diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/ssl/ssl_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ssl/ssl_lib.c | 1992 |
1 files changed, 1087 insertions, 905 deletions
diff --git a/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 74bd633..9e1e308 100644 --- a/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -138,14 +138,11 @@ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ -#include <openssl/ssl.h> - #include <assert.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <openssl/bytestring.h> -#include <openssl/crypto.h> #include <openssl/dh.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/lhash.h> @@ -158,10 +155,6 @@ #include "../crypto/internal.h" -/* |SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL| is no longer emitted, but continue to define it - * to avoid downstream churn. */ -OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL) - /* Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script never * regresses this. */ OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION == @@ -171,192 +164,91 @@ OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION == /* kMaxHandshakeSize is the maximum size, in bytes, of a handshake message. */ static const size_t kMaxHandshakeSize = (1u << 24) - 1; -static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl = - CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; -static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx = - CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; - -int SSL_library_init(void) { - CRYPTO_library_init(); - return 1; -} - -static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { - uint32_t hash = - ((uint32_t)a->session_id[0]) || - ((uint32_t)a->session_id[1] << 8) || - ((uint32_t)a->session_id[2] << 16) || - ((uint32_t)a->session_id[3] << 24); - - return hash; -} - -/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of - * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure - * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being - * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session - * with a matching session ID. */ -static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { - if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) { - return 1; - } - - if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) { - return 1; - } - - return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length); -} - -SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) { - SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; +static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; +static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; - if (method == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); - return NULL; - } - - if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); - goto err; +int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) { + if (ssl->method == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); + return 0; } - ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); - if (ret == NULL) { - goto err; + if (ssl_clear_bad_session(ssl)) { + SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); + ssl->session = NULL; } - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); - - ret->method = method->method; - - CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock); - - ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; - ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; - - /* We take the system default */ - ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; - - ret->references = 1; + ssl->hit = 0; + ssl->shutdown = 0; - ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; - ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; - ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(); - if (ret->cert == NULL) { - goto err; + /* SSL_clear may be called before or after the |ssl| is initialized in either + * accept or connect state. In the latter case, SSL_clear should preserve the + * half and reset |ssl->state| accordingly. */ + if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL) { + if (ssl->server) { + SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); + } else { + SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); + } + } else { + assert(ssl->state == 0); } - ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); - if (ret->sessions == NULL) { - goto err; - } - ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); - if (ret->cert_store == NULL) { - goto err; - } + /* TODO(davidben): Some state on |ssl| is reset both in |SSL_new| and + * |SSL_clear| because it is per-connection state rather than configuration + * state. Per-connection state should be on |ssl->s3| and |ssl->d1| so it is + * naturally reset at the right points between |SSL_new|, |SSL_clear|, and + * |ssl3_new|. */ - ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list, - &ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); - if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || - sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); - goto err2; - } + ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + ssl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; - ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); - if (!ret->param) { - goto err; - } + BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); + ssl->init_buf = NULL; - ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); - if (ret->client_CA == NULL) { - goto err; - } + ssl->packet = NULL; + ssl->packet_length = 0; - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ret, &ret->ex_data); + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); - ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + OPENSSL_free(ssl->next_proto_negotiated); + ssl->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; + ssl->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; - /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ - if (!RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) || - !RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) || - !RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16)) { - ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; + /* The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across + * clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset). + * + * TODO(davidben): Avoid this. */ + unsigned mtu = 0; + if (ssl->d1 != NULL) { + mtu = ssl->d1->mtu; } - /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely deployed - * might change this. */ - ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; - - /* Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy - * uses of SSL_METHOD. */ - if (method->version != 0) { - SSL_CTX_set_max_version(ret, method->version); - SSL_CTX_set_min_version(ret, method->version); + ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); + if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) { + return 0; } + ssl->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(ssl->version); + assert(ssl->enc_method != NULL); - return ret; - -err: - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -err2: - SSL_CTX_free(ret); - return NULL; -} - -void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) { - if (ctx == NULL || - !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) { - return; + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { + ssl->d1->mtu = mtu; } - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); - - /* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the - * ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the - * sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch - * the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the - * cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket - * [openssl.org #212].) */ - SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0); - - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); - - CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock); - lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions); - X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); - ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ctx->cipher_list_by_id); - ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list_tls10); - ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list_tls11); - ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert); - sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->client_custom_extensions, - SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free); - sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->server_custom_extensions, - SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free); - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles); - OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); - OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); - OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); - OPENSSL_free(ctx->ocsp_response); - OPENSSL_free(ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list); - EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); - BIO_free(ctx->keylog_bio); + ssl->client_version = ssl->version; - OPENSSL_free(ctx); + return 1; } SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return NULL; } if (ctx->method == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return NULL; } @@ -397,8 +289,17 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); s->ctx = ctx; + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); s->initial_ctx = ctx; + if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { + s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = BUF_memdup( + ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); + if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { + goto err; + } + s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; + } if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = @@ -409,6 +310,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { } s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } + s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { s->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, @@ -429,6 +331,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { assert(s->enc_method != NULL); s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, s, &s->ex_data); @@ -455,474 +358,16 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { err: SSL_free(s); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } -void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl == NULL) { - return; - } - - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ssl->param); - - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data); - - if (ssl->bbio != NULL) { - /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ - if (ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio) { - ssl->wbio = BIO_pop(ssl->wbio); - } - BIO_free(ssl->bbio); - ssl->bbio = NULL; - } - - int free_wbio = ssl->wbio != ssl->rbio; - BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio); - if (free_wbio) { - BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio); - } - - BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); - - /* add extra stuff */ - ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ssl->cipher_list_by_id); - - ssl_clear_bad_session(ssl); - SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); - - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); - - ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); - - OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname); - SSL_CTX_free(ssl->initial_ctx); - OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); - OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); - EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); - OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint); - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); - OPENSSL_free(ssl->next_proto_negotiated); - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles); - - if (ssl->method != NULL) { - ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); - } - SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); - - OPENSSL_free(ssl); -} - -void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) { - ssl->server = 0; - ssl->shutdown = 0; - ssl->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; - ssl->handshake_func = ssl->method->ssl_connect; - /* clear the current cipher */ - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); -} - -void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) { - ssl->server = 1; - ssl->shutdown = 0; - ssl->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; - ssl->handshake_func = ssl->method->ssl_accept; - /* clear the current cipher */ - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); -} - -void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { - /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it. */ - if (ssl->bbio != NULL) { - if (ssl->wbio == ssl->bbio) { - ssl->wbio = ssl->wbio->next_bio; - ssl->bbio->next_bio = NULL; - } - } - - if (ssl->rbio != rbio) { - BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio); - } - if (ssl->wbio != wbio && ssl->rbio != ssl->wbio) { - BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio); - } - ssl->rbio = rbio; - ssl->wbio = wbio; -} - -BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rbio; } - -BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->wbio; } - -int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); - return -1; - } - - if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - return ssl->handshake_func(ssl); -} - -int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->handshake_func == 0) { - /* Not properly initialized yet */ - SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); - } - - if (ssl->handshake_func != ssl->method->ssl_connect) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - return ssl->handshake_func(ssl); -} - -int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->handshake_func == 0) { - /* Not properly initialized yet */ - SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); - } - - if (ssl->handshake_func != ssl->method->ssl_accept) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - return ssl->handshake_func(ssl); -} - -int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) { - if (ssl->handshake_func == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); - return -1; - } - - if (ssl->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - return 0; - } - - ERR_clear_system_error(); - return ssl->method->ssl_read_app_data(ssl, buf, num, 0); -} - -int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) { - if (ssl->handshake_func == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); - return -1; - } - - if (ssl->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { - return 0; - } - - ERR_clear_system_error(); - return ssl->method->ssl_read_app_data(ssl, buf, num, 1); -} - -int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num) { - if (ssl->handshake_func == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); - return -1; - } - - if (ssl->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); - return -1; - } - - ERR_clear_system_error(); - return ssl->method->ssl_write_app_data(ssl, buf, num); -} - -int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl) { - /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might expect. - * Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but calling it - * once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used (see - * ssl3_shutdown). */ - - if (ssl->handshake_func == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); - return -1; - } - - if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - /* Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify. */ - if (ssl->quiet_shutdown) { - ssl->shutdown = SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - return 1; - } - - if (!(ssl->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { - ssl->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN; - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); - - /* our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be - * written, ssl->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */ - if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) { - return -1; /* return WANT_WRITE */ - } - } else if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) { - /* resend it if not sent */ - int ret = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl); - if (ret == -1) { - /* we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must have - * already signalled return 0 upon a previous invoation, return - * WANT_WRITE */ - return ret; - } - } else if (!(ssl->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { - /* If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */ - ssl->method->ssl_read_close_notify(ssl); - if (!(ssl->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { - return -1; /* return WANT_READ */ - } - } - - if (ssl->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && - !ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) { - return 1; - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code) { - int reason; - uint32_t err; - BIO *bio; - - if (ret_code > 0) { - return SSL_ERROR_NONE; - } - - /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, - * where we do encode the error */ - err = ERR_peek_error(); - if (err != 0) { - if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) { - return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; - } - return SSL_ERROR_SSL; - } - - if (ret_code == 0) { - if ((ssl->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && - (ssl->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) { - /* The socket was cleanly shut down with a close_notify. */ - return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN; - } - /* An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying - * transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the - * caller. */ - return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; - } - - if (SSL_want_session(ssl)) { - return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION; - } - - if (SSL_want_certificate(ssl)) { - return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE; - } - - if (SSL_want_read(ssl)) { - bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); - if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; - } - - if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { - /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write to the - * rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio are separate - * couldn't even know what it should wait for. However if we ever set - * s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of - * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, this test works - * around that bug; so it might be safer to keep it. */ - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; - } - - if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { - reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); - if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; - } - - if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; - } - - return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; /* unknown */ - } - } - - if (SSL_want_write(ssl)) { - bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); - if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; - } - - if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { - /* See above (SSL_want_read(ssl) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; - } - - if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { - reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); - if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; - } - - if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; - } - - return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; - } - } - - if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(ssl)) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP; - } - - if (SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(ssl)) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; - } - - if (SSL_want_private_key_operation(ssl)) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; - } - - return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; -} - -void SSL_CTX_set_min_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) { - ctx->min_version = version; -} - -void SSL_CTX_set_max_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) { - ctx->max_version = version; -} - -void SSL_set_min_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) { - ssl->min_version = version; -} - -void SSL_set_max_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) { - ssl->max_version = version; -} - -uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { - ctx->options |= options; - return ctx->options; -} - -uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { - ctx->options &= ~options; - return ctx->options; -} - -uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } - -uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { - ssl->options |= options; - return ssl->options; -} - -uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { - ssl->options &= ~options; - return ssl->options; -} - -uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; } - -uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { - ctx->mode |= mode; - return ctx->mode; -} - -uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { - ctx->mode &= ~mode; - return ctx->mode; -} - -uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; } - -uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { - ssl->mode |= mode; - return ssl->mode; -} - -uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { - ssl->mode &= ~mode; - return ssl->mode; -} - -uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; } - -X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL || ssl->session->peer == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - return X509_up_ref(ssl->session->peer); -} - -STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - return ssl->session->cert_chain; -} - -int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, - size_t max_out) { - /* The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which - * is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1. */ - const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished; - size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len; - if (ssl->hit) { - /* tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used. */ - if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { - goto err; - } - finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished; - finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len; - } - - if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || - ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION) { - goto err; - } - - *out_len = finished_len; - if (finished_len > max_out) { - *out_len = max_out; - } - - memcpy(out, finished, *out_len); - return 1; - -err: - *out_len = 0; - memset(out, 0, max_out); - return 0; -} - int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, - unsigned sid_ctx_len) { - if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(ctx->sid_ctx)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); + unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { + if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; @@ -932,9 +377,10 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, - unsigned sid_ctx_len) { + unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_session_id_context, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; @@ -954,7 +400,7 @@ int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id, - unsigned id_len) { + unsigned int id_len) { /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how we * can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to find if * there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with any new @@ -976,28 +422,28 @@ int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id, return p != NULL; } -int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *ctx, int purpose) { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose); +int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } -int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *ssl, int purpose) { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ssl->param, purpose); +int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } -int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *ctx, int trust) { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust); +int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } -int SSL_set_trust(SSL *ssl, int trust) { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ssl->param, trust); +int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } -int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param); +int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); } -int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, param); +int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); } void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free( @@ -1069,7 +515,86 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; } -void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(ssl->cert); } +void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert); } + +void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) { + if (ssl == NULL) { + return; + } + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ssl->param); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data); + + if (ssl->bbio != NULL) { + /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ + if (ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio) { + ssl->wbio = BIO_pop(ssl->wbio); + } + BIO_free(ssl->bbio); + ssl->bbio = NULL; + } + + int free_wbio = ssl->wbio != ssl->rbio; + BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio); + if (free_wbio) { + BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio); + } + + BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); + + /* add extra stuff */ + ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ssl->cipher_list_by_id); + + ssl_clear_bad_session(ssl); + SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); + + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); + + ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); + + OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname); + SSL_CTX_free(ssl->initial_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); + OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); + EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); + OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint); + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); + OPENSSL_free(ssl->next_proto_negotiated); + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles); + + if (ssl->method != NULL) { + ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); + } + SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); + + OPENSSL_free(ssl); +} + +void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { + /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it. */ + if (s->bbio != NULL) { + if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { + s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio; + s->bbio->next_bio = NULL; + } + } + + if (s->rbio != rbio) { + BIO_free_all(s->rbio); + } + if (s->wbio != wbio && s->rbio != s->wbio) { + BIO_free_all(s->wbio); + } + s->rbio = rbio; + s->wbio = wbio; +} + +BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return s->rbio; } + +BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return s->wbio; } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return SSL_get_rfd(s); } @@ -1105,7 +630,7 @@ int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); if (bio == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_fd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); @@ -1125,7 +650,7 @@ int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); if (bio == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_wfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); @@ -1149,7 +674,7 @@ int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); if (bio == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_rfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); @@ -1193,18 +718,14 @@ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { return ret; } -int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_mode; } - -int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *ssl) { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ssl->param); -} +int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return s->verify_mode; } -int SSL_get_extms_support(const SSL *ssl) { - return ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret == 1; +int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } -int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { - return ssl->verify_callback; +int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { + return s->verify_callback; } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify_mode; } @@ -1213,21 +734,20 @@ int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } -int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))( - int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx) { +int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return ctx->default_verify_callback; } -void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode, - int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)) { - ssl->verify_mode = mode; +void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, + int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { + s->verify_mode = mode; if (callback != NULL) { - ssl->verify_callback = callback; + s->verify_callback = callback; } } -void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth) { - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ssl->param, depth); +void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) { + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } @@ -1239,47 +759,226 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes) { } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) { } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { + if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) { + return 0; + } + return (s->s3->rrec.type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length : 0; } +X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { + X509 *r; + + if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) { + r = NULL; + } else { + r = s->session->peer; + } + + if (r == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return X509_up_ref(r); +} + +STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { + STACK_OF(X509) *r; + + if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL || s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { + r = NULL; + } else { + r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; + } + + /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if we + * are a server, it does not. */ + return r; +} + /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { - if (ctx->cert->x509 == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cert == NULL || ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, + SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } - if (ctx->cert->privatekey == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); + if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, + SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return 0; } - return X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->x509, ctx->cert->privatekey); + return X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, + ctx->cert->key->privatekey); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->cert->x509 == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + if (ssl == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->cert == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, + SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, + SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } - if (ssl->cert->privatekey == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); + if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, + SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return 0; } - return X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->x509, ssl->cert->privatekey); + return X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, + ssl->cert->key->privatekey); +} + +int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + /* Not properly initialized yet */ + SSL_set_accept_state(s); + } + + if (s->handshake_func != s->method->ssl_accept) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + return s->handshake_func(s); +} + +int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + /* Not properly initialized yet */ + SSL_set_connect_state(s); + } + + if (s->handshake_func != s->method->ssl_connect) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_connect, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + return s->handshake_func(s); } -long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl) { +long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; } +int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_read, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return 0; + } + + ERR_clear_system_error(); + return s->method->ssl_read_app_data(s, buf, num, 0); +} + +int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_peek, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + return 0; + } + + ERR_clear_system_error(); + return s->method->ssl_read_app_data(s, buf, num, 1); +} + +int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); + return -1; + } + + ERR_clear_system_error(); + return s->method->ssl_write_app_data(s, buf, num); +} + +int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { + /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might expect. + * Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but calling it + * once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used (see + * ssl3_shutdown). */ + + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_shutdown, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (SSL_in_init(s)) { + return 1; + } + + /* Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify. */ + if (s->quiet_shutdown) { + s->shutdown = SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return 1; + } + + if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { + s->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN; + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); + + /* our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be + * written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */ + if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + return -1; /* return WANT_WRITE */ + } + } else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + /* resend it if not sent */ + int ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (ret == -1) { + /* we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must have + * already signalled return 0 upon a previous invoation, return + * WANT_WRITE */ + return ret; + } + } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { + /* If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */ + s->method->ssl_read_close_notify(s); + if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { + return -1; /* return WANT_READ */ + } + } + + if (s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && + !s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) { /* Caller-initiated renegotiation is not supported. */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_renegotiate, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } @@ -1287,6 +986,54 @@ int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; } +uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { + ctx->options |= options; + return ctx->options; +} + +uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { + ssl->options |= options; + return ssl->options; +} + +uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { + ctx->options &= ~options; + return ctx->options; +} + +uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { + ssl->options &= ~options; + return ssl->options; +} + +uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } + +uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; } + +uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { + ctx->mode |= mode; + return ctx->mode; +} + +uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { + ssl->mode |= mode; + return ssl->mode; +} + +uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { + ctx->mode &= ~mode; + return ctx->mode; +} + +uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { + ssl->mode &= ~mode; + return ssl->mode; +} + +uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; } + +uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; } + size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->max_cert_list; } @@ -1341,6 +1088,10 @@ int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->s3->send_connection_binding; } +long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { + return s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg); +} + LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { @@ -1367,6 +1118,10 @@ int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->session_cache_mode; } +long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { + return ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg); +} + /* return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { @@ -1383,11 +1138,6 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { return s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11->ciphers; } - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ctx != NULL && - s->ctx->cipher_list_tls10 != NULL) { - return s->ctx->cipher_list_tls10->ciphers; - } - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL) { return s->ctx->cipher_list->ciphers; } @@ -1449,21 +1199,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { if (sk == NULL) { return 0; } else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls10(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - - sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls10, NULL, str); - if (sk == NULL) { - return 0; - } else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } @@ -1477,7 +1213,8 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { if (sk == NULL) { return 0; } else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11, + SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } @@ -1495,7 +1232,7 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) { if (sk == NULL) { return 0; } else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } @@ -1531,13 +1268,9 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, uint8_t *p) { return 0; } - /* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is - * added. */ - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && - !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { + /* Add SCSVs. */ + if (!s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { s2n(SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff, p); - /* The renegotiation extension is required to be at index zero. */ - s->s3->tmp.extensions.sent |= (1u << 0); } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { @@ -1557,13 +1290,14 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs) { } if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, + SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return NULL; } sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); if (sk == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } @@ -1571,7 +1305,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs) { uint16_t cipher_suite; if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -1579,7 +1313,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs) { if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating. */ if (s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, + SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } @@ -1592,7 +1327,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs) { uint16_t max_version = ssl3_get_max_server_version(s); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (uint16_t)s->version > max_version : (uint16_t)s->version < max_version) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto err; } @@ -1601,7 +1337,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs) { c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); if (c != NULL && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } @@ -1679,37 +1415,39 @@ void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, *out_len = session->ocsp_response_length; } -int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *list, - size_t list_len) { - OPENSSL_free(ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list); - ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length = 0; - - ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list = BUF_memdup(list, list_len); - if (ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list == NULL) { - return 0; - } - ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length = list_len; - - return 1; -} - -int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response, - size_t response_len) { - OPENSSL_free(ctx->ocsp_response); - ctx->ocsp_response_length = 0; - - ctx->ocsp_response = BUF_memdup(response, response_len); - if (ctx->ocsp_response == NULL) { - return 0; - } - ctx->ocsp_response_length = response_len; - - return 1; -} - -int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, - const uint8_t *server, unsigned server_len, - const uint8_t *client, unsigned client_len) { +/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is + * expected that this function is called from the callback set by + * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. + * + * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte + * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte + * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. + * + * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: + * + * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the + * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection + * or have a default application level protocol. + * + * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the + * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the + * API that this fallback case was enacted. + * + * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list + * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's + * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol + * a client should use. + * + * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised + * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. + * + * It returns either + * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or + * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. + */ +int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *outlen, const uint8_t *server, + unsigned int server_len, const uint8_t *client, + unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const uint8_t *result; int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; @@ -1737,31 +1475,57 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, found: *out = (uint8_t *)result + 1; - *out_len = result[0]; + *outlen = result[0]; return status; } -void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data, - unsigned *out_len) { - *out_data = ssl->next_proto_negotiated; - if (*out_data == NULL) { - *out_len = 0; +/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's + * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't + * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. + * + * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned + * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols + * provided by the callback. */ +void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const uint8_t **data, + unsigned *len) { + *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; + if (!*data) { + *len = 0; } else { - *out_len = ssl->next_proto_negotiated_len; + *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; } } +/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a + * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol + * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned + * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will + * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to + * it. + * + * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. + * Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb( SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned *out_len, void *arg), + int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; } +/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a + * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| + * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). + * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's + * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can + * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. + * + * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this + * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. + */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb( - SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, - const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg), + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *s, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *outlen, + const uint8_t *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; @@ -1790,25 +1554,32 @@ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, unsigned protos_len) { return 0; } +/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called + * during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the + * client's list of offered protocols. */ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, - uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *in, - unsigned in_len, void *arg), + uint8_t *outlen, const uint8_t *in, + unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; } -void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data, - unsigned *out_len) { - *out_data = NULL; +/* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|. + * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name (not + * including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with + * a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */ +void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **data, + unsigned *len) { + *data = NULL; if (ssl->s3) { - *out_data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; + *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; } - if (*out_data == NULL) { - *out_len = 0; + if (*data == NULL) { + *len = 0; } else { - *out_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; + *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } } @@ -1824,9 +1595,210 @@ int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, s, out, out_len, label, label_len, context, context_len, use_context); } +static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { + uint32_t hash = + ((uint32_t)a->session_id[0]) || + ((uint32_t)a->session_id[1] << 