am b8494591: Revert "Revert "external/boringssl: sync with upstream.""

* commit 'b8494591d1b1a143f3b192d845c238bbf3bc629d':
  Revert "Revert "external/boringssl: sync with upstream.""

1 files changed, 1741 insertions, 1394 deletions

diff --git a/src/ssl/t1_lib.c b/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 213a647..f30e8eb 100644
--- a/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -106,12 +106,16 @@
  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
 
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
 #include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
@@ -122,9 +126,6 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *tick, int ticklen,
-                              const uint8_t *sess_id, int sesslen,
-                              SSL_SESSION **psess);
 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 
@@ -213,8 +214,7 @@ static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) {
   extension_types =
       (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions);
   if (extension_types == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions,
-                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     goto done;
   }
 
@@ -338,24 +338,21 @@ char SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
 struct tls_curve {
   uint16_t curve_id;
   int nid;
+  const char curve_name[8];
 };
 
 /* ECC curves from RFC4492. */
 static const struct tls_curve tls_curves[] = {
-    {21, NID_secp224r1},
-    {23, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
-    {24, NID_secp384r1},
-    {25, NID_secp521r1},
-};
-
-static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] = {
-    TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
+    {21, NID_secp224r1, "P-224"},
+    {23, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "P-256"},
+    {24, NID_secp384r1, "P-384"},
+    {25, NID_secp521r1, "P-521"},
 };
 
 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
     23, /* X9_62_prime256v1 */
     24, /* secp384r1 */
-#if defined(ANDROID)
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
     25, /* secp521r1 */
 #endif
 };
@@ -381,6 +378,16 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(uint16_t *out_curve_id, int nid) {
   return 0;
 }
 
+const char* tls1_ec_curve_id2name(uint16_t curve_id) {
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tls_curves) / sizeof(tls_curves[0]); i++) {
+    if (curve_id == tls_curves[i].curve_id) {
+      return tls_curves[i].curve_name;
+    }
+  }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
 /* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the
  * list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero, return the
  * peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */
@@ -535,28 +542,6 @@ static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id,
   return 1;
 }
 
-/* tls1_check_point_format returns one if |comp_id| is consistent with the
- * peer's point format preferences. */
-static int tls1_check_point_format(SSL *s, uint8_t comp_id) {
-  uint8_t *p = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist;
-  size_t plen = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length;
-  size_t i;
-
-  /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
-   * supported (see RFC4492). */
-  if (p == NULL) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  for (i = 0; i < plen; i++) {
-    if (comp_id == p[i]) {
-      return 1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
 /* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our
  * and the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
  * preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */
@@ -593,18 +578,6 @@ static int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const uint8_t **pformats,
-                                size_t *pformatslen) {
-  /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default */
-  if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
-    *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
-    *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-  } else {
-    *pformats = ecformats_default;
-    *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
-  }
-}
-
 int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x) {
   int ret = 0;
   EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
@@ -615,7 +588,7 @@ int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x) {
       pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC ||
       !tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec) ||
       !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
-      !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id)) {
+      comp_id != TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
     goto done;
   }
 
@@ -663,17 +636,8 @@ static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 };
 
 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const uint8_t **psigs) {
-  /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
-  if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
-    *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
-    return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
-  } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
-    *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
-    return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
-  } else {
-    *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
-    return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-  }
+  *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+  return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
 }
 
 /* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of |cbs|. It
@@ -684,26 +648,26 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, SSL *s,
                             CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
   const uint8_t *sent_sigs;
   size_t sent_sigslen, i;
-  int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+  int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey->type);
   uint8_t hash, signature;
 
   /* Should never happen */
   if (sigalg == -1) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     return 0;
   }
 
   if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) ||
       !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
     return 0;
   }
 
   /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
   if (sigalg != signature) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
     return 0;
   }
@@ -718,8 +682,8 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, SSL *s,
     }
 
     if (s->server && (!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
-                      !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+                      comp_id != TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
       *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
       return 0;
     }
@@ -735,14 +699,14 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, SSL *s,
 
   /* Allow fallback to SHA-1. */
   if (i == sent_sigslen && hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
     return 0;
   }
 
   *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash);
   if (*out_md == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
     return 0;
   }
@@ -799,1128 +763,1785 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) {
   }
 }
 
-/* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to
- * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding
- * is to be done. */
-uint8_t *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *limit,
-                                    size_t header_len) {
-  int extdatalen = 0;
-  uint8_t *ret = buf;
-  uint8_t *orig = buf;
-  /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
-  int using_ecc = 0;
-
-  if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-    size_t i;
-    uint32_t alg_k, alg_a;
-    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
-      const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
-      alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
-      alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-      if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
-        using_ecc = 1;
-        break;
-      }
-    }
+/* tls_extension represents a TLS extension that is handled internally. The
+ * |init| function is called for each handshake, before any other functions of
+ * the extension. Then the add and parse callbacks are called as needed.
+ *
+ * The parse callbacks receive a |CBS| that contains the contents of the
+ * extension (i.e. not including the type and length bytes). If an extension is
+ * not received then the parse callbacks will be called with a NULL CBS so that
+ * they can do any processing needed to handle the absence of an extension.
+ *
+ * The add callbacks receive a |CBB| to which the extension can be appended but
+ * the function is responsible for appending the type and length bytes too.
+ *
+ * All callbacks return one for success and zero for error. If a parse function
+ * returns zero then a fatal alert with value |*out_alert| will be sent. If
+ * |*out_alert| isn't set, then a |decode_error| alert will be sent. */
+struct tls_extension {
+  uint16_t value;
+  void (*init)(SSL *ssl);
+
+  int (*add_clienthello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out);
+  int (*parse_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents);
+
+  int (*parse_clienthello)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents);
+  int (*add_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out);
+};
+
+
+/* Server name indication (SNI).
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3. */
+
+static void ext_sni_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_sni_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
-  if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
-    return orig;
+  CBB contents, server_name_list, name;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &server_name_list) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&server_name_list, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &name) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&name, (const uint8_t *)ssl->tlsext_hostname,
+                     strlen(ssl->tlsext_hostname)) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  ret += 2;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-  if (ret >= limit) {
-    return NULL; /* should never occur. */
+static int ext_sni_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
-    /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
-    unsigned long size_str;
-    long lenmax;
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    /* check for enough space.
-       4 for the servername type and entension length
-       2 for servernamelist length
-       1 for the hostname type
-       2 for hostname length
-       + hostname length */
+  assert(ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL);
 
