diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/cipher/e_tls.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/crypto/cipher/e_tls.c | 611 |
1 files changed, 611 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/cipher/e_tls.c b/src/crypto/cipher/e_tls.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ac1aae --- /dev/null +++ b/src/crypto/cipher/e_tls.c @@ -0,0 +1,611 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/aead.h> +#include <openssl/cipher.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/sha.h> + +#include "../crypto/internal.h" +#include "internal.h" + + +typedef struct { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx; + HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx; + /* mac_key is the portion of the key used for the MAC. It is retained + * separately for the constant-time CBC code. */ + uint8_t mac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + uint8_t mac_key_len; + /* enc_key is the portion of the key used for the stream or block + * cipher. It is retained separately to allow the EVP_CIPHER_CTX to be + * initialized once the direction is known. */ + uint8_t enc_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + uint8_t enc_key_len; + /* iv is the portion of the key used for the fixed IV. It is retained + * separately to allow the EVP_CIPHER_CTX to be initialized once the direction + * is known. */ + uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + uint8_t iv_len; + /* implicit_iv is one iff this is a pre-TLS-1.1 CBC cipher without an explicit + * IV. */ + char implicit_iv; + char initialized; +} AEAD_TLS_CTX; + + +static void aead_tls_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { + AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx); + OPENSSL_cleanse(&tls_ctx->mac_key, sizeof(tls_ctx->mac_key)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(&tls_ctx->enc_key, sizeof(tls_ctx->enc_key)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(&tls_ctx->iv, sizeof(tls_ctx->iv)); + OPENSSL_free(tls_ctx); + ctx->aead_state = NULL; +} + +static int aead_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, + const EVP_MD *md, char implicit_iv) { + if (tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH && + tag_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_init, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_TAG_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + if (key_len != EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_init, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + size_t mac_key_len = EVP_MD_size(md); + size_t enc_key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); + size_t iv_len = implicit_iv ? EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) : 0; + assert(mac_key_len + enc_key_len + iv_len == key_len); + assert(mac_key_len < 256); + assert(enc_key_len < 256); + assert(iv_len < 256); + /* Although EVP_rc4() is a variable-length cipher, the default key size is + * correct for TLS. */ + + AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(AEAD_TLS_CTX)); + if (tls_ctx == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_init, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); + HMAC_CTX_init(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx); + memcpy(tls_ctx->mac_key, key, mac_key_len); + tls_ctx->mac_key_len = (uint8_t)mac_key_len; + memcpy(tls_ctx->enc_key, &key[mac_key_len], enc_key_len); + tls_ctx->enc_key_len = (uint8_t)enc_key_len; + memcpy(tls_ctx->iv, &key[mac_key_len + enc_key_len], iv_len); + tls_ctx->iv_len = (uint8_t)iv_len; + tls_ctx->implicit_iv = implicit_iv; + tls_ctx->initialized = 0; + + ctx->aead_state = tls_ctx; + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) || + !HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, key, mac_key_len, md, NULL)) { + aead_tls_cleanup(ctx); + return 0; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, 0); + + return 1; +} + +/* aead_tls_ensure_cipher_init initializes |tls_ctx| for encryption (or + * decryption, if |encrypt| is zero). If it has already been initialized, it + * ensures the direction matches and fails otherwise. It returns one on success + * and zero on failure. + * + * Note that, unlike normal AEADs, legacy TLS AEADs may not be used concurrently + * due to this (and bulk-cipher-internal) statefulness. */ +static int aead_tls_ensure_cipher_init(AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx, int encrypt) { + if (!tls_ctx->initialized) { + /* Finish initializing the EVP_CIPHER_CTX now that the direction is + * known. */ + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, tls_ctx->enc_key, + tls_ctx->implicit_iv ? tls_ctx->iv : NULL, + encrypt)) { + return 0; + } + tls_ctx->initialized = 1; + } else if (tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt != encrypt) { + /* Unlike a normal AEAD, using a TLS AEAD once freezes the direction. */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_ensure_cipher_init, + CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int aead_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, + size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, + const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { + AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state; + size_t total = 0; + + if (in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead) < in_len || + in_len > INT_MAX) { + /* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + if (max_out_len < in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + + if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + if (!aead_tls_ensure_cipher_init(tls_ctx, 1)) { + return 0; + } + + /* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the + * length for legacy ciphers. */ + uint8_t ad_extra[2]; + ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(in_len >> 8); + ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(in_len & 0xff); + + /* Compute the MAC. This must be first in case the operation is being done + * in-place. */ + uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned mac_len; + HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx; + HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx); + if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&hmac_ctx, &tls_ctx->hmac_ctx) || + !HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad, ad_len) || + !HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra)) || + !HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, in, in_len) || + !HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len)) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx); + return 0; + } + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx); + + /* Configure the explicit IV. */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + !tls_ctx->implicit_iv && + !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Encrypt the input. */ + int len; + if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, + (int)in_len)) { + return 0; + } + total = len; + + /* Feed the MAC into the cipher. */ + if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, mac, + (int)mac_len)) { + return 0; + } + total += len; + + unsigned block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); + if (block_size > 1) { + assert(block_size <= 256); + assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE); + + /* Compute padding and feed that into the cipher. */ + uint8_t padding[256]; + unsigned padding_len = block_size - ((in_len + mac_len) % block_size); + memset(padding, padding_len - 1, padding_len); + if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, padding, + (int)padding_len)) { + return 0; + } + total += len; + } + + if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) { + return 0; + } + total += len; + + *out_len = total; + return 1; +} + +static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, + size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, + const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { + AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state; + + if (in_len < HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return 0; + } + + if (max_out_len < in_len) { + /* This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it + * will always be removed on return. */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + + if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + if (in_len > INT_MAX) { + /* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + if (!aead_tls_ensure_cipher_init(tls_ctx, 0)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Configure the explicit IV. */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + !tls_ctx->implicit_iv && + !