINSTA_ALL_ACCESS, &attributes); + LocalFree(attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor); + + if (*winsta) + return SBOX_ALL_OK; + + return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_WINSTATION; +} + +ResultCode CreateAltDesktop(HWINSTA winsta, HDESK* desktop) { + std::wstring desktop_name = L"sbox_alternate_desktop_"; + + // Append the current PID to the desktop name. + wchar_t buffer[16]; + _snwprintf_s(buffer, sizeof(buffer) / sizeof(wchar_t), L"0x%X", + ::GetCurrentProcessId()); + desktop_name += buffer; + + // Get the security attributes from the current desktop, we will use this as + // the base security attributes for the new desktop. + SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES attributes = {0}; + if (!GetSecurityAttributes(GetThreadDesktop(GetCurrentThreadId()), + &attributes)) { + return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_DESKTOP; + } + + // Back up the current window station, in case we need to switch it. + HWINSTA current_winsta = ::GetProcessWindowStation(); + + if (winsta) { + // We need to switch to the alternate window station before creating the + // desktop. + if (!::SetProcessWindowStation(winsta)) { + ::LocalFree(attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor); + return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_DESKTOP; + } + } + + // Create the destkop. + // TODO(nsylvain): don't ask for GENERIC_ALL if we don't need to. + *desktop = ::CreateDesktop(desktop_name.c_str(), NULL, NULL, 0, GENERIC_ALL, + &attributes); + ::LocalFree(attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor); + + if (winsta) { + // Revert to the right window station. + if (!::SetProcessWindowStation(current_winsta)) { + return SBOX_ERROR_FAILED_TO_SWITCH_BACK_WINSTATION; + } + } + + if (*desktop) + return SBOX_ALL_OK; + + return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_CREATE_DESKTOP; +} + +std::wstring GetWindowObjectName(HANDLE handle) { + // Get the size of the name. + DWORD size = 0; + ::GetUserObjectInformation(handle, UOI_NAME, NULL, 0, &size); + + if (!size) { + NOTREACHED(); + return std::wstring(); + } + + // Create the buffer that will hold the name. + scoped_array<wchar_t> name_buffer(new wchar_t[size]); + + // Query the name of the object. + if (!::GetUserObjectInformation(handle, UOI_NAME, name_buffer.get(), size, + &size)) { + NOTREACHED(); + return std::wstring(); + } + + return std::wstring(name_buffer.get()); +} + +std::wstring GetFullDesktopName(HWINSTA winsta, HDESK desktop) { + if (!desktop) { + NOTREACHED(); + return std::wstring(); + } + + std::wstring name; + if (winsta) { + name = GetWindowObjectName(winsta); + name += L'\\'; + } + + name += GetWindowObjectName(desktop); + return name; +} + +} // namespace sandbox diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/window.h b/sandbox/win/src/window.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f65b463 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox/win/src/window.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2009 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_WINDOW_H_ +#define SANDBOX_SRC_WINDOW_H_ + +#include <windows.h> +#include <string> + +#include "sandbox/src/sandbox_types.h" + +namespace sandbox { + + // Creates a window station. The name is generated by the OS. The security + // descriptor is based on the security descriptor of the current window + // station. + ResultCode CreateAltWindowStation(HWINSTA* winsta); + + // Creates a desktop. The name is a static string followed by the pid of the + // current process. The security descriptor on the new desktop is based on the + // security descriptor of the desktop associated with the current thread. + // If a winsta is specified, the function will switch to it before creating + // the desktop. If the functions fails the switch back to the current winsta, + // the function will return SBOX_ERROR_FAILED_TO_SWITCH_BACK_WINSTATION. + ResultCode CreateAltDesktop(HWINSTA winsta, HDESK* desktop); + + // Returns the name of a desktop or a window station. + std::wstring GetWindowObjectName(HANDLE handle); + + // Returns the name of the desktop referenced by |desktop|. If a window + // station is specified, the name is prepended with the window station name, + // followed by a backslash. This name can be used as the lpDesktop parameter + // to CreateProcess. + std::wstring GetFullDesktopName(HWINSTA winsta, HDESK desktop); + +} // namespace sandbox + +#endif // SANDBOX_SRC_WINDOW_H_ |