-    lenmax = limit - ret - 9;
-    size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
-    if (lenmax < 0 || size_str > (unsigned long)lenmax) {
-      return NULL;
+  if (!ssl->hit) {
+    assert(ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
+    ssl->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
+    if (!ssl->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    /* extension type and length */
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
-    s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    /* length of servername list */
-    s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
+static int ext_sni_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-    /* hostname type, length and hostname */
-    *(ret++) = (uint8_t)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
-    s2n(size_str, ret);
-    memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
-    ret += size_str;
+  /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
+   *
+   * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+   * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, in
+   *   which case an fatal alert is generated.
+   * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+   * - When a session is resumed, the servername callback is invoked in order
+   *   to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
+   * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
+   *   it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
+   *   Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
+   *   set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+   *   case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
+   *   a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
+   *   presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
+   *   the value of the Host: field.
+   * - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+   *   if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
+   *   session,
+   *   i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
+   */
+
+  CBS server_name_list;
+  char have_seen_host_name = 0;
+
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &server_name_list) ||
+      CBS_len(&server_name_list) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Add RI if renegotiating */
-  if (s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-    int el;
+  /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
+  while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0) {
+    uint8_t name_type;
+    CBS host_name;
 
-    if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
+    if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name)) {
+      return 0;
     }
 
-    if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
+    /* Only host_name is supported. */
+    if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
+      continue;
     }
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
-    s2n(el, ret);
-
-    if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
+    if (have_seen_host_name) {
+      /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain more than one name of the same
+       * name_type. */
+      return 0;
     }
 
-    ret += el;
-  }
+    have_seen_host_name = 1;
 
-  /* Add extended master secret. */
-  if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
-    if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
-    s2n(0, ret);
-  }
-
-  if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
-    int ticklen = 0;
-    /* Renegotiation does not participate in session resumption. However, still
-     * advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry
-     * over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers
-     * without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4. */
-    if (!s->s3->initial_handshake_complete && s->session != NULL &&
-        s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
-      ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+    if (CBS_len(&host_name) == 0 ||
+        CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
+        CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+      return 0;
     }
 
-    /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
-     * ticket. */
-    if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
-    s2n(ticklen, ret);
-    if (ticklen) {
-      memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
-      ret += ticklen;
+    if (!ssl->hit) {
+      assert(ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
+      if (ssl->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+        /* This should be impossible. */
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
+      if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &ssl->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 1;
     }
   }
 
-  if (ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->client_version) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    size_t salglen;
-    const uint8_t *salg;
-    salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
-    if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
-    s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
-    s2n(salglen, ret);
-    memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
-    ret += salglen;
-  }
-
-  if (s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
-    /* The status_request extension is excessively extensible at every layer.
-     * On the client, only support requesting OCSP responses with an empty
-     * responder_id_list and no extensions. */
-    if (limit - ret - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
-    s2n(1 + 2 + 2, ret);
-    /* status_type */
-    *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
-    /* responder_id_list - empty */
-    s2n(0, ret);
-    /* request_extensions - empty */
-    s2n(0, ret);
-  }
-
-  if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
-      !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-    /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support for
-     * Next Protocol Negotiation */
-    if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
-    s2n(0, ret);
+static int ext_sni_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl->hit ||
+      !ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni ||
+      ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  if (s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
-    /* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support for
-     * certificate timestamps. */
-    if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, ret);
-    s2n(0, ret);
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-    if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
-    s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
-    s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
-    memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
-    ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Renegotiation indication.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746 */
+
+static int ext_ri_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  CBB contents, prev_finished;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                     ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-    /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support for
-     * Channel ID. */
-    if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
-      return NULL;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_ri_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    /* No renegotiation extension received.
+     *
+     * Strictly speaking if we want to avoid an attack we should *always* see
+     * RI even on initial ServerHello because the client doesn't see any
+     * renegotiation during an attack. However this would mean we could not
+     * connect to any server which doesn't support RI.
+     *
+     * A lack of the extension is allowed if SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT is
+     * defined. */
+    if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) {
+      return 1;
     }
-    if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new) {
-      s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, ret);
+
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const size_t expected_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
+                              ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+
+  /* Check for logic errors */
+  assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+  assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+
+  /* Parse out the extension contents. */
+  CBS renegotiated_connection;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Check that the extension matches. */
+  if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != expected_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *d = CBS_data(&renegotiated_connection);
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+        ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    return 0;
+  }
+  d += ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
+        ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_ri_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    CBS *contents) {
+  /* Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be
+   * called after the initial handshake. */
+  assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+
+  CBS fake_contents;
+  static const uint8_t kFakeExtension[] = {0};
+
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    if (ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+      /* The renegotiation SCSV was received so pretend that we received a
+       * renegotiation extension. */
+      CBS_init(&fake_contents, kFakeExtension, sizeof(kFakeExtension));
+      contents = &fake_contents;
+      /* We require that the renegotiation extension is at index zero of
+       * kExtensions. */
+      ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << 0);
     } else {
-      s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, ret);
+      return 1;
     }
-    s2n(0, ret);
   }
 
-  if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
-    int el;
+  CBS renegotiated_connection;
 
-    ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  /* Check that the extension matches */
+  if (!CBS_mem_equal(&renegotiated_connection, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                     ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
-    s2n(el, ret);
+  ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
 
-    if (!ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    ret += el;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_ri_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  CBB contents, prev_finished;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                     ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
+                     ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (using_ecc) {
-    /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
-    long lenmax;
-    const uint8_t *formats;
-    const uint16_t *curves;
-    size_t formats_len, curves_len, i;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len);
 
-    lenmax = limit - ret - 5;
-    if (lenmax < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    if (formats_len > 255) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
-    }
+/* Extended Master Secret.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-05 */
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
-    s2n(formats_len + 1, ret);
-    *(ret++) = (uint8_t)formats_len;
-    memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len);
-    ret += formats_len;
+static void ext_ems_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
+}
 
