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+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+/* The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
+ * SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
+ * that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. */
+static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) {
+ return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
+ return ssl->session;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
+ /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
+ return SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+ int index;
+ if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, new_func,
+ dup_func, free_func)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return index;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) {
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) {
+ SSL_SESSION *ss;
+
+ ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ if (ss == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+
+ ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
+ ss->references = 1;
+ ss->timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+ ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+ return ss;
+}
+
+const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) {
+ if (len) {
+ *len = s->session_id_length;
+ }
+ return s->session_id;
+}
+
+/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
+ * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
+ * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
+ * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
+ * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
+ * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone
+ * is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our
+ * server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting
+ * question ... */
+static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len) {
+ static const unsigned kMaxAttempts = 10;
+ unsigned int retry = 0;
+ do {
+ if (!RAND_bytes(id, *id_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++retry < kMaxAttempts));
+
+ if (retry < kMaxAttempts) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* else - woops a session_id match */
+ /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of a
+ * collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent creation
+ * of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have means to
+ * atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make a
+ * reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the internal
+ * cache as well). */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) {
+ /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+ unsigned int tmp;
+ SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
+ GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
+
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
+ SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ss = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (ss == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If the context has a default timeout, use it over the default. */
+ if (s->initial_ctx->session_timeout != 0) {
+ ss->timeout = s->initial_ctx->session_timeout;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+
+ if (session) {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_VERSION ||
+ s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
+ s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = s->version;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ goto sess_id_done;
+ }
+
+ /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+ if (s->generate_session_id) {
+ cb = s->generate_session_id;
+ } else if (s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id) {
+ cb = s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id;
+ }
+
+ /* Choose a session ID */
+ tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+ if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
+ /* The callback failed */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor set it
+ * higher than it was. */
+ if (!tmp || tmp > ss->session_id_length) {
+ /* The callback set an illegal length */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+ /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+ if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, ss->session_id_length)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sess_id_done:
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
+ s->session = ss;
+ ss->ssl_version = s->version;
+ ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+ * connection. It is only called by servers.
+ *
+ * ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a
+ * shallow parse of the ClientHello.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: error
+ * 0: a session may have been found.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
+ * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
+ * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
+ * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). */
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
+ int fatal = 0;
+ int try_session_cache = 1;
+ int r;
+
+ if (ctx->session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->session_id_len == 0) {
+ try_session_cache = 0;
+ }
+
+ r = tls1_process_ticket(s, ctx, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
+ switch (r) {
+ case -1: /* Error during processing */
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+
+ case 0: /* No ticket found */
+ case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
+ break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
+
+ case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
+ case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
+ try_session_cache = 0;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ abort();
+ }
+
+ if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
+ !(s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+ SSL_SESSION data;
+ data.ssl_version = s->version;
+ data.session_id_length = ctx->session_id_len;
+ if (ctx->session_id_len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(data.session_id, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
+
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&s->initial_ctx->lock);
+ ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->initial_ctx->sessions, &data);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&s->initial_ctx->lock);
+
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
+ s->initial_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+ int copy = 1;
+
+ ret = s->initial_ctx->get_session_cb(s, (uint8_t *)ctx->session_id,
+ ctx->session_id_len, &copy);
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ if (ret == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
+ /* This is a magic value which indicates that the callback needs to
+ * unwind the stack and figure out the session asynchronously. */
+ return PENDING_SESSION;
+ }
+
+ /* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
+ * (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are
+ * shared between threads, it must handle the reference count itself
+ * [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be thread-safe). */
+ if (copy) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as well if and
+ * only if we are supposed to. */
+ if (!(s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
+ /* The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are very
+ * strange */
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(s->initial_ctx, ret);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
+ if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length ||
+ memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ /* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to use it
+ * in this context. */
+ goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
+ }
+
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
+ /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, which is
+ * especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application should have
+ * used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
+ *
+ * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating the event
+ * like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
+ * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
+ * noticing). */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_prev_session,
+ SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) {
+ /* timeout */
+ if (try_session_cache) {
+ /* session was from the cache, so remove it */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->initial_ctx, ret);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = ret;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ if (!try_session_cache) {
+ /* The session was from a ticket, so we should
+ * issue a ticket for the new session */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (fatal) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) {
+ int ret = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION *s;
+
+ /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though it
+ * has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and an
+ * lhash */
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c);
+ /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
+
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &s, c)) {
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this case, s
+ * == c should hold (then we did not really modify ctx->sessions), or we're
+ * in trouble. */
+ if (s != NULL && s != c) {
+ /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
+ * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the same
+ * cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain the
+ * same session from an external cache) */
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
+ }
+
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference count
+ * because it already takes into account the cache */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+ while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+ if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) {
+ return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lock) {
+ SSL_SESSION *r;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (c != NULL && c->session_id_length != 0) {
+ if (lock) {
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ }
+ r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c);
+ if (r == c) {
+ ret = 1;
+ r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
+ }
+
+ if (lock) {
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+ }
+
+ if (ret) {
+ r->not_resumable = 1;
+ if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
+ ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(r);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session) {
+ CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&session->references);
+ }
+ return session;
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session == NULL ||
+ !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&session->references)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, session, &session->ex_data);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(session->master_key, sizeof(session->master_key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(session->session_id, sizeof(session->session_id));
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(session->sess_cert);
+ X509_free(session->peer);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_hostname);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_tick);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->ocsp_response);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->psk_identity);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(session, sizeof(*session));
+ OPENSSL_free(session);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (s->session == session) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = session;
+ if (session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
+ s->verify_result = session->verify_result;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) {
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->timeout = t;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) {
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return s->timeout;
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) {
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return s->time;
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) {
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->time = t;
+ return t;
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->peer; }
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len) {
+ if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) {
+ long l;
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ l = s->session_timeout;
+ s->session_timeout = t;
+ return l;
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) {
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return s->session_timeout;
+}
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st {
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ long time;
+ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *sess, void *void_param) {
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = void_param;
+
+ if (param->time == 0 ||
+ param->time > (sess->time + sess->timeout)) {
+ /* timeout */
+ /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
+ * save on locking overhead */
+ (void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, sess);
+ sess->not_resumable = 1;
+ if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
+ param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, sess);
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t) {
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+ tp.ctx = ctx;
+ tp.cache = ctx->sessions;
+ if (tp.cache == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ tp.time = t;
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+}
+
+int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) {
+ if (s->session != NULL && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ !SSL_in_init(s)) {
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) {
+ if (s->next == NULL || s->prev == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
+ /* last element in list */
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
+ /* only one element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
+ s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
+ /* first element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
+ s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ } else { /* middle of list */
+ s->next->prev = s->prev;
+ s->prev->next = s->next;
+ }
+ }
+ s->prev = s->next = NULL;
+}
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) {
+ if (s->next != NULL && s->prev != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
+ s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ } else {
+ s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
+ s->next->prev = s;
+ s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+ }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) {
+ ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+ return ctx->new_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) {
+ ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+ return ctx->remove_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ uint8_t *data, int len,
+ int *copy)) {
+ ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *data,
+ int len, int *copy) {
+ return ctx->get_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) {
+ ctx->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
+ int val) {
+ return ctx->info_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
+ ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
+ return ctx->client_cert_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
+ ctx->channel_id_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
+ return ctx->channel_id_cb;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)