wpa_supplicant: Update to 07-Jul-2012 TOT

commit a5ed45586c63ffd8f9d2b44e27c251d7bacbeaf4
Author: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date:   Sat Jul 7 13:01:45 2012 +0300

    WPS SSDP: Fix socket leaks on error paths

Change-Id: I0864aac7fc88fa2a60f5cca7d524b94363410c85
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>

5 files changed, 155 insertions, 78 deletions

diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_aka.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_aka.c
index 135c02b..9cd5509 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_aka.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_aka.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
- * hostapd / EAP-AKA (RFC 4187) and EAP-AKA' (draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf)
- * Copyright (c) 2005-2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * hostapd / EAP-AKA (RFC 4187) and EAP-AKA' (RFC 5448)
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2012, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
  *
  * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
  * See README for more details.
@@ -266,8 +266,18 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_build_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
 			       EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY);
 	if (eap_sim_db_identity_known(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, sm->identity,
 				      sm->identity_len)) {
-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ");
-		eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, 0, NULL, 0);
+		if (sm->identity_len > 0 &&
+		    (sm->identity[0] == EAP_AKA_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX ||
+		     sm->identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PRIME_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX)) {
+			/* Reauth id may have expired - try fullauth */
+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "   AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ");
+			eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, 0,
+					NULL, 0);
+		} else {
+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ");
+			eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, 0,
+					NULL, 0);
+		}
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * RFC 4187, Chap. 4.1.4 recommends that identity from EAP is
@@ -292,12 +302,23 @@ static int eap_aka_build_encr(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data,
 			      const u8 *nonce_s)
 {
 	os_free(data->next_pseudonym);
-	data->next_pseudonym =
-		eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, 1);
+	if (nonce_s == NULL) {
+		data->next_pseudonym =
+			eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(
+				sm->eap_sim_db_priv,
+				data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ?
+				EAP_SIM_DB_AKA_PRIME : EAP_SIM_DB_AKA);
+	} else {
+		/* Do not update pseudonym during re-authentication */
+		data->next_pseudonym = NULL;
+	}
 	os_free(data->next_reauth_id);
 	if (data->counter <= EAP_AKA_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) {
 		data->next_reauth_id =
-			eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, 1);
+			eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(
+				sm->eap_sim_db_priv,
+				data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ?
+				EAP_SIM_DB_AKA_PRIME : EAP_SIM_DB_AKA);
 	} else {
 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Max fast re-authentication "
 			   "count exceeded - force full authentication");
@@ -615,7 +636,8 @@ static void eap_aka_determine_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
 		identity = data->reauth->identity;
 		identity_len = data->reauth->identity_len;
 	} else if (sm->identity && sm->identity_len > 0 &&
-		   sm->identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX) {
+		   (sm->identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX ||
+		    sm->identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PRIME_PERMANENT_PREFIX)) {
 		identity = sm->identity;
 		identity_len = sm->identity_len;
 	} else {
@@ -731,7 +753,7 @@ static void eap_aka_determine_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
 			  sm->identity, identity_len);
 
 	if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
-		eap_aka_prime_derive_keys(identity, identity_len, data->ik,
+		eap_aka_prime_derive_keys(sm->identity, identity_len, data->ik,
 					  data->ck, data->k_encr, data->k_aut,
 					  data->k_re, data->msk, data->emsk);
 	} else {
@@ -1017,11 +1039,6 @@ static void eap_aka_process_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm,
 		identity_len = id2_len;
 	}
 
-	if (data->next_pseudonym) {
-		eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
-					 identity_len, data->next_pseudonym);
-		data->next_pseudonym = NULL;
-	}
 	if (data->next_reauth_id) {
 		if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
 #ifdef EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 6c47dee..b61061b 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #include "common.h"
+#include "crypto/sha256.h"
 #include "eap_server/eap_i.h"
 #include "eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h"
 
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ struct eap_pwd_data {
 	EC_POINT *my_element;
 	EC_POINT *peer_element;
 
-	u8 my_confirm[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	u8 my_confirm[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
 
 	u8 msk[EAP_MSK_LEN];
 	u8 emsk[EAP_EMSK_LEN];
@@ -288,8 +289,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_build_confirm_req(struct eap_sm *sm,
 				      struct eap_pwd_data *data, u8 id)
 {
 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
-	HMAC_CTX ctx;
-	u8 conf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+	struct crypto_hash *hash;
+	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
 	u16 grp;
 	int offset;
 
@@ -313,7 +314,9 @@ static void eap_pwd_build_confirm_req(struct eap_sm *sm,
 	 * commit is H(k | server_element | server_scalar | peer_element |
 	 *	       peer_scalar | ciphersuite)
 	 */
-	H_Init(&ctx);
+	hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
+	if (hash == NULL)
+		goto fin;
 