-    /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
-    tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
+static int ext_ems_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-    lenmax = limit - ret - 6;
-    if (lenmax < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    if (curves_len * 2 > (size_t)lenmax) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    if (curves_len * 2 > 65532) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
-    s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret);
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    s2n(curves_len * 2, ret);
-    for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
-      s2n(curves[i], ret);
-    }
+static int ext_ems_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  if (header_len > 0) {
-    size_t clienthello_minsize = 0;
-    header_len += ret - orig;
-    if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) {
-      /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
-       * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
-       *
-       * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions
-       * it MUST always appear last. */
-      clienthello_minsize = 0x200;
-    }
-    if (s->fastradio_padding) {
-      /* Pad the ClientHello record to 1024 bytes to fast forward the radio
-       * into DCH (high data rate) state in 3G networks. Note that when
-       * fastradio_padding is enabled, even if the header_len is less than 255
-       * bytes, the padding will be applied regardless. This is slightly
-       * different from the TLS padding extension suggested in
-       * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 */
-      clienthello_minsize = 0x400;
-    }
-    if (header_len < clienthello_minsize) {
-      size_t padding_len = clienthello_minsize - header_len;
-      /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include least
-       * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application
-       * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
-      if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) {
-        padding_len -= 4;
-      } else {
-        padding_len = 1;
-      }
+  if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION || CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-      if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0) {
-        return NULL;
-      }
+  ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-      s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
-      s2n(padding_len, ret);
-      memset(ret, 0, padding_len);
-      ret += padding_len;
-    }
+static int ext_ems_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION || contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  extdatalen = ret - orig - 2;
-  if (extdatalen == 0) {
-    return orig;
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  s2n(extdatalen, orig);
-  return ret;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-uint8_t *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *limit) {
-  int extdatalen = 0;
-  uint8_t *orig = buf;
-  uint8_t *ret = buf;
-  int next_proto_neg_seen;
-  uint32_t alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-  uint32_t alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-  int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
-  using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+static int ext_ems_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-  /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
-  if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
-    return orig;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  ret += 2;
-  if (ret >= limit) {
-    return NULL; /* should never happen. */
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Session tickets.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077 */
+
+static int ext_ticket_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  if (!s->hit && s->should_ack_sni && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
-    if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  const uint8_t *ticket_data = NULL;
+  int ticket_len = 0;
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
-    s2n(0, ret);
+  /* Renegotiation does not participate in session resumption. However, still
+   * advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry
+   * over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers
+   * without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4. */
+  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+      ssl->session != NULL &&
+      ssl->session->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
+    ticket_data = ssl->session->tlsext_tick;
+    ticket_len = ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen;
   }
 
-  if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
-    int el;
+  CBB ticket;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &ticket) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, ticket_data, ticket_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
+static int ext_ticket_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                        CBS *contents) {
+  ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
-    s2n(el, ret);
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-    if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  /* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set then no extension will have been sent and
+   * this function should never be called, even if the server tries to send the
+   * extension. */
+  assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0);
 
-    ret += el;
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
-    if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_ticket_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  /* This function isn't used because the ticket extension from the client is
+   * handled in ssl_sess.c. */
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
-    s2n(0, ret);
+static int ext_ticket_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  if (using_ecc) {
-    const uint8_t *plist;
-    size_t plistlen;
-    /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
-    long lenmax;
+  /* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set, |tlsext_ticket_expected| should never be
+   * true. */
+  assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0);
 
-    tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    lenmax = limit - ret - 5;
-    if (lenmax < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    if (plistlen > 255) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
-    s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
-    *(ret++) = (uint8_t)plistlen;
-    memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
-    ret += plistlen;
+
+/* Signature Algorithms.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
+
+static int ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl3_version_from_wire(ssl, ssl->client_version) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
   }
-  /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
 
-  if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
-    if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
-    s2n(0, ret);
+  const uint8_t *sigalgs_data;
+  const size_t sigalgs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_data);
+
+  CBB contents, sigalgs;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&sigalgs, sigalgs_data, sigalgs_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
-    if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
-    s2n(0, ret);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_sigalgs_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents != NULL) {
+    /* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION_SENT_BY_SERVER);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (s->srtp_profile) {
-    int el;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+static int ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         CBS *contents) {
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs);
+  ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+  ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
 
-    if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
-    s2n(el, ret);
+  CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
+      !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    if (!ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    ret += el;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_sigalgs_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  /* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* OCSP Stapling.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8 */
+
+static void ext_ocsp_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_ocsp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty responder ID list */) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty request extensions */) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
-  s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-  if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
-    const uint8_t *npa;
-    unsigned int npalen;
-    int r;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(
-        s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
-    if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
-      if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) {
-        return NULL;
-      }
-      s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
-      s2n(npalen, ret);
-      memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
-      ret += npalen;
-      s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-    }
+static int ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
-    const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
-    size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
-    s2n(3 + len, ret);
-    s2n(1 + len, ret);
-    *ret++ = len;
-    memcpy(ret, selected, len);
-    ret += len;
-  }
-
-  /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
-   * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
-  if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-    if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
-      s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, ret);
-    } else {
-      s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, ret);
-    }
-    s2n(0, ret);
+  ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  extdatalen = ret - orig - 2;
-  if (extdatalen == 0) {
-    return orig;
+  uint8_t status_type;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  s2n(extdatalen, orig);
-  return ret;
+  /* We cannot decide whether OCSP stapling will occur yet because the correct
+   * SSL_CTX might not have been selected. */
+  ssl->s3->tmp.ocsp_stapling_requested = status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_ocsp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */
+  if (ssl->hit ||
+      !ssl->s3->tmp.ocsp_stapling_requested ||
+      ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length == 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
+
+  return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) &&
+         CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */);
 }
 
-/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
- * ClientHello.
- *   cbs: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
- *   out_alert: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a zero
- *       return.
+
+/* Next protocol negotiation.
  *
- *   returns: 1 on success. */
-static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
-  CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name_list_copy;
-  const uint8_t *selected;
+ * https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/agl/technotes/blob/master/nextprotoneg.html */
+
+static void ext_npn_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_npn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+      ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL ||
+      SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_npn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  /* If any of these are false then we should never have sent the NPN
+   * extension in the ClientHello and thus this function should never have been
+   * called. */
+  assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+  assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl));
+  assert(ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb != NULL);
+
+  if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
+    /* NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection. */
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *const orig_contents = CBS_data(contents);
+  const size_t orig_len = CBS_len(contents);
+
+  while (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    CBS proto;
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &proto) ||
+        CBS_len(&proto) == 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *selected;
   uint8_t selected_len;
-  int r;
+  if (ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(
+          ssl, &selected, &selected_len, orig_contents, orig_len,
+          ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->next_proto_negotiated);
+  ssl->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+  if (ssl->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+  ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_npn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents != NULL && CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (contents == NULL ||
+      ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+      /* If the ALPN extension is seen before NPN, ignore it. (If ALPN is seen
+       * afterwards, parsing the ALPN extension will clear
+       * |next_proto_neg_seen|. */
+      ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL ||
+      ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL ||
+      SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_npn_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  /* |next_proto_neg_seen| might have been cleared when an ALPN extension was
+   * parsed. */
+  if (!ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *npa;
+  unsigned npa_len;
+
+  if (ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(
+          ssl, &npa, &npa_len, ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg) !=
+      SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+    ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&contents, npa, npa_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Signed certificate timestamps.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1 */
 