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Decrypt to get the plaintext + MAC + padding. */ + size_t total = 0; + int len; + if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) { + return 0; + } + total += len; + if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) { + return 0; + } + total += len; + assert(total == in_len); + + /* Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to + * |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers. */ + int padding_ok; + unsigned data_plus_mac_len, data_len; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + padding_ok = EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding( + &data_plus_mac_len, out, total, + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx), + (unsigned)HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); + /* Publicly invalid. This can be rejected in non-constant time. */ + if (padding_ok == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return 0; + } + } else { + padding_ok = 1; + data_plus_mac_len = total; + /* |data_plus_mac_len| = |total| = |in_len| at this point. |in_len| has + * already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function. */ + assert(data_plus_mac_len >= HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); + } + data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx); + + /* At this point, |padding_ok| is 1 or -1. If 1, the padding is valid and the + * first |data_plus_mac_size| bytes after |out| are the plaintext and + * MAC. Either way, |data_plus_mac_size| is large enough to extract a MAC. */ + + /* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the + * length for legacy ciphers. */ + uint8_t ad_fixed[13]; + memcpy(ad_fixed, ad, 11); + ad_fixed[11] = (uint8_t)(data_len >> 8); + ad_fixed[12] = (uint8_t)(data_len & 0xff); + ad_len += 2; + + /* Compute the MAC and extract the one in the record. */ + uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + size_t mac_len; + uint8_t record_mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + uint8_t *record_mac; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md)) { + if (!EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md, mac, &mac_len, + ad_fixed, out, data_plus_mac_len, total, + tls_ctx->mac_key, tls_ctx->mac_key_len)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return 0; + } + assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); + + record_mac = record_mac_tmp; + EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(record_mac, mac_len, out, data_plus_mac_len, total); + } else { + /* We should support the constant-time path for all CBC-mode ciphers + * implemented. */ + assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE); + + HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx; + HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx); + unsigned mac_len_u; + if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&hmac_ctx, &tls_ctx->hmac_ctx) || + !HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad_fixed, ad_len) || + !HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, out, data_len) || + !HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len_u)) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx); + return 0; + } + mac_len = mac_len_u; + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx); + + assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); + record_mac = &out[data_len]; + } + + /* Perform the MAC check and the padding check in constant-time. It should be + * safe to simply perform the padding check first, but it would not be under a + * different choice of MAC location on padding failure. See + * EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding. */ + unsigned good = constant_time_eq_int(CRYPTO_memcmp(record_mac, mac, mac_len), + 0); + good &= constant_time_eq_int(padding_ok, 1); + if (!good) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return 0; + } + + /* End of timing-sensitive code. */ + + *out_len = data_len; + return 1; +} + +static int aead_rc4_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_rc4(), EVP_sha1(), 0); +} + +static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), + EVP_sha1(), 0); +} + +static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), + EVP_sha1(), 1); +} + +static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), + EVP_sha256(), 0); +} + +static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), + EVP_sha1(), 0); +} + +static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), + EVP_sha1(), 1); +} + +static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), + EVP_sha256(), 0); +} + +static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), + EVP_sha384(), 0); +} + +static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), + EVP_sha1(), 0); +} + +static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_len, + size_t tag_len) { + return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), + EVP_sha1(), 1); +} + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_sha1_tls = { + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + RC4) */ + 0, /* nonce len */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_rc4_sha1_tls_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls = { + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES128) */ + 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ + 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16 + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES128 + IV) */ + 0, /* nonce len */ + 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls = { + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA256 + AES128) */ + 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ + 16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = { + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA1 + AES256) */ + 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ + 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32 + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES256 + IV) */ + 0, /* nonce len */ + 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls = { + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA256 + AES256) */ + 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ + 16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls = { + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA384 + AES256) */ + 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ + 16 + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA384) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls = { + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24, /* key len (SHA1 + 3DES) */ + 8, /* nonce len (IV) */ + 8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24 + 8, /* key len (SHA1 + 3DES + IV) */ + 0, /* nonce len */ + 8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ + aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, + aead_tls_cleanup, + aead_tls_seal, + aead_tls_open, +}; + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_tls(void) { return &aead_rc4_sha1_tls; } + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls(void) { + return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls; +} + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) { + return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv; +} + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls(void) { + return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls; +} + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls(void) { + return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls; +} + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) { + return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv; +} + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls(void) { + return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls; +} + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls(void) { + return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls; +} + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls(void) { + return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls; +} + +const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) { + return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv; +} |