 	/*
 	 * Zero the memory each time because this is mod prime math and some
@@ -324,7 +327,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_build_confirm_req(struct eap_sm *sm,
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(data->k);
 	BN_bn2bin(data->k, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 
 	/* server element: x, y */
 	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
@@ -338,18 +341,18 @@ static void eap_pwd_build_confirm_req(struct eap_sm *sm,
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
 	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
 	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 
 	/* server scalar */
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) -
 		BN_num_bytes(data->my_scalar);
 	BN_bn2bin(data->my_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
 
 	/* peer element: x, y */
 	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
@@ -363,18 +366,18 @@ static void eap_pwd_build_confirm_req(struct eap_sm *sm,
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
 	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
 	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 
 	/* peer scalar */
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) -
 		BN_num_bytes(data->peer_scalar);
 	BN_bn2bin(data->peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
 
 	/* ciphersuite */
 	grp = htons(data->group_num);
@@ -386,17 +389,17 @@ static void eap_pwd_build_confirm_req(struct eap_sm *sm,
 	ptr += sizeof(u8);
 	*ptr = EAP_PWD_DEFAULT_PRF;
 	ptr += sizeof(u8);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, ptr-cruft);
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, ptr - cruft);
 
 	/* all done with the random function */
-	H_Final(&ctx, conf);
-	os_memcpy(data->my_confirm, conf, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	eap_pwd_h_final(hash, conf);
+	os_memcpy(data->my_confirm, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
 
-	data->outbuf = wpabuf_alloc(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	data->outbuf = wpabuf_alloc(SHA256_MAC_LEN);
 	if (data->outbuf == NULL)
 		goto fin;
 
-	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
 
 fin:
 	os_free(cruft);
@@ -404,8 +407,6 @@ fin:
 	BN_free(y);
 	if (data->outbuf == NULL)
 		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
-
-	return;
 }
 
 
@@ -735,10 +736,10 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
 			     const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
 {
 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
-	HMAC_CTX ctx;
+	struct crypto_hash *hash;
 	u32 cs;
 	u16 grp;
-	u8 conf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
 	int offset;
 
 	/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
@@ -761,13 +762,15 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
 	 * commit is H(k | peer_element | peer_scalar | server_element |
 	 *	       server_scalar | ciphersuite)
 	 */
-	H_Init(&ctx);
+	hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
+	if (hash == NULL)
+		goto fin;
 
 	/* k */
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(data->k);
 	BN_bn2bin(data->k, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 
 	/* peer element: x, y */
 	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
@@ -780,18 +783,18 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
 	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
 	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 
 	/* peer scalar */
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) -
 		BN_num_bytes(data->peer_scalar);
 	BN_bn2bin(data->peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
 
 	/* server element: x, y */
 	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
@@ -805,28 +808,28 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
 	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
 	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 
 	/* server scalar */
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) -
 		BN_num_bytes(data->my_scalar);
 	BN_bn2bin(data->my_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
 
 	/* ciphersuite */
 	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
-	H_Update(&ctx, (u8 *)&cs, sizeof(u32));
+	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, (u8 *) &cs, sizeof(u32));
 
 	/* all done */
-	H_Final(&ctx, conf);
+	eap_pwd_h_final(hash, conf);
 
 	ptr = (u8 *) payload;
-	if (os_memcmp(conf, ptr, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
+	if (os_memcmp(conf, ptr, SHA256_MAC_LEN)) {
 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): confirm did not "
 			   "verify");
 		goto fin;
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_sim.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_sim.c
index f49f70e..6658d9c 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_sim.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_sim.c
@@ -107,8 +107,17 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_sim_build_start(struct eap_sm *sm,
 			       EAP_SIM_SUBTYPE_START);
 	if (eap_sim_db_identity_known(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, sm->identity,
 				      sm->identity_len)) {
-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ");
-		eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, 0, NULL, 0);
+		if (sm->identity_len > 0 &&
+		    sm->identity[0] == EAP_SIM_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX) {
+			/* Reauth id may have expired - try fullauth */
+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "   AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ");
+			eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, 0,
+					NULL, 0);
+		} else {
+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ");
+			eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, 0,
+					NULL, 0);
+		}
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * RFC 4186, Chap. 4.2.4 recommends that identity from EAP is
@@ -131,12 +140,19 @@ static int eap_sim_build_encr(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_sim_data *data,
 			      const u8 *nonce_s)
 {
 	os_free(data->next_pseudonym);
-	data->next_pseudonym =
-		eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, 0);
+	if (nonce_s == NULL) {
+		data->next_pseudonym =
+			eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv,
+						      EAP_SIM_DB_SIM);
+	} else {
+		/* Do not update pseudonym during re-authentication */
+		data->next_pseudonym = NULL;
+	}
 	os_free(data->next_reauth_id);
 	if (data->counter <= EAP_SIM_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) {
 		data->next_reauth_id =
-			eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, 0);
+			eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(sm->eap_sim_db_priv,
+						      EAP_SIM_DB_SIM);
 	} else {
 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Max fast re-authentication "
 			   "count exceeded - force full authentication");
@@ -616,11 +632,6 @@ static void eap_sim_process_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm,
 		identity_len = id2_len;
 	}
 