-  if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) {
+static int ext_sct_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) ||
-      CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) {
-    goto parse_error;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_sct_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  /* If this is false then we should never have sent the SCT extension in the
+   * ClientHello and thus this function should never have been called. */
+  assert(ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled);
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) == 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
+  if (!ssl->hit &&
+      !CBS_stow(contents, &ssl->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+                &ssl->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_sct_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     CBS *contents) {
+  return contents == NULL || CBS_len(contents) == 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_sct_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */
+  if (ssl->hit ||
+      ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length == 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents;
+  return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) &&
+         CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) &&
+         CBB_add_bytes(&contents, ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+                       ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length) &&
+         CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+
+/* Application-level Protocol Negotiation.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301 */
+
+static void ext_alpn_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->alpn_selected);
+  ssl->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+}
+
+static int ext_alpn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL ||
+      ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, proto_list;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&proto_list, ssl->alpn_client_proto_list,
+                     ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_alpn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+  assert(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL);
+
+  if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+    /* NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection. */
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have
+   * exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed. */
+  CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
+      /* Empty protocol names are forbidden. */
+      CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &ssl->s3->alpn_selected,
+                &ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_alpn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL ||
+      ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+  ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+
+  CBS protocol_name_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
   /* Validate the protocol list. */
-  protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
+  CBS protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
   while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) {
     CBS protocol_name;
 
-    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name)) {
-      goto parse_error;
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name) ||
+        /* Empty protocol names are forbidden. */
+        CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0) {
+      return 0;
     }
   }
 
-  r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(
-      s, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list),
-      CBS_len(&protocol_name_list), s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
-  if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
-    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-    s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
-    if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+  const uint8_t *selected;
+  uint8_t selected_len;
+  if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb(
+          ssl, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list),
+          CBS_len(&protocol_name_list),
+          ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg) == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+    OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->alpn_selected);
+    ssl->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+    if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
       *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
       return 0;
     }
-    s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+    ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
   }
 
   return 1;
+}
 
-parse_error:
-  *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  return 0;
+static int ext_alpn_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, proto_list, proto;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&proto_list, &proto) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&proto, ssl->s3->alpn_selected, ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
 }
 
-static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
-  int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-  CBS extensions;
 
-  s->should_ack_sni = 0;
-  s->srtp_profile = NULL;
-  s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-  s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
-  s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
+/* Channel ID.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01 */
+
+static void ext_channel_id_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_channel_id_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled ||
+      SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-  OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-  s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-  /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
-  OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
-  s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
-  s->cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+static int ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                            CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-  /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
-  OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
-  s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
-  s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+  assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl));
+  assert(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled);
 
-  /* Clear ECC extensions */
-  OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
-  s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
-  s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-  OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
-  s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
-  s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+  ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-  /* There may be no extensions. */
-  if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
-    goto ri_check;
+static int ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                            CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL ||
+      !ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled ||
+      SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
-      !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
-    uint16_t type;
-    CBS extension;
+  ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    /* Decode the next extension. */
-    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
-        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+static int ext_channel_id_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) extension.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764 */
+
+
+static void ext_srtp_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->srtp_profile = NULL;
+}
+
+static int ext_srtp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
+  if (profiles == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  const size_t num_profiles = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles);
+  if (num_profiles == 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, profile_ids;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < num_profiles; i++) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids,
+                     sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i)->id)) {
       return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
-
-       - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
-       - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, in
-         which case an fatal alert is generated.
-       - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
-       - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
-         to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
-       - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
-         it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
-         Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
-         set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
-         case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
-         a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
-         presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
-         the value of the Host: field.
-       - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
-         if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
-       session,
-         i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
-       - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. */
-
-    if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
-      CBS server_name_list;
-      char have_seen_host_name = 0;
-
-      if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) ||
-          CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty use_mki value */) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-      /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
-      while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0) {
-        uint8_t name_type;
-        CBS host_name;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-        /* Decode the NameType. */
-        if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type)) {
-          *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-          return 0;
-        }
+static int ext_srtp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-        /* Only host_name is supported. */
-        if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
-          continue;
-        }
+  /* The extension consists of a u16-prefixed profile ID list containing a
+   * single uint16_t profile ID, then followed by a u8-prefixed srtp_mki field.
+   *
+   * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764#section-4.1.1 */
+  CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki;
+  uint16_t profile_id;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids, &profile_id) ||
+      CBS_len(&profile_ids) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-        if (have_seen_host_name) {
-          /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain more than one name of the same
-           * name_type. */
-          *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-          return 0;
-        }
+  if (CBS_len(&srtp_mki) != 0) {
+    /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-        have_seen_host_name = 1;
+  STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
 
-        if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
-            CBS_len(&host_name) < 1) {
-          *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-          return 0;
-        }
+  /* Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and presumably
+   * offered). */
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles); i++) {
+    const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile =
+        sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i);
 
-        if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
-            CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) {
-          *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-          return 0;
-        }
+    if (profile->id == profile_id) {
+      ssl->srtp_profile = profile;
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
 
-        if (!s->hit) {
-          assert(s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
-          if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
-            /* This should be impossible. */
-            *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-            return 0;
-          }
-
-          /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
-          if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
-            *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-            return 0;
-          }
-
-          s->should_ack_sni = 1;
-        }
-      }
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
-      CBS ec_point_format_list;
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+  return 0;
+}
 
-      if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
-          CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+static int ext_srtp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-      if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
-                    &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
-      CBS elliptic_curve_list;
-      size_t i, num_curves;
-
-      if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
-          CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
-          (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
-          CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+  CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) ||
+      CBS_len(&profile_ids) < 2 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  /* Discard the MKI value for now. */
 
-      OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
-      s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+  const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *server_profiles =
+      SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
 
-      s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist =
-          (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
+  /* Pick the server's most preferred profile. */
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(server_profiles); i++) {
+    const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *server_profile =
+        sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(server_profiles, i);
 
-      if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    CBS profile_ids_tmp;
+    CBS_init(&profile_ids_tmp, CBS_data(&profile_ids), CBS_len(&profile_ids));
+
+    while (CBS_len(&profile_ids_tmp) > 0) {
+      uint16_t profile_id;
+      if (!CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids_tmp, &profile_id)) {
         return 0;
       }
 
-      num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
-      for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
-        if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
-                         &s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i])) {
-          *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-          return 0;
-        }
+      if (server_profile->id == profile_id) {
+        ssl->srtp_profile = server_profile;
+        return 1;
       }
+    }
+  }
 
-      if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+  return 1;
+}
 
-      s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
-      if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-      renegotiate_seen = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
-      CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
+static int ext_srtp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl->srtp_profile == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-      if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension,
-                                       &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
-          CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+  CBB contents, profile_ids;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, ssl->srtp_profile->id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty MKI */) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-      /* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It contains a list of
-       * SignatureAndHashAlgorithms which are two bytes each. */
-      if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
-          (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+  return 1;
+}
 