8) || + ((uint32_t)a->session_id[2] << 16) || + ((uint32_t)a->session_id[3] << 24); + + return hash; +} + +/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of + * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure + * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being + * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session + * with a matching session ID. */ +static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { + if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) { + return 1; + } + + if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) { + return 1; + } + + return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length); +} + +SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) { + SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; + + if (method == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); + return NULL; + } + + if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); + goto err; + } + + ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); + if (ret == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); + + ret->method = method->method; + + CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock); + + ret->cert_store = NULL; + ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; + ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; + ret->session_cache_head = NULL; + ret->session_cache_tail = NULL; + + /* We take the system default */ + ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; + + ret->new_session_cb = 0; + ret->remove_session_cb = 0; + ret->get_session_cb = 0; + ret->generate_session_id = 0; + + ret->references = 1; + ret->quiet_shutdown = 0; + + ret->info_callback = NULL; + + ret->app_verify_callback = 0; + ret->app_verify_arg = NULL; + + ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; + ret->msg_callback = 0; + ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL; + ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; + ret->sid_ctx_length = 0; + ret->default_verify_callback = NULL; + ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(); + if (ret->cert == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + ret->default_passwd_callback = 0; + ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL; + ret->client_cert_cb = 0; + + ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); + if (ret->sessions == NULL) { + goto err; + } + ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); + if (ret->cert_store == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list, + &ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); + if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || + sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); + goto err2; + } + + ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); + if (!ret->param) { + goto err; + } + + ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); + if (ret->client_CA == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ret, &ret->ex_data); + + ret->extra_certs = NULL; + + ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + + ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; + ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; + /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ + if (!RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) || + !RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) || + !RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16)) { + ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; + } + + ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; + ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; + ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + ret->psk_client_callback = NULL; + ret->psk_server_callback = NULL; + + /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely deployed + * might change this. */ + ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; + + /* Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy + * uses of SSL_METHOD. */ + if (method->version != 0) { + SSL_CTX_set_max_version(ret, method->version); + SSL_CTX_set_min_version(ret, method->version); + } + + return ret; + +err: + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +err2: + SSL_CTX_free(ret); + return NULL; +} + +void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) { + if (ctx == NULL || + !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) { + return; + } + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); + + /* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the + * ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the + * sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch + * the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the + * cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket + * [openssl.org #212].) */ + SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); + + CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock); + lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions); + X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); + ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ctx->cipher_list_by_id); + ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list_tls11); + ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert); + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); + sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free); + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles); + OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); + OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); + OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); + EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); + BIO_free(ctx->keylog_bio); + + OPENSSL_free(ctx); +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { + ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) { + ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; +} + void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx, - void *arg), + int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; @@ -1842,48 +1814,57 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { - ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg); + ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); } -void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { - ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg); +void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { + ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg); +} + +static int ssl_has_key(SSL *s, size_t idx) { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = &s->cert->pkeys[idx]; + return cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey; } void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *s, uint32_t *out_mask_k, uint32_t *out_mask_a) { CERT *c = s->cert; - int have_rsa_cert = 0, dh_tmp; + int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp; uint32_t mask_k, mask_a; - int have_ecc_cert = 0, ecdsa_ok; + int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok; X509 *x; - dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); - - if (s->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(s)) { - if (ssl_private_key_type(s) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - have_rsa_cert = 1; - } else if (ssl_private_key_type(s) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { - have_ecc_cert = 1; - } + if (c == NULL) { + /* TODO(davidben): Is this codepath possible? */ + *out_mask_k = 0; + *out_mask_a = 0; + return; } + dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); + + rsa_enc = ssl_has_key(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); + rsa_sign = ssl_has_key(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); + have_ecc_cert = ssl_has_key(s, SSL_PKEY_ECC); mask_k = 0; mask_a = 0; + if (rsa_enc) { + mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; + } if (dh_tmp) { mask_k |= SSL_kDHE; } - if (have_rsa_cert) { - mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; + if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; } /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDSA cipher suites depending on the * key usage extension and on the client's curve preferences. */ if (have_ecc_cert) { - x = c->x509; + x = c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509; /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags). */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) @@ -1913,6 +1894,81 @@ void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *s, uint32_t *out_mask_k, *out_mask_a = mask_a; } +/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ +#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ + (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) + +int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; + uint32_t alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; + int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0; + + /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + if (x->sig_alg && x->sig_alg->algorithm) { + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); + OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); + } + if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { + /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg, + SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; /* all checks are ok */ +} + +static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s) { + int idx; + idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509) { + idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; + } + if (idx == -1) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_server_cert_index, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + } + return idx; +} + +CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) { + int i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); + + /* This may or may not be an error. */ + if (i < 0) { + return NULL; + } + + /* May be NULL. */ + return &s->cert->pkeys[i]; +} + +EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { + uint32_t alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; + CERT *c = s->cert; + int idx = -1; + + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { + if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) { + idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; + } else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) { + idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + } + } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && + (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) { + idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } + + if (idx == -1) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_sign_pkey, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; +} + void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) { /* Never cache sessions with empty session IDs. */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) { @@ -1958,6 +2014,143 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) { } } +int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code) { + int reason; + uint32_t err; + BIO *bio; + + if (ret_code > 0) { + return SSL_ERROR_NONE; + } + + /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, + * where we do encode the error */ + err = ERR_peek_error(); + if (err != 0) { + if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) { + return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; + } + return SSL_ERROR_SSL; + } + + if (ret_code == 0) { + if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && + (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) { + /* The socket was cleanly shut down with a close_notify. */ + return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN; + } + /* An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying + * transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the + * caller. */ + return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; + } + + if (SSL_want_session(s)) { + return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION; + } + + if (SSL_want_certificate(s)) { + return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE; + } + + if (SSL_want_read(s)) { + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; + } + + if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { + /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write to the + * rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio are separate + * couldn't even know what it should wait for. However if we ever set + * s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of + * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, this test works + * around that bug; so it might be safer to keep it. */ + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; + } + + if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { + reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); + if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; + } + + if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; + } + + return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; /* unknown */ + } + } + + if (SSL_want_write(s)) { + bio = SSL_get_wbio(s); + if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; + } + + if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { + /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; + } + + if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { + reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); + if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; + } + + if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; + } + + return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; + } + } + + if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP; + } + + if (SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s)) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; + } + + return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; +} + +int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { + int ret = 1; + + if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_do_handshake, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); + return -1; + } + + if (SSL_in_init(s)) { + ret = s->handshake_func(s); + } + return ret; +} + +void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) { + ssl->server = 1; + ssl->shutdown = 0; + ssl->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; + ssl->handshake_func = ssl->method->ssl_accept; + /* clear the current cipher */ + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); +} + +void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) { + ssl->server = 0; + ssl->shutdown = 0; + ssl->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; + ssl->handshake_func = ssl->method->ssl_connect; + /* clear the current cipher */ + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); +} + static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) { switch (version) { case TLS1_2_VERSION: @@ -1983,16 +2176,12 @@ static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) { } } -const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl) { - return ssl_get_version(ssl->version); -} - -const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) { - return ssl_get_version(session->ssl_version); +const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { + return ssl_get_version(s->version); } -const char* SSL_get_curve_name(uint16_t curve_id) { - return tls1_ec_curve_id2name(curve_id); +const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *sess) { + return ssl_get_version(sess->ssl_version); } void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { @@ -2004,7 +2193,7 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) { - return s->cert->x509; + return s->cert->key->x509; } return NULL; @@ -2012,7 +2201,7 @@ X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) { - return s->cert->privatekey; + return s->cert->key->privatekey; } return NULL; @@ -2020,7 +2209,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) { X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) { - return ctx->cert->x509; + return ctx->cert->key->x509; } return NULL; @@ -2028,22 +2217,22 @@ X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) { - return ctx->cert->privatekey; + return ctx->cert->key->privatekey; } return NULL; } -const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->aead_write_ctx == NULL) { +const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { + if (s->aead_write_ctx == NULL) { return NULL; } - return ssl->aead_write_ctx->cipher; + return s->aead_write_ctx->cipher; } -const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { return NULL; } +const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { return NULL; } -const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { return NULL; } +const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { return NULL; } int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) { BIO *bbio; @@ -2063,7 +2252,7 @@ int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) { BIO_reset(bbio); if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_init_wbio_buffer, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } @@ -2141,9 +2330,9 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store); } -int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ca_file, - const char *ca_dir) { - return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, ca_file, ca_dir); +int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, + const char *CApath) { + return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath); } void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, @@ -2160,9 +2349,7 @@ int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->state; } void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { } -void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long result) { - ssl->verify_result = result; -} +void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) { ssl->verify_result = arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_result; } @@ -2176,12 +2363,12 @@ int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, return index; } -int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *arg) { - return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx, arg); +int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) { + return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); } -void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx) { - return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx); +void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) { + return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); } int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, @@ -2195,12 +2382,12 @@ int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, return