-	if (data->next_pseudonym) {
-		eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
-					 identity_len, data->next_pseudonym);
-		data->next_pseudonym = NULL;
-	}
 	if (data->next_reauth_id) {
 		eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
 				      identity_len, data->next_reauth_id,
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_sim_db.c b/src/eap_server/eap_sim_db.c
index 9db26dc..ce3238c 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_sim_db.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_sim_db.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * hostapd / EAP-SIM database/authenticator gateway
- * Copyright (c) 2005-2007, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2010, 2012, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
  *
  * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
  * See README for more details.
@@ -647,7 +647,8 @@ eap_sim_db_get_pseudonym(struct eap_sim_db_data *data, const u8 *identity,
 
 	if (identity_len == 0 ||
 	    (identity[0] != EAP_SIM_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX &&
-	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX))
+	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX &&
+	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX))
 		return NULL;
 
 	/* Remove possible realm from identity */
@@ -685,7 +686,8 @@ eap_sim_db_get_pseudonym_id(struct eap_sim_db_data *data, const u8 *identity,
 
 	if (identity_len == 0 ||
 	    (identity[0] != EAP_SIM_PERMANENT_PREFIX &&
-	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX))
+	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX &&
+	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_PERMANENT_PREFIX))
 		return NULL;
 
 	p = data->pseudonyms;
@@ -710,7 +712,8 @@ eap_sim_db_get_reauth(struct eap_sim_db_data *data, const u8 *identity,
 
 	if (identity_len == 0 ||
 	    (identity[0] != EAP_SIM_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX &&
-	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX))
+	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX &&
+	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX))
 		return NULL;
 
 	/* Remove possible realm from identity */
@@ -777,8 +780,9 @@ eap_sim_db_get_reauth_id(struct eap_sim_db_data *data, const u8 *identity,
  * @identity_len: Length of identity in bytes 
  * Returns: 0 if the user is found or -1 on failure
  *
- * In most cases, the user name is ['0','1'] | IMSI, i.e., 1 followed by the
- * IMSI in ASCII format, ['2','3'] | pseudonym, or ['4','5'] | reauth_id.
+ * In most cases, the user name is ['0','1','6'] | IMSI, i.e., 1 followed by
+ * the IMSI in ASCII format for EAP-SIM, ['2','3','7'] | pseudonym, or
+ * ['4','5','7'] | reauth_id.
  */
 int eap_sim_db_identity_known(void *priv, const u8 *identity,
 			      size_t identity_len)
@@ -789,21 +793,24 @@ int eap_sim_db_identity_known(void *priv, const u8 *identity,
 		return -1;
 
 	if (identity[0] == EAP_SIM_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX ||
-	    identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX) {
+	    identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX ||
+	    identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PRIME_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX) {
 		struct eap_sim_pseudonym *p =
 			eap_sim_db_get_pseudonym(data, identity, identity_len);
 		return p ? 0 : -1;
 	}
 
 	if (identity[0] == EAP_SIM_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX ||
-	    identity[0] == EAP_AKA_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX) {
+	    identity[0] == EAP_AKA_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX ||
+	    identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PRIME_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX) {
 		struct eap_sim_reauth *r =
 			eap_sim_db_get_reauth(data, identity, identity_len);
 		return r ? 0 : -1;
 	}
 
 	if (identity[0] != EAP_SIM_PERMANENT_PREFIX &&
-	    identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX) {
+	    identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX &&
+	    identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_PERMANENT_PREFIX) {
 		/* Unknown identity prefix */
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -843,7 +850,7 @@ static char * eap_sim_db_get_next(struct eap_sim_db_data *data, char prefix)
 /**
  * eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym - EAP-SIM DB: Get next pseudonym
  * @priv: Private data pointer from eap_sim_db_init()
- * @aka: Using EAP-AKA instead of EAP-SIM
+ * @method: EAP method (SIM/AKA/AKA')
  * Returns: Next pseudonym (allocated string) or %NULL on failure
  *
  * This function is used to generate a pseudonym for EAP-SIM. The returned
@@ -851,18 +858,31 @@ static char * eap_sim_db_get_next(struct eap_sim_db_data *data, char prefix)
  * with eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym() once the authentication has been completed
  * successfully. Caller is responsible for freeing the returned buffer.
  */
-char * eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(void *priv, int aka)
+char * eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(void *priv, enum eap_sim_db_method method)
 {
 	struct eap_sim_db_data *data = priv;
-	return eap_sim_db_get_next(data, aka ? EAP_AKA_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX :
-				   EAP_SIM_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX);
+	char prefix = EAP_SIM_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX;
+
+	switch (method) {
+	case EAP_SIM_DB_SIM:
+		prefix = EAP_SIM_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX;
+		break;
+	case EAP_SIM_DB_AKA:
+		prefix = EAP_AKA_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX;
+		break;
+	case EAP_SIM_DB_AKA_PRIME:
+		prefix = EAP_AKA_PRIME_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return eap_sim_db_get_next(data, prefix);
 }
 