-      if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-      /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal error. */
-      if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext,
-                          SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        return 0;
-      }
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-               !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
-               s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-      /* The extension must be empty. */
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-      s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
-               s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-      if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-      /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
-      s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled &&
-               !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-      /* The extension must be empty. */
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
 
-      s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
-               s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-      /* The extension must be empty. */
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+/* EC point formats.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 */
 
-      s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
-      s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
-      if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
-               s->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+static int ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
+
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
 
-      s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
+    const uint32_t alg_k = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    const uint32_t alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
+      return 1;
     }
   }
 
-ri_check:
-  /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+  return 0;
+}
 
-  if (!renegotiate_seen && s->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
-      !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext,
-                      SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+static int ext_ec_point_add_extension(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  CBB contents, formats;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &formats) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&formats, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) {
-  int alert = -1;
-  if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+static int ext_ec_point_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out);
+}
+
+static int ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                          CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBS ec_point_format_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ec_point_format_list) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext,
-                      SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+  /* Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the uncompressed
+   * point format. */
+  if (memchr(CBS_data(&ec_point_format_list), TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
+             CBS_len(&ec_point_format_list)) == NULL) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
     return 0;
   }
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
- * fill the length of the block. */
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs) {
-  CBS copy = *cbs;
+static int ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                          CBS *contents) {
+  return ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, contents);
+}
+
+static int ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  const uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+  const uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+  const int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
 
-  while (CBS_len(&copy) != 0) {
-    CBS proto;
-    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&copy, &proto) || CBS_len(&proto) == 0) {
+  if (!using_ecc) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out);
+}
+
+
+/* EC supported curves.
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 */
+
+static void ext_ec_curves_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_ec_curves_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, curves_bytes;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &curves_bytes)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint16_t *curves;
+  size_t curves_len;
+  tls1_get_curvelist(ssl, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
+
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&curves_bytes, curves[i])) {
       return 0;
     }
   }
 
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+static int ext_ec_curves_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                           CBS *contents) {
+  /* This extension is not expected to be echoed by servers and is ignored. */
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
-  int tlsext_servername = 0;
-  int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-  CBS extensions;
+static int ext_ec_curves_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                           CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-  /* TODO(davidben): Move all of these to some per-handshake state that gets
-   * systematically reset on a new handshake; perhaps allocate it fresh each
-   * time so it's not even kept around post-handshake. */
-  s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-  s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-  s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
-  s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
-  s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+  CBS elliptic_curve_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
+      CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
+      (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-  OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-  s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist =
+      (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
 
-  /* Clear ECC extensions */
-  OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
-  s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
-  s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+  if (ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-  /* There may be no extensions. */
-  if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
-    goto ri_check;
+  const size_t num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
+                     &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i])) {
+      goto err;
+    }
   }
 
-  /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
-      !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    return 0;
+  assert(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0);
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
+
+  return 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_ec_curves_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  /* Servers don't echo this extension. */
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* kExtensions contains all the supported extensions. */
+static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = {
+  {
+    /* The renegotiation extension must always be at index zero because the
+     * |received| and |sent| bitsets need to be tweaked when the "extension" is
+     * sent as an SCSV. */
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,
+    NULL,
+    ext_ri_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ri_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ri_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ri_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,
+    ext_sni_init,
+    ext_sni_add_clienthello,
+    ext_sni_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_sni_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_sni_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
+    ext_ems_init,
+    ext_ems_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ems_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ems_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ems_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
+    NULL,
+    ext_ticket_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ticket_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ticket_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ticket_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
+    NULL,
+    ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello,
+    ext_sigalgs_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_sigalgs_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
+    ext_ocsp_init,
+    ext_ocsp_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ocsp_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,
+    ext_npn_init,
+    ext_npn_add_clienthello,
+    ext_npn_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_npn_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_npn_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,
+    NULL,
+    ext_sct_add_clienthello,
+    ext_sct_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_sct_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_sct_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
+    ext_alpn_init,
+    ext_alpn_add_clienthello,
+    ext_alpn_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_alpn_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_alpn_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,
+    ext_channel_id_init,
+    ext_channel_id_add_clienthello,
+    ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_channel_id_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp,
+    ext_srtp_init,
+    ext_srtp_add_clienthello,
+    ext_srtp_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_srtp_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_srtp_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
+    NULL,
+    ext_ec_point_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ec_point_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,
+    ext_ec_curves_init,
+    ext_ec_curves_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ec_curves_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ec_curves_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ec_curves_add_serverhello,
+  },
+};
+
+#define kNumExtensions (sizeof(kExtensions) / sizeof(struct tls_extension))
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <=
+                           sizeof(((SSL *)NULL)->s3->tmp.extensions.sent) * 8,
+                       too_many_extensions_for_sent_bitset);
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <=
+                           sizeof(((SSL *)NULL)->s3->tmp.extensions.received) *
+                               8,
+                       too_many_extensions_for_received_bitset);
+
+static const struct tls_extension *tls_extension_find(uint32_t *out_index,
+                                                      uint16_t value) {
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (kExtensions[i].value == value) {
+      *out_index = i;
+      return &kExtensions[i];
+    }
   }
 
-  while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
-    uint16_t type;
-    CBS extension;
+  return NULL;
+}
 
-    /* Decode the next extension. */
-    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
-        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      return 0;
+int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned extension_value) {
+  uint32_t index;
+  return extension_value == TLSEXT_TYPE_padding ||
+         tls_extension_find(&index, extension_value) != NULL;
+}
+
+/* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to
+ * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding
+ * is to be done. */
+uint8_t *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *const buf,
+                                    uint8_t *const limit, size_t header_len) {
+  /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+  if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+    return buf;
+  }
+
+  CBB cbb, extensions;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, buf, limit - buf) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &extensions)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  s->s3->tmp.extensions.sent = 0;
+  s->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.sent = 0;
+
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
+      kExtensions[i].init(s);
     }
+  }
 
-    if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
-      /* The extension must be empty. */
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
+  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    const size_t len_before = CBB_len(&extensions);
+    if (!kExtensions[i].add_clienthello(s, &extensions)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (CBB_len(&extensions) != len_before) {
+      s->s3->tmp.extensions.sent |= (1u << i);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!custom_ext_add_clienthello(s, &extensions)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (header_len > 0) {
+    header_len += CBB_len(&extensions);
+    if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) {
+      /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
+       * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+       *
+       * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions
+       * it MUST always appear last. */
+      size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
+      /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include least
+       * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application
+       * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
+      if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) {
+        padding_len -= 4;
+      } else {
+        padding_len = 1;
       }
 
-      /* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */
-      if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-        return 0;
+      uint8_t *padding_bytes;
+      if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) ||
+          !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, padding_len) ||
+          !CBB_add_space(&extensions, &padding_bytes, padding_len)) {
+        goto err;
       }
 