index; } -int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *arg) { - return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, arg); +int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) { + return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); } -void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) { - return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); +void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) { + return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); } X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { @@ -2248,7 +2435,8 @@ void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } @@ -2266,23 +2454,24 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { return 1; } -int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *identity_hint) { - if (ssl == NULL) { +int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) { + if (s == NULL) { return 0; } if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_use_psk_identity_hint, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } /* Clear currently configured hint, if any. */ - OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint); - ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint); + s->psk_identity_hint = NULL; if (identity_hint != NULL) { - ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); - if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { + s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); + if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { return 0; } } @@ -2290,47 +2479,63 @@ int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *identity_hint) { return 1; } -const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl == NULL) { +const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) { + if (s == NULL) { return NULL; } - return ssl->psk_identity_hint; + return s->psk_identity_hint; } -const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { +const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) { + if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) { return NULL; } - return ssl->session->psk_identity; + return s->session->psk_identity; } void SSL_set_psk_client_callback( - SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, - unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, - unsigned max_psk_len)) { - ssl->psk_client_callback = cb; + SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, + unsigned int max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, + unsigned int max_psk_len)) { + s->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback( - SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, - unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, - unsigned max_psk_len)) { + SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, + unsigned int max_identity_len, + uint8_t *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_set_psk_server_callback( - SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk, - unsigned max_psk_len)) { - ssl->psk_server_callback = cb; + SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk, + unsigned int max_psk_len)) { + s->psk_server_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback( - SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, - uint8_t *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)) { + SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, + uint8_t *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; } +void SSL_CTX_set_min_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) { + ctx->min_version = version; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_max_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) { + ctx->max_version = version; +} + +void SSL_set_min_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) { + ssl->min_version = version; +} + +void SSL_set_max_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) { + ssl->max_version = version; +} + void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, @@ -2391,13 +2596,16 @@ int ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL_CTX *ctx, } if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 4 + 16 + 1 + premaster_len * 2 + 1)) { return 0; } - CBB_zero(&cbb); - if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 4 + 16 + 1 + premaster_len * 2 + 1) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"RSA ", 4) || + if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"RSA ", 4) || /* Only the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster secret are * logged. */ !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, encrypted_premaster, 8) || @@ -2431,13 +2639,15 @@ int ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *client_random, } if (client_random_len != 32) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_ctx_log_master_secret, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - CBB_zero(&cbb); - if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 14 + 64 + 1 + master_len * 2 + 1) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14) || + if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 14 + 64 + 1 + master_len * 2 + 1)) { + return 0; + } + + if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14) || !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, client_random, 32) || !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) || !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, master, master_len) || @@ -2696,15 +2906,19 @@ uint16_t ssl3_version_from_wire(SSL *s, uint16_t wire_version) { return version; } -int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_session_reused(ssl); } +int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s) { return s->hit; } -int SSL_is_server(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->server; } +int SSL_is_server(SSL *s) { return s->server; } void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb( SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *)) { ctx->dos_protection_cb = cb; } +void SSL_enable_fastradio_padding(SSL *s, char on_off) { + s->fastradio_padding = on_off; +} + void SSL_set_reject_peer_renegotiations(SSL *s, int reject) { s->accept_peer_renegotiations = !reject; } @@ -2719,73 +2933,43 @@ int SSL_get_rc4_state(const SSL *ssl, const RC4_KEY **read_key, EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_rc4_state(&ssl->aead_write_ctx->ctx, write_key); } -int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->method == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); - return 0; - } - - if (ssl_clear_bad_session(ssl)) { - SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); - ssl->session = NULL; - } - - ssl->hit = 0; - ssl->shutdown = 0; - - /* SSL_clear may be called before or after the |ssl| is initialized in either - * accept or connect state. In the latter case, SSL_clear should preserve the - * half and reset |ssl->state| accordingly. */ - if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL) { - if (ssl->server) { - SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); - } else { - SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); +int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, + size_t max_out) { + /* The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which + * is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1. */ + const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished; + size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len; + if (ssl->hit) { + /* tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used. */ + if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { + goto err; } - } else { - assert(ssl->state == 0); + finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished; + finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len; } - /* TODO(davidben): Some state on |ssl| is reset both in |SSL_new| and - * |SSL_clear| because it is per-connection state rather than configuration - * state. Per-connection state should be on |ssl->s3| and |ssl->d1| so it is - * naturally reset at the right points between |SSL_new|, |SSL_clear|, and - * |ssl3_new|. */ - - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - - BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); - ssl->init_buf = NULL; - - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); - - OPENSSL_free(ssl->next_proto_negotiated); - ssl->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; - ssl->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; - - /* The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across - * clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset). - * - * TODO(davidben): Avoid this. */ - unsigned mtu = 0; - if (ssl->d1 != NULL) { - mtu = ssl->d1->mtu; + if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || + ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION) { + goto err; } - ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); - if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) { - return 0; + *out_len = finished_len; + if (finished_len > max_out) { + *out_len = max_out; } - ssl->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(ssl->version); - assert(ssl->enc_method != NULL); - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { - ssl->d1->mtu = mtu; - } + memcpy(out, finished, *out_len); + return 1; - ssl->client_version = ssl->version; +err: + *out_len = 0; + memset(out, 0, max_out); + return 0; +} - return 1; +int SSL_initial_handshake_complete(const SSL *ssl) { + return ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; } int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } @@ -2799,5 +2983,3 @@ int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } -void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) {} -void SSL_load_error_strings(void) {} |