 
 /**
  * eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id - EAP-SIM DB: Get next reauth_id
  * @priv: Private data pointer from eap_sim_db_init()
- * @aka: Using EAP-AKA instead of EAP-SIM
+ * @method: EAP method (SIM/AKA/AKA')
  * Returns: Next reauth_id (allocated string) or %NULL on failure
  *
  * This function is used to generate a fast re-authentication identity for
@@ -871,11 +891,24 @@ char * eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(void *priv, int aka)
  * has been completed successfully. Caller is responsible for freeing the
  * returned buffer.
  */
-char * eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(void *priv, int aka)
+char * eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(void *priv, enum eap_sim_db_method method)
 {
 	struct eap_sim_db_data *data = priv;
-	return eap_sim_db_get_next(data, aka ? EAP_AKA_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX :
-				   EAP_SIM_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX);
+	char prefix = EAP_SIM_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX;
+
+	switch (method) {
+	case EAP_SIM_DB_SIM:
+		prefix = EAP_SIM_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX;
+		break;
+	case EAP_SIM_DB_AKA:
+		prefix = EAP_AKA_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX;
+		break;
+	case EAP_SIM_DB_AKA_PRIME:
+		prefix = EAP_AKA_PRIME_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return eap_sim_db_get_next(data, prefix);
 }
 
 
@@ -1156,7 +1189,7 @@ void eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(void *priv, struct eap_sim_reauth *reauth)
  * called once the results become available.
  *
  * In most cases, the user name is '0' | IMSI, i.e., 0 followed by the IMSI in
- * ASCII format.
+ * ASCII format for EAP-AKA and '6' | IMSI for EAP-AKA'.
  *
  * When using an external server for AKA authentication, this function can
  * always start a request and return EAP_SIM_DB_PENDING immediately if
@@ -1178,7 +1211,8 @@ int eap_sim_db_get_aka_auth(void *priv, const u8 *identity,
 	char msg[40];
 
 	if (identity_len < 2 || identity == NULL ||
-	    identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX) {
+	    (identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX &&
+	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_PERMANENT_PREFIX)) {
 		wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM DB: unexpected identity",
 				  identity, identity_len);
 		return EAP_SIM_DB_FAILURE;
@@ -1281,7 +1315,8 @@ int eap_sim_db_resynchronize(void *priv, const u8 *identity,
 	size_t i;
 
 	if (identity_len < 2 || identity == NULL ||
-	    identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX) {
+	    (identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX &&
+	     identity[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_PERMANENT_PREFIX)) {
 		wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM DB: unexpected identity",
 				  identity, identity_len);
 		return -1;
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_sim_db.h b/src/eap_server/eap_sim_db.h
index abe185e..1f6375a 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_sim_db.h
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_sim_db.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * hostapd / EAP-SIM database/authenticator gateway
- * Copyright (c) 2005-2007, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2008, 2012, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
  *
  * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
  * See README for more details.
@@ -18,6 +18,15 @@
 #define EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX '0'
 #define EAP_AKA_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX '2'
 #define EAP_AKA_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX '4'
+#define EAP_AKA_PRIME_PERMANENT_PREFIX '6'
+#define EAP_AKA_PRIME_PSEUDONYM_PREFIX '7'
+#define EAP_AKA_PRIME_REAUTH_ID_PREFIX '8'
+
+enum eap_sim_db_method {
+	EAP_SIM_DB_SIM,
+	EAP_SIM_DB_AKA,
+	EAP_SIM_DB_AKA_PRIME
+};
 
 void * eap_sim_db_init(const char *config,
 		       void (*get_complete_cb)(void *ctx, void *session_ctx),
@@ -36,9 +45,11 @@ int eap_sim_db_get_gsm_triplets(void *priv, const u8 *identity,
 int eap_sim_db_identity_known(void *priv, const u8 *identity,
 			      size_t identity_len);
 
-char * eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(void *priv, int aka);
+char * eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(void *priv,
+				     enum eap_sim_db_method method);
 
-char * eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(void *priv, int aka);
+char * eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(void *priv,
+				     enum eap_sim_db_method method);
 
 int eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(void *priv, const u8 *identity,
 			     size_t identity_len, char *pseudonym);