-      tlsext_servername = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
-      CBS ec_point_format_list;
+      memset(padding_bytes, 0, padding_len);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *ret = buf;
+  const size_t cbb_len = CBB_len(&cbb);
+  /* If only two bytes have been written then the extensions are actually empty
+   * and those two bytes are the zero length. In that case, we don't bother
+   * sending the extensions length. */
+  if (cbb_len > 2) {
+    ret += cbb_len;
+  }
+
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+uint8_t *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *const buf,
+                                    uint8_t *const limit) {
+  /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
+  if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+    return buf;
+  }
+
+  CBB cbb, extensions;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, buf, limit - buf) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &extensions)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (!(s->s3->tmp.extensions.received & (1u << i))) {
+      /* Don't send extensions that were not received. */
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (!kExtensions[i].add_serverhello(s, &extensions)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!custom_ext_add_serverhello(s, &extensions)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *ret = buf;
+  const size_t cbb_len = CBB_len(&cbb);
+  /* If only two bytes have been written then the extensions are actually empty
+   * and those two bytes are the zero length. In that case, we don't bother
+   * sending the extensions length. */
+  if (cbb_len > 2) {
+    ret += cbb_len;
+  }
+
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
+      kExtensions[i].init(s);
+    }
+  }
+
+  s->s3->tmp.extensions.received = 0;
+  s->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.received = 0;
+  /* The renegotiation extension must always be at index zero because the
+   * |received| and |sent| bitsets need to be tweaked when the "extension" is
+   * sent as an SCSV. */
+  assert(kExtensions[0].value == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate);
 
-      if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
-          CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+  /* There may be no extensions. */
+  if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) {
+    /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
+    CBS extensions;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
+        !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+      uint16_t type;
+      CBS extension;
+
+      /* Decode the next extension. */
+      if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+          !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
         *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         return 0;
       }
 
-      if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
-                    &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
-      if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-        return 0;
+      unsigned ext_index;
+      const struct tls_extension *const ext =
+          tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
+
+      if (ext == NULL) {
+        if (!custom_ext_parse_clienthello(s, out_alert, type, &extension)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+          return 0;
+        }
+        continue;
       }
 
-      s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
-      /* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if we've requested a
-       * status request message. */
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      s->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << ext_index);
+      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      if (!ext->parse_clienthello(s, &alert, &extension)) {
+        *out_alert = alert;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type);
         return 0;
       }
+    }
+  }
 
-      if (!s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (!(s->s3->tmp.extensions.received & (1u << i))) {
+      /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
+       * parameter. */
+      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      if (!kExtensions[i].parse_clienthello(s, &alert, NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+        *out_alert = alert;
         return 0;
       }
+    }
+  }
 
-      /* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */
-      s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-               !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-      uint8_t *selected;
-      uint8_t selected_len;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-      /* We must have requested it. */
-      if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-        return 0;
-      }
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) {
+  int alert = -1;
+  if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-      /* The data must be valid. */
-      if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+  if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-      if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(
-              s, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&extension),
-              CBS_len(&extension),
-              s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+  return 1;
+}
 
-      s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
-      if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
+  uint32_t received = 0;
+  assert(kNumExtensions <= sizeof(received) * 8);
+
+  if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) {
+    /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
+    CBS extensions;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
+        !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return 0;
+    }
 
-      s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
-      s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
-               !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-      CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
 
-      /* We must have requested it. */
-      if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-        return 0;
-      }
+    while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+      uint16_t type;
+      CBS extension;
 
-      /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have
-       * exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed. */
-      if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) ||
-          CBS_len(&extension) != 0 ||
-          !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
-          CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) {
+      /* Decode the next extension. */
+      if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+          !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
         *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         return 0;
       }
 
-      if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &s->s3->alpn_selected,
-                    &s->s3->alpn_selected_len)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+      unsigned ext_index;
+      const struct tls_extension *const ext =
+          tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
 
-      s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
+      if (ext == NULL) {
+        if (!custom_ext_parse_serverhello(s, out_alert, type, &extension)) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+        continue;
       }
 
-      s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
-      s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) {
-      if (CBS_len(&extension) == 0) {
+      if (!(s->s3->tmp.extensions.sent & (1u << ext_index))) {
+        /* If the extension was never sent then it is illegal. */
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension :%u", (unsigned)type);
         *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         return 0;
       }
 
-      /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
-      if (!s->hit &&
-          !CBS_stow(&extension, &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
-                    &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
-      if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
+      received |= (1u << ext_index);
 
-      renegotiate_seen = 1;
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
-      if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
+      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      if (!ext->parse_serverhello(s, &alert, &extension)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type);
+        *out_alert = alert;
         return 0;
       }
-    } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
-      if (/* It is invalid for the server to select EMS and
-             SSLv3. */
-          s->version == SSL3_VERSION || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-
-      s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
     }
   }
 
-  if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1 && s->tlsext_hostname) {
-    if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
-      s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
-      if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (!(received & (1u << i))) {
+      /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
+       * parameter. */
+      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      if (!kExtensions[i].parse_serverhello(s, &alert, NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+        *out_alert = alert;
         return 0;
       }
-    } else {
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      return 0;
     }
   }
 
-ri_check:
-  /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid an
-   * attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello because the
-   * client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. However this would
-   * mean we could not connect to any server which doesn't support RI so for
-   * the immediate future tolerate RI absence on initial connect only. */
-  if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) &&
-      !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext,
-                      SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
   return 1;
 }
 
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; }
-
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; }
-
 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) {
   int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
   int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -1947,7 +2568,7 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) {
       return 1;
 
     case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-      s->should_ack_sni = 0;
+      s->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 0;
       return 1;
 
     default:
@@ -1956,22 +2577,9 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) {
 }
 
 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) {
-  int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+  int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
   int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
 
-  /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite,
-   * then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it must contain
-   * uncompressed. */
-  uint32_t alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-  uint32_t alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-  if (((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
-      !tls1_check_point_format(s, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext,
-                      SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-
   if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
     ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
                                              s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
@@ -2007,203 +2615,131 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) {
   }
 
   if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext,
-                      SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
     return 0;
   }
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
- * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
- *
- *   ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a
- *       shallow parse of the ClientHello.
- *   ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- *       point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- *    0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
- *    1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
- *       session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
- *    2: a ticket was offered but couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal
- *       error.
- *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
- *
- * Side effects:
- *   Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
- *   a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
- *   but the client either doesn't have a session ticket or we couldn't use
- *   the one it gave us, or if s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew
- *   the client's ticket.  Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- */
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
-                        SSL_SESSION **ret) {
-  *ret = NULL;
-  s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-  const uint8_t *data;
-  size_t len;
-  int r;
-
-  /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
-   * resumption. */
-  if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) ||
-      (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION && !ctx->extensions) ||
-      !SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
-                                            &data, &len)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (len == 0) {
-    /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have one. */
-    s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
-                         ret);
-  switch (r) {
-    case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
-      s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-      return 2;
+int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session,
+                       int *out_send_ticket, const uint8_t *ticket,
+                       size_t ticket_len, const uint8_t *session_id,
+                       size_t session_id_len) {
+  int ret = 1; /* Most errors are non-fatal. */
+  SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
+  uint8_t *plaintext = NULL;
 
-    case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
-      return r;
+  HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx);
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher_ctx);
 
-    case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
-      s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-      return 3;
+  *out_send_ticket = 0;
+  *out_session = NULL;
 
-    default: /* fatal error */
-      return -1;
+  if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+    goto done;
   }
-}
 
-/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
- *
- *   etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- *   eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
- *   sess_id: points at the session ID.
- *   sesslen: the length of the session ID.
- *   psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- *       point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- *    2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
- *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
- *    4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. */
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *etick, int eticklen,
-                              const uint8_t *sess_id, int sesslen,
-                              SSL_SESSION **psess) {
-  SSL_SESSION *sess;
-  uint8_t *sdec;
-  const uint8_t *p;
-  int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
-  uint8_t tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  HMAC_CTX hctx;
-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-  SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+  if (ticket_len == 0) {
+    /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have one. */
+    *out_send_ticket = 1;
+    goto done;
+  }
 
   /* Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV
    * |tlsext_ticket_key_cb| may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but
    * the maximum IV length should be well under the minimum size for the
    * session material and HMAC. */
-  if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
-    return 2;
-  }
-
-  /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
-  HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-  if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
-    uint8_t *nctick = (uint8_t *)etick;
-    int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, &ctx, &hctx,
-                                        0 /* decrypt */);
-    if (rv < 0) {
-      return -1;
+  if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
+    goto done;
+  }
+  const uint8_t *iv = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN;
+
+  if (ssl_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
+    int cb_ret = ssl_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, (uint8_t*)ticket /* name */,
+                                               (uint8_t*)iv, &cipher_ctx, &hmac_ctx,
+                                               0 /* decrypt */);
+    if (cb_ret < 0) {
+      ret = 0;
+      goto done;
     }
-    if (rv == 0) {
-      return 2;
+    if (cb_ret == 0) {
+      goto done;
     }
-    if (rv == 2) {
-      renew_ticket = 1;
+    if (cb_ret == 2) {
+      *out_send_ticket = 1;
     }
   } else {
-    /* Check key name matches */
-    if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
-      return 2;
+    /* Check the key name matches. */
+    if (memcmp(ticket, ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
+               SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
+      goto done;
     }
-    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac_ctx, ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+                      sizeof(ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), tlsext_tick_md(),
                       NULL) ||
-        !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-                            tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16)) {
-      HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-      return -1;
+        !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+                            ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) {
+      ret = 0;
+      goto done;
     }
   }
+  size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cipher_ctx);
 
-  /* First, check the MAC. The MAC is at the end of the ticket. */
-  mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
-  if ((size_t) eticklen < 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + 1 + mlen) {
+  /* Check the MAC at the end of the ticket. */
+  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t mac_len = HMAC_size(&hmac_ctx);
+  if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len + 1 + mac_len) {
     /* The ticket must be large enough for key name, IV, data, and MAC. */
-    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    return 2;
-  }
-  eticklen -= mlen;
-  /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
-  HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
-  HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
-  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    return 2;
-  }
-
-  /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
-  /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
-  p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-  eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-  sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
-  if (!sdec) {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    return -1;
+    goto done;
   }
-  EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
-  if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    OPENSSL_free(sdec);
-    return 2;
-  }
-  slen += mlen;
-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-  p = sdec;
-
-  sess = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(sdec, slen);
-  OPENSSL_free(sdec);
-  if (sess) {
-    /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect that the
-     * ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session structure. If it
-     * is empty set length to zero as required by standard. */
-    if (sesslen) {
-      memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
-    }
-    sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
-    *psess = sess;
-    if (renew_ticket) {
-      return 4;
-    }
-    return 3;
+  HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ticket, ticket_len - mac_len);
+  HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, NULL);
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ticket + (ticket_len - mac_len), mac_len) != 0) {
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  /* Decrypt the session data. */
+  const uint8_t *ciphertext = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len;
+  size_t ciphertext_len = ticket_len - SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN - iv_len -
+                          mac_len;
+  plaintext = OPENSSL_malloc(ciphertext_len);
+  if (plaintext == NULL) {
+    ret = 0;
+    goto done;
+  }
+  if (ciphertext_len >= INT_MAX) {
+    goto done;
+  }
+  int len1, len2;
+  if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, plaintext, &len1, ciphertext,
+                         (int)ciphertext_len) ||
+      !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cipher_ctx, plaintext + len1, &len2)) {
+    ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  /* Decode the session. */
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(plaintext, len1 + len2);
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */
+    goto done;
   }
 
-  ERR_clear_error();
-  /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */
-  return 2;
+  /* Copy the client's session ID into the new session, to denote the ticket has
+   * been accepted. */
+  memcpy(session->session_id, session_id, session_id_len);
+  session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
+
+  *out_session = session;
+
+done:
+  OPENSSL_free(plaintext);
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx);
+  return ret;
 }
 
 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
@@ -2233,18 +2769,12 @@ static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) {
   return -1;
 }
 
-static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) {
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-    if (table[i].id == id) {
-      return table[i].nid;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return NID_undef;
+int tls12_get_sigid(int pkey_type) {
+  return tls12_find_id(pkey_type, tls12_sig,
+                       sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
 }
 
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(uint8_t *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) {
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *p, const EVP_MD *md) {
   int sig_id, md_id;
 
   if (!md) {
@@ -2257,7 +2787,7 @@ int tls12_get_sigandhash(uint8_t *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
+  sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(ssl_private_key_type(ssl));
   if (sig_id == -1) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -2267,11 +2797,6 @@ int tls12_get_sigandhash(uint8_t *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) {
-  return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
-                       sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-}
-
 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(uint8_t hash_alg) {
   switch (hash_alg) {
     case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
@@ -2312,256 +2837,129 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_type(uint8_t sig_alg) {
   }
 }
 
-/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
-static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
-                               int *psignhash_nid, const uint8_t *data) {
-  int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
-  if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
-    hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
-                              sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-    if (phash_nid) {
-      *phash_nid = hash_nid;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
-    sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
-                              sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-    if (psign_nid) {
-      *psign_nid = sign_nid;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (psignhash_nid) {
-    if (sign_nid && hash_nid) {
-      OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
-    } else {
-      *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
-static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, const uint8_t *pref,
-                                   size_t preflen, const uint8_t *allow,
-                                   size_t allowlen) {
-  const uint8_t *ptmp, *atmp;
-  size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
-
-  for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
-    /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
-    if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL ||
-        tls12_get_pkey_type(ptmp[1]) == -1) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
-      if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
-        nmatch++;
-        if (shsig) {
-          shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
-          shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
-          tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, &shsig->sign_nid,
-                             &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
-          shsig++;
-        }
-
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return nmatch;
-}
-
-/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
-static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) {
-  const uint8_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
-  size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
-  size_t nmatch;
-  TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
-  CERT *c = s->cert;
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS) == 2,
+    sizeof_tls_sigalgs_is_not_two);
 
-  OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
-  c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
-  c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
-
-  /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
-  if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs) {
-    conf = c->client_sigalgs;
-    conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
-  } else if (c->conf_sigalgs) {
-    conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
-    conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
-  } else {
-    conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
+  /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+  if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
-    pref = conf;
-    preflen = conflen;
-    allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
-    allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
-  } else {
-    allow = conf;
-    allowlen = conflen;
-    pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
-    preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
-  }
+  CERT *const cert = ssl->cert;
+  OPENSSL_free(cert->peer_sigalgs);
+  cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+  cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
 
-  nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
-  if (!nmatch) {
-    return 1;
-  }
+  size_t num_sigalgs = CBS_len(in_sigalgs);
 
-  salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
-  if (!salgs) {
+  if (num_sigalgs % 2 != 0) {
     return 0;
   }
+  num_sigalgs /= 2;
 
-  nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
-  c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
-  c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs) {
-  CERT *c = s->cert;
-
-  /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
-  if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+  /* supported_signature_algorithms in the certificate request is
+   * allowed to be empty. */
+  if (num_sigalgs == 0) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0 ||
-      !CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen) ||
-      !tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) {
+  /* This multiplication doesn't overflow because sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS) is two
+   * (statically asserted above) and we just divided |num_sigalgs| by two. */
+  cert->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_sigalgs * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+  if (cert->peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
+  cert->peer_sigalgslen = num_sigalgs;
 
-  return 1;
-}
+  CBS sigalgs;
+  CBS_init(&sigalgs, CBS_data(in_sigalgs), CBS_len(in_sigalgs));
 
-const EVP_MD *tls1_choose_signing_digest(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
-  CERT *c = s->cert;
-  int type = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
   size_t i;
-
-  /* Select the first shared digest supported by our key. */
-  for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
-    const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rhash);
-    if (md == NULL ||
-        tls12_get_pkey_type(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rsign) != type ||
-        !EVP_PKEY_supports_digest(pkey, md)) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    return md;
-  }
-
-  /* If no suitable digest may be found, default to SHA-1. */
-  return EVP_sha1();
-}
-
-int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
-                    uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash) {
-  const uint8_t *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
-
-  if (psig == NULL) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (idx >= 0) {
-    idx <<= 1;
-    if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) {
+  for (i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
+    TLS_SIGALGS *const sigalg = &cert->peer_sigalgs[i];
+    if (!CBS_get_u8(&sigalgs, &sigalg->rhash) ||
+        !CBS_get_u8(&sigalgs, &sigalg->rsign)) {
       return 0;
     }
-    psig += idx;
-    if (rhash) {
-      *rhash = psig[0];
-    }
-    if (rsig) {
-      *rsig = psig[1];
-    }
-    tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
   }
 
-  return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash,
-                           int *psignhash, uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash) {
-  TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
-
-  if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
-    return 0;
-  }
+const EVP_MD *tls1_choose_signing_digest(SSL *ssl) {
+  CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
+  int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl);
+  size_t i, j;
+
+  static const int kDefaultDigestList[] = {NID_sha256, NID_sha384, NID_sha512,
+                                           NID_sha224, NID_sha1};
+
+  const int *digest_nids = kDefaultDigestList;
+  size_t num_digest_nids =
+      sizeof(kDefaultDigestList) / sizeof(kDefaultDigestList[0]);
+  if (cert->digest_nids != NULL) {
+    digest_nids = cert->digest_nids;
+    num_digest_nids = cert->num_digest_nids;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < num_digest_nids; i++) {
+    const int digest_nid = digest_nids[i];
+    for (j = 0; j < cert->peer_sigalgslen; j++) {
+      const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(cert->peer_sigalgs[j].rhash);
+      if (md == NULL ||
+          digest_nid != EVP_MD_type(md) ||
+          tls12_get_pkey_type(cert->peer_sigalgs[j].rsign) != type) {
+        continue;
+      }
 
-  shsigalgs += idx;
-  if (phash) {
-    *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
-  }
-  if (psign) {
-    *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
-  }
-  if (psignhash) {
-    *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
-  }
-  if (rsig) {
-    *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
-  }
-  if (rhash) {
-    *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
+      return md;
+    }
   }
 
-  return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+  /* If no suitable digest may be found, default to SHA-1. */
+  return EVP_sha1();
 }
 
-/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the
- * given SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */
-int tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s) {
+int tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
+  int ret = 0;
   EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-  uint8_t temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  unsigned temp_digest_len;
-  int i;
-  static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
 
-  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
-      !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
-    return 0;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+    goto err;
   }
 
-  EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
+  static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
+  EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
 
-  if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
+  if (ssl->hit) {
     static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
-    if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
-      return 0;
+    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
+    if (ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
     }
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
-                     s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
+    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl->session->original_handshake_hash,
+                     ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
   }
 
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-  for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
-    if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])) {
-      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-      return 0;
-    }
-    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
+  uint8_t handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  int handshake_hash_len = tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, handshake_hash,
+                                                 sizeof(handshake_hash));
+  if (handshake_hash_len < 0) {
+    goto err;
   }
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, handshake_hash, (size_t)handshake_hash_len);
+  unsigned len_u;
+  EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &len_u);
+  *out_len = len_u;
 
-  return 1;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
 }
 
 /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
@@ -2575,12 +2973,6 @@ int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) {
     return -1;
   }
 
-  /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
-   * negotiated. */
-  if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
   digest_len =
       tls1_handshake_digest(s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
                             sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
@@ -2592,48 +2984,3 @@ int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) {
 
   return 1;
 }
-
-int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
-                     int client) {
-  uint8_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
-  int rhash, rsign;
-  size_t i;
-
-  if (salglen & 1) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
-  if (sigalgs == NULL) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
-    rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
-                          sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-    rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
-                          sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-
-    if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    *sptr++ = rhash;
-    *sptr++ = rsign;
-  }
-
-  if (client) {
-    OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
-    c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
-    c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
-  } else {
-    OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
-    c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
-    c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
-  return 